Unleashing Achilles: How the Army Can Build a Faster Learning Force

Small Wars Journal | Howard C. Romans III, Richard A. McConnell

The U.S. Army must accelerate its institutional learning loops to prevent rapidly evolving autonomous systems, proliferating sensors, and dual-use technologies from permanently outperforming traditional military acquisition and training processes. Recent directives like the 30 April 2025 acquisition reform memorandum mandate division-level unmanned systems and counter-UAS capabilities, yet bureaucratic bottlenecks block rapid scaling.

This systemic friction stems from a deeply ingrained military culture that resists ambiguity and intellectual risk, as demonstrated by officer discomfort during creative exercises at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. In contrast, Ukrainian forces under existential pressure have bypassed centralised programs. By April 2025, their Brave1 platform registered over 1,500 companies and 1,000 solutions, proving that decentralised, user-driven ecosystems can rapidly field commercial technologies. Adaptation is now a continuous cycle. To institutionalise this agility, the proposed Army Innovation Learning Architecture outlines a five-step process—capture, screen, test, share, and institutionalise—to systematically scale grassroots soldier innovations before they disappear.

Comment

The cultural friction identified at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College reveals a fundamental misalignment between rigid military educational structures and the fluid demands of modern multi-domain operations. While the 30 April 2025 acquisition reform memorandum mandates rapid technology integration, the underlying doctrine remains tethered to centralised, risk-averse decision-making hierarchies. This tension limits the operational utility of emerging capabilities, as tactical commanders lack the formal authority to adapt systems dynamically on the battlefield. Consequently, the bottleneck is not technological scarcity but the doctrinal inability of the U.S. Army to decentralise testing and validation at the brigade combat team level.

This institutional hesitation contrasts sharply with the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers, where the U.S. Army deliberately embraced doctrinal ambiguity to test novel anti-tank and armoured formations under simulated combat conditions. During those exercises, senior leadership tolerated widespread operational failures specifically to accelerate the development of the tank destroyer doctrine. Replicating that level of systemic risk tolerance determines whether the U.S. Army's proposed Innovation Learning Architecture can successfully transition commercial unmanned systems into active combat units.

Strategic Question for Discussion

What structural mechanisms would allow the modern U.S. Army to replicate the deliberate failure-tolerance of the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers without compromising peacetime safety and statutory acquisition standards?

The historical precedent suggests that isolating high-risk experimentation within dedicated, bounded environments—similar to the modern National Training Center rather than standard home-station training—offers a viable pathway. By establishing clear regulatory safe harbours for specific, pre-authorised exercises, the institution can simulate the operational latitude of the 1941 maneuvers. This approach allows tactical units to iterate rapidly on commercial technologies while preserving the broader safety and budgetary compliance of the force.

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