Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners launched airstrikes in March 2015 against the Houthis in Yemen, possessing overwhelming air superiority and modern combat aircraft while facing an adversary with no comparable air force. Yet material dominance failed to achieve strategic success because the anti-Houthi coalition suffered from profound internal divisions, with Saudi Arabia backing the internationally recognized government and the United Arab Emirates supporting southern separatists like the Southern Transitional Council.
Rival factions often fought each other in Aden instead of maintaining a unified front against the centralized Houthi command structure. External technical assistance helped the Houthis improve their missile and drone capabilities, allowing them to strike targets in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Red Sea shipping lanes. Airpower could inflict heavy damage on adversary positions, but it could not resolve competing political ambitions among allied partners on the ground.
Air campaigns routinely mistake destructive capacity for political leverage when allied partners maintain divergent post-conflict objectives. During the 2015 intervention, Royal Saudi Air Force F-15 fleets and United Arab Emirates Air Force assets established uncontested skies over Sanaa, yet failed to dislodge Ansar Allah from urban redoubts because ground forces answered to fragmented patronage networks rather than a unified command. Operation Inherent Resolve encountered similar friction in eastern Syria, where coalition air support to the Syrian Democratic Forces operated alongside competing Turkish objectives that fractured territorial consolidation.
No comments:
Post a Comment