20 November 2026

China and Nuclear Arms Control: Why a Trump-Xi Breakthrough at APEC Is Unlikely

Council on Foreign Relations | Eleanor Atkins, Gerald C. Brown

U.S. President Donald Trump has proposed trilateral denuclearization discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, China. Beijing remains resistant to formal nuclear limits, pointing to its stockpile of approximately 600 warheads compared to 3,700 U.S. and 4,400 Russian weapons.

Structural historical grievances drive China's refusal to accept nuclear constraints. Premier Zhou Enlai denounced the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty as a swindle, establishing an enduring institutional view that arms control locks in foreign advantages. Quantitative ambiguity remains essential to the survivability of Beijing's deterrent posture. Dissent costs within Xi's governance model further prevent internal posture shifts. Foreign Ministry arms control director Sun Xiaobo broke off dialogue in 2024 following U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Washington rejects Chinese preconditions regarding no-first-use pledges and missile defense systems like Golden Dome. Misperception risks grow daily. Launch notifications and tactical posture discussions offer modest operational options to reduce immediate crisis escalation risks.

Comment

Beijing's quantitative ambiguity model links strategic nuclear deterrence directly to conventional theater denial operations. By keeping the precise inventory of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force concealed within underground facilities like the Underground Great Wall network, Chinese strategic planners create uncertainty that deters U.S. conventional strikes against command nodes during a western Pacific contingency. The expansion of silo fields at Yumen and Hami shifts this posture from minimum deterrence to assured retaliation under contested conditions.

This structural dynamic mirrors Soviet operational doctrine during the 1970s prior to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II negotiations. Moscow similarly expanded its heavy ICBM arsenal—specifically the R-36M series—to force Washington to recognize numerical parity before agreeing to formal deployment ceilings. Until PLARF achieves perceived operational symmetry, arms control proposals will be evaluated in Beijing primarily as counter-force target acquisition mechanisms.

Strategic Question for Discussion
Which factor presents a greater barrier to multi-party nuclear negotiations: PLARF's reliance on quantitative ambiguity at missile fields like Yumen, or Washington's unconstrained deployment of regional missile defense architectures?
PLARF's expanding silo footprint at Yumen signals that Beijing prioritizes operational survivability over early arms control engagement. Until Chinese strategic planners perceive that their warhead inventory can reliably survive a first strike alongside active U.S. missile defenses, quantitative ambiguity will remain non-negotiable. Consequently, structural expansion is likely to precede any formal participation in strategic stability dialogues.
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