20 November 2026

Taliban is building a web of partners, and Pakistan must adapt

Asia Times | Mansoor Qaisar

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk led trade talks in Kabul on November 12, 2026, revealing bilateral trade surged to US$349 million in the first eight months of 2026. Russia remains the only country to formally recognize the Taliban regime, having done so in July 2025. This diplomatic momentum reflects Kabul building transactional partnerships to bypass international isolation following the Western withdrawal.

India upgraded its Kabul technical mission to an embassy status in October 2025, while China pursues mineral and infrastructure dialogues. Concurrently, security friction between Kabul and Islamabad has intensified over Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan cross-border operations, triggering Pakistani airstrikes in October 2026. The rift caused the October 5 Moscow Format talks to collapse without a joint statement. Border closures at Torkham and Chaman since October 2025 forced regional trade rerouting. Transit paths shifted. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates signed a Trans-Afghan railway agreement on September 30.

Comment

Coercive border closures along transit bottlenecks like the Torkham and Chaman crossings lose structural efficacy when landlocked targets establish alternative supply corridors. Blockades historically allowed Islamabad to extract political concessions by monopolising Karachi port access for Afghan commerce. The rerouting of Central Asian cargo around traditional Pakistani entry points demonstrates how transit vulnerability diminishes once multimodal bypasses become operational.

This logistical diversification alters border management economics for authorities in Islamabad. Intermittent access restrictions at Chaman lose leverage, shifting transit fee revenues toward the Iranian port of Chabahar and Central Asian rail networks.

Strategic Question for Discussion
If multimodal supply chains around the Torkham and Chaman crossings become fully operational, which factor will determine whether landlocked transit routes remain economically viable — port tariff structures at Chabahar or security guarantees along the Trans-Afghan railway line?
The available evidence points toward security guarantees along the Trans-Afghan railway line as the decisive variable over pure port tariff competitiveness at Chabahar. While lower maritime freight rates historically favoured ocean access via Karachi, commercial operators routinely price cross-border insurgency risks into transit insurance costs. Consequently, regional trade volume will likely flow toward whichever corridor can guarantee physical infrastructure protection regardless of baseline tariff differentials.
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