Why Data Centers Should Be Able to Defend Themselves

National Interest | Lora Karch

Commercial data centers in Bahrain and the UAE operated by Amazon were destroyed by IRGC drone and missile strikes in March and April. The United States faces a widening security gap as drones target private cloud infrastructure relied upon by the military, while existing legislation like the Safer Skies Act excludes commercial entities from counter-UAS authorities.

Senator Tom Cotton introduced the Critical Infrastructure Airspace Defense Act to authorize designated facilities to defend themselves against aerial threats. The Iran War demonstrates that commercial assets are now frontline targets in regional conflicts. As American technology firms secure major defense contracts with agencies like the Pentagon, policymakers confront pressure to permit corporate self-defense capabilities without monopolizing national security resources or risking escalation.

Comment

Commercial cloud infrastructure integration into military networks creates a direct exposure to kinetic strikes that traditional regulatory frameworks fail to address. When state actors target facilities operated by Amazon in the Gulf, the distinction between civilian assets and military command nodes dissolves under the pressure of asymmetric air warfare. Proposals such as the Critical Infrastructure Airspace Defense Act attempt to bridge this statutory gap by extending kinetic and electronic countermeasures to non-state operators. However, delegating air defence authorities to corporate entities introduces complex command and control frictions regarding rules of engagement, cross-border spillover, and liability during active missile salvos. Allowing private security teams to deploy counter-UAS effectors near civil airspace risks interference with military transponders and commercial aviation corridors. The absence of a unified air defense architecture leaves dispersed server farms vulnerable to saturation attacks that localized corporate systems cannot repel alone.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How does delegating counter-unmanned aerial system authorities to private operators under the proposed Critical Infrastructure Airspace Defense Act alter liability during an active saturation strike on a civilian data center?

The regulatory framework remains silent on cross-jurisdictional accountability when corporate kinetic countermeasures disrupt adjacent military frequencies or commercial flight paths. This ambiguity points to an operational friction where state air defence commanders retain ultimate responsibility for airspace safety while private operators execute time-sensitive kinetic responses.

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