Will Taiwan issue derail Washington and Beijing’s latest reset? Analysts are sceptical

South China Morning Post | Amber Wang

On October 10, 2026, Taiwan's former leader Tsai Ing-wen began a seven-day visit to the United States, during which she met former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in California and Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung opened a new Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Phoenix, Arizona. This series of diplomatic activities takes place at the same time as Taiwan receiving two F-16V fighter jets as a result of a deal valued at NT$247.2 billion (US$7.8 billion) that was approved in August 2019.

The tension still centres on the US$14 billion arms package from Washington which is awaiting approval by the executive branch. The Chinese academics Zhu Feng and Shi Yinhong believe that Beijing sees Tsai as a political figure who has retired, thus reducing the likelihood of immediate diplomatic conflict. High-level diplomatic channels between the two countries are still operating. US Ambassador David Perdue stood by Washington's position, stating that the United States is sticking to its policy of non-coercion while at the same time opposing any form of Taiwanese independence. The current diplomatic situation will come under pressure before the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, at which President Xi Jinping and Donald Trump are expected to meet.

Comment

The delays in the delivery of weapons to Taiwan point to fundamental bottlenecks in defence industrial capacity rather than simply to political reluctance. The delivery of two F-16V aircraft under a 2019 contract shows that there are serious production limitations at Lockheed Martin's assembly plant in Greenville, South Carolina. Defence assistance programmes which are coordinated have difficulty when the manufacturing lines encounter shortages of components and have backlogs concerning the integration of complex software.

The shortage of capacity is directly due to the reduction in the number of lower-tier defence suppliers in North America after the period following the end of the Cold War. Since approval for Foreign Military Sales increases at the same time in both the European and Indo-Pacific areas, the production facilities for aircraft such as the F-16 Block 70 cannot increase output unless there are many years' worth of capital investments made in tooling and skilled labour. As a result, the lead times for systems such as the AN/APG-83 AESA radar remain extended over several international order books.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the F-16 Block 70 deliveries are delayed beyond their scheduled induction windows due to production bottlenecks at places such as Greenville, which has a greater influence on near-term cross-strait deterrence — Taiwan's asymmetric reserve stocks or the growth in the PLA's fighter inventory?

The evidence currently available suggests that Taiwan's unequal reserves are the more urgent operational measure for countering delays in the delivery of weapons. Even though the expansion of the PLA's fighter fleet is increasing the pressure on air superiority, the delayed delivery of the F-16 Block 70 forces Taipei to depend more on dispersed and mobile air defence systems such as the Sky Bow III if it is to maintain its ability to deny sea access and carry out counter-air operations. Modernisation of the air force in the long term cannot take the place of a saturation of surface-to-air missiles during the early stages of a conflict.

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