Michael Hochberg & Leonard Hochberg
Option 2: Reinforce the Rules-Based International Order through Ukrainian Victory
One reason that the war in Ukraine has been met with such alarm is that it is a direct attack on the rules-based international order, which stipulates the sanctity of the territorial integrity of sovereign states. In the absence of a global government enforcing these rules, enforcement rests on the willingness of the U.S., as a now-weakened global hegemon, to enforce its treaty obligations.
Foolishly, NATO and the U.S. failed to provide the Ukrainians with the means to deter a Russian invasion, which was a remarkable failure of strategy and policy. Having convinced the Ukrainians to give up their nuclear weapons in exchange for a paper promise of territorial integrity, the United States and the United Kingdom declined to provide them with an alternative means of deterrence. A strong and independent Ukraine would have created considerable geostrategic insecurity among the Russian policy elite, standing astride a southern invasion route, just as the Baltic states occupy the northern one, into Russia.
As the war unfolded, the U.S. and its NATO allies realized that supplying arms, training, intelligence, money, and foreign soldiers to Ukraine would prolong the conflict. After the Russian failure to conquer Kyiv, merely propping up Ukraine’s military and economy gave way to hope that a conventional military confrontation might result in a victory. Such an outcome could be maximalist—driving the Russians out of Ukrainian territory as it was constituted prior to the 2014 invasion. Or the victory could be minimalist—turning the Russians back and seizing territory that was lost since the war recommenced this year, leaving the Russians with the Russian speaking territories in the east and with Crimea.
The maximalist version would reassert the primacy of rules-based international order by reestablishing the inviolability of national borders. It would also come with an increased risk of escalation. As the Ukrainians have moved closer to driving the Russians back into Crimea and the Donbas, the Russians have begun to use more sophisticated weaponry, such as armed Iranian drones. To achieve a maximalist victory, or even to stabilize the gains associated with a minimalist victory, NATO powers will need to furnish the Ukrainians with increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, such as air defense weaponry, and will need to continue sharing tactical intelligence on where to aim those weapons.
In international conflict, actions grounded in certainty can be extremely dangerous. If both sides believe that victory is achievable, a negotiated settlement is extremely unlikely. Furthermore, it is likely that in the absence of a formal peace, even a maximalist Ukrainian victory will result in continued hostilities and some form of frozen conflict; if Putin cannot plausibly claim some form of victory, it is unlikely that he will accept any formal end to hostilities. Russian irredentists will not lay down their arms; an insurgency against the Ukrainian central government will emerge; Putin will rearm and resupply the insurgents. Russia may not entirely stand down. Therefore, Ukrainian cities and infrastructure will need to be protected by many of the West’s highest-performance weapons systems.
The risk of nuclear escalation is, of course, an ever-present danger in any conflict between two nuclear powers, even if such a conflict is fought through proxies on one or both sides. In the current situation, where only one side is fighting through a proxy, the danger of escalation seems higher than in a war that was being fought through proxies on both sides; the stakes of defeat, at least on one side, are considerably higher. Will the prospect of a Ukraine victory enhance the possibility of nuclear escalation in this war? If so, U.S. inaction would demonstrate that the threatened use of tactical nuclear weapons will deter the United States from fulfilling its international commitments.
Should the Ukrainians triumph, they would be well advised to remember Napoleon’s observation that the moment of greatest danger is the moment of victory. As the Ukrainians take back territory, they already face embarrassing dilemmas: What to do with prisoners of war who may be war criminals? What to do with Russian sympathizers, turncoats, and Quislings? Will the Ukrainian government expel Russians from Crimea and elsewhere, or use them as bargaining chips to repatriate Ukrainians that Russians relocated during their campaigns? How can a war end when Russia has been engaged in the wholesale theft of Ukrainian children and forced relocation of Ukrainian citizens into Russia? Should the lands of Russian irredentists in Ukraine be seized? What about Ukrainian ancestral lands on the other side of the Russian border? The American public likes to support underdogs, but it is an open question whether the U.S. will be prepared to continue supporting the Ukrainians as they achieve victories. Will the American public, particularly on the far left, turn on Ukraine, as they have on Israel, as Ukraine deals with these dilemmas of victory?
Will a Ukrainian victory encompass the destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet? This fleet has suffered some massive blows (particularly the Moskva) and considerable embarrassment, but still represents what Alfred Thayer Mahan termed a ‘fleet in being’ and remains the dominant naval force in the Black Sea. Russia has used these ships to project power and intimidate neighbors for many years and will continue to do so. With the increasing importance of Black Sea gas supplies, Russian naval capability will remain dangerous even with a Ukrainian victory on land. Were this fleet destroyed, it would take decades for Russia to reconstruct the relevant capabilities.
Destroying the Russian submarine fleet would present considerable challenges, given the weakness of Ukrainian anti-submarine warfare capabilities. At minimum, it would be necessary to furnish the Ukrainian navy with helicopters, torpedoes, and ASW electronics and sonar platforms that could be fitted to existing civilian ships. Destroying the surface fleet, assuming it remains at sea, would be considerably less difficult, provided Western powers continue to supply anti-ship missiles and intelligence. Seizing this opportunity to enable Ukraine to destroy the Russian Black Sea Fleet would constitute a major, long-term, geopolitical victory for NATO.
Short of the destruction of the Russian fleet, the restoration of 2013 borders would once again give Ukraine control of Sevastopol, the current naval base of the Russian Black Sea fleet, and the land abutting the Kerch Strait that provides access to the Sea of Azov. A land victory would deprive Russia of forward positions for its Black Sea fleet and would circumscribe Russia’s ability to intimidate its neighbors.
Of greatest strategic significance, a Ukrainian victory could be accompanied by Ukraine entering NATO and the European Union. Such a geopolitical shift would serve to keep the Ukrainian population, resources, grain, and shoreline along the Black Sea in the emerging Western economic bloc and deny these resources to the emerging China-Russia-Iran-North Korea aligned autocracies.
From a military and tactical perspective, a Ukrainian victory would give NATO a third front, should a war break out with Russia: The Karelian front via Sweden and Finland, the Northern European Plain front via the Baltic States and Poland, and now a southern front via Ukraine. Russian strategists would have to account for this new possibility, constituting a long-term threat to Russian national security. This would reduce the likelihood of Russia invading any of their neighbors to the west for the foreseeable future. In addition, Belarus would be surrounded by NATO states.
Many commentators have suggested that a maximalist victory by Ukraine would cause the fall of the Putin regime. While this is entirely possible, it is also highly likely that whatever regime replaces Putin will be subject to the same internal political pressures and geostrategic concerns that drive Putin. There is no reason to assume that a replacement would choose to change any of Putin’s policies, though a resounding defeat may require a delay in achieving the same goals.
Most importantly, a Ukrainian victory would bolster the rules-based international order, reaffirming the legitimacy of international borders through force of arms. It would show the world the superiority of Western armament and doctrine while demonstrating to adversarial powers that the threat of nuclear escalation is not sufficient to cause NATO and the West to back down. While the risk of nuclear escalation in this scenario is real, the downside risk of appeasing nuclear powers whenever they threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts would be significantly worse.
A central challenge in achieving this outcome is that, even with a reconstituted Ukraine at the pre-2013 borders, such a state will remain vulnerable to Russian terror attacks on cities and infrastructure indefinitely. Giving Ukraine the ability to make tit-for-tat cross-border retaliatory attacks would constitute an escalation, but such capabilities are needed in order to forge any kind of durable peace.
To achieve maximalist goals, several policy actions would make sense:Providing massive material support including long range missiles, anti-ship missiles, and artillery: Whatever conventional arms the Ukrainians need to recapture their territory.
Allowing and enabling private U.S. citizens and corporations to straightforwardly donate money and arms to Ukraine; the U.S. civilian population is in possession of perhaps the largest reserve of military-grade small arms and ammunition in the world. About half of those guns are held by 3% of the U.S. population. Ten percent of the privately held firearms in the U.S. would serve to arm every single Ukrainian man, woman, and child. Elon Musk has demonstrated this kind of private initiative with Starlink; similar initiatives could easily extend to shipments of arms.
Encouraging and sponsoring the creation of U.S. and European-based Lincoln brigades and sending private contractors as a disavowed counter to Wagner and Russian forces. These volunteer groups could be staffed with both westerners and Ukrainian refugees.
Facilitating the purchase of (U.S.-insured) Ukraine war bonds through 401(k) plans; purchasers of such bonds will band together to lobby Congress for victory and will form a constituency supporting a Ukrainian victory.
Enforcing punitive economic measures on Russia and China by default, even after any Ukrainian victory. There can be no return to business as normal with Russia for a generation unless it is part of a broader anti-PRC deal.
Providing the Ukrainian military with strong tactical and strategic C4ISR support.
Providing the Ukrainians with a comprehensive air defense network to stop incoming Russian missiles from hitting infrastructure and civilian targets.
Meanwhile, in the absence of a decisive effort by the United States to defeat the Russians, the most likely scenario is that the Ukraine war will emerge as a protracted conflict.
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