14 October 2024

Debt or Diplomacy? Inside China’s Controversial Loans to Sri Lanka, Laos, and Malaysia

Zdeněk Rod

In recent years, much of the discussion around China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” has come from U.S. media and political hawks. In May 2019, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused China of using this approach, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an infrastructure project aimed at expanding China’s influence across Asia, Africa, and beyond. According to Pompeo, China uses opaque practices, corruption, and predatory loans to saddle countries with unsustainable debt, thereby undermining their sovereignty and seizing control of critical infrastructure, such as ports or power plants.

Beyond political rhetoric, foreign policy experts have also weighed in on the matter, suggesting that China deliberately targets countries that are unlikely to repay their loans. The argument is that when these countries default, they are forced to cede key assets like energy facilities, ports, or railways, thus extending Beijing’s influence over strategic infrastructure globally.

However, recent studies indicate that the reality of China’s debt diplomacy is more nuanced than commonly portrayed. While it’s true that China has lent vast sums to countries with questionable creditworthiness, many of these nations willingly accept such risky terms. In most cases, no country has completely forfeited its infrastructure to China, except in the partial example of Laos (more on that below). More commonly, nations have leased portions of their infrastructure to Chinese firms for extended periods, rather than surrendering outright ownership.

The China-US Geopolitical Rivalry And Myanmar’s Civil War – Analysis

Maung Khaing Tun (Pyi Thit)

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw to meet junta boss Min Aung Hlaing in August has rocked Myanmar’s political landscape. Two days after Wang’s visit to the Myanmar capital, officials from the US State Department held talks with leaders of the shadow National Unity Government and “K3C”, pledging full support for Myanmar’s revolution and the restoration of democracy.

The K3C comprises four of Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed organisations – the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and Chin National Front (CNF).

Junta media reported that Wang stressed three points during his visit; that China opposes armed conflicts in northern Shan State, will provide technical and financial assistance for the junta’s proposed poll next year, and does not accept foreign interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs.

Meanwhile, changes are also taking place in Myanmar’s neighbours. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has resigned and fled the country after weeks of deadly anti-government protests, and a new prime minister has taken office in Thailand.

Securing The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Navigating Conflicts And Public Scepticism – Analysis

Kyi Sin

On 26 December 2023, the State Administration Council (SAC) military regime in Myanmar inked with China an addendum to the concession agreement for the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and its deep-sea port.[1] This deep-sea port, coupled with the SEZ, is a critical component of the ambitious China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

This corridor is strategically designed to provide quick sea access for China’s landlocked western provinces, connecting them to the Bay of Bengal. The CMEC thus presents considerable strategic and economic value to China. The date of the addendum’s signature, however, has some significance. The SAC signed this agreement with China in the aftermath of Operation 1027, a surprise offensive launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) — a coalition formed since 2019 by three leading ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), namely the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – in northern Shan State. Operation 1027 and its aftermath shifted the conflict dynamics in Myanmar’s ongoing civil war.[2] Even before and especially after Operation 1027, the AA has been gaining more ground and functional control in Rakhine State, where the Kyaukphyu SEZ is located. The AA is for the first time since its establishment in 2009, poised to wrest control of Rakhine from the SAC’s central administrative reach.[3]

Xi knows what it takes to sustain China’s rally

William Pesek

Last week, as Chinese stocks produced their biggest gain since 2015, Lu Ting, chief China economist at Nomura Holdings, was warning investors not to forget another, more traumatic memory from that same year. “Given the current market momentum and our tracking of sentiment on China’s social media, the risk of repeating the epic boom.

Disclosing the undisclosed: China's Advanced firing range and probable SIGINT facilities near Shigatse, TAR

Dr Y Nithiyanandam

Backstory

Have you ever wondered what an advanced firing range looks like? While media reports often mention the PLA conducting sophisticated drills "somewhere" in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), this report offers the first detailed glimpse, captured through satellite images, of such a site and its major components. It can show how the landscape has evolved chronologically.

But it’s not just about the firing range. Are you curious about what kind of technology China might use for signal intelligence (SIGINT), navigation, or space situational awareness? In the second part of the report, we reveal two massive SIGINT facilities located near Shigatse along the Yarlung Tsang Po River.

This report focuses on a significant military site—likely a firing range—and two SIGINT facilities situated just 200 km from the Doklam plateau, 150 km from India’s border with Sikkim, and 30 km from the Shigatse dual-use airport. This location underscores China’s intense military preparations, where a variety of air-to-ground and ground-to-ground weapons are tested and complex target simulations are carried out.

Why Switzerland Seeks Deeper Ties With China – Analysis

Balz Rigendinger and Pauline Turuban

The rift between those in favour of free trade with China and those against is mainly about economics and moral values.

China’s growing hunger for power in the world has obviously not escaped the notice of Swiss politicians. In the parliament in Bern, Chinese global ambitions are now discussed and observed more critically than they were in 2013, when the free trade agreement between the two countries was signed.

Scepticism and concern are rife across all parties. In September, the House of Representatives decided that major Swiss companies could no longer simply be taken over by foreign investors. The bill was unofficially called “Lex China”.

For the leftwing Social Democratic Party and Green Party in particular, Switzerland’s ties with China are already too close. Most recently, Green parliamentarian Nicolas Walder demanded that Switzerland terminate the free trade agreement because of Chinese human rights violations. Parliament rejected this motion in February.

There Will Be No “New” Middle East

Leon Hadar

A“new Middle East” seems to always be on the horizon. In 1982, Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon envisioned a new order in the Middle East, with a free Lebanon under a pro-Western Maronite government and a Palestinian State in Jordan. An Israeli invasion of Lebanon would destroy the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and ensure Israel’s security.

Shimon Peres and Tom Friedman promised a “New Middle East” in the aftermath of the Oslo Agreement in 1993. Instead of fighting, young Palestinians and Israelis would launch high-tech start-ups. The Lexus would smash the olive tree and usher in the “end of History.

Then, a democratic and pro-American Middle East was supposed to emerge, starting with Iraq, after President George W. Bush’s exercises in “regime change” and “democracy promotion” in the 2000s.

That was followed by the “Arab Spring” in the early 2010s, which was expected to launch a wave of liberal-democratic revolutions in the Middle East led by all the young Facebook users assembled in Tahrir Square.

Does Iran Still Care About its Proxies?

Burcu Ozcelik

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched 180 missiles in “Operation True Promise II” in retaliation for recent Israeli attacks that killed the leaders of the Hezbollah and Hamas militant groups, as well as a senior IRGC commander. Iran claims to have carried out the operation in line with the “legitimate right of self-defense under the United Nations Charter.”

Launching a direct attack against Israel for assassinations carried out against leaders of Iran-linked militia is an admission of the obvious. Iran wants its “axis of resistance” to hold. A pillar of its forward defense strategy in the Middle East, the network of proxy groups provides strategic depth and access to sanctions-busting trade routes across Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. The Iranian claim to the right of “self-defense” shows that the IRGC and Supreme Leader Khamenei consider its regional arc of armed non-state actors as part of their core security interests. The intention of the strike was likely to reassure a battered Hezbollah of Tehran’s support. Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s status in Tehran’s eyes has diminished from core asset to liability. Moreover, Iran’s missile strikes have made it more vulnerable to Israeli counterattacks, which are likely to be more substantial in scale and impact than the April exchange.


A Simple View of the Arab-Israeli War

George Friedman

Last week, I wrote an article on the two wars raging in Eurasia. It was “idiosyncratic” in that, unlike other columns circling the mediasphere, it focused on how ground combat in the Middle East evolves into conventional war, and how a conventional war demands the movement of forces that could implicate other nations, particularly Russia. The crux of my argument was that airstrikes, however intense, rarely result in capitulation. Even in World War II, intense, coordinated airstrikes against Germany did not, on the whole, reduce Nazi resistance. It cleared the table for ground attacks by the Western allies and the Soviets, who eventually overran Germany. Air power mattered, but when it came to ending the war, ground operations mattered more.

Over the past week, as the conflict reached the one-year mark, Israel has overwhelmingly used aerial operations, hammering Lebanon and testing Iranian intentions. (Iran responded with an aerial bombardment in kind.) Here again: All of this has value, but none of it is able to eliminate an enemy or overtake cities that contain command centers, intelligence and weapons. Destroying what remains of Hamas or Hezbollah by air will not cripple their ability to wage war. If it didn’t work against Nazi Germany, it certainly won’t work against a decentralized insurgent force.

Target: Iran – OpEd

John Feffer

Israel has assassinated the leader of Hezbollah and killed many of its members by way of booby-trapped pagers and walky-talkies. After a blitzkrieg bombing campaign, Israel once again invaded Lebanon this week to escalate its campaign against the paramilitary-cum-political party. Meanwhile, it continues to wage war against Hamas in Gaza. It has bombed various locations in Syria. And it has even attacked the Houthis in distant Yemen.

The Israeli government has never tried to hide its larger objective: weaken the sponsor of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Israel is really fighting against Iran.

At the United Nations last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu displayed a map of the region labelled “The Curse.” It showed a swath of the Middle East in black that encompassed Iran, Syria, and Iraq, with outposts in Lebanon and Yemen.

“It’s a map of an arc of terror that Iran has created and imposed from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean,” Netanyahu declared. “Iran’s aggression, if it’s not checked, will endanger every single country in the Middle East, and many, many countries in the rest of the world, because Iran seeks to impose its radicalism well beyond the Middle East.”

Why Did Russia Just Shoot Down Its Own Fighter-Sized S-70 Hunter Drone Over Ukraine?

Tyler Rogoway

A bizarre situation emerged out of Eastern Ukraine this morning, one in which a Russian fighter fired a short-range air-to-air missile and shot down one of its own aircraft while flying over highly-defended Ukrainian territory. And this wasn’t just any aircraft, it was one of a tiny handful of Russian Air Force S-70 Okhotnik-B (Hunter-B) flying wing unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV).

The S-70 is a heavy-weight strike and reconnaissance tactical drone with some low observable (stealthy) features. It was also envisioned to be able to partake in air-to-air combat. Independent operations and those paired with other aircraft, both manned and unmanned, are envisioned for the type.

The engagement occurred near Konstantynivka, in Donetsk, supposedly around 10 miles behind Ukrainian lines. Video shot from the ground shows one jet firing on another at close range, then a shattered flying wing aircraft falling to the ground. Images and video of the wreckage make it undeniable, it was indeed an S-70.

Although we cannot say conclusively at this time, it appears to be one of the earlier demonstrator aircraft, which first emerged in early 2019, or one built to a similar specification and is significantly lower in sophistication than a more refined variant with enhanced low-observable (stealth) features rolled out in 2021.

A Year That Will Live in Infamy

Seth Cropsey

By the evening of December 7th, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt understood that the world crisis had taken a new, decisive turn. The United States had been attacked. It must go to war. Yet despite Roosevelt’s apparent rhetorical shock – he inserted the famous “infamy” phrase to emphasize American victimhood vis-a-vis Japan – the Pearl Harbor attacks fit within the constellation of American strategy. Washington’s policymakers, from the president down, understood that the United States would go to war in the coming two years, and potentially in the coming six months depending upon Japanese and German action. Indeed, the Fall of France had impressed upon the United States the non-viability of strategic patience. America had to act and wage war against the revisionist coalition, or risk a permanent, potentially fatal reversal of the Eurasian balance.

A year on from Hamas’ barbaric attack on Israel, it is clear that the United States remains shocked and surprised. The Biden administration has shown no sign of grasping strategic reality. Washington faces a world crisis as intense as that of the late 1930s and early 1940s. Its goal must be victory, for without it, the American Republic is unlikely to survive. Instead, the U.S. policy class has embraced a paradigm of de-escalation and war avoidance that guarantees a longer, bloodier contest, whether in this decade or the next.


UK retain Diego Garcia military base, but concede sovereignty over islands

John Hill

Enduring disputed claims over Diego Garcia, an atoll within the Chagos archipelago, located in the Indian Ocean, have come to an end after a deal was struck between the UK and Mauritius on 3 October 2024.

As part of the agreement, the UK will retain a key strategic military base on the island it shares with the US military for an initial period of 99 years while the East African state exercises sovereignty over the island chain. While political negotiations have concluded, a formal treaty has yet to be signed.

The Treaty, when ratified, will also “address [the] wrongs of the past,” stated the US State Department, referring to the contentious means by which the two countries agreed to depopulate between 1,500 and 2,000 Chagosians from Diego Garcia, the largest island in the archipelago, ahead of the construction of the base in 1971.

The latest agreement follows 13 rounds of talks that began in 2022 after Mauritian calls for sovereignty were recognised by the International Court of Justice and the UN General Assembly in 2019 and 2021.

U.S. Spends a Record $17.9 Billion on Military Aid to Israel Since Last Oct. 7

Ellen Knickmeyer

The United States has spent a record of at least $17.9 billion on military aid to Israel since the war in Gaza began and led to escalating conflict around the Middle East, according to a report for Brown University’s Costs of War project, released on the anniversary of Hamas’ attacks on Israel.

An additional $4.86 billion has gone into stepped-up U.S. military operations in the region since the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks, researchers said in findings first provided to The Associated Press. That includes the costs of a Navy-led campaign to quell strikes on commercial shipping by Yemen’s Houthis, who are carrying them out in solidarity with the fellow Iranian-backed group Hamas.

The report — completed before Israel opened a second front, this one against Iranian-backed Hezbollah militants in Lebanon, in late September — is one of the first tallies of estimated U.S. costs as the Biden administration backs Israel in its conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon and seeks to contain hostilities by Iran-allied armed groups in the region.

Is Netanyahu Facing Another Osirak Moment?

Francis P. Sempa

Before Netanyahu

It was codenamed Operation Opera — Israel’s daring and successful air attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha. On June 7, 1981, fourteen Israeli fighter jets (F-16s and F-15As) plus other aircraft flew from Etzion airport more than 600 miles over hostile countries into Iraqi airspace.

To avoid radar detection, the fighters flew low, and when they reached the reactor each fighter jet released its bombs. The attack partially destroyed the reactor and killed ten Iraqi soldiers and a French engineer. (Iraq had purchased the reactor from France on the condition that it be used for “peaceful” purposes).

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin had been warned by Israeli intelligence that the reactor would become operational sometime between July and November of 1981, and that after that Saddam Hussein would be able to extract plutonium from spent atomic fuel to manufacture an atomic bomb. As John Correll wrote in Air Force Magazine, “If Israel was going to act, it had to be soon. Once the reactor was in operation and … fueled with uranium …. a bombing attack would spread radioactive fallout across Baghdad,” which was only 12 miles away.

Israel Intensifies Attacks Near Beirut As October 7 Anniversary Looms


Israel stepped up its massive air strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs in its drive to wipe out Hezbollah’s capabilities and leadership, even as the world awaits with trepidation the October 7 anniversary of the bloody attack on Israel by Hamas — which, like Hezbollah, is a U.S.-designated terror group with ties to Iran.

Meanwhile, Tehran said it had lifted “all flight restrictions” after earlier announcing it was closing Iranian airports as of 9 p.m. on October 6 until 6 a.m. on October 7, citing “operational restrictions,” at a time when Israel is weighing options for its response to Iran’s recent massive missile strike on its territory.

State media said the restrictions were lifted “after ensuring favorable and safe conditions.”

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on October 6 threatened Iran that it might eventually find itself looking like Beirut or Gaza — which has also been battered over the past year — if Tehran attempts to further harm Israel.


Energy Literacy For Policymakers: Wind And Solar Do Different Things Than Crude Oil – OpEd

Ronald Stein and John Shanahan

The elephant in the room that no one wants to discuss is that crude oil is the foundation of our materialistic society as it is the basis of all products and fuels demanded by the 8 billion on this planet, of which only one billion existed less than 200 years ago.

All hospitals, airports, communication systems, militaries, planes, trains, and vehicles are based on the products that did not exist before the 1800’s, that are now made from fossil fuels.

Humanity’s addiction to the products and fuels made from oil has grown to a whopping consumption of 100 million barrels a day. For those unfamiliar with a “barrel”, it contains 42 gallons, which equates to 4,000,000,000 GALLONS of oil needed every day to meet the demands of today’s lifestyle and economies.

What Israel Has Lost And How It Can Regain Its Strategic Edge

Ari Shavit

The massacre of October 7, 2023, was one of the most horrific atrocities perpetrated since World War II. On that day, Hamas-led militants kidnapped Israeli children, raped Israeli women, beheaded Israeli men, and burned alive entire Israeli families in their homes. But beyond this human and moral calamity, the catastrophe that befell Israel on a bleak Sabbath morning reverberates with historic significance. Because it took place in the immediate vicinity of Gaza—the one place in which Israel had dismantled settlements and withdrawn to the 1967 border—this massacre was an attack on the idea of a Jewish state in any part of the land of Israel. Because its very essence was the slaughter of peace-loving kibbutzniks and life-celebrating music festival attendees, it was an assault on the existence of a liberal and cosmopolitan democracy in the Middle East. And because it led to a surge of anti-Semitism the likes of which had not been seen since 1945, it was a blatant act of aggression against the Jewish people as a whole.

The attack was highly significant not only for Israelis and Jews, however, but also for the entire world. Hamas was able to carry out a technically sophisticated assault thanks to its patron, Iran, which has become a formidable regional power. And Iran’s influence, in turn, rests on its links to China, North Korea, and Russia—a nascent authoritarian axis that seeks to upend the U.S.-backed liberal international order. For Israel, 7/10 was 9/11 on steroids, and for the Jewish people, 7/10 was a new Kristallnacht. But the international community should have perceived the attack as a sequel to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine: the second violent conflagration of the second Cold War. Hamas’s savagery was backed by an aggressive Iran that is supported by the authoritarian axis; as such, October 7 was a direct assault on the free world.


Israel’s triumphant response to 7 October7 October

Jonathan Sacerdoti


One year after the brutal attacks of 7 October 2023, Israel’s global reputation has undergone a remarkable transformation. Far from being undermined by the actions it has taken in Gaza and beyond, Israel’s standing has been fortified, its image strengthened with steel. While some voices –particularly in the West – have feigned concern about Israel sacrificing its international standing in its pursuit of victory, the reality is starkly different. Israel’s reputation has not been diminished but has evolved into one of decisiveness, strategic intelligence, and strength.

Much of the concern surrounding Israel’s actions in the last year was not genuine, but a veiled excuse to criticise the state for defending itself. Critics lamented that Israel might sacrifice global goodwill in its pursuit of victory, but these criticisms are superficial and often placate those who have long sought to undermine Israel’s legitimacy. The notion that Israel should refrain from defending itself to preserve its reputation overlooks a critical reality: a nation’s first responsibility is its own survival, not global approval.

Israel’s reputation has been bolstered precisely because it has shown it will act decisively when threatened and preemptively when necessary. Previously seen as a nation reluctant to engage in prolonged or preemptive conflicts, preferring a ‘mowing the grass’ approach of managing problems, Israel has shifted. No longer will it allow threats to fester unchecked. The events of 7 October served as a brutal reminder of what happens when enemies are managed rather than defeated. From now, Israel will focus on eliminating threats outright, particularly Hamas and Hezbollah, whose goal is Israel’s destruction.

One Year After the October 7 Attacks: The Impact on Four Fronts

Elliott Abrams, Linda Robinson, Ray Takeyh, and Steven A. Cook

Israel’s Year of Trial and Reckoning on Defense

Most of 2023, which overlapped with the Jewish years 5783-4, was marked by deep internal divisions in Israel over “judicial reform”. Large demonstrations, vicious political rhetoric, and a sharp split between those who favored the reform as a way to limit excessive judicial power and those who saw it as the end of democracy in Israel heated Israeli politics to the boiling point.

But then came October 7, 2023, and the judicial reform was forgotten. The country came together in shock and horror at the magnitude of the loss of life and the brutality of the Hamas-led Palestinian armed groups who crossed the border from the Gaza Strip to kill, maim, rape, and take hostages. In the ensuing months of 2023, there was broad agreement on the need to defeat Hamas, and moreover, unified support for the soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces. Some senior officers resigned quickly and others more slowly in the aftermath, taking responsibility for the security disaster, but the bravery and commitment of the young soldiers, most of them reservists, taught Israelis a lesson about their younger generation. There had been loose rhetoric by old-timers wondering whether the great generations who founded the state in 1948 and guided it through the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 were being followed by a new generation not up to the task of defending Israel. That argument is over.

The Fall Of Vuhledar: What It Means For Ukraine’s Beleaguered Military – Analysis

Mike Eckel

In late January 2023, a column of Russian vehicles and hundreds of naval infantry ran into a buzz saw of Ukrainian defenses near the Donbas city of Vuhledar, a humiliating defeat that showcased both Ukrainian pluck, but also Russia’s frequently ham-handed offensive operations.

Times have changed.

On October 2, the Ukrainian military confirmed it was pulling units out of Vuhledar, in the face of a relentless, monthslong offensive by Russian forces along a wide swathe of Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region.

If nothing else, it’s a sign of how dire things are looking for Ukraine’s military.

Here’s what you need to know about the fall of Vuheldar.

Yes, You’ve Probably Heard Of Vuhledar Before

Located about 90 kilometers southwest Donetsk, a Russian-controlled city and the largest city in the Donbas, Vuhledar is a coal-mining town with a preinvasion population of 14,000 with drab Soviet-style apartment blocks set amid a flat, open landscape.

Alcohol Plays a Major Role in New Cancer Cases

Justin Stebbing

A little bit of alcohol was once thought to be good for you. However, as scientific research advances, we’re gaining a clearer picture of alcohol’s effect on health—especially regarding cancer.

The complex relationship between alcohol and cancer was recently highlighted in a new report from the American Association for Cancer Research. The report’s findings are eye-opening.

The authors of the report estimate that 40 percent of all cancer cases are associated with “modifiable risk factors”—in other words, things we can change ourselves. Alcohol consumption being prominent among them.

Six types of cancer are linked to alcohol consumption: head and neck cancers, esophageal cancer, liver cancer, breast cancer, colorectal cancer, and stomach cancer.

The statistics are sobering. In 2019, more than one in 20 cancer diagnoses in the West were attributed to alcohol consumption, and this is increasing with time. This figure challenges the widespread perception of alcohol as a harmless social lubricant and builds on several well-conducted studies linking alcohol consumption to cancer risk.


Large Artificial Intelligence Language Models, Increasingly Unreliable


According to José Hernández Orallo, a researcher at the Valencian Institute for Research in Artificial Intelligence (VRAIN) of the UPV and ValgrAI, one of the main concerns about the reliability of language models is that their performance does not match the human perception of task difficulty.

In other words, there is a mismatch between expectations that the models will fail based on human perception of task difficulty and the tasks on which the models fail. ‘Models can solve certain complex tasks in line with human abilities, but at the same time, they fail on simple tasks in the same domain. For example, they can solve several PhD-level mathematical problems. Still, they can get a simple addition wrong,’ notes Hernández-Orallo.

In 2022, Ilya Sutskever, the scientist behind some of the most significant advances in artificial intelligence in recent years (from the Imagenet solution to AlphaGo) and co-founder of OpenAI, predicted that ‘maybe over time that discrepancy will diminish’.

However, the study by the UPV, ValgrAI and Cambridge University team shows this has not been the case. To demonstrate this, they investigated three key aspects that affect the reliability of language models from a human perspective.

BEYOND BELIEF: THE IMPERATIVE TO DEVELOP EMPOWERED MILITARY AI

Andrew A. Hill & Stephen Gerras 

An empowered military AI (EMAI) that independently makes lethal decisions is scary. Ancient mythology is full of stories of creators being destroyed by their creations, as when the Olympian Gods overthrew the Titans. Killer machines are a mainstay of science fiction. Long before Michael Crichton’s Westworld and James Cameron’s Terminator, Samuel Butler’s 1872 novel Erewhon described an isolated civilization that had banned complex machines out of a fear that technology would someday supplant humankind. Butler quotes one Erewhonian philosopher, “I fear none of the existing machines; what I fear is the extraordinary rapidity with which they are becoming something very different to what they are at present.”

Advanced AI seems to tap into some primal human fears. Risk expert David Ropeik highlights thirteen “fear factors” that lead humans to be more afraid of something, and advanced AI has eight of them: lack of control, trust, and choice; the fact it is man-made; its uncertainty; its potential for catastrophe; its novelty; and the personal risk it poses to us in potentially taking our jobs (or our lives). These factors make empowered AI particularly frightening, encouraging a denial of its possible implications. We want humans to perform better than machines, and we do not want machines to make life or death choices; but these are normative arguments, and wishful thinking should not masquerade as technological reality.


On General Douglas MacArthur’s Presumed Arrogance

Roger Thompson

Even the most casual students of military history know that General Douglas MacArthur was fired for insubordination during the Korean War, and his reputation was well-established before that war. According to the new book Generals and Admirals, Criminals and Crooks: Dishonorable Leadership in the U.S. Military by Jeffrey J. Matthews: “At the time of MacArthur’s Korean appointment, some observers registered prescient misgivings. New York Times columnist James Reston worried about the risks of a broader war in Asia because of the general’s legendary hubris and penchant for autonomous action. Reston described MacArthur as ‘a sovereign power in his own right, with stubborn confidence in his own judgment’ and as a commander with an ‘old habit of doing things in his own way without too much concern about waiting for orders from Washington.’” (p. 94)

I think most people would agree with that assessment of MacArthur as a field commander, but I am going to go out on a limb and suggest that perhaps he, in fact, appreciated the advice of experts who did not always agree with him. If we are to believe Rear-Admiral Jeffry V. Brock’s autobiography, for example, MacArthur may have been very misinformed about North Korea’s geography and naval capabilities from the get-go. Brock was in charge of the Canadian naval forces in Korea, and he met with the general to discuss the role of navies in dealing with North Korea’s aggression against South Korea and the UN forces stationed there. At the beginning of their meeting, MacArthur wanted Brock to come up with a plan to counter what he himself conceived as the North Korean submarine threat in the Yellow Sea.

13 October 2024

Targeting Taiwan Beijing’s Playbook for Economic and Cyber Warfare

Craig Singleton & RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

Introduction

“The complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and it will definitely be fulfilled,” declared Xi Jinping on the 110th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, underscoring Taiwan’s reintegration into China as a core element of his vision for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), using minimal military force and preserving Taiwan’s infrastructure and economy during reunification are paramount.

A cyber-enabled economic coercion campaign is the CCP’s most strategic and logical approach to realizing this long-term national priority.

The CCP’s strategy to win without fighting is not new. In writings by ancient strategists Sun Tzu and Kautilya, undermining enemy morale and cohesion plays a prominent role. But modern globalization has created more economic connections that China can exploit to achieve coercive aims. Technological innovation created even more digital connections, offering more possibilities for coercion, including through the targeting of critical infrastructure.


China could wage economic war on Taiwan to force surrender, report say


U.S. military officials and analysts have for years warned of possible armed attacks or blockades by China on Taiwan, but a report released Friday has raised a red flag about possible nonmilitary tactics that could be used effectively against the self-governed island.

Beijing could wage an economic and cyber war to force a surrender from Taiwan without direct use of military power, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington research institute, said in the report. Such a likely but overlooked scenario, it said, poses a challenge for the U.S., the island's biggest ally, and it suggested Washington make preparations for how best to respond.

FDD researchers teamed up with banking and finance experts in Taiwan over two days earlier this year to simulate likely nonmilitary moves by Beijing, such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks on infrastructure. The exercise was the first of its kind and sought to fill an analytical gap, FDD said.

Taiwan’s Greatest Vulnerabilities Extend Beyond Its Military

Lili Pike

In recent years, Taiwan wargames have become standard practice from Capitol Hill to Wall Street. The exercises model pathways China might pursue to achieve its desired end goal: bringing the island democracy, which Beijing still considers to be part of its territory, under its political control.

Over the years, such wargames have played out different military scenarios, from a Chinese blockade of the island to a full amphibious invasion, and assessed the capacity of Taiwan and the United States and its allies to respond.

China Has 3 Carriers at Sea — Will PLA Seize Middle East Distraction to Attack Taiwan?

Jim Morris

It’s been a big story for much of the last year. But now, with the world’s attention focused on Israel and Lebanon, could China use the opportunity to ramp up the pressure on Taiwan?

China now has all three of its aircraft carriers at sea for the first time. Meanwhile, the US has moved naval and air assets to the Middle East, a move which Politico says “comes at a high cost for the Navy. It also leaves the Indo-Pacific shorthanded as ships are pulled into the Middle East to protect American forces and battle Houthi missiles and drones targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea.”

Earlier this week, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III ordered the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and its escort group to stay in the region. A month ago, the carrier was diverted from a planned deployment to Pacific to head to the Middle East.

The Israel-Iran War Enters A New Stage – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

What Happened?

On October 1, 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran unleashed a large salvo of nearly 200 ballistic missiles against Israel.

Iran’s attack came only five days after Israel conducted strikes to eliminate several high-ranking officials of the Iran-backed proxy terror group Hezbollah—most notably late Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Israel’s strike also killed General Abbas Nilforoushan, the former deputy of operations for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Muhammad Ja’far Kasir, the chief of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, a special body tasked with overseeing weapons transfers between the proxy network and Tehran. Iran’s strike also coincided with the Israel Defense Forces’ initiation of limited ground operations in Lebanon.

The Strategy and Concepts of Operations behind the Attack

In its April 13 attacks against Israel, Iran unleashed a mixed strike package of drones alongside cruise and ballistic missiles. This offensive configuration complicated Israel’s efforts to defend its skies, as sensors have greater difficulty tracking slow-moving drones and dealing with ground clutter. But the slower projectiles also gave the Israeli Defense Forces hours of notice before Tehran’s more powerful missiles neared their targets. The early warning made it all but impossible for Tehran to maintain the element of surprise during the April strike.

Nasrallah Assassination Will Only Make Israel Less Safe | Opinion

Daniel L. Davis

Many in the Middle East and America hailed the September 27 Israeli assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Television stations in Israel had singing and dancing in their studios and some reporters handed out chocolate on the streets.

In time, they may come to regret these celebrations.

Hassan Nasrallah was many things, but he was a cautious and pragmatic politician at heart. He used many inflammatory words in often-fiery speeches over the years, but kept his actions restrained. He held back many of the most violent and reckless voices within Hezbollah, seeking to thread the needle of keeping up resistance against Israeli strength while avoiding anything that might invite an Israeli military response.

The day after the October 7 terrorist attack by Hamas, Hezbollah fired a limited number of rockets and artillery shells against Israeli targets "in solidarity" with the Palestinian people, 300 of whom had been killed in the first 24 hours by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in response to the terrorist attack. In the early days of the war against Hamas, there was concern that Hezbollah might attack the IDF, putting the latter in a two-front war. Nasrallah restrained his troops, however, and no northern front was ever opened.

Escalating to War between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

Daniel Byman, Seth G. Jones and Alexander Palmer

Introduction

Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah continue to escalate in what Israel has called Operation Northern Arrows.1 In mid-September 2024, Israeli intelligence sabotaged thousands of Hezbollah beepers and walkie-talkies, detonating them in an operation that killed dozens of group members and wounded thousands more. On September 27, 2024, Israel killed Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah in an airstrike on the group’s Beirut headquarters—the culmination of a campaign against Hezbollah’s leaders that led to the killing of numerous senior group leaders in September 2024. Two days before the Nasrallah assassination, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, chief of the general staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), told Israeli troops from the Seventh Brigade deployed along the northern border, “We are preparing the process of a manoeuvre, which means your military boots . . . will enter enemy territory.”2 The IDF also called up two reserve brigades for what it referred to as “operational missions in the northern arena.”3 Israeli commandoes have conducted cross-border operations to gather intelligence and otherwise prepare for a ground invasion, and Israel has done limited operations so far in southern Lebanon.4 Iran responded by launching waves of ballistic missiles and other stand-off weapons at Israel.

To better understand the prospect of further escalation, this brief asks four questions: What are Israel’s and Hezbollah’s objectives? How has violence evolved over the past several months? What are plausible scenarios for further escalation? What options do the United States and other countries have to mitigate or prevent escalation? To answer these questions, this analysis draws on a mixture of quantitative and qualitative information. It compiles data on Israeli and Hezbollah strikes along the Israel-Lebanon-Syria border and geolocates Hezbollah attacks against Israel in the demilitarized zone between the Blue Line and Litani River.

Israel’s Campaign against Hezbollah and the Fight for Southern Lebanon’s Tunnels

Patrick Sullivan, John Spencer and John Amble

“Those who go beneath the surface do so at their peril.”

So warned Oscar Wilde in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Of course, his words of caution were aimed at consumers of art and not at twenty-first-century military forces. And yet for those forces, the peril beneath the surface is even more real. Even a military with extraordinary capabilities above the ground will quickly encounter extreme limitations to those capabilities below it.

So when the Israel Defense Forces acknowledged having been quietly carrying out raids into Hezbollah tunnels in southern Lebanon for months, the natural question for many observers was why. Examining that question highlights lessons on underground warfare, illuminates how Israel likely intends to treat Hezbollah’s tunnels in its plans for a broader campaign against the group, and offers a glimpse into the capabilities required to overcome the subterranean hazards of the modern battlefield.

Hezbollah’s Tunnels

Much is unknown about Hezbollah tunnels. Like the Hamas tunnels in Gaza that Israeli forces have contended with during their military campaign there, the only way to know for sure how many tunnels there are—and their scale, form, and purposes—is discovering them on the ground.

Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t? Strategic Implications of Designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Terrorist Organisation

Gustav Christensson

Introduction

The effect of sanctions on state behaviour is a complex topic that is frequently debated in international studies, and views vary even among proponents or opponents. Questions of efficacy, the consequences for citizens as opposed to the targeted governments or individuals, and morality and ethics are all topics that have been frequently debated.1 The various types of sanctions can target individuals if they are limited in scope, or actors or state organs if they are broader. Sanctions are ostensibly a means of achieving specific political goals. In the contemporary debate, however, sanctions are often treated as a goal in themselves rather than as a tool for changing behaviour. This policy brief analyses the legal criteria for and the potential consequences of the European Union (EU) designating a state organ a terrorist organisation, which is one type of sanction that the EU is able to implement. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Iran serves as the empirical case, based on the ongoing debate regarding a terrorist designation for that group. The consequences are examined in terms of the consequences for the IRGC as an organisation and the consequences for the EU. Some context is provided regarding the organisational structure of the IRGC and the Islamic Republic. The brief concludes with a succinct description of the risks and rewards of a terrorist designation and some policy recommendations. The recommendations address under what circumstances the EU should designate the IRGC a terrorist organisation and whether other options might be more effective.


Transforming to Innovate for National Security

Steve Deal

Now is the time to create the political will necessary for real change. The four-year election cycle dominates strategic thinking and capacity for change much as Soviet five-year planning models did during the Cold War. The only reliable springtime occurs quadrennially, before the presidential election, before cabinet confirmation season, and well before the year or so it takes for each newly chosen administration to find its collective way and cull any kind of coherence it might possibly achieve.

And so, it is in the area of national security where this lengthy run-up yet crucial moment of strategic fusion matters most. It is this realm that is historically most vital to the continuance of our sovereignty and way of life. Here precisely is where we must interrogate our past “idols of the tribe” and become deadly honest with ourselves: that our capacity for self-governance, backed up by our best current defenses, could be defeated by our adversaries. That our assumptions about the nature of the competition are likely wrong. Thus, we plan to win by first contemplating how or why we could lose. We learn what we can or need to do by realizing what we can’t, or without such needed change, what we won’t, and why.


U.S. eyes geostationary orbit for next-gen GPS

Sandra Erwin

An experimental U.S. military satellite designed to test new space-based navigation technologies has been waiting nearly 20 months for a ride to geostationary Earth orbit (GEO).

The Navigation Technology Satellite-3 (NTS-3), developed by the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, aims to test advanced technologies for future GPS and satellite navigation systems. Its launch, potentially before year’s end, hinges on the certification of United Launch Alliance’s Vulcan rocket.

NTS-3 is set to explore next-generation positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) technologies that could help modernize the Global Positioning System. The mission is significant for the U.S. military, as it would provide a rare chance to test PNT capabilities from GEO — a domain where China’s BeiDou system currently has the upper hand.

“We really don’t understand how accurate our signals can be from GEO. We’ve never done it before. So that’s one of the experiments for NTS-3,” said Joseph Rolli, director of business development for PNT at L3Harris Technologies, which manufactured the satellite under an $84 million contract awarded in 2018.

How Top Arms Exporters Have Responded To The War In Gaza – Analysis

Zain Hussain

Following the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on 7 October 2023, Israel launched an intensive military campaign in Gaza, with the stated aims of destroying Hamas’s military and governing capabilities and bringing home 251 hostages taken during the incursion.

While many states were quick to affirm Israel’s right to self-defence, international concern grew about the high death toll and the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza as well as about Israel’s conduct of the war. This has included ground assaults and air strikes that have targeted or hit hospitals, schools, emergency shelters and United Nations and other humanitarian operations, as well as areas previously designated as ‘safe zones’ in Gaza by the Israelis. These have resulted in the deaths of journalists, humanitarian workers and peaceful protesters, along with many other civilians.

On 12 December 2023 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding an ‘immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza, parties’ compliance with international law’ and ‘release of all hostages’.

Ukraine unveils new “Bohdana-BG” artillery system

Dylan Malyasov

According to reports from Militarny, this new artillery system is a hybrid of the Ukrainian-made Bohdana and the Soviet-era 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B artillery system, modified to incorporate modern features.

The Bohdana system has been mounted on the carriage of the Giatsint-B, aiming to create a cost-effective and easily producible artillery solution for Ukraine’s military. The development of towed artillery systems comes at a crucial time for Ukraine as it seeks to rapidly expand its artillery capabilities in the face of ongoing conflict with Russia.

Towed artillery offers several advantages over self-propelled systems, particularly in terms of production and operational simplicity. “Their production is much cheaper, simpler, and therefore faster compared to self-propelled units, which is a key factor for Ukraine today,” Militarny reported. This allows for quicker manufacturing and deployment on the battlefield, making it a practical solution in current conditions.

With Foundations Laid, Pentagon Building CJADC2’s Data Backbone

Josh Luckenbaugh

North Korea launches a missile, and U.S. Forces Korea and Indo-Pacific Command initially manage command and control of the situation. So begins a hypothetical scenario raised by a former Air Force chief of staff.

“Now let’s say that that missile is … going into space, we think it’s going to hit a satellite, now [Space Command] has C2,” Greg Little, senior counselor at Palantir, said at the National Defense Industrial Association’s recent Emerging Technologies for Defense Conference and Exhibition. “Now we don’t think it’s going to hit a satellite, it’s going back towards Japan,” Indopacom takes charge again, but “then as it’s actually heading, we think, into California,” Northern Command takes control of the situation, as imagined by retired Gen. David Goldfein.

“Now imagine thousands of missiles, hundreds of ships, hundreds of tanks, not only in the Pacific but in the Middle East and Europe … and then imagine actually managing that in an integrated way in an era of great power competition,” Little continued. “The only way to do that is to leverage digital technologies” such as artificial intelligence, advanced computing and analytics.

A Crucial Step in Combating Terrorism

Eli M. Gold

In the wake of the devastating October 7th attacks on Israel, the United States finds itself at a critical juncture in its ongoing fight against international terrorism. The horrific nature of these attacks, which claimed numerous lives, including those of American citizens, and resulted in hundreds of hostages, demands a robust and decisive response from our nation. As we grapple with the aftermath of this tragedy, a new piece of legislation, the Hamas Terrorist Fugitive Act (H.R. 9153), has emerged as a beacon of hope and a powerful tool in our pursuit of justice.

This bill represents a significant advancement in our commitment to dismantling terrorist organizations that threaten global peace and security. At its core, this crucial piece of legislation proposes adding key leaders of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists List. While this may seem like a simple administrative action, its implications are far-reaching and profound.

By placing these terrorists on this high-profile list, we send an unequivocal message to the world: those responsible for acts of terror will be held accountable, no matter how long it takes or how far they run. This move demonstrates our unwavering commitment to bringing the perpetrators of the October 7th attacks to justice, a commitment that extends beyond mere words to concrete action.

Helen Benedict, Ending the Cycle of Revenge

Helen Benedict

With the first anniversary of the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel approaching, the death toll in Gaza climbing to more than 41,500, and Israel inflicting ever more extreme violence on the West Bank and now on Lebanon as well, something very different happened recently in a poky classroom at Columbia University. Two young men, one Palestinian and one Israeli, both of whom had lost people they deeply loved to the conflict, came to speak not about fear and anger, revenge or oppression, but about reconciliation, friendship, and peace.

One of them was Arab Aramin, a 30-year-old Palestinian from Jerusalem whose little sister, Abir, had been shot and killed in front of her school by an Israeli soldier. She was 10 years old.

The other was Yonatan Zeigen, a 36-year-old Israeli who grew up on the Kibbutz Be’eri near the Gaza border, where his mother, the renowned peace activist Vivian Silver was killed by Hamas on October 7, 2023.

Both men are fathers, both thin and lightly bearded, and both are members of the Parents Circle, a joint Israeli-Palestinian organization of 750 bereaved people working together to end the cycle of revenge that has so scarred their lives. They and other members of the group were touring New York City and the Boston area to introduce the Parents Circle and its philosophy to Americans.

7 ways the US is beating Europe

Carlo Martuscelli and Hanne Cokelaere

The United States and the European Union have faced similar challenges over the past couple of decades, with the financial crash and the Covid pandemic wreaking economic havoc, taking years to recover from.

But of the two, it's America that has found a way to surge ahead. When it comes to things that create wealth — science, innovation, even a higher birthrate — the U.S. is ahead by most metrics.

The EU is trying to change that. It hired the former European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi to deliver a report into all that was wrong and everything that needs to be done about it. A year and 400 pages later, the verdict was clear: The gap between the EU and U.S. is only growing. Drastic measures are called for.

Beyond the List: The Broad Range of United Front Work in Sweden

Cheryl Yu

On October 1, Swedish reporters working as part of an international consortium of journalists broke the news of a leaked list identifying 233 individuals across Europe connected to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) united front system, shedding light on the extent of the Party’s influence abroad (tv4.se, October 1). Tony Fang, a professor at Stockholm University who is affiliated with multiple united front agencies, was featured in the report (tv4.se, October 1). However, Fang and the 17 individuals based in Sweden named in the list are just a few of the Swedish individuals and organizations that are linked to the united front system. The scope of the Party’s united front network in Sweden extends far beyond the education sector. It is present across all areas in society, including culture, business, politics, and media. Further research by the Jamestown Foundation that traces CCP activities and organizations has now uncovered at least 103 united front groups in Sweden—only some of which were identified in the leaked list.

United front work (统战工作) is a key tool the Party uses to achieve its goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (中华民族伟大复兴) and become a global power by building relationships with individuals and their affiliated organizations it considers useful. As the Chinese Communist Party Regulation on United Front Work states, “The united front … is an important magic weapon for … realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xinhua, January 5, 2021). CCP chairman Xi Jinping stated at the Central United Front Work Conference in 2015 that the united front “is about human relations, and the purpose of promoting the united front is to strengthen the forces for common struggle” (People’s Daily, May 21, 2015). Engaging with the united front system must be understood in the Party’s terms as an explicitly political activity rather than as ordinary civil society or private sector activities in a democratic society.

More Wars, a Failed State, and a Step Back by the United States - Analysis

Daniel Byman

Someday, probably later rather than sooner, Israel and Hamas will stop shooting at each other. Relieved U.S. officials could claim there is a cease-fire and the worst is behind us, even if limited violence continues. More good things might follow. The Houthis would be reluctant to fight a war on behalf of Hamas that Hamas itself is not fighting, returning their focus to Yemen. The fighting in Lebanon, which surged after Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, might eventually subside.

All this would be a dramatic improvement over the deadly and devastating conflict in Gaza. Yet even a successful cease-fire would not put the Middle East back on the path it was on before Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7, as dismal as that seemed at the time.