12 July 2019

India’s defence planning has no clear strategic direction

Brahma Chellaney 

India’s new national budget accentuates its stagnant defence spending. India’s defence spending figure of $46.3 billion contrasts starkly with China’s $177.5 billion, underscoring the yawning power gap between the two. Indeed, India’s defence budget is smaller than even China’s trade surplus with it, highlighting the extent to which India underwrites China’s hostile actions against it.

To be sure, national security has little relationship with the level of defence spending. Bigger military outlays do not mean greater security. What matters is how the money is spent to boost indigenous capabilities, deter adversaries and project power. As a relatively poor country, India must balance national security demands with pressing socio-economic priorities.

The government has rightly sought to rein in defence spending. However, military modernisation continues to lag due to stalled defence reforms, with two-thirds of the defence budget earmarked just for salaries and other day-to-day running costs. On top of that, pensions cost $16.4 billion which is not part of the defence budget. The Army’s spending on modernisation, for example, has been a mere 14% of its budget.

India’s policy on data must focus on access, not physical location


In recent times, India, Japan and the United States have found themselves on the same side of the table, more often than not. So, when India declined to participate in the Osaka Track, the Japanese prime minister’s favourite initiative at the G-20 summit last month, it was something of an aberration.

Shinzo Abe wants to create a group of countries that will allow free flow of data across international borders. India declined, taking the view that such a conversation ought to take place under the WTO. The real stumbling block was the Indian government’s seriousness on data localisation.

Staying out of the Osaka Track was a prudent decision, but the Narendra Modi government’s presumption that data localisation is in the national interest requires a thorough reconsideration.

Very often, the way an issue is framed shapes people’s attitudes and government policies towards it. More so, if the framing is pithy and clever. Therefore, when the phrase “data is the new oil” gets tossed around social media, op-ed pages, board rooms, keynote speeches and international summits, it is normal to expect that people and governments will begin to guard data much like they would do oil wells. Facepalm.

A Decade on from the 2008 Mumbai Attack: Reviewing the question of state-sponsorship

Prem Mahadevan

On the night of 26 November 2008, ten Kalashnikov-wielding terrorists attacked Mumbai. They stuck simultaneously at five locations, shooting dead 140 Indians and 25 foreign tourists. American and British passport-holders were executed in two luxury hotel complexes.[1] At a Jewish cultural centre, Israeli nationals were tortured before being killed. A fourth location, a café frequented by Western backpackers, was enfiladed with automatic fire. Only at the city’s main railway station, the site of the largest number of deaths, were all the victims Indian. The gunmen seemed at war not just with India, but with the world.[2]

A decade later, the findings of several international police investigations and dozens of analytical studies triggered by the attack have been largely forgotten.[3] This paper seeks to help break this silence by presenting a detailed interpretation of what transpired, with particular focus on an inconvenient reality: the potential role played by state-sponsorship of terrorism. Throughout the discussion that follows, this paper switches between three different analytical views of the Mumbai attack. One perspective, which is most strongly-held in India, holds that it was a state-sponsored covert operation by a Pakistani intelligence agency. A second opinion, more frequently encountered among American and European analysts, takes the more limited view that ‘rogue’ elements within Pakistan’s intelligence service ISI were involved in the attack. Finally, there is the interpretation favoured by Pakistani officials, which holds that the Mumbai attack involved no state-based actors whatsoever.

India’s Deadly War on Experts


The air pollution in India is almost always bad, but in the winter it’s dire. For the last four national elections, Indians voted in late spring. Perhaps that is why national politics has seen so little attention paid to the ever-worsening air pollution. Nowhere in the world are there more deadly particles in the air than north India, where hundreds of millions of people live. But if you only listened to political campaigns and never looked to the sky or took a breath, you might miss the threat altogether.

In May, India finished its elections, returning Prime Minister Narendra Modi to power for five years with a parliamentary majority. In two ways, this election was an outlier. For one, air pollution has been unseasonably bad this spring. There were not as many particles in the air in May as there were last winter, but there were enough to qualify as an emergency—anywhere outside of Indian politics.

The Islamic State in South and Southeast Asia

Antonio Talia 

The heinous terrorist attacks against churches and hotels that killed 258 people and injured at least 500 in Sri Lanka on Easter Day, caused political turmoil and confirmed a worrying trend already on the rise in the last years: for Islamic State (IS), South and Southeast Asia are the next hotbeds of jihadism, and are an area where the terrorist organisation can sponsor local groups and merge its brand with local guerrillas.

After the attacks, the semi-official Amaq News outlet of the Islamic State took credit for the bombings, releasing pictures and videos of the attackers: their profiles – they all came from local, wealthy Muslim families – increased the jingoistic propaganda spread in several Southeast Asian countries, depicting the Muslim minorities as part of a wider conspiracy led by Middle Eastern powers to eradicate Buddhism and Hinduism, and finally convert the whole area to Islam.



How should Washington deal with an authoritarian regime that is expanding its influence abroad and repressing its citizens at home? That is the question the United States faces today in dealing with Xi Jinping’s China. But it is not a new challenge. After World War II, the United States faced another authoritarian state intent on expanding its borders, intimidating its neighbors, undermining democratic institutions, exporting its authoritarian model, and stealing U.S. technology and know-how. The result, after a period of initial debate and uncertainty in U.S. policy, was the Cold War: a 40-year competition over power, influence, and the contours of global order.

As tensions between Beijing and Washington harden, there is a growing fear that China and the United States are entering a new cold war—another multi-decade struggle to shape the international system. There is also a growing debate about who or what is responsible for the deterioration in the relationship. Is it the vaulting ambition and personalistic rule of Xi Jinping? The nature of Communist rule in China? The tragic qualities of international relations? America’s own behavior and global ambitions?

China’s Overrated Technocrats


Many Western parliaments are dominated by people with law degrees, but China’s leaders are mostly trained as engineers and scientists—or so goes conventional wisdom. Advocates for this supposed Chinese approach, such as the entrepreneur Elon Musk, argue that it produces leaders who adopt a pragmatic and technocratic framework to solving problems. And those scientist-politicians, the theory goes, are more likely to govern efficiently, in part because they are unburdened by ideology.

But advocates for China’s supposed technocracy are not only wrong about the background of Beijing’s current leadership. They are also fundamentally mistaken about how their training shapes policymaking. China’s leaders today—including President Xi Jinping himself—have been molded less by their education and more by the need to consolidate control and prevail in the brutal internal power struggles of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Value of Global China


At a time when the risks of international engagement are more obvious than ever, China faces important questions about whether – and to what extent – it should continue to pursue opening up its economy to the rest of the world. At stake may be some $22-37 trillion in economic value – or 15-26% of world GDP – by 2040.

SHANGHAI – Over nearly 40 years of economic reform, China has reaped extraordinary rewards from opening up to the world. Integration into the global economy – albeit a supporting element of the country’s broader historic turn to the market mechanism – has enabled millions of China’s citizens to escape poverty, while transforming China into the world’s largest economy in purchasing power parity terms. And the potential of such engagement is far from depleted, our new research shows. 

Can Multilateralism Survive the Sino-American Rivalry?


The US-China trade and technology war has invited comparisons to the Cold War. For international organizations, the lesson of great-power rivalries is to focus on facilitating cooperation toward specifically defined goals, rather than attempting to establish new broad-based rules.

OXFORD – The strategic rivalry between the United States and China poses a sharp challenge to international organizations, which are now at risk of becoming mere pawns of either power. Whether multilateral institutions can retain a role in facilitating desperately needed international cooperation remains to be seen.

The Sino-American conflict is already replacing globally agreed rules with the exercise of raw power, as each side wrestles for access to resources and markets. The US is eschewing long-standing trade agreements in favor of unilaterally imposed measures. China is carving out its own economic and geostrategic sphere through bilateral partnerships and aid, trade, and investment packages under its transnational Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).


The U.S. Army is radically changing both military culture and the conduct of operations in their incorporation of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). U.S. Army Pacific Commander General Robert B. Brown described the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) as “a significant step toward integrated, joint formations,” and declared that “we are driving the progress toward the changing nature of warfare.” The Army’s MDTF includes: a more robust incorporation of cyber and electronic warfare in various echelons of Army units; an expansion of the personnel and resources devoted to space operations; and new ways to conduct anti-ship operations from land with precision long-range fires. The concept is very different from the way that the Army approaches large-scale land warfare with major formations, fixing forces, blocking forces and decisive forces. In the Indo–Pacific theater, however, MDTF facilitates joint MDO. 

This monograph briefly examines U.S. Army efforts to develop operating concepts and conduct MDO at different levels of war, then takes a more extensive look at how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has adopted the concept of multi-domain warfare and analyzes the capabilities of the PLA to counter the Army’s nascent MDTF. 

Analysis and Publications

by Raymond Yamamoto

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013 is among the most ambitious global visions promoted by one country. The general goal of BRI is the provision of economic infrastructure worth at least $1 trillion to improve the land and sea routes between Asia, Africa, and Europe. In order to attract additional international investments to finance the initiative, China even created a multilateral bank – the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) — in 2015. However, China’s ambitious BRI strategy has met considerable criticism from politicians and policy-makers, journalists, analysts, and scholars. These criticisms include accusations of pursuing debt-trap diplomacy to gain concessions from countries participating in BRI. The decision of Sri Lanka in 2018 to lease Hambantota port to China in order to reduce its BRI debt burden is often cited as a prime example. Together with growing Chinese military strength and assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, BRI is being framed as an instrument deployed by China to build up its global dominance.

5G and the US–China Tech Rivalry – a Test for Europe’s Future in the Digital Age

Until late last year, most Europeans only knew Huawei as one of many smartphone manufacturers gaining ground in stores across the continent. But in recent months, the tech giant has turned into a symbol of a high-stakes wrestling match between the world’s premier superpower, the United States, and its increasingly ambitious and capable challenger, China. Indeed, the impending rollout of 5G infrastructure has become a key battleground in a broader struggle for control over the industries of the future. Europe has meanwhile been caught on its back foot and urgently needs to develop a strategy to not only guide it through the current 5G debate, but also the tech rivalries that are still to come.

With dramatically higher data transfer speeds and decreased latency, 5G carries the promise of revolutionizing all spheres of daily life: from self-driving vehicles to health­care to the “internet of things” and the digi­tali­zation of industrial production processes and so-called smart cities. Huawei currently leads the field in 5G infrastructure and as such, for the first time in modern history, China is in a prime position to lead the world in the rollout of a potentially game-chang­ing technology. This prospect has caused fierce pushback from Washington and jit­ters across Europe and much of the West.

Cyber Warfare Threat Rises As Iran And China Agree ‘United Front’ Against U.S.

Last week, the ICT ministers of Iran and China met in Beijing in order to discuss “common challenges” in the face of “US unilateralism.” The countries looked into “ways to boost cooperation in the field of information technology and countering threats in cyberspace—and agreed to establish a joint workgroup to survey and counter those threats,” Iranian state media reported.

As a result of these developments, these two Untied States adversaries may eventually begin coordinating offensive cyber campaigns targeting US systems, which could lead to further escalations in cyberspace. The timing of the announcement is significant, since tensions between the US and Iran have escalated in recent weeks, while Washington is also engaged in fierce technological and trade competition with Beijing.

Tense U.S.-Iran Relations Have Put the Middle East on the Brink

After U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran initially reacted by seeking respite from Europe and trying to wait out the Trump administration. But with European attempts to keep the deal afloat floundering, and amid increasingly bellicose rhetoric out of Washington, Iran has shifted gears in recent months. Find out more when you subscribe to World Politics Review (WPR).

In May 2018, when U.S. President Donald Trump followed through on a campaign promise to withdraw the U.S. from the 2015 multilateral deal limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment program, Tehran initially reacted by adopting a posture of strategic patience. But after European attempts to keep the deal afloat failed to deliver any respite from the U.S. campaign of “maximum pressure,” and amid increasingly bellicose rhetoric out of Washington, Iran has shifted gears in recent months.

Tensions rose dramatically in May and June, after a series of attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman that Washington blamed on Iran prompted the U.S. to send additional troops to the region. Soon thereafter, Iranian forces shot down a pilotless U.S. drone it claims was operating in its airspace. Most recently, Iran announced it had breached its obligations under the nuclear deal for the first time, exceeding limits on its stockpile of enriched uranium.

Is Iran’s Nuclear Program Back for Good?

By Philip H. Gordon

The demise of the Iran nuclear deal does not make Tehran an immediate threat, but it opens the door to nuclear escalation.

The main provisions of the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), are now no longer being carried out. CFR Senior Fellow Philip H. Gordon assesses what this means and what comes next.
Does this latest announcement that Iran is breaking the uranium enrichment limits set by the nuclear agreement mean the deal is effectively over? 

In practical terms the JCPOA is dead—at least for now. The United States has withdrawn from the agreement and, through its secondary sanctions on other countries doing business with Iran, it is preventing other parties from upholding their commitments. And now Iran is no longer abiding by some of the deal’s core provisions.

Both sides could sooner or later return to compliance, but the deal’s main provisions—international sanctions relief in exchange for Iranian nuclear restraint—are no longer being implemented. 

Will the European Union ease or tighten sanctions in response? 

Pentagon to Get Its Fourth Leader in Six Months


Navy Secretary Richard Spencer is preparing to become the U.S. Defense Department’s fourth leader in just six months, at a time when some experts say the United States can ill afford another acting defense secretary.

Spencer, a former Marine aviator and career businessman, is expected to assume one of the most prominent cabinet secretary positions on a temporary basis in coming weeks while U.S. President Donald Trump’s latest nominee, Mark Esper, enters the confirmation process—and at an especially tumultuous time. The U.S. military came within minutes of a conflict with Iran in June, after Tehran shot down a surveillance drone over the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the administration is trying to shore up additional support from allies in Syria amid the possible resurgence of the Islamic State. Washington is also locked in a kind of cold war with Beijing, as China continues island building and other provocative behavior in the South China Sea.

Within the department, 20 of the Pentagon’s top jobs are vacant or held by temporary or acting officials. Most recently, Adm. William Moran, who was set to become the Navy’s top military officer, resigned due to a probe into his relationship with a former officer accused of sexual harassment.

How to lose friends and not influence people

HAVING THE current foreign secretary and his predecessor locked in a battle to be prime minister makes this an awkward time for Britain’s Foreign Office. To make matters worse, it now has to hunt for the mole responsible for a deeply embarrassing leak of dispatches from the country’s ambassador to Washington, Sir Kim Darroch. Just when it should be preparing for a post-Brexit “Global Britain”, the Foreign Office finds itself fighting fires both at home and in relations with the countries it most needs to cultivate.

In truth Sir Kim’s cables assessing President Donald Trump and his policies, covering a period from 2017 to today and leaked on July 6th in the Mail on Sunday, revealed little that has not been said frequently in the press. Still, coming from a top British diplomat, the assessments make juicy reading. Sir Kim describes the Trump administration as “dysfunctional” and “diplomatically clumsy and inept”, and does not expect that to change. A memo from June 2017 described reports of “vicious infighting and chaos” inside the White House as “mostly true”. He depicts Mr Trump as “radiating insecurity”. More recently, Sir Kim warned that, although the president may have been dazzled on his recent state visit to Britain, America would continue to follow its self-interest in negotiations for a post-Brexit trade deal: “This is still the land of America First.”

Britain, France Agree to Send Additional Troops to Syria


In a major victory for U.S. President Donald Trump’s national security team, the United Kingdom and France have agreed to send additional forces to Syria to pick up the slack as U.S. troops withdraw, sources familiar with the discussions told Foreign Policy.

Britain and France, the only other U.S. partners that still have ground forces in Syria, will commit to a marginal 10 to 15 percent troop increase, a U.S. administration official confirmed. Other countries may send small numbers of troops as well, but in exchange the United States would have to pay, the official said.

Neither the timeframe for the deployment nor the exact number of additional troops is clear, the official said, adding that “overall we have been disappointed” in efforts to persuade U.S. allies to commit additional resources to the ongoing fight against the Islamic State terrorist group in Syria.

Command of the Sea

By George Friedman 

Command of the sea is the foundation of American national security. Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the greatest strategist in American history, identified it as the core American interest (though he wrote before the war on terrorism began and before the development of nuclear weapons). The United States, he argued, can be threatened only by an enemy naval force that could both invade its territory and curb its access to the oceans. Therefore, the foundation of America’s national security, as with Britain’s, had to be the command of the sea.

Indispensable Sea Lanes

Command of the sea guarantees security and trade. Ancient Rome certainly understood as much, focused as they were on controlling Mare Nostrum (or Our Sea, referring to the Mediterranean), which forced North African threats like Carthage to attack Rome on its flanks and ensured access to Egyptian crops. The land routes around the Mediterranean were powerful but slow. The naval routes were rapid but lighter, and commercially, they were indispensable

Can Tariffs and Sanctions Lead to a Better Climate Change Strategy?

Neil Bhatiya

A little more than two years since he announced in the Rose Garden that the United States was “getting out” of the Paris climate change agreement, President Donald Trump was in Japan, the sole leader at the G-20 summit to disagree with a modest communiqueonce again committing the international community to taking on climate change. It laid bare America’s isolation under Trump on an issue that much of the world—and indeed more and more of the American public—consider increasingly dire

A New Americanism

By Jill Lepore 

In 1986, the Pulitzer Prize–winning, bowtie-wearing Stanford historian Carl Degler delivered something other than the usual pipe-smoking, scotch-on-the-rocks, after-dinner disquisition that had plagued the evening program of the annual meeting of the American Historical Association for nearly all of its centurylong history. Instead, Degler, a gentle and quietly heroic man, accused his colleagues of nothing short of dereliction of duty: appalled by nationalism, they had abandoned the study of the nation.

“We can write history that implicitly denies or ignores the nation-state, but it would be a history that flew in the face of what people who live in a nation-state require and demand,” Degler said that night in Chicago. He issued a warning: “If we historians fail to provide a nationally defined history, others less critical and less informed will take over the job for us.”

Cyber Strikes Do Not Equate to Cyber Warfare

In response to Iran’s attacks on oil tankers and the downing of a surveillance drone, the United States Cyber Command launched cyber attacks against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s missile systems, according to news reporting

Per sources, the attack crippled computers used to control some of Iran’s rocket and missile launchers. Iran immediately denied that the attack was successful, although officials confirmed that cyber attacks were transpiring. Details of how this attack was deployed remains vague, as such military equipment is generally considered a hard target not easily accessible by remote operations. Even the 2010 Stuxnet attack required a person direct access to the target to deploy the malware via a USB key. However, some have pointed out the interconnected nature of these weapons systems (e.g., radars, command and control systems, etc.) which may have at one time been connected to the Internet. It will likely be a while before more details emerge.

Israel Publicly Threatens Iran With F35s, But The Cyber War Is Already Underway

Zak Doffman 

"Iran has recently threatened the destruction of Israel," Benjamin Netanyahu said on Tuesday (July 9), filmed in front of an F35 fighter jet at the Nevatim Air Force Base near Be'er Sheva. "But these planes," he warned, "can reach anywhere in the Middle East—including Iran and Syria."

Meanwhile, Israel's cyber capabilities have not been held back. Almost all of the real action is taking place behind the scenes, as the integration of cyber and conventional warfare has developed this year as never before. And this has introduced a new media dynamic—what is being seen is one dimension, one slice, you see what those controlling the narrative want you to see.

In his F35 video, Netanyahu was responding publicly to the threat made a week earlier by Mojtaba Zolnour, head of Iran's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, that "if the U.S. attacks Iran, Israel will have only half an hour left to live."

Russian Military Plans Swarms Of Lethal 'Jihadi-Style' Drones Carrying Explosives

Zak Doffman 

In May, I reported that the Iranian-backed terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad had released a video purporting to show an IED being dropped from a small drone onto Israeli tanks on the Gaza border. The terrorist threat from drones is a serious concern to authorities around the world, with the vulnerability of aircraft and crowded spaces a particular cause for concern.

Now, Russia's military has decided to get in on the act, taking a lesson from the militants it has also faced in the Middle East, arming its own miniature (read domestic-sized) drones as a new battlefield tactic. A spokesperson for the Defense Ministry told Izvestia that it is exploring the use of such drones to deliver lethal payloads.

Such small devices are already used for surveillance and reconnaissance. But Russia's plan is for such drones to "strike targets with bombs—making mini-UAVs extremely effective weapons." Russia envisages all branches of its military having access to the devices, with special forces the first to benefit—the defense spokesperson confirmed that "miniature bombs are being developed" for the drones, which will be modified to carry them.

Quantifying Lethality on the Back of a Napkin

By Edward H. Carpenter & Jessica M. Libertini

Lethality is one of the latest buzzwords to gain traction in the Department of Defense. It was quietly inserted into the department’s 2018 mission statement, and former Secretary of Defense James Mattis touted lethality as his number one line of effort while launching a Task Force focused on increasing it. But exactly what is lethality?

The textbook definition, according to the Oxford Dictionary, is:

Lethality, noun. The capacity to cause death or serious harm or damage. Example, 'the increasing lethality of modern weapons.'

Lethality is a subject of interest in various fields. Medical researchers, for example, use the term when evaluating how well an antiviral reduces the lethality of an infection, or when evaluating the outcomes of various suicide attempts; law enforcement personnel use it to express the deadliness of different types of criminal assaults. The common thread in all these definitions is, of course, the death of a person.

America's Best STEM-Educated CEOs? They're The Military's Four Star Officers

Michael T. Nietzel 

In an age where technology, scientific discoveries and data play increasingly essential roles in economic growth, national security and general well-being, advanced education in Science-Technology-Engineering-Math (STEM) fields has become a highly desirable asset for America’s leaders.

Among leading chief executives, the senior commanders of the U. S. military stand heads and shoulders above their CEO peers when it comes to STEM education. Compared to governors, big-city mayors, university presidents, major philanthropic foundation heads, press titans and the CEOs of the nation’s biggest companies, it’s the highest ranking officers in the military–the four-star officers–who possess the strongest STEM backgrounds.

Currently, the U.S. military has 42 four-star officers, which includes 31 generals (fourteen in the Air Force, twelve in the Army, and five in the Marines), and 11 admirals (eight in the Navy, two in the Coast Guard and one in the Public Health Service). Here's a quick summary of their education credentials.

Undergraduate education of active four-star officers

Navy Arms Destroyers With New High-Powered Laser - Changes War Tactics

By Kris Osborn - Warrior Maven

(Washington, D.C.) If swarms of enemy small attack boats armed with guns and explosives approached a Navy ship, alongside missile-armed drones and helicopters closing into strike range, ship commanders would instantly begin weighing defensive options - to include interceptor missiles, electronic warfare, deck-mounted guns or area weapons such as Close-in-Weapons System.

Now, attacks such as these will also be countered with laser weapons being added to the equation, bringing new dimensions to maritime warfare on the open sea.

Navy developers tell Warrior development of HELIOS is happening on an accelerated timeline.

"HELIOS is a Maritime Accelerated Acquisition effort that is currently in its development phase. HELIOS has successfully completed its preliminary design review and is proceeding toward its critical design review," Anna Taylor, Naval Sea Systems Command, told Warrior in a written statement.


Back in May, in a rare set up for a smooth transition in an administration characterized by “acting” officials, gapped billets, backlogged confirmations, and general staffing disarray, Admiral Moran was confirmed by the Senate to be the next CNO once Admiral Richardson’s term ended.

And then last night, news broke that he is resigning after 38-years of service.

That is the “what” but not the “so what.” Here’s the “so what.”

What happened has laid bare a deep, structural rot in our Navy that I am not sure … no, I am sure … cannot and will not be fixed with the present civilian leadership we have. As a matter of fact, they are encouraging the rot they were – as part of the present administration’s charter – sent to repair.

Let’s dive in and review the wave tops. I’ve gone through a few drafts over the last 12-hrs after some raging over on twitter, but have waited for more information to come out this AM. The core issues remain the same, so let’s run with them.

On the Correct Use of Terms

By: Anne-Marie Brady


In 2017 a Chinese company, CEFC China Energy, made international headlines when Patrick Ho Chi-ping, the General Secretary of its non-profit wing China Energy Fund Committee, was arrested in the United States on charges of bribing officials at the United Nations, in Chad, and in Uganda (Hong Kong Free Press, November 21, 2017). CEFC China Energy is nominally a private company, albeit one with close government connections (Fortune, September 28. 2016). It epitomizes the close party-state-military-market nexus of the political system in China, wherein corporate interests serve the political agenda of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). CEFC China Energy has been involved in energy investments with the military’s “princeling” elite, and its affiliate China Energy Fund Committee is a pro-CCP think tank with ties to retired military intelligence officers (South Sea Conversations, January 17, 2017).

CEFC China Energy and its subsidiary appear to have used investments and other economic inducements to buy local influence over policies in a number of states (Sinopsis, June 26, 2018). In the Czech Republic, CEFC chairman Ye Jianming was even installed as a “special adviser” to the Czech president (Sinopsis, February 8, 2018). Not long after Patrick Ho’s downfall, Ye Jianming was detained for questioning in China (SCMP, March 1, 2018). All CEFC’s assets have now been transferred to the state-owned CITIC group, underlining the company’s close connections to the CCP government (Global Voices, March 15).

Military Review

o Reinvigorating the Army’s Approach to Command and Control: Leading by Mission Command (Part II)

o Risky Business: Commercial Support for Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations

o Putting the Fight Back in the Staff

o Multi-Domain Information Operations and the Brigade Combat Team: Lessons from Cyber Blitz 2018

o Return of Ground-Based Electronic Warfare Platforms and Force Structure

o Of Strong Men and Straw Men: Appraising Post-Coup Political Developments

o The Cost of Tolerating Toxic Behaviors in the Department of Defense Workplace