2 July 2022

The Marshall Plan and the Belt and Road Initiative: More differences than similarities

Sienna Nordquist


China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often directly compared to the United States’ postwar Marshall Plan. The comparison is made due to the BRI’s scale, global infrastructure investment ambitions, and geopolitical and security ramifications. But how accurate is this analogy, and what do the similarities and differences between the two infrastructure programs tell us about the economic and political anxieties of our time? While there are far more differences than agreements between the BRI and the Marshall Plan, the impetus behind both initiatives reveals important parallels between the postwar reality and post-financial crisis global posture. Through the analysis of several examples, this issue brief provides crucial insights as international political and business leaders once again call for a “new Marshall Plan”—this time to rebuild Ukraine should Russian aggression end.

Comparing the Marshall Plan and the BRI

There are more differences than similarities between the Marshall Plan and the BRI.

First, the method of financing for the two programs are polar opposites. The Marshall Plan was mostly financed through concessions, where countries received funds through grants or in-kind subsidies. The BRI instead relies on loans and liquidity support from the People’s Bank of China.

China’s Vast Maritime Claims Are Becoming Reality

Raymond Powell

On June 13th, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin held an extraordinary press conference in which he made a series of audacious statements about the sprawling reach of Beijing’s territorial sovereignty and administrative authority. Placed in the context of China’s other recent actions and statements, the incredible size and shape of its regional ambitions are brought into sharp relief.

In simple terms, Beijing is determined to thoroughly dominate its region.

Wang began by addressing Canada’s protests over China’s harassment of its reconnaissance aircraft, which were enforcing United Nations sanctions of North Korea. It was China, Wang countered, that had reason to be “threatened” by “the Canadian military aircraft that flew thousands of miles to harass China at its doorstep.”

This is patent nonsense, of course. China voted for the U.N. sanctions in question, together with the “enhanced vigilance” against illicit petroleum transfers the unarmed Canadian plane was deployed to ensure. This wasn’t about threats to China. Rather, it was part of a brazen pattern designed to deter and intimidate foreign ships and aircraft from operating legally in China’s rapidly growing sphere of influence – specifically the international sea and airspace that China wants the world to accept as its own sovereign territory.

Why Does Israel Keep Assassinating Iranian Officials? Because It Works.

Danielle Pletka

On Sept. 11, 1962, German rocket scientist Heinz Krug disappeared from his office in Munich, never to be seen again. Like several other veterans of the Nazi missile program, Krug was working for the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose nation had already fought two wars with the young state of Israel. The backstory is long and complicated—involving Benito Mussolini, Eva Perón, and hidden Nazi gold—but the short version is that the Mossad, Israel’s chief intelligence agency, recruited a Nazi once close to Adolf Hitler to knock Krug off.

But, although it might have been Israel’s most film noir-worthy tale of assassination, it certainly wasn’t its last. This year, in late May and June, seven individuals affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including two colonels, were killed in separate incidents. Iran, unsurprisingly, has fingered the Mossad in most of the deaths.

Assassination has long been a vital tool in Israel’s arsenal. Just as Israel was emerging as a state in 1948, United Nations negotiator Folke Bernadotte was killed by members of the Lehi gang, which included a man who would later become an Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir. (Bernadotte was promoting alternatives to the U.N. partition plan that Lehi feared might gain traction.)

Yes, We Need to Talk About Cutting Energy Demand

Jason Bordoff and Meghan L. O’Sullivan

Germany put its energy sector on war footing last week, warning of impending shortages as Russia further tightens deliveries of natural gas to Europe. By reducing Europe’s ability to fill inventories that will be needed when winter comes, Russia is boosting its leverage to weaponize energy exports as part of its campaign to conquer Ukraine and break Western resistance. In escalating the gas system to the second-highest “alarm” stage—one step away from government energy rationing—German Energy and Economics Minister Robert Habeck called on Germans to “make a difference” by voluntarily changing their consumption behavior to conserve energy.

Habeck hit on a critically important and underappreciated solution to today’s energy crisis. Unlike many approaches being adopted, increasing efficiency can simultaneously reduce Russian leverage, counteract high energy prices, and curb carbon emissions to address climate change. In fact, efficiency and conservation gains—from adjusting the thermostat and driving less to smart digital controls and insulating buildings—are among the fastest, cheapest, and easiest ways to deal with all of these challenges. With a far worse energy crisis still to come, policymakers around the world should make reducing energy consumption in the short, medium, and long term a central component of any strategy. Unfortunately, Germany’s call on citizens and companies to conserve energy is the exception to the approach being taken by most countries to cope with looming energy shortages.

New Google Division Will Take Aim at Pentagon Battle-Network Contracts


Google is creating a division to help win more federal and state government contracts, including work for the Defense Department’s battle networks, company officials announced Tuesday.

The Google Public Sector division will help add employees and facilities with the security clearances necessary to bid on Pentagon work, Google Cloud CEO Thomas Kurian told Defense One.

“By bringing this into a separate division it allows us to bring more resources to support missions and programs more effectively today,” Kurian said. “For example, if you want to serve…certain kinds of programs, you need employees with clearances that operate in a secure facility. Those are things we do have but this allows us to scale up much more quickly and also brings focus in a specific unit that can do that and help the government with them.”

Global Migration Is Not Abating. Neither Is the Backlash Against It

The European refugee crisis of 2015 has long since abated, and some of Europe’s leading figures on the far right from that time, like Italy’s Matteo Salvini and the Netherlands’ Geert Wilder, have lost relevance as a result. Nevertheless, other far-right populists—like France’s Marine Le Pen and, more recently, Eric Zemmour—continue to hammer on anti-immigrant sentiment to fuel their electoral ambitions.

In the aftermath of a global pandemic that at least initially inhibited migrants’ mobility, it is not clear the issue will continue to have the same impact as it did in 2015, when more than 1 million refugees and asylum-seekers arrived in Europe from Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. Still, the populist narrative of immigration as a threat is enough to keep centrist governments toeing a tough line on the issue at home, even as they work with countries of origin and transit to restrict migration. And Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko recently demonstrated the continued salience of that “threat narrative” when he tried to “weaponize” migration by encouraging refugees from Iraq to travel to the Polish border, where many were left stranded in freezing conditions.

An Opinion Series on Innovation: How the Intelligence Community Kills Ideas


OPINION — I recently saw a creative idea killed. Like a professional hit, the kill was silent and non-attributable. Managers essentially neutralized the employee—let’s call him Matt. I’m confident Matt will never make another suggestion, much less offer another game-changing idea, again.

Idea rejection in bureaucracies is often a clueless crime scene. There are no fingerprints because no one says, “No.” Managers and co-workers use passive-aggressive put-downs, grimaces, or admonishments like:We tried it before.

Don’t rock the boat; be a team player.

It won’t work here; we’re different.

The boss will never buy it.

We have mission to do—no time for this.

Ukraine: Think Deep Attacks Against Russian Logistics

Chuck de Caro

The current state of the Ukraine-Russian war has fallen into a see-saw struggle for small territorial gains, much like the War in Korea in 1952-53.

While the Ukrainians are now beefing up their capability for offensive naval operations in the Black Sea, as recommended in these pages months ago, those actions against the vulnerable Russian littoral left flank have yet to occur.

With those naval operations presumably soon at hand, the Ukrainians might be well advised to begin attacking the Russian war effort’s other great vulnerability: Logistics. Specifically, the Russian Rail System, and the command and control structure of the Russian Army’s Material Technical Support Brigades.

The Future of Military Satellites Lies in Modularity


The Ukrainian crisis has shed light on the criticality of space assets for military operations, with the hacking of Viasat’s KA-SAT numbing the ability of the Ukrainian armed forces in the early hours of the conflict. This episode illustrates how satellites transitioned from being supporting capabilities for ground operations to strategic warfare assets of their own. But in a context of increased threats and scrutinized public finances, military satellites must now respond to new imperatives: better responsiveness and an improved resiliency, in addition to cost-effectiveness. Satellite modularity may be the key to answering these new imperatives for the military space.

Military satellite development is a lengthy and costly process. To sustain long years of activity in space, satellite buses and payloads require a high level of customization and integration that leaves but little room to the use of standardized components. For military forces, this comes with a set of drawbacks.

Long development timescales with no upgradeability expose military assets to technological obsolescence with sensors often outdated months after they are placed on orbit. This means that military satellites often showcase outdated space technologies when compared to commercial counterparts, increasing the reliance of the military on commercial actors, at a financial cost.

House Armed Services Committee concerned with state of Navy cyber readiness

Mark Pomerleau

The House Armed Services Committee is pushing the Navy to create a singular and special work role dedicated to cyberspace matters and is willing to play hardball with the service to get it to do so, according to a provision in its version of the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act.

Not having such a specific role risks neglecting cyber and having a lack of institutional expertise both in the operations community and at top echelons of leadership, sources have indicated. Others argue the Navy is organized properly and the changes advocated by the HASC are unnecessary.

The Navy is currently the only service that does not have a dedicated military occupational specialty or, in Navy parlance, “designator” for cyber. Its cyber personnel are primarily resourced from its cryptologic warfare community — which is also responsible for signals intelligence, electronic warfare and information operations, among several mission sets — with additional roles resourced from information specialists and cyber warfare engineers. Cyber warfare engineers are not operators, but specialize in highly technical skills and development of tools.

Weapons of mass destruction: What will be new in the 2022 NATO strategic concept?

Rose Gottemoeller

This week’s NATO Summit in Madrid will launch a new Strategic Concept, NATO’s statement of its strategic goals and objectives, its purpose in life. With Russia threatening to use weapons of mass destruction, NATO’s approach to deterring chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks will be in the global spotlight. Will NATO have something new to say on deterrence, or stick to the past?

This summit was meant to be many things that it will not. NATO was going to focus its attention for the first time on China, to think through how best to sustain the defense of Europe while the United States pivots to the Indo-Pacific. The defense of Europe, in this setting, would remain important, but more the purview of the European NATO allies, a kind of strategic rear guard against the main action, countering China’s rising influence.

The NATO Summit was also meant to be the celebratory hand-off between Jens Stoltenberg, who has served skillfully as NATO Secretary General for eight years, to a new Secretary General. Perhaps, for the first time, the person selected would be a woman.



Over the forty years since its last comprehensive modernization in the 1980s, the U.S. Army has demonstrated its ability to rapidly respond to crises across the globe and within the U.S. homeland. As the Army looks ahead toward the next forty years, it must maintain its readiness to fight tonight while preparing for the necessities of the future battlefield. To balance between these competing demands, the Army has identified three overarching priorities to ensure it remains the preeminent global land force: people, readiness and modernization. Guided by its People First philosophy, the Army is ensuring it maintains a healthy, cohesive force, ready to deploy on a moment’s notice, while fielding the capabilities required for Soldiers to prevail on the battlefields of the future.


The Army’s number one priority is its people. In June of 2021, motivated by input received from Soldiers, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army made a joint statement before Congress announcing that the Army would be realigning its priorities to put people first, which would also enable improved readiness by creating a healthier, more cohesive force. This means focusing not just on Soldiers who are currently serving, but also on their families, Army civilians and veterans.

Conflict and Development in the Myanmar-China Border Region

This report by Kachinland Research Centre analyzes three towns on the Myanmar–China border: Kan Pai Ti and Loi Je in Kachin State and Mu Se in northern Shan State. They are key sites in the growing cross-border economic integration between the two countries, offering an opportunity to examine the political economy of the Myanmar-China border region and the challenges faced by local communities. The research highlights how increased cross-border flows of investment and commodities interact with local conflict and economic dynamics in Myanmar’s border regions. In doing so, it reveals how local communities, ethnic armed organizations, militia groups, the Myanmar military, and Chinese businesses interact with one another in everyday life.

Why North Korea Wants Battlefield Nuclear Weapons

Robert Kelly

North Korea has long been rumored to be working on smaller nuclear weapons. These could be deployed on a battlefield alongside traditional conventional weapons, adding significantly more destructive power to traditional military formations. Given that North Korea is technologically far behind its rivals, this makes military sense. Such ‘tactical’ or battlefield nukes help level the conventional playing field where NK is far behind.

But it is also risky. Even a small nuclear weapon used on a battlefield would still be a nuclear detonation. It is unclear how South Korea or the United States would respond – or even China, North Korea’s ostensible ally. Indeed, international relations theory has a term for this uncertainty around nuclear use – the ‘nuclear taboo.’ Nukes have been used only twice at the very beginning of the nuclear age (in 1945); they have since had a unique escalatory aura – a taboo. No one is really sure how an opponent would react if it were nuked. For example, the taboo has likely helped stay Vladimir Putin’s nuclear hand in Ukraine as he has conventionally struggled to win.

Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Sean Monaghan


Deterrence has been central to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategic concepts since the beginning. The first such concept, “Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area,” known as DC 6/1 and approved in December 1949, declared as its main objective: “To coordinate, in time of peace, our military and economic strength with a view to creating a powerful deterrent to any nation or group of nations threatening the peace, independence and stability of the North Atlantic family of nations.”2

The primary mechanism through which NATO sought to deter Soviet aggression was deterrence by punishment through the threat of American atomic weapons.3 Yet NATO’s focus on atomic weapons was not just about deterrence—it also strengthened its ability to defend itself if deterrence failed.4 NATO’s early emphasis on nuclear weapons stemmed from its assessment of the vast numerical superiority of Soviet forces in comparison to its own. As MC 14, the detailed strategic guidance that accompanied the first strategic concept, stated: “special emphasis must be laid on the necessity for developing methods to compensate for numerical inferiority.”5 MC 14 also assumed any war with the Soviet Union would be total in nature, which justified the strategic concept’s reliance on nuclear deterrence.6

Philippines-China energy sharing dead in the water


MANILA – In perhaps the clearest sign yet of outgoing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s fruitless strategic lean toward China, the outgoing leader’s chief diplomat has announced bilateral energy exploration talks in the South China Sea have collapsed.

“The President had spoken. I carried out his instructions to the letter: oil and gas discussions are terminated completely. Nothing is pending; everything is over,” Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. said in a major speech last week.

“We had both tried to go as far as we could – without renouncing China’s aspiration on his part; and constitutional limitations on my part. I shut down the shop completely,” the diplomatic chief added, warning of a “constitutional crisis” at home should Manila press ahead with resource-sharing with China within Philippine-claimed waters.

Between Russia and the EU, Kaliningrad is isolated by Putin’s war

Maximilian Hess

It is closer to Berlin than St Petersburg, the former Prussian royal capital that was only annexed by the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Kaliningrad, formerly Königsberg, is Russia’s western-most spur and the base for its Baltic fleet. The city’s hodgepodge of influences is evident on its main thoroughfare, Leninsky Prospekt, where the former stock exchange was turned into a Communist “Palace of Culture”. Construction on the House of Soviets, a famous brutalist building, began shortly after the city castle was demolished in 1968; it has never been completed.

Until recently, Leninsky Prospekt was also home to both a Kalinin Express fast-food joint, named for a long-standing ally of Stalin, Mikhail Kalinin (and the city’s present namesake), and an “Obama Pizza” restaurant, complete with Masonic eye. East meets west, à la Putin.

Cut off from Russia’s main landmass by Lithuania and Poland, Kaliningrad now faces major ramifications from Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the diplomatic and economic response of its neighbours, both of them members of the EU – and Nato.

The Future of the West Is in Question


Russia’s invasion of Ukraine surely heralded the end of an era of illusions. The subsequent criminal actions of the Russian army — the massacre of civilians in Bucha, Borodyanka, Mariupol and Irpin — have proven that post-Soviet Russia is not the country the West had imagined. A confluence of old-fashioned nationalism, imperialism and colonialism supercharged by hyper-modern propaganda tools: This is the image of a 21st-century totalitarian state. It is the true face of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and one must be a cynic not to recognize it. And yet, just diagnosing the disease is not a cure. It is not enough for us to discard our illusions regarding Russia, we must also cast off the illusions toward ourselves.

More than 120 days have passed since the beginning of the war. Ukraine and its military can be proud of the steadfast resistance they have put up against one of the supposedly most powerful armies in the world. On Feb. 24, no one gave the Ukrainians a chance of more than several days of survival. Meanwhile, they not only defended Kyiv, but pushed back the enemy far to the east.

However, only now have we reached the critical point of this conflict. Many assumed that Putin’s aim was a blitzkrieg and the seizure of all Ukraine. Russia’s enormous potential notwithstanding, taking control of a country as large as Ukraine, with more than 40 million inhabitants, would always be a nearly impossible task. However, Russia’s main objective remains not only that of paralyzing Ukraine but of further destabilizing the West. And despite the successes of Ukrainian troops, Russia is moving forward with its central goal, destroying industry, roads and schools along the way. While Ukraine has surpassed expectations to fend off Russia for this long, unless the U.S. and Europe intervene more forcefully, a protracted war could mean not only Ukraine’s downfall but — in the long term — the rise of a new global hegemony, which will be able to marginalize the Western world.

Microsoft Reports on Russian Cyber War and Disinformation Efforts In Ukraine

Daniel Pereira

Last week, Microsoft released a report with an assessment of the cyber lessons learned in Ukraine since the inception of the conflict. A collaboration between Microsoft threat intelligence and data science teams, the report’s goals and conclusions are described in an Editor’s Note as:

Sharpening our understanding of the threat landscape in the ongoing war in Ukraine;

A series of lessons and conclusions resulting from the data gathered and analyzed;

New information about Russian efforts including an increase in network penetration and espionage activities amongst allied governments, non-profits, and other organizations outside Ukraine;

Details about sophisticated and widespread Russian foreign influence operations being used among other things, to undermine Western unity and bolster their war effort. We are seeing these foreign influence operations enacted in force in a coordinated fashion along with the full range of cyber destructive and espionage campaigns; and

Brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine has transformed cybersecurity - UK cyber chief


“The brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine has transformed the context of cybersecurity” worldwide, said British National Cyber Security Center CEO Linda Cameron.

Speaking at the Tel Aviv University Cyber Week on Tuesday, Cameron said that the lives of millions of innocent people are in jeopardy due to cyber threats, just like on the battlefield, but that “Ukrainian cyber defenders repelled the attacks and are real heroes.”

Even as the world is focused on the Russian threat to Ukraine and Eastern Europe, the UK cyber chief said, “We must not lose sight of the longer-term strategic challenges from China as a technological and economic power,” since Beijing is spreading across the globe with “cyber and technology for control.”

IDF official: Israel thwarted cyberattack targeting US power plants


Israel halted hackers from attacking US power plants, the deputy chief of the Israeli army's signals intelligence branch, Unit 8200, said at Tel Aviv University’s annual cyber week on Wednesday.

The IDF official said that his unit became aware of the cyber threat in the process of stopping another attack aimed at Israel.

“We also found that they were attempting to target US power plants as well. This was the first indication of this attack. It enabled preventing this threat, through tight collaboration with our fantastic American partners," Colonel U. told the audience, according to The Jerusalem Post.

He also explained how his unit dealt with the alleged Iranian attack in 2020 targeting Israel's water facilities.

Could the Russian cyber attack on Lithuania draw a military response from NATO?

Rowland Manthorpe

A NATO member is under attack.

Normally the meaning of this would be frighteningly clear, but this is an attack with a difference: not a physical attack, but a cyber attack; and working out what a cyber attack means is never simple.

The NATO member in question is the Baltic state of Lithuania, which was targeted on Monday by Russian hackers. According to the hackers, the attack is still going on.

Transport and media websites have been hit, as have the websites of various state institutions such as the Lithuanian tax service, which had to pause its operations yesterday.

A Russian hacker group known as Killnet claimed responsibility for the attacks, claiming on its Telegram channel that the attack was retaliation for Lithuania's decision to stop the transit of some goods to the Russian territory of Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast.

World War III will be a cyber war but the world isn't ready - comptroller


“World War III will be a cyberwar, but the world is not prepared for cyberattacks,” said Israel’s State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman on Wednesday.

During a panel at Cyber Week 2022, Englman gave a grim statement on the current state of public cyber security. “In a way, we all are living inside the global ‘Big Brother’ show,” he warned. “We are exposed. The citizens of the world have no protection. Our data are visible to too many people. Our money is exposed; our children are exposed; our health is exposed; our security is exposed.”

He explained that the vulnerabilities that the Israeli public faces in the cyber arena have inspired his decision to focus on cybersecurity in his official duties, noting that “in view of the growing cyber threats faced by the State of Israel in recent years, I have decided to place the cyber field as one of the core issues the [state] audit will address.”

Why Has China Increased Military Flights off Taiwan Coast?

Ralph Jennings

China has increased the number of military flights into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone at sea. Analysts believe the move is designed to send a message to the U.S. rather than to threaten the island itself, analysts say.

Since mid-2020, the People’s Liberation Army-Air Force has flown a small number of fighters and bombers over part of the Taiwanese air defense identification zone (ADIZ) almost daily.

But the island’s Ministry of National Defense says China flew 29 flights on Tuesday and 22 on Thursday. Maps released by the ministry indicate that on both Tuesday and Thursday at least one plane arced around the Taiwan south coast, though well offshore, before doubling back. The planes all went through a corner of Taiwan’s air defense zone at sea west of the port city Kaohsiung.

Semiconductors and Security

James Andrew Lewis

Many people know that China has spent hundreds of billions of dollars to build its own semiconductor industry and has committed billions more. Taiwan is spending $120 billion to build 20 new plants, including four cutting-edge semiconductor fabs, and is already breaking ground for the new plants. Japan and Korea have approved subsidies. Even the European Union, in its own Chips Act, a copy of U.S. legislation, has approved $46 billion in subsidies, and member states like Germany have allocated billions more. Only one country lags behind: the United States. This makes semiconductor funding a national security issue.

Congress, to its credit, passed two Chips Acts. Unfortunately, the two bills have major differences that need to be resolved in conference, and there are substantial disagreements. The first is the question of investment in China. Some legislators believe that any company that gets Chips Act funding should forswear future investment in China. This does not make any sense for national security. A Cold War analogy is misleading; in the Cold War, there was a clear bifurcation between democracies and communists, an “Iron Curtain,” with very little trade or exchange between them. There were two separate blocs. This bifurcation cannot be replicated now with China. The U.S. and Chinese economies are too closely intertwined, the global market is too interconnected, and other countries will not boycott low-risk sales or investments in the Chinese market.

Turkey lifts block on Finnish and Swedish NATO bids


MADRID — Turkey has lifted its objection to the NATO membership applications by Finland and Sweden, paving the way for the two countries to join the military alliance.

The three countries signed a memorandum of understanding in Madrid on Tuesday evening, ahead of a summit of NATO leaders.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted a shift in public opinion across northern Europe toward NATO, leading Helsinki and Stockholm to formally apply for membership in mid-May. But the Turkish leadership, citing concerns over the countries’ alleged support for Kurdish groups and arms embargoes, blocked the process.

On Tuesday, following weeks of talks, the three countries reached a deal, clearing the biggest hurdle holding up Finland and Sweden’s NATO bids. The progress is a blow to Russia’s stated ambition of rolling back NATO’s growth through its war in Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine: From the roots to the future

Xavier Tytelman and Eloïse Le Meitour

The bombs are falling and the number of graves is rising in Ukraine, while inhumanities are breaking out. On 24 February 2022, Vladimir Putin decided to bring the high intensity war up-to-date by invading Ukraine, under the cover of a “special military operation” and “denazification,” a dialectic far from reality that gathers all the characteristics of a war: a collective and organised armed violence, as Clausewitz described it. (1)
The beginning: The first signs in history

War is a race towards power. In the case of Russia, it is a will to recover a lost power. Historically, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus were all founded by the so-called “Rus of Kiev” during the 9th century, before the territory was divided. A large part of what we consider Ukraine today was invaded by Russia in 1654 thanks to the Treaty of Pereïaslav. The Russification of the territory was intensified during the 18th century, when many Russians settled in the area and Russia decided to limit the use of the Ukrainian language and forbid it in schools in 1874. This led to the renewal of an autonomist movement and a struggle for independence. Ukraine finally recovered its sovereignty for a few years, before it was fully integrated into the Soviet Union. Mass deportations and an organised starvation, which reduced the Ukrainian population by more than 5 million inhabitants in the 1930s, provoked the comeback of the independence movement. The Soviet Union had to fight until 1956 for the definitive annihilation of anti-communist partisan groups.

The Geopolitics of Hydrogen in the Indo-Pacific Region

Jane Nakano

Large energy consumers in the Indo-Pacific region and their traditional energy suppliers are examining the potential role of clean hydrogen in energy systems as well as their own potential roles in hydrogen supply chains. Several Asian governments are leading the charge in creating a clean hydrogen economy by releasing and executing hydrogen strategies and funding new projects, while others are beginning to articulate visions and strategies.

This report surveys national visions and strategies of leading Asian economies and their traditional energy suppliers and presents key implications of clean hydrogen development in the Indo-Pacific region. The report further offers recommendations on the role the United States could play in this rising market, including ensuring resilience and robustness in clean hydrogen supply chains, recognizing the energy security benefit of clean hydrogen exports from the United States, and ensuring the environmental sustainability in hydrogen value-chain creation.


U.S. Semiconductor Exports to China: Current Policies and Trends

Saif M. Khan

Executive Summary

The United States has long used export controls to prevent the proliferation of advanced semiconductors and the inputs necessary to produce them. Semiconductors underpin virtually all aspects of economic and technological development, therefore impacting national and international security. The United States and a small number of democratic allies are sole producers of advanced semiconductors and many key inputs necessary to manufacture them, creating the option of using export controls as nonproliferation tools. In particular, the United States has recently tightened semiconductor export controls on China, given the country’s efforts to build its own semiconductor industry to answer the demands of “Made in China 2025” and address overreliance of Chinese high-technology industries on imports for semiconductors.

Currently, the United States applies multiple types of semiconductor export controls on China. While these controls all involve lists, “list-based controls” is a term of art that refers to a list of specific technologies whose export is controlled. “End-use and end-user controls” refer to lists of prohibited end-uses for exported technologies and end-users that cannot receive exports. To export any controlled items, exporters must obtain export licenses—which can be denied by licensing officers.

Ukraine: the situation (June 27, 2022)


A second sub-salient of the Donbas salient, centered on the town of Borivske southeast of Lysychansk, has been closed by Russian forces. The Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) announced that Borivske had fallen.

Most of the 2,000 Ukrainian troops trapped since last week in the Hirske to Zolote sub-salient have been cleared out. The escape gap to the west has narrowed to ten from 25 kilometers a week ago.

The One China Policy Is A Lie

Michael Rubin

Seeking to both assuage China and to clarify confusion left by President Joe Biden’s off-the-cuff remarks about Taiwan, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan earlier this month reiterated America’s “One China” policy while speaking at a Washington think tank. He should not have.

Put aside the unseemliness of unelected, unconfirmed staffers correcting a sitting president – an action that only reinforces the notion among foreigners that Biden is senile and not in control of his own administration. The reality is that the One China notion was born from the ambition of Mao Zedong, chairman of China’s Communist Party, and Henry Kissinger, who as national security advisor helped broker détente with Beijing.

Four years before Sullivan was born, President Richard Nixon acquiesced to the One China idea in the Shanghai Communique. But Nixon’s agreement was never as clear as Beijing claims. Rather than unequivocally endorse Mao’s statement that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China,” Nixon said the “United States Government does not challenge that position” but instead “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.”