5 June 2022

7 Habits That Changed My Life

1. Waking up and going to bed early

I’ve been waking up around 5 am and going to bed around 9 pm for the past 6 years.

There are no distractions early in the morning and going to bed early keeps you out of trouble.

“Early to bed and early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise.” ― Benjamin Franklin.

“Go to bed early and wake up early. The morning hours are good.” ― Jeff Bezos

2. Limiting the number of decisions

I eat a lot of the same foods, wake up and fall asleep around the same time, exercise daily, and have worn the same jeans and style of shoes for 8 years.

Putin’s Hard Choices: Why the Russian Despot Can Neither Mobilize Nor Retreat

Michael Kimmage and Maria Lipman

Russian President Vladimir Putin has landed in an unenviable position. His country has the resources to inflict damage on Ukraine in perpetuity. But because the first phase of the war has been so costly for Russia and because Ukraine’s military is mounting such stiff resistance, Russia faces serious difficulty achieving anything meaningful on the battlefield without committing much more manpower than it currently has available.

Calling up large numbers of reservists while putting Russian society openly on a war footing solves the problem in theory. But it is something for which the Russian public is fundamentally unprepared. To date, Putin has referred to the war in Ukraine as a “special military operation” and held only one mass rally in support of the war. Full-out mobilization, which would make war an inescapable fact of Russian life, would revolutionize the regime Putin has constructed since coming to power in 2000. Putinism has been a formula: the government discouraged people from meddling in politics, while leaving them mostly on their own, and the people readily surrendered their responsibility for decision making. In 2014, he could achieve his military aims in Ukraine without radically redefining Russian politics. That is no longer an option.

Diagnosing Putin: What do we know about the health of the Russian president?

Tom Nagorski

What ails Russian President Vladimir Putin — if anything? A lot of people seem to think they know.

Hardly a day passes without fresh speculation about the health and welfare of the Russian leader. Putin has blood cancer; he has thyroid cancer; he has a brain tumor. He has Parkinson’s disease or early-stage dementia.

The symptoms? He doesn’t walk normally — or at least not the way he used to. He behaves irrationally and appears disoriented. His face is puffy, his posture isn’t right. He has hand and leg tremors. He disappears from public view.

A Telegram channel run by a former Russian foreign intelligence officer said Putin will soon undergo cancer surgery — the report goes so far as to identify the official who will stand in for Putin during the operation. A study prepared for the State Department more than a decade ago resurfaces; according to its author, Putin has Asperger’s Syndrome.

Forging A New Path For Pakistan–China Relations

Arif Rafiq*

When a suicide bomber killed three Chinese nationals and their Pakistani driver several weeks ago in Karachi, China–Pakistan relations were already being tested by Pakistan’s economic troubles and political instability, as well as the broader US–China rivalry.

The attack — claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army, a secular, ethnic Baloch separatist organisation seeking to secede from Pakistan and eliminate China’s economic and diplomatic footprint in the region — may be an inflection point in the two strategic partners’ relationship.

Pakistan’s new Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif reacted swiftly, visiting the Chinese embassy in Islamabad hours later to express solidarity. But Beijing was incensed. An editorial published in the state-run Global Times ‘strongly demand[ed]’ better protection for Chinese citizens and entities in Pakistan and warned that those targeting Chinese nationals will be hit hard.

36 experts agree: Stay the course in Ukraine


Over the past three months, the Ukrainians have thwarted Vladimir Putin’s effort to topple their duly elected government, take Kyiv and occupy much of the country. The battle is not over, however, so the West must continue to help ensure that the Kremlin’s aggression fails and that Ukraine forces a Russian withdrawal or achieves a negotiated outcome on terms acceptable to Ukrainians.

More than 30 of our fellow experts and national security professionals — whose digital signatures appear at the end of this op-ed — agree.

Russia’s egregious violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and numerous war crimes — from the indiscriminate bombardment of hospitals, schools and residential areas, to use of cluster and vacuum bombs, summary executions, widespread rape, mass deportations, including of children, and torture — have engendered strong popular support in the United States and other Western countries for Ukraine. The Biden administration and bipartisan leadership in Congress have risen to the challenge through close coordination with allies and partners in implementing punishing sanctions on Russia, supplying major weapons to Ukraine, strengthening NATO’s force posture on its eastern flank, and supporting the bids by Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Quick passage of the Lend-Lease Act and a $40 billion assistance package (that provides, among other things, $6 billion in military aid to Ukraine) provides a much-needed boost to Kyiv’s efforts but must also include stringent oversight to ensure proper use.

Should the United States Defend or Ditch Taiwan?

Lami Kim

President Joe Biden’s recent pledge to defend Taiwan has ignited renewed controversy. When asked if he “was willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan” during his visit to Asia on May 23, he answered yes, adding: “That’s the commitment we made.” His remarks are apparently in contradiction with “strategic ambiguity,” the decades-long U.S. policy toward Taiwan that is deliberately ambivalent about the extent of the United States’ commitment to come to the aid of Taiwan. Although the White House, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and later Biden himself denied that the statement reflects a change in U.S. policy, it is unclear whether this was another gaffe by the president or a deliberate statement aimed at enhancing deterrence against China (adding ambiguity to strategic ambiguity), particularly given that this was not the first time Biden expressed his commitment.

Is Missile-Driven Deterrence the Solution to the War in Ukraine?

Henry Sokolski

Ever since President Joe Biden first swore off fighting World War III (and creating no-fly zones over Ukraine), Washington nuclear intellectuals have enjoyed a momentary splash of relevance. Nuclear fear and loathing—i.e., nuclear mutual assured destruction and deterrence—are back. Vladimir Putin rattled his nuclear sabers. Initially, we blinked. Now, however, with Ukraine better armed and about to receive advanced missiles, the blinking is less intense.

Without quite thinking it through, Washington and Ukraine are transitioning from a war initially bounded primarily by nuclear threats to one being driven by conventional strike systems. Thus, strategic military breakouts by either side have been stymied less by dint of threatened nuclear attacks (which although frightening, are highly unlikely), than by the exchange of thousands of artillery rounds, drones, and rockets.

Both sides have used these weapons to strike armor, ships, cannon, and troops. Putin has gone further to use them to knockout Ukrainian maternity wards, children’s hospitals, nurseries, grocery stores, schools, theaters, cultural moments, and churches. He has fortified these “value” terrorizing raids with long-range strikes against Ukrainian electrical generation stations, shopping centers, factories, fuel, and food storage sites, and critical industrial and agriculture infrastructure. Russia’s aims? First, amp up international digital displays of darkness, hunger, and despair to deter Ukraine from shooting outside its borders and NATO and the United States from shooting in. Second, brutalize and grind Ukraine to force it and its friends to cave.

Artillery Duel: Who Will Win the Russian-Ukrainian War for the Donbas?

Kris Osborn

The Pentagon describes the current war in Ukraine as an “artillery duel” in which each side is firing stand-off projectiles at ranges out to 30km or more. Russian weapons such as rockets and missiles are able to travel hundreds of miles, but 155mm Howitzer cannons now possessed by Ukraine can fire as far as 30km, meaning Russian forces are now more vulnerable than they were previously.

Russia is making some uneven and insecure gains, yet the Pentagon effort to send large amounts of artillery is described as a specific response to what Ukrainian forces most need in the current fight.

“In the last several days, the Russians have made some incremental progress in and around the Donbas. They have not had a decisive breakthrough. And the Ukrainians are putting up a heck of a fight,” Dr. Colin Kahl, under secretary of defense for policy, told reporters, according to a Pentagon transcript.

Russia Warns Turkey Against Launching Northern Syria Offensive

Trevor Filseth L

Kremlin spokeswoman Maria Zakharova cautioned the Turkish government against launching a military intervention in northern Syria on Thursday, one day after Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced his intention to launch a punitive expedition into Syria targeting Kurdish militia units in two northern cities.

“We hope that Ankara will refrain from actions that could lead to a dangerous deterioration of the already difficult situation in Syria,” Zakharova said. “Such a move, in the absence of the agreement of the legitimate government of the Syrian Arab Republic”—referring to the Damascus-based government of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad—“would be a direct violation of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Imperial Overstretch: Has Xi Jinping’s China Gone Too Far?

Mark S. Cogan Paul Scott

If Deng Xiaoping were alive today, he would neither be pleased nor surprised. The pro-market reforms that launched China into a global power are being undone under Xi Jinping, curtailing growth for the sake of concentrating political power, spending far too much political capital on crushing dissent and punishing the last vestiges of democratic ambitions, and overextending China militarily in the Indo-Pacific.

Deng’s critical reforms were based on two fundamental beliefs, first, that communism in China could be saved by creating a vibrant economy and improving people’s lives, and second, without the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in charge, China would descend into chaos. When Wei Jingsheng went on trial in 1979 on charges of being a counter-revolutionary, the first sign was visible that the gaps between economic and political reform and the need for a Fifth Modernization, democracy, would not and could not be resolved.

U.S. Sanctions Curb Chinese Technology Exports to Russia

Raquel Leslie, Brian Liu

Major Chinese technology companies have quietly exited Russia in the face of U.S. sanctions threats, despite Beijing’s promise of a “no limits” relationship with Russia. Chinese drone maker DJI openly announced in late April that it was suspending its business operations in Ukraine and Russia. Other firms, laptop maker Lenovo and phone maker Xiaomi, have left Russia with less fanfare, halting shipments to Russia but without explicit announcements that they were doing so.

Chinese technology companies have faced pressure from the Chinese public and government to stay in Russia. The Chinese public has been largely supportive of the Russian war and has vocally called on Chinese tech firms to stand in solidarity with Russia. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce in April called on companies “not to submit to external coercion and make improper external statements.” Despite pressure from the Chinese public and official sources, the exit of these firms shows that Chinese companies have little appetite for running afoul of U.S. sanctions, particularly given that Chinese trade with Russia constitutes only 2 percent of China’s total trade.

Stoltenberg: Ukraine Conflict Turning Into a ‘War of Attrition’

Trevor Filseth

NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg warned on Thursday that the conflict in Ukraine had transformed into a “war of attrition,” and underlined the importance of continued American and European arms shipments to Kyiv.

In his remarks at the White House alongside President Joe Biden, Stoltenberg stopped short of predicting the conflict’s outcome, cautioning that “wars are by nature unpredictable.”

“Therefore,” he added, “we just have to be prepared for the long haul, because what we see is that this war has now become a war of attrition, where the Ukrainians are paying a high price for defending their own country … but also where we see that Russia is taking high casualties.”

Stoltenberg emphasized that NATO had a “responsibility” to continue aiding Ukraine. He also claimed that the war could only be resolved through diplomacy and a negotiated settlement between Russian and Ukrainian officials, although diplomatic talks between the two sides have largely stalled amid accusations of bad faith.

Israeli-Saudi Deal Over Two Islands Is a Step Toward Peace

Orde Kittrie

Israel and Saudi Arabia have reportedly agreed on a security arrangement enabling Egypt to transfer to the Saudis two strategic islands near Israel. In return for Israel’s acquiescence, Saudi Arabia is set to allow Israeli airlines to fly more frequently over its airspace. The deal is expected to be announced by President Joe Biden during his trip to the Middle East at the end of June.

While the two islands — Tiran and Sanafir — have no civilian inhabitants or known natural resources, tensions related to their strategic location contributed to two Arab-Israeli wars. Now, they could provide a stepping-stone to Arab-Israeli and indeed Muslim-Israeli peace. To capitalize on this opportunity, the Biden administration should encourage Saudi Arabia to take additional, public steps toward peace with Israel. There are several specific steps the Saudis should take, both in relation to the island transfer and in other arenas.
Causes of War

Weighing America’s ‘repivot’ away from Asia


SEOUL – US President Joe Biden last week wrapped up the first Asia tour of his administration with trips to South Korea and Japan, where pro-US governments in both Seoul and Tokyo staunchly reiterated their commitment to their American alliances.

But the trip came against the backdrop of a war in Europe that is consuming much of America’s political, diplomatic, military and media bandwidth.

Biden’s visit has been a long time coming. The two-nation visit, which included a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialog in Tokyo, followed three separate tours Biden has made to Europe. There, he has visited Belgium, Italy, Poland, the UK, Switzerland and Vatican City, and attended the G7 and NATO summits.

Turns Out It Is Not 85 Percent

Paul Rosenzweig

How much of the United States’ critical infrastructure is controlled by private owners? For many years, American leaders have repeated the statistic that 85 percent of all critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. They use this mantra as an implicit justification for a set of policy choices that lean toward private-sector control—as they should, if those statistics were accurate.

But the statistic itself seems to be the product of nothing more than early good-faith estimates. As I’ve noted on Lawfare before, the 85 percent figure has no clear factual grounding, despite the frequency with which it is cited. As far as one can tell, the earliest source of the 85 percent figure is the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, which offers no source or citation for its conclusion.

It is frustrating, to say the least, to make policy with bad data, with no data at all or with data that is merely based on good-faith conjecture. How much more valuable would it be if critical infrastructure security were, in fact, based on an accurate picture of the ownership of that infrastructure.

Artillery will decide the war in Ukraine


US President Joe Biden’s decision to send missiles to Ukraine is to help Kyiv’s war effort against Russia. But the time it has taken the White House to agree to send the weapons means there is a real danger that they could arrive too late to make a significant difference on the battlefield.

For weeks Ukrainian leaders have been calling on the West to provide heavy weapons to enable them to hold off Russia’s huge military offensive in the Donbas region. In particular, they have been asking for American-made Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), which have a top range of almost 300 kilometres – 10 times Ukraine’s current capabilities. The MLRS are meant to help Kyiv's forces target Russian artillery, which is playing a key role in Moscow's latest offensive.

Ukraine’s appeals to the Biden administration have been coming thick and fast ever since Moscow abandoned its original offensive to seize Kyiv in favour of concentrating its military strength in the country's eastern region.

Just Say No to “Friend-Shoring”


CHICAGO – In an important speech to the Atlantic Council in April, US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen issued a welcome call for revitalizing the world economic order. But she also generated headlines with a single sentence advocating what she called “friend-shoring”: that is, limiting the trade of key inputs to trusted countries in order to reduce risks to the supply chains on which the United States and its partners rely.

This should worry us. Today’s global supply chains – made possible by reductions in tariffs and lower transportation and communication costs – have transformed production by allowing firms to manufacture goods wherever it is cheapest to do so. This has generally meant that while high-value-added inputs (such as research and development, design, advertising, and finance) are sourced in advanced economies, manufacturing moves to emerging markets and developing countries.

The benefits are obvious. Final products are significantly less expensive, so even the poorest people in rich countries can buy them.

The Evolution of Russia’s Ukraine Strategy

Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco

The 2004 Orange Revolution, a wave of street protests that fueled the rise of a pro-Western government in Kiev, will likely be remembered by future historians as the very first modern episode in the drama that would eventually lead to the current Ukraine War. This turning point was enthusiastically supported by the West as a meaningful ideological victory for liberal democracy and ‒ above all ‒ as a geopolitical milestone in the Eastward march of both NATO and the EU. Needless to say, the shockwaves were powerfully felt in the Kremlin. Until then, Boris Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin, had been seeking some sort of accommodation with the West. Moscow offered flirtatious overtures to NATO, unilateral diplomatic concessions, and even support for the American military intervention in Afghanistan. Such gestures were seen in Washington and Brussels as a sign of weakness. After all, conventional wisdom dictated that, in the post-Cold War era, Russia was rapidly fading into irrelevance so disregarding what it had to say or what it wanted was an affordable luxury. Considering that Russia was a mere shadow of the impressive power once held by the Soviet Union, Moscow was not being taken seriously anymore.

Europe’s Oil Embargo Is Not Enough


PARIS – Vladimir Putin needs petrodollars, and he needs them now. Many expected Russia’s president to issue a formal declaration of war on Ukraine, a move that would permit the full mobilization of Russia’s reserve forces. But while Putin may want to send more soldiers to Ukraine, he cannot afford to do so. Will the European Union’s newly announced oil embargo force him to wind down the invasion?

Already, the Kremlin has toned down its propaganda. There is no more talk of taking Kyiv. Putin’s only goal now, apparently, is to occupy the eastern Donbas region. But even there, Putin is not guaranteed victory, as that is where Ukraine has launched its so-called Joint Forces Operation, which includes its best-trained military units – increasingly armed with advanced Western military equipment.

Russia, meanwhile, has lost much of its modern military equipment, and Western sanctions have left it unable to replenish its stocks. With few options, Russia is now unpacking Soviet-era tanks.

The Long Arm of Authoritarianism How Dictators Reach Across Borders to Shut Down Dissent

Yana Gorokhovskaia and Isabel Linzer

Last year was a particularly dangerous time to be a Belarusian political dissident—not just in Belarus, but anywhere in the world. In 2021, after months of violently cracking down on peaceful opposition protests at home, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko began exporting his repressive tactics abroad. His targets ranged widely, from longtime dissidents to novice critics. Although many of his efforts flew under the international radar, others attracted major public attention. In May 2021, for instance, Lukashenko’s regime concocted a false bomb threat to force a passenger airliner traveling between Greece and Lithuania to land in Minsk so that Roman Pratasevich, a young journalist and political activist on board, could be arrested on the tarmac. Later, during the Tokyo Olympics, Belarusian authorities tried to forcibly repatriate Krystsina Tsimanouskaya, a track and field athlete, after she criticized the national team’s coaching staff—and were only prevented from doing so by the Japanese police.

Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead? How the United States Should Navigate People-to-People Exchange in a New Era

Diana Fu

Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, advocacy-oriented civil society—those that press for rights associated with liberal democracies—in China has been placed under immense pressure. Based on synthesizing publicly available media articles and reports, this essay assesses whether rights advocacy civil society in China is effectively “dead” under the Xi Administration (2012-2022) and if and where opportunities still exist for people-to-people exchange. The essay argues that a key to analyzing the party-state’s response to advocacy civil society is to disaggregate two facets of threat: mobilizational and ideological. The former refers to civil society’s potential to threaten social stability through collective action while the latter refers to their ideas and values that threaten orthodoxy. In both Mainland China and in Hong Kong, rights advocacy organizations and networks have been amputated, but they are not “dead” in the sense of being permanently demolished. At the same time, the party-state has been actively re-molding educational and cultural institutions to ensure that the future generation of youth—a key pillar of civil society will be pro-CCP in their ideologies. Despite these developments, the essay identifies key issue-areas, actors, and institutions through which U.S. policymakers, U.S. civil society, and educational institutions can continue to engage with Chinese counterparts in a tense period and beyond.

White Hull Diplomacy in Gray Spaces

Commander Jeremy M. Greenwood And Lieutenant Commander Emily Miletello

Over the course of history, confusion, miscommunication, and accidents have led to significant armed conflicts. Today, the situation in the Indo-Pacific seems ripe for such an inadvertent and potentially catastrophic military escalation—particularly in interactions between the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the U.S. Coast Guard. Efforts to clarify operating procedures to guide interactions between the services have stalled, leaving these two capable forces operating in close proximity in a murky operational theater. This could be a recipe for disaster.
Failed Efforts To Establish Guardrails

Chinese and U.S. officials have acknowledged the risks posed by the evolving CCG and increased U.S. Coast Guard presence in the region. In 2016, officials from the two services met to negotiate a “rules of behavior” agreement (ROB) to govern interactions and decrease risk during unplanned encounters at sea. These agreements are routine, largely reflecting the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.

Why Japan Is Getting Tough on Russia Now

Tsuruoka Michito

One of the most remarkable outcomes to emerge from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is Tokyo’s tough response. The Japanese government of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has imposed an unprecedented level of economic sanctions against Russia, fully aligned with Japan’s G7 partners, including a freezing of the assets of Russia’s Central Bank and individual sanctions against President Vladimir Putin himself and those close to him. The measures represent a stark contrast to the response following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, when the Japanese government was led by former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.

Tokyo also expelled nine Russian diplomats in April 2022 in response to revelations about mass killings in Bucha, a city on the outskirts of Kyiv. Tokyo’s series of tough actions have taken many Americans and Europeans – not to mentioned Japanese themselves – by surprise. Nor did Russia seem to have anticipated this.

But CAN the United States defend Taiwan?

Michael E. O’Hanlon

President Joe Biden has yet again stated that if China attacked Taiwan to reunify what Beijing sees as a renegade province with the mainland, the United States would come to Taiwan’s military defense. White House staff has again followed up these off-the-cuff presidential comments with a “clarification” that in fact, strategic ambiguity remains American policy. Somewhat oxymoronically, the United States seeks to be crystal clear about being intentionally unclear about what we would do (evocative of British policy just before World War I on whether London would come to Paris’s aid, should France be attacked). The goal is to avoid emboldening Taiwan to provoke China even as we try to deter China in the event it does feel provoked. Quite the balancing act.

But here’s the real rub: Saying we WOULD defend Taiwan militarily does not mean we COULD do so successfully. These doctrinal debates over strategic ambiguity versus strategic clarity seem strangely disconnected from military reality.

Indian officials hold first talks with Taliban in Afghanistan

A team of Indian officials has met the acting foreign minister of Afghanistan to discuss bilateral ties and humanitarian aid, the Taliban said, in what was the first such visit to Kabul since the group took control of the country last year.

Poverty and hunger have rocketed in Afghanistan since the Taliban took power after the United States pulled out, and India has sent food grains and other aid.

The Taliban administration’s acting foreign minister, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, met an Indian foreign ministry delegation led by JP Singh, a secretary in the ministry.

“The meeting focused on India-Afghan diplomatic relations, bilateral trade and humanitarian aid,” Taliban foreign ministry spokesman Abdul Qahar Balkhi said on Twitter.

What Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Means for the Middle East


Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed several truths about its foreign policy, while the poor performance of its military has revealed facts about its defense policy. Both suggest that Gulf countries that have been seeking closer ties to Moscow as a hedge against a declining American commitment to the region are likely wasting their time.

Russia, already straitened by sanctions, will find itself further weakened as the world moves away from the fossil fuels that undergird the bulk of its economy. Over the coming decades, funding for military research and development can be expected to slow to a trickle, reducing both Russia’s own relative military capability and its ability to supply other nations with cutting-edge weapons. Nor can Russia expect to draw significant foreign investment in its defense industry. Most investors will be deterred by current and threatened sanctions, while the others will be interested in exploiting the country’s economic desperation, not in rebuilding its military industry.

Why Putin’s betrayal of Ukraine could trigger nuclear proliferation

Steven Pifer

On June 1, 1996, two trains arrived in Russia transporting the last nuclear warheads that had been deployed in Ukraine when the Soviet Union collapsed. That concluded the process in which Kyiv gave up what was then the world’s third-largest nuclear weapons arsenal—exceeding Britain, France, and China combined. The Ukrainian government did so in large part because of Russia’s assurances that it would respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and refrain from the use of force against Ukraine.

Twenty-six years later, Russia is more than three months into a massive invasion of Ukraine. This has understandably led Ukrainians to question the wisdom of giving up those nuclear arms, and Vladimir Putin’s war has dealt a blow to future efforts to arrest nuclear proliferation.

Deadly Secret: Electronic Warfare Shapes Russia-Ukraine War

On Ukraine’s battlefields, the simple act of powering up a cellphone can beckon a rain of deathly skyfall. Artillery radar and remote controls for unmanned aerial vehicles may also invite fiery shrapnel showers.

This is electronic warfare, a critical but largely invisible aspect of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Military commanders largely shun discussing it, fearing they’ll jeopardize operations by revealing secrets.

Electronic warfare technology targets communications, navigation and guidance systems to locate, blind and deceive the enemy and direct lethal blows. It is used against artillery, fighter jets, cruise missiles, drones and more. Militaries also use it to protect their forces.

It’s an area where Russia was thought to have a clear advantage going into the war. Yet, for reasons not entirely clear, its much-touted electronic warfare prowess was barely seen in the war’s early stages in the chaotic failure to seize the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv.

A digital conflict between Russia and Ukraine rages on behind the scenes of war

Jenna McLaughlin

SEATTLE — On the sidelines of a conference in Estonia on Wednesday, a senior U.S. intelligence official told British outlet Sky News that the U.S. is running offensive cyber operations in support of Ukraine.

"My job is to provide a series of options to the secretary of defense and the president, and so that's what I do," said Gen. Paul Nakasone, the head of the National Security Agency, who also serves as the chief of the Pentagon's digital branch, the U.S Cyber Command.

While he did not give any further detail, it was the first time the spy chief alluded to the U.S. government's efforts to launch counterattacks against Russia in cyberspace, in addition to helping defend Ukrainian agencies.

‘World Is A Customer’ – Raging Success Of Turkish Bayraktar Drones Against Russia & Armenia Boosts Its Demand

Tanmay Kadam

The designer of the ‘world-famous’ Turkish TB2 Bayraktar drones has said that the destruction of Russian artillery systems and armored vehicles by the Ukrainian fleet of TB2 drones has made “the whole world” a customer.

“Bayraktar TB2 is doing what it was supposed to do — taking out some of the most advanced anti-aircraft systems, artillery systems and armored vehicles,” Selçuk Bayraktar, the Chief Technology Officer of Baykar, the maker of TB2 drones, told Reuters. “The whole world is a customer,” he added.

TB2 has been instrumental in the Ukrainian military’s resistance against Russian forces and social media is abuzz with videos showing Russian tanks, air defense systems, helicopters, supply trucks, and trains being knocked out by TB-2 strikes or TB2-assisted artillery strikes.

Russia’s urban warfare struggles in Ukraine ‘a key lesson for China’ in possible Taiwan conflict

Kristin Huang

A key lesson mainland China has learned from the Ukraine war is how to conduct urban warfare that might one day be used in a conflict with Taiwan, a leading Chinese military magazine has said.

An analysis of Russia’s military operations published in Naval and Merchant Ships said this was a particularly important issue for China.

“Ukraine has exploited Russia’s weaknesses … and successfully forced Russia to change its strategies,” the article said. “How this success was achieved can hardly exclude factors such as Nato and the United States. And it’s not difficult to imagine that Taiwan would receive guidance, plans, intelligence, experience and training [from Nato and the US] too.”