BRICS Democracies Are Losing Leverage

Oliver Stuenkel

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In 2003, India, Brazil, and South Africa established what they called the IBSA Dialogue Forum. The trilateral initiative aimed to promote south-south cooperation, reform global governance structures, and amplify the three democracies’ voices on the international stage. In the years that followed, the leaders of IBSA countries organized regular summits to facilitate collaboration across various sectors.

However, as the BRICS bloc—which initially included Brazil, Russia, India, and China—gained prominence and added South Africa as a member in 2010, IBSA’s activities waned. Though IBSA foreign ministers still organize a yearly meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, where they regularly call for U.N. Security Council reform, the group’s relevance has plummeted.

The Next War Between India and Pakistan

Aqil Shah

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Nearly two weeks after India and Pakistan reached an uneasy cease-fire, neither New Delhi nor Islamabad agree on what happened preceding it. India blames Pakistan for the April 22 terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that left 26 people dead; Pakistan denies responsibility. On May 7, India launched retaliatory missile strikes against targets in Pakistan associated with known terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; both sides dispute the scale and impact of these attacks. That barrage prompted further salvos that led to the downing of Indian fighter jets (according to Pakistani and international media) and Pakistani jets (according to Indian media). Drones and missiles whizzed across the border in both directions, with the governments and national media offering dueling claims about targets hit, infrastructure destroyed, and lives lost. Fighting came to an end after senior U.S. officials pressed both sides to step back from the brink, but even here the fog of war prevails; while Islamabad thanked U.S. President Donald Trump for helping bring the fighting to an end, New Delhi denied that any mediation took place.

Although the dust remains in the air, some outcomes are clear. The recent fighting represents a significant escalation in the cross-border disputes that have periodically flared between India and Pakistan. Unlike India’s limited punitive strikes in the past, this offensive pressed deeper into Pakistani territory. India’s Operation Sindoor ranged far beyond Pakistani-administered Kashmir into Punjab, Pakistan’s heartland, eventually hitting not just the facilities of militant groups but also military targets, including air bases. In recent decades, fighting has mostly been confined to the border region around the disputed territory of Kashmir. In May, Pakistan’s major metropolises and many big cities in northern India were on high alert.

With its strikes, the Indian government hoped to demonstrate strength to a public that wanted revenge for the terrorist attack in Kashmir. But by venturing deeper into Pakistan and hitting a broad array of targets, India also wanted to reestablish deterrence and discourage Pakistan’s military from backing militant groups active in Indian territory. In that effort, India will probably be disappointed. Rather than deterring its rival, India precipitated a retaliation that ended up burnishing the Pakistani military’s reputation and boosting its domestic popularity. Paradoxically, India’s retribution has handed the Pakistani army its biggest symbolic victory in recent decades. And that will hardly discourage Islamabad from reining in the proxy war against New Delhi or from risking future flare-ups between these two nuclear-armed states.

CLIMBING THE LADDER

An 18th-century war power resurfaces in cyber policy talks

DAVID DIMOLFETTA

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In recent closed-door discussions, Trump administration and industry officials have discussed whether modern-day letters of marque—once used to deputize privately owned ships to lawfully attack other vessels during wartime—might enable private-sector hacking operations against unfriendly nation-states, according to two people familiar with the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity to freely discuss the sensitive deliberations.

The high-level view among U.S. officials is that this old-world maritime authority is unlikely to be directly used in cyberspace, but a more modern, tailored version might arise as the administration seeks ways to even the fight against Chinese-backed groups, one of the people said.

“The general consensus from [U.S. government] officials on the topic is that we aren’t going to apply a 200-year-old [privateering] authority to the cyber domain,” said the person. “However, there is a standing question and ongoing debate regarding what modern authorities and authorizations are required by various cybersecurity and tech industry organizations to better enable the defense of the United States.”

Letters of marque played a major role during the War of 1812, when the U.S. government issued them to private ship-owners to capture British vessels. And even further back, they were used to convert pirates into privateers, acting on behalf of their sponsoring governments to raid enemy ships. Privateering was broadly outlawed by the U.S. and other signatories to an 1858 treaty, although the Confederacy used it during the Civil War.

Outnumbered against China

The idea of modern-day letters of marque has been raised several times since the 9/11 attacks, and again in recent months in connection with Chinese hacking.

Late last month, in a private meeting at the RSAC Conference in San Francisco, a senior U.S. official told a room of cybersecurity executives that Chinese cyber capabilities outmatch those of the U.S., according to a person who was at the discussion. The person declined to name the senior official.

TAKING FLIGHT: CHINA’S MILITARY UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) INDUSTRY

China Aerospace Studies Institute

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Unmanned aerial systems (UAS), including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platforms, are a core element of the PRC’s military modernization program. The PLA has operated UAVs since the 1950s. While aerial drones are not a new technology, contemporary UAV systems are improving rapidly due to advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning, robotics, image sensing, battery and energy storage, communications and networking technologies, materials science, and aeronautical design and engineering. As a result, modern UAV systems are becoming increasingly capable, versatile, and autonomous.

All PLA services and theater commands now use UAVs for a range of missions. These include, but are not limited to, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic intelligence (ELINT); maritime and border defense patrol; ground and naval strike; air-to-air attack; anti-submarine warfare; air defense suppression, including by using small UAV “swarms;” electronic warfare; communications; transportation and logistical support; emergency medical aid; firefighting; and information operations, including psychological warfare. Moreover, PLA exercises, trainings, and simulations indicate that UAVs would fulfill an array of roles in any land or maritime conflict involving the PRC.

No Dominant Strategy for Air Dominance: Collaborative Combat Aircraft Employment, Basing, and Sortie Generation in a Taiwan Scenario

Travis Sharp

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In 2023, the Air Force unveiled plans to acquire a fleet of autonomous unmanned collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) that would fly under the custody of manned aircraft pilots as loyal wingmen. The Air Force has stressed the CCA’s broad usefulness across diverse missions, including forward sensing, air-to-air attack, and electronic warfare. Despite this emphasis, the fact remains that tradeoffs must be made for any aircraft to excel at a given mission. The CCA is no exception.

In No Dominant Strategy for Air Dominance, CSBA Senior Fellow and Director of Defense Budget Studies Travis Sharp applies a simple sortie-generation model to explore options for employing and basing CCAs during a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan in the early to mid-2030s. The report first illustrates the effects of CCA mission profile, geographic emphasis, and basing dispersion on sortie generation to show the range of operational possibilities and logistical burdens. It then illustrates how combat attrition might affect CCA fleet size and identifies the resulting quantity–cost tradespace.

Sharp finds that the CCA fleet’s combat potential, logistical demands, and basing configuration could look very different depending on how CCAs are employed. A CCA fleet conducting persistence missions in vicinity of Taiwan would need a different aircraft design, sustainment setup, and attrition reserve than a CCA fleet launching hit-and-run attacks outside Taiwan. Determining the optimal basing locations depends on whether CCAs plan to swarm the conflict epicenter in Taiwan or fan out to inflict damage on Chinese forces elsewhere. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to CCA employment and design. The challenge for the Air Force, as always, is how to conceptualize and choose among distinct options that lead to different outcomes.

Deterring China's Use of Force in the Space Domain

Kevin Pollpeter, Elizabeth Barrettand, April Herlevi

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This report examines the evolving deterrence dynamics between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the space domain. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence helped maintain the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it remains a cornerstone of US defense policy today. However, for reasons both geopolitical and technological, the ability of any country to deter another from attacking its space assets is being called into question.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is acquiring and developing a range of counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and co-orbital satellites, as well as the space surveillance capabilities that enable their use. The use of these weapons against the US space architecture could threaten US military superiority by undermining the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that enable the US military to operate in the Indo-Pacific and project power globally.

APPLYING DETERRENCE TO THE SPACE DOMAIN

We define space deterrence as one country dissuading another country from interfering with systems that operate in space or support the operation of space systems from the ground. Numerous variables can complicate the success of deterrence in the space domain. Deterrence dynamics may be influenced by whether attacks are reversible or irreversible, terrestrial or space-based, kinetic or non-kinetic, and lethal or non-lethal.

The effectiveness of space deterrence could be shaped by the type of weapon. Nuclear weapons, kinetic weapons, and non-kinetic weapons, such as electronic countermeasures, directed energy weapons, and cyber weapons, could all be used against space assets. Space deterrence could also include preventing attacks against launch sites and other facilities using conventional munitions, such as bombs and missiles.

US brain drain handing the global talent war to Chin

Tang Meng Kit

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The US-China rivalry is no longer just a clash of tariffs, navies and diplomatic showdowns. A quieter, subtler front has emerged – one that is nonetheless reshaping the global order and deciding future winners and losers. It’s a contest for people, specifically the scientists, engineers and academic pioneers who will shape the future.

In this emerging struggle, talent is the new oil and the pipelines are shifting as the once-unidirectional flow of talent toward the United States is reversing, redirecting careers, rebalancing innovation and redrawing the map of global power and influence.

Thousands of highly skilled professionals, especially those of Chinese descent, are leaving American institutions for new opportunities in China and elsewhere. This is more than a reversal; it is a redistribution of global brainpower, one that is reshaping research ecosystems and tilting discernibly the balance of global innovation.

Between 2010 and 2021, nearly 20,000 Chinese-born scientists left the United States, a trend that accelerated after 2018. These are not second-string researchers: they include figures like neuroscientist Yan Ning, who left Princeton to lead the Shenzhen Medical Academy, and Gang Chen, a top MIT engineer who returned to Tsinghua University after being cleared of espionage-related charges.

Increasingly under Trump, restrictive visa policies, geopolitics and racialized suspicion are repelling rather than attracting top talent. The previous Trump administration’s China Initiative may be over, but its chilling effect remains.

Chinese and other Asian scientists worry about surveillance, unjust scrutiny or even prosecution. Simultaneously, shrinking research budgets and unstable funding make the US less attractive.

Added to that is a cultural atmosphere strained by rising anti-Asian sentiment. For many scientists, it is not just about funding, it is about a sense of belonging, and increasingly, they feel like they don’t.

Comparative Insurgencies: Strategic Lessons for Myanmar’s Resistance from Syria’s Regime Collapse

Tin Shine Aung 

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On the morning of December 8, 2024, the world was stunned by the news that Syrian rebel groups, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), had captured Damascus and overthrown President Bashar al-Assad’s government after 13 years of civil war. This unexpected turn in one of the Middle East’s most protracted conflicts holds vital lessons for other movements seeking to overthrow entrenched dictatorships. Answering a set of questions helps bring those lessons forward: (1) How did Syrian rebel groups topple the Assad regime quickly this time? (2) What stance has Syria’s interim government taken toward ethnic and religious minorities for national reconciliation? (3) How is HTS navigating international legitimacy, given its designation by many Western governments as a terrorist group, while positioning itself as the de facto authority in Damascus?

This article explores these lessons through the lens of the Myanmar Revolution, offering insights that the Myanmar National Unity Government (NUG) and other rebel groups can draw from the Syrian Revolution. The involvement of external powers in the Syrian conflict is far more pronounced and significant than that of Myanmar, where direct interventions have been limited, with the notable exception of China’s involvement. While the situations in Syria and Myanmar differ significantly, certain parallels can be drawn between the two conflicts. These include (1) the shared aspiration of civilians in both nations to be liberated from oppressive regimes, (2) the presence of diverse ethnic and religious communities within both countries, (3) ongoing international legal proceedings against both regimes at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for alleged crimes against its civilians; (4) the involvement of numerous militia groups with divergent agendas in both conflicts; (5) repeated vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions targeting these regimes by permanent members such as Russia and China; (6) the strategic interests of regional powers – such as Iran & Turkey in Syria, and China & India in Myanmar – that shape the dynamics of both conflicts; and (7) the inefficient roles of regional blocs like the Arab League in Syria and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Myanmar.

How Could Syrian Rebel Groups Topple the Assad Regime So Swiftly?

Securing the space-based assets of NATO members from cyberattacks

Julia Cournoyer

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The increased dependence on space-based assets for both military and civilian functions has turned these critical systems into a potential target for cyberattacks. NATO’s deterrence capability relies on these assets, such as satellites, for secure communication, navigation, intelligence and early warning systems.

Protecting space-based assets requires a coordinated and proactive cybersecurity strategy. This paper proposes a three-tiered framework – based on mitigation, adaptation and resilience – for strengthening NATO’s space cybersecurity approach.

As defence commitments among NATO allies shift, ensuring the long-term stability of space security cooperation within the alliance will be critical for sustaining collective deterrence and operational resilience.

NATO: The Damage Is Done – So Think Big

Sven Biscop

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For seventy-six years, NATO tried to prove Lord Palmerston wrong. Now it turns out that he was right after all: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. The second Trump Administration behaves as Europe’s rival, not as its ally. It is too late for mere damage control. Placating Trump will not work either: unrestrained, he will just go further and further. Europeans must present the US with a clear idea of which NATO they want, and what they will invest to get it. That is the way to salvage the Alliance at the NATO Summit in The Hague in June.

The damage is done. Because even if the US were to radically alter course and recommit fully to NATO as we knew it, everyone now knows that a next President may change it back again. The US cannot treat NATO the way it treats the agreements on climate change: it joins, it leaves, it rejoins, and leaves again. Deterrence demands constancy, or there is no deterrence. Unless it is actually tested in war, Article 5 will now never be as credible as before.

This has already affected the global balance of power: adversaries who perceive that the US may not stand by Europe may be emboldened and become more aggressive. Against Europe, but also against the US, whose erratic economic and foreign policies Europe will not follow.

Scenarios That Could Define 2035

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The goal of scenario planning is to understand more about the future, not to predict it. Identifying key drivers of change, as well as understanding their second- and third-order effects and the interrelationships between them, does more than help to prepare for contingencies—it also helps to look for warning indicators and triggers of profound change, and it can drive action to prevent scenarios from coming about in the first place.

The CSIS Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy drafted several scenarios to help think through aspects of the world in 2035. It then turned to trusted experts, inside and outside of CSIS, for their comments, insights, and concerns. The experts' contributions overlay the scenarios themselves, highlighting further areas of emphasis, implications, or alternative outcomes.

Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign

Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan

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The IssueRussia’s drone campaign utilizes inexpensive Shahed drones to saturate Ukrainian air defenses and erode civilian morale through persistent nightly attacks. Originally Iranian made, these drones are now mass produced in Russia using Western electronics and essential Chinese components.

Ukraine urgently requires layered, cost-effective air defenses, including high-energy laser systems, to counter drone saturation. Targeted long-range strikes on drone production and launch sites and disrupting China’s supply of critical electronics to Russia are essential steps.

Russia’s relentless use of low-cost drones signals a broader shift toward attrition warfare based on overwhelming air defense systems with sheer numbers. Western governments must innovate in economical defenses and tackle Chinese technology flows fueling Russian drone production.

Russia is using a punishment strategy to force Kyiv into negotiations designed to end the war and hamper Ukrainian sovereignty for the next generation. This approach increasingly relies on a single weapon: the Shahed drone. Originally imported from Iran but now mass produced in Russia using a mix of smuggled Western electronics and important Chinese parts, these low-cost attack drones cause millions of Ukrainians to wake up to the sound of air raid sirens every night. This terror campaign has lasted longer than the infamous Blitz aerial bombing of London during World War II and shows no signs of letting up.

The intensive use of these low-cost drones highlights the need to help Ukraine discover additional low-cost countermeasures that limit the ability of Russia’s punishment campaign. Specifically, European states and U.S. firms should work together to test new approaches to air defense that build on Ukrainian wartime innovations (e.g., acoustic sensors, an integrated air defense network, and improvised surface-to-air missiles) and emerging approaches that use electronic warfare and even high-energy lasers. Second, the U.S. military should catalogue these efforts and use them to accelerate its own thinking about layered air defense in future conflicts, which will almost certainly see a mix of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles attacking alongside waves of one-way attack drones. In these fights, point airfield defense and mobile counter–unmanned aircraft systems will not be enough to counter drone saturation designed to break air defense systems and open attack lanes for more exquisite weapons.

Can Ukraine Fight Without U.S. Aid? Seven Questions to Ask

Iselin Brady, Daniel Byman, Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer

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The Trump administration has repeatedly threatened to walk away from Ukraine if there is no progress on a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. Although the administration has sent mixed signals, its threat is not empty. On March 3, 2025, the United States suspended military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine following a tense meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky on February 28, only lifting the suspension on March 11.

A U.S. suspension of military support to Ukraine would be a grievous blow to Kyiv. But would it be fatal? Ukraine’s own resolve has been formidable even after three years of war, and Europe, which already provides tens of billions of euros in financial and military aid, might play a still greater role. This paper argues that a complete U.S. military and intelligence aid cutoff would significantly harm Ukraine’s ability to fight Russia but would not necessarily lead to immediate defeat—and that more limited cutoffs would have more limited effects on Ukraine’s battlefield performance. But the exact extent to which a U.S. cutoff would harm Ukraine depends on Europe’s ability to fill the gap with its own capabilities. Ukraine currently relies heavily on U.S. systems, training, intelligence, and logistics, and although European support and Ukraine’s own defense industry are substantial and growing, they cannot fully replace U.S. capabilities—particularly in the areas of air defense and intelligence assistance for precision targeting. The result is that continued U.S. aid remains extremely important for Ukraine’s long-term effectiveness on the battlefield. The broader geopolitical implications of a U.S. withdrawal could embolden Russia and its allies while straining transatlantic unity.

Ukraine currently relies heavily on U.S. systems, training, intelligence, and logistics, and although European support and Ukraine’s own defense industry are substantial and growing, they cannot fully replace U.S. capabilities.

Understanding the true impact of a cutoff, however, requires a deeper understanding of the types of weapons involved, European and Ukrainian capabilities absent the United States, and how China and other Russian allies would respond. The responses to the seven questions below illustrate the impact of a cutoff, important ambiguities regarding several key specifics of the U.S. threat, and the possibilities and limits of non-U.S. sources of aid.

Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Systems and Escalation Risks

Sameer PATIL and Rahul RAWAT

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The contemporary global nuclear landscape is dotted with several nuclear risks. Geopolitical conflagrations, coupled with nuclear modernisation efforts by major nuclear-armed states and the strategies of brinkmanship, are increasing the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation. Emerging technologies such as cyber weapons, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems exacerbate those risks. The great power competition, which the United States (US) officials describe as one characterised by “near-peer competitors,” has acted as a structural catalyst fuelling security dilemmas for the US, Russia and China to pursue advanced technology in warfare and gain competitive advantage. However, in this quest, the element of ‘ever-accelerating automation in warfare’ has become the only constant, whose implications transcend great power competition.

Technological advancements have improved precision, lethality, range autonomy, and effect, which in turn have upgraded nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities. Alongside the nuclear modernisation and doctrine-related developments, there is enough evidence to highlight the integration of conventional and nuclear capabilities leading to the emergence of dual-capable and dual-role weapon systems. Besides, as part of modernisation efforts, several states are considering the potential integration of AI in their nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3), including early warning systems to enhance operational efficiency. This integration, however, is not without risks, as it increases the prospects of faulty judgment and false warnings of attack among other miscalculations.

The plausibility of these scenarios has reshaped the analytical community’s understanding of escalation risks, strategic stability and the deterrence dynamics associated with the nuclear-conventional entanglement. This policy brief reviews the escalation risks arising from the integration of AI in nuclear systems and offers some thoughts on how to mitigate these risks. The brief also examines how these technological developments, specifically AI, could influence India’s nuclear arsenal.

Trump reignites tensions with EU tariff threats

Michael Race & Natalie Sherman

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US President Donald Trump reignited trade tensions on Friday, threatening a 50% tariff on all goods sent to the United States from the European Union.

He also warned Apple that he would impose a 25% import tax "at least" on iPhones not manufactured in America, later widening the threat to any smartphone.

The warning against the EU came just hours before the two sides were set to have trade talks. Trump last month announced a 20% tariff on most EU goods, but had halved it to 10% until 8 July to allow time for negotiations.

In a statement after the talks, the EU said it remained committed to securing a deal, while warning again that it was prepared to retaliate.

"EU-US trade is unmatched & must be guided by mutual respect, not threats," European Union Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič wrote on social media. "We stand ready to defend our interests."

In remarks to reporters at the White House on Friday afternoon, Trump expressed impatience with the pace of negotiations, saying his plan to raise tariffs on 1 June was set.

"I'm not looking for a deal - we've set the deal," he added, before immediately adding that a big investment in the US by a European company might make him open to a delay.

"We're going to see what happens but right now it's going on on June 1st," he said.

Analysts said it remained to be seen whether Trump's rhetoric would turn into reality.

Trade expert Aslak Berg from the Centre for European Reform told the BBC that he thought Trump's post was intended to increase leverage ahead of the negotiations.

What’s Next for Elon Musk?

Rishi Iyengar

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U.S. President Donald Trump’s trip to the Persian Gulf last week was all about big wins and sweet deals that he could tout to his base back in the United States, and he came away with $2 trillion in financial commitments from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

Some of those deals are also benefiting one of his most trusted lieutenants, billionaire Elon Musk. Musk announced during an investment summit in Riyadh that Saudi Arabia had approved the use of Starlink—the satellite internet service run by his company SpaceX—for use in the country, and the visit came weeks after his electric carmaker, Tesla, opened its first Saudi dealerships. Another of Musk’s companies, Neuralink, which makes computer chips it hopes to implant in people’s brains, announced it would conduct its first clinical trial in the Middle East, in the UAE capital of Abu Dhabi.

The Key to Ukraine’s Future Lies in Europe

Dimitar Bechev

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Carnegie Politika is a digital publication that features unmatched analysis and insight on Russia, Ukraine and the wider region. For nearly a decade, Carnegie Politika has published contributions from members of Carnegie’s global network of scholars and well-known outside contributors and has helped drive important strategic conversations and policy debates.Learn More

What will happen to Ukraine when the guns finally fall silent? Many believe it will be up to two people: U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Though there is some truth to this, it misses the point. The future will also depend on the relationship that Ukraine and Europe forge with one another.

Ever since Trump returned to the White House, his attention has been fixed on the Ukraine war. For its part, Russia has done its best to sweet-talk the U.S. president, betting on the calculation that he will eventually give up and let Moscow deal with what Russian officials see as a rebellious vassal. Putin’s surprise call for direct negotiations with Ukraine in early May 2025 serves precisely that objective, paying lip service to Trump’s mediation efforts while continuing to press Russia’s advantage on the battlefield.

The Europeans, led by France and the United Kingdom, are going along with Trump’s peacemaking in the hope of freezing the war on terms favorable to Ukraine. That would mean preserving Ukraine as a viable state that could pursue a pro-Western course in domestic and foreign affairs. The visit to Kyiv on May 10 by French President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was as much about signaling unity as it was a nod to Trump.

It’s always hard to tell which way the wind is blowing with a leader as fickle as Trump. Likely, the pendulum in Washington will swing back and forth, with different factions within the U.S. administration pulling in different directions. A total U.S. pullout from Ukraine looks unlikely thanks to perseverance from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and efforts to engage Trump from Macron and Starmer. But Trump’s first 100 days in office show that at the very least, the United States can no longer be taken for granted.

Netanyahu accuses Starmer of being on 'wrong side of humanity' and siding with Hamas

Jamie McConkey & Yang Tian

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Israel's PM has accused the leaders of the UK, France and Canada of being on "the wrong side of history"

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has launched a blistering attack on UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and the leaders of France and Canada - saying that they had "effectively said they want Hamas to remain in power".

He also accused Starmer, Emmanuel Macron and Mark Carney of siding with "mass murderers, rapists, baby killers and kidnappers".

Netanyahu was speaking after Thursday's deadly attack on Israeli embassy staff in Washington. Days earlier, the UK, France and Canada had condemned Israel's expanded offensive in Gaza as "disproportionate" and described the humanitarian situation as "intolerable".

Downing Street has pointed to Sir Keir's condemnation of the Washington attack.

In that post, Sir Keir called antisemitism an "evil we must stamp out".

All three countries denounced the Washington killings, which saw embassy workers Yaron Lischinsky, 30, and Sarah Lynn Milgrim, 26, shot dead at an event hosted by the Capital Jewish Museum.

The suspect, Elias Rodriguez of Chicago, repeatedly shouted "free Palestine" as he was arrested, police said.

Social media accounts linked to the suspect indicate that he was involved in pro-Palestinian protest movements. Investigators say they are working to verify online writings purportedly by him that accuse Israel of genocide in Gaza and criticise US policy.

Missile Defense at Any Cost?

Fabian Hoffmann

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This week, U.S. President Donald Trump outlined his plans for the United States’ “Golden Dome” missile defense project. The name is modeled after Israel’s “Iron Dome” missile defense system, which protects Israeli territory against short-range rockets and projectiles, including mortar and artillery rounds.

In contrast to Iron Dome, however, the President Trump’s demands for the program are much more ambitious, aiming to defend the continental United States from a divdrse range of missile threats, including hypersonic missile systems, cruise missiles, and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

According to the plan, the U.S. Congress is being asked to provide an initial “down payment” of $25 billion, followed by an additional $175 billion over the next three years. Trump stated that the project would be completed within his current term and claimed it would protect the U.S. homeland with a success rate “very close to 100 percent.”

This post analyzes the Golden Dome project, including its technical feasibility, economic rationale, and potential political ramifications. In short, if Golden Dome focuses on defending the United States against cruise missiles, short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and long-range drones, it stands a good chance of meaningfully contributing to U.S. defense and deterrence, potentially even within a relatively short timeframe. However, if the focus shifts toward deploying a space-based strategic missile defense system, as strongly implied by Trump in recent media appearances, the costs are likely to outweigh the benefits.

America is having its Ming Dynasty moment

Noah Smith

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“I set no value on objects strange or ingenious” — The Qianlong Emperor

Ten years ago, when I was still writing freelance articles in my spare time, I wrote a post for The Week in which I mused about America becoming like China’s Ming Dynasty — powerful but insular, rich but stagnant, arrogantly disdainful of science and technology, and ignorant of progress being made in the world outside:

Ming China was by far the greatest nation on the planet for most of the 15th and 16th centuries…But with the hindsight of history, the Ming doesn’t look so awesome. While China was basking in seemingly timeless stability, Europe was seething with new ideas and technological progress.

Even as the Chinese government banned oceanic shipping and heavily restricted foreign trade, European countries were discovering the New World and building trading empires…Another likely reason for the Ming’s decline was disrespect of science…[T]he Ming education system de-emphasized science and technical studies, and instead forced aspiring bureaucrats to learn “Confucianist” philosophy…

Why did the Ming allow itself to become isolationist, stagnant, and backward-looking? Historians are divided, but the leading explanation is what…Mark Elvin calls the “high-level equilibrium trap.” Simply put, when a country thinks it’s in a golden age, it stops focusing on progress…

America shows signs of falling into this trap…We gape and gawk when we first travel to Japan or Switzerland and find that all the trains run perfectly on time — not to mention the fact that there are trains in the first place. We ignore our sky-high infrastructure costs…never pausing to wonder why West Europe and East Asia don’t have these problems…America had an extraordinary run of success in the 20th century…But other countries have been racing to catch up with us, and in some ways they have already succeeded.

Speech: Donald Trump Delivers the Commencement Address at West Point

Stress Lens

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Well, I want to thank you very much. This is a beautiful place. I've been here many times going to high school, not so far away. Good, a good place. Also, a military academy. Not quite of this distinction, but it was a lot of fun for me. And I just wanna say hello cadets and on behalf of our entire nation, let me begin by saying congratulations to the West Point class of 2025, you are winners, every single one of you.

Thank you. And now we want you to relax and I'm supposed to say, "At ease." But you're already at ease. You're at ease because you've made a great choice in what you're doing. Your choices in life has been really amazing. So this is a celebration and let's have a little fun. I want to thank your highly respected superintendent, General Stephen Glenn, and he is really, uh, something, I got to know him backstage with his beautiful family and his reputation -- His wife is just incredible, his reputation is unbelievable.

And thank you very much. And your daughter is a winner also. Just like everybody out there, real winner. Thank you. Thank you. I also want to thank your [Inaudible] General RJ Garcia, Secretary of the Army, Dan Driscoll, Army Chief of Staff, General Randy George, Senator Ashley Moody, Representatives Steve Womack, Bill Huizenga, Pat Ryan, Mark Green, Keith Self.

Acting US attorney, Alina Habba. And very much, uh, just all of the friends. We have a lot of friends in the audience today. And I just want to thank 'em all for being here. We have a tremendous amount of my friends. They wanted to come up and they wanted to watch this ceremony and they wanted to watch you much more so than me. So I just want to thank so many people are here.

Over the past four years, an extraordinary group of professors, teachers, coaches, leaders, and warriors have transformed this class of cadets into an exceptional group of scholars and soldiers. And so let's give the entire group, the entire West Point faculty, the staff, for their incredible love of you and outstanding devotion to the core.

Trump Lauds Cadets for Choosing Service, Honor Over Civilian Life

David Vergun

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"No task has ever been too tough for America's Army, and now that 250-year legacy of glory and pride belongs to you," President Donald J. Trump told more than 1,000 cadets while delivering the commencement address to the 2025 graduating class of the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y., today. "You are the greatest fighting force in the history of the world."

The president noted that each cadet on the field could have taken an easier path.

"You could have done anything you wanted. You could have gone anywhere. You could have gone to any school. … [But instead], you chose a life of service," Trump said.

The president urged graduates to savor the moment, but warned against complacency.

"You can never rest on your laurels. You can never give up. You can have great moments," he said.

"Through every challenge and every battle, you'll stand strong, you'll work hard, you'll stay tough and you will fight, fight, fight and win, win, win," he added.

Financial Influence Operations in the Hybrid Threats Spectrum

Bernard Siman

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This paper examines the Hybrid Threats posed by perfectly legal and legitimate financial markets operations to national security through a variety of legal routes including acquisitions of intellectual property (IPs), E.S.G. regulations, Activist Investors and others. Focus has hitherto been on macro-measures, such as Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) Screening, sanctions compliance, Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”), Counter-Terrorism financing (“C-TF”), supply chain security, raw materials and the like. However, very little attention has been paid to micro-level financial and economic security threats through legal and legitimate financial markets operations. In other words, Why spy when you can buy. To achieve economic and financial security in the interest of national security and maintaining military capability superiority, such micro-financial markets operations in the Hybrid Threats spectrum, i.e., in the financial markets, must be tackled to prevent, inter alia, critical technology leak; as well as to enable greater investments in military capabilities, which have become a key defence, security and Strategic Autonomy priority. The fovus on macro-measure, in other words, is insufficient to achieve the objectives of economic and national security and must be urgently augmented by microlevel financial markets measures and awareness beyond AML and C-TF.

An 18th-century war power resurfaces in cyber policy talks

David DiMolfetta,

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The Trump administration and industry partners have discussed whether privateering contracts — once used to deputize pirate ships — could offer inspiration for authorizing private sector hacking operations against China, though many say the 18th-century tool wouldn’t cleanly map onto modern cyber warfare.

The authority stems from a historically maritime legal mechanism, known as a letter of marque, that allowed privately owned ships to lawfully attack other vessels. Today, that authorization would aim to give the U.S. a better fighting chance against China and other nation-state adversaries.

In recent closed-door discussions, industry chiefs and administration officials have raised the idea of privateering contracts and “letters of marque” that could grant private cybersecurity and tech firms legal authority to launch cyberattacks, according to two people familiar with the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity to freely discuss the sensitive deliberations.

But the high-level view among U.S. officials is that an old-world maritime authority is unlikely to be directly used in cyberspace. A more modern, tailored version of these authorizations is more likely to surface as the Trump administration seeks to define a desired path forward, one of the people said.

“The general consensus from [U.S. government] officials on the topic is that we aren’t going to apply a 200 year-old [privateering] authority to the cyber domain,” said the person. “However, there is a standing question and ongoing debate regarding what modern authorities and authorizations are required by various cybersecurity and tech industry organizations to better enable the defense of the United States.”

Letters of marque played a major role during the War of 1812, when the U.S. government issued them to private ship-owners to capture British vessels. And even further back, they were used to convert pirates into privateers, acting on behalf of their sponsoring governments to raid enemy ships.

Here Are All the Big Cuts and Changes Coming to the Army

Steve Beynon

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The Army is heading for a major reorganization that includes eliminating at least 2,000 positions -- a combination of civilian and troop roles -- and cuts to planned purchases in various drone and vehicle programs that are considered outdated, according to internal documents reviewed by Military.com.

Senior Army officials outlined the plan to top officials across the force earlier this month, the documents show. The undertaking amounts to one of the Army's most significant structural transformations in decades.

The service's aim is to streamline the force while investing in emerging technologies that Army officials say are critical to preparing for modern conflicts, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.

"Every role must sharpen the spear or be cut away," Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and Gen. Randy George, the service's top officer, said in a joint memo to the force earlier this month.

The plan calls for eliminating 1,000 Army staff roles in the Pentagon and nixing various air cavalry squadrons -- specific units were not listed -- along with combining and deactivating other units that will result in reducing personnel.

For example, U.S. Army Japan Headquarters will combine with the 4th Multidomain Task Force, with the total size of that element being cut by 170 positions.

As for hardware, the Army plans to end purchases of the Gray Eagle drone and reduce purchases of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle by $498 million, in addition to other cuts, according to the documents.

All commands will be directed to reduce temporary duty funding by 20%, and the service will slash funding for collective training barracks by $346 million. Those barracks are typically living quarters for major training exercises, basic training and various schools.

However, it was still unclear what the changes could mean for the total size of the Army. The plan outlines reductions to "responsibly balance end strength" in pursuit of a "leaner, more lethal Army."