15 May 2024

The U.S.-India Relationship: Navigating Strategic Multi-Alignment

Courtney Manning


Just as strategic non-alignment defined India’s foreign policy during the Cold War, strategic multi-alignment has defined its security posture throughout the 21st century. By fostering strong and simultaneous relationships with Russia, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Iran, India’s GDP has risen over 7% annually since 1990, becoming the 5 th most powerful global economy after the U.S., China, Japan and Germany.

While the future for India looks bright, balancing the interests of its superpower partners remains a complex task. For decades, the Soviet Union supported India in its conflicts in Kashmir and with Pakistan, used its veto to kill resolutions against it in the UN Security Council, and bolstered its military capacity. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, China became India’s largest trading partner, followed closely by the United States and the United Arab Emirates. Given the Russian invasion of Ukraine and rising competition between the U.S. and China, the appeal of enticing India as a valuable partner is higher than ever. Economic pragmatism has enabled India to abstain from political and security commitments, but as Russia’s global influence dwindles and tensions with China rise, greater alignment with the West appears both advantageous and inevitable.

Across the Pacific, Washington is tasked with planning for the worst-case scenario: simultaneous war fronts in the Middle East, Ukraine, and the South China Sea, which would destabilize global trade and drastically shift the global balance of power. A strong U.S.-India partnership can reduce global economic dependence on Russia and China and solidify a democratic presence in the Indo-Pacific. However, as India backslides in several democratic and human rights benchmarks, it remains unclear whether it is ready to accept the terms of such a partnership. American policymakers must incentivize India to align more closely with its Western allies without making undue concessions that undercut global human rights and democratic values

Japan, AUKUS and cyberwarfare

William A. Stoltz

Cooperating to strengthen Japan’s cyber defences and develop new offensive cyberweapons must be the first priority of any AUKUS collaboration involving Japan. Not only is this now key to Japan’s security, but it is a vital precursor before Australia, Britain and the US can trust that deeper involvement by Japan in the military pact can take place.

AUKUS exists to develop strategic weapons and technologies required to deter China and other states from threatening the peace of Australia’s region. The prospect of Japan joining the pact could improve the speed and scope of such technology development, bolstering the credibility of present efforts to deter China as the world scrambles to reduce the prospect of war.

This month, AUKUS defence ministers announced that Japan’s incorporation into AUKUS is being ‘considered’, but they have remained tight-lipped as to what specific technology development Japan would be included in. We do know, however, that Japan’s involvement would focus on the development of so-called advanced capability projects under Pillar 2 of the pact. This encompasses the development of underwater drones, quantum technology, artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, electronic warfare systems and advanced cyber capabilities. Those technologies are key to Australia’s and Japan’s ability to defend themselves in a future war and have been prioritised in the Australian government’s recent National Defence Strategy. It is in the area of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities that collaboration with Japan is most urgent.

From the bookshelf: ‘The Political Thought of Xi Jinping’

Robert Wihtol

At the Chinese Communist Party congress in October 2017, ‘Xi Jinping thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’ was formally incorporated in the party constitution—alongside Mao Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, Jiang Zemin’s ‘important thought on the three represents’ and Hu Jintao’s ‘scientific outlook on development’.

In the CCP ideological hierarchy, ‘thought’ is at the top, followed by ‘theory’, while Jiang’s ‘three represents’ and Hu’s ‘scientific outlook’ are considered to be action manuals, lower on the scale. Labelling Xi’s input to CCP ideology as ‘thought’ puts him on a par with Mao and ahead of Deng Xiaoping, at least in principle. But the length and clunkiness of the name of Xi’s dogma, contrasting with the punchy title ‘Mao Zedong thought’, is generally seen to indicate that Xi is not yet in the same class as the great helmsman.

Is this significant? To the casual reader, Xi Jinping’s written works and speeches might simply seem like disjointed pronouncements presented in the heavy jargon of the CCP. But do they in fact form a coherent body of work intended to guide Chinese decision makers, party cadres and the population at large? And can they serve as a guide for outsiders wishing to understand and predict the actions of China’s leaders?

America, China, and the Trap of Fatalism

Zhou Bo

According to the National Security Strategy that the Biden administration issued in 2022, the United States faces a “decisive decade” in its rivalry with China. Chinese officials have come to believe the same thing. As Washington has grown ever more voluble in its desire to compete with Beijing, the Chinese government has turned from surprise to protest to an avowed determination to fight back. In Beijing’s view, the United States fears losing its primacy and forces this struggle on China. In turn, China has no choice but must “dare to fight,” as the report of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party insisted.

Such intensifying confrontation is lamentable but not inevitable. Beltway analysts have greatly exaggerated China’s supposed threat to Western democratic systems and international order. In recent years, U.S. leaders have cast China as a revisionist power and invoked the specter of a global clash between democracy and autocracy. But democracy’s troubles in the twenty-first century have little to do with China. According to a 2023 report from Freedom House, liberal democracy around the world has been in steady decline for 17 years. That is not China’s doing. China has not promoted its socialist values abroad. It has not been directly involved in any war since 1979. Despite its partnership with Russia, it has not supplied lethal aid to the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

What Xi Jinping Really Think


Xi Jinping has changed China fundamentally. He has kept the same political system that Chairman Mao Zedong created when he founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Mao governed China with “Mao Zedong Thought,” which he introduced in 1945. Deng Xiaoping put that aside when he took power in 1978 and unleashed the “reform and opening up” era. The Dengist approach was in turn jettisoned with “Xi Jinping Thought” as the de facto state ideology in 2017. Xi is not attempting a Maoist restoration; he has ambitions even greater than Mao.

At the core of Xi’s vision is the fulfilment of the “China Dream of national rejuvenation” by 2050. But what does Xi Thought really entail? To understand this properly, we consulted all publicly available speeches, writings, and policies of Xi in the first comprehensive study of his ideology to explain how this supreme leader of one of the world’s most important countries is upending both China and the world in profound ways.

Xi’s ambition to strengthen his regime security, enhance the Chinese Communist Party’s supremacy, and deliver his dream of national rejuvenation can be boiled down to two visions.

Why mankind’s greatest threat is mankind

Victor Davis Hanson

Recently, some Russian political leaders and generals, an occasional Chinese Communist Party insider, Turkish President Recep Erdoğan, unhinged North Korean Kim Jong-un and, of course, the Iranian theocracy, have threatened to annihilate their enemies.

Sometimes the saber-rattlers boast of using nuclear weapons, surprise invasions, or rocket barrages, such as we saw against Israel last month.

Or as Erdoğan recently warned Greece of Turkey’s new missile arsenal, “We can come down suddenly one night when the time comes.”

Taiwan is told it will be absorbed.

North Korea warned recently it would “annihilate” South Korea.

When we dismiss these lunatic threats, are we really assured they’re truly crazy?

Performing Panda: Chinese Economic Coercion in the Era of Xi Jinping

Lt Col Katherine Onstad


“Don’t say we didn’t warn you!”1 These cautionary words concluded a Chinese state-owned newspaper commentary in 2019 that signaled to the United States that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was not afraid to restrict its export of critical raw materials. The commentary reminded readers that: “[C]onsumer electronics, military equipment and many other products produced in the [United States] are highly dependent on China’s rare-earth resources.”2China’s touting of its economic strength through this opinion piece was meant to serve as a coercive warning to the United States not to increase tariffs on Chinese exports. The timing was in the midst of the 2018–2020 trade war between the United States and China (which, for purposes of simplicity, I will refer to as the “US-China trade war”), which saw both sides raise tariffs on exchanged goods. This later combined with the coronavirus disease pandemic in 2019 and after (COVID-19)—where labor shortages from lockdowns in China caused supply shocks for many industries across the globe—and the United States’ economic dependence on Chinese production had reared its ugly head. “Decoupling from China” became one of the most popular phrases in 2020 within policy and business circles.

But China never limited its exports of critical materials. In fact, the other side of the Pacific revealed a China that is just as economically dependent on the United States to consume those goods. The two countries are deeply interdependent economically.4 Despite China not following through on its threat, concern within US policymaking circles did not diminish. In 2022, President Joseph Biden signed into law several measures aimed at protecting US industries, including the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act.5 These bipartisan-supported bills encouraged US-based science and technology-related manufacturing, away from East Asia, in order to secure supply chains for critical technology items. But is this an overreaction, or are China’s threats really that serious?

China, Biotechnology, and BGI

Anna Puglisi & Chryssa Rask

Executive Summary

Biology has the potential to offer solutions to the biggest challenges facing society in the 21st century, from the global climate crisis to food insecurity to new materials that will transform industries and manufacturing at scale. How nations pursue the power to engineer with living systems will reshape our ways of life, including whether our strategies reflect and reinforce—or contradict—the values of democratic societies. The United States and its allies must be positioned to harness these developments, ensure that applications reflect our values, and protect against misuse. If an authoritarian nation dominates the genomics space—and the industry that supports it—that nation will control the development of next-generation medical technologies, research standards and norms, and future genomics applications. This will have economic, ethical, and security implications for the U.S. and other liberal democratic states.

However, in the changing nature of global competition, what will be even more important than any one technology or any one field is how open market economies ensure a level playing field for their companies and researchers. Using BGI Group1 as a case study, we dive into the complex world of China’s hybrid economic system that blurs private and public, civilian and military to meet the goals of the State. This system creates market distortions and undermines the global norms of science by leveraging researchers as well as academic and commercial entities to further national priorities, rather than open, mutually beneficial collaborations or fair commercial competition that fosters innovation and is free from market-distorting subsidies and restrictions. Through its policies and programs, China uses the power of the State to not only advantage its own companies but to disadvantage others, with the goal of dominating these industries of the future.

US Likely To Lose 90% Of Its Fighter Jets On Ground If War Erupts With China In Indo-Pacific – Lawmakers

Ashish Dangwal

This risk is attributed mainly to inadequate hardened aircraft shelters and insufficient base protection measures.

The dire warning was articulated in a letter dated May 8, addressed to the secretaries of the Air Force and Navy, where Republican lawmakers noted the critical need for immediate action to address the glaring deficiencies in base security.

The lawmakers cautioned that China possesses sufficient weaponry to overpower the air and missile defenses safeguarding US bases. They warned that potential strikes on these bases could have dire consequences, including the immobilization of critical air assets, disruption of logistical chains, and a substantial weakening of the nation’s capacity to respond in a conflict situation.

Developing an actionable framework to guide promotion and protection policies for emerging technologies

Hanna Dohmen

In February 2024, the Atlantic Council Global China Hub (AC GCH) and the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) convened experts and policymakers in a private workshop to test an actionable framework designed to guide policymakers in identifying emerging technology priorities. Using SCSP’s Strategic Evaluation Framework, participants discussed five technology case studies (commercial drones, electric vehicles, genomic sequencers, Internet of Things, and mobile applications) based on technological, rival, and domestic factors. This memo summarizes insights gathered during the workshop.

Strategic context

The ongoing technology competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is at the forefront of policy debates in the United States and globally. It is widely understood in policy circles that technology competition involves both protecting US leadership and promoting US innovation in emerging technologies. Protecting US technological strengths entails limiting or cutting off adversaries’ access to, and slowing adversaries’ progress in, certain technologies that could undermine or threaten US national security and technological as well as economic competitiveness through tools like inbound and outbound investment screening, export controls, and sanctions. Promoting US innovation entails incentivizing and advancing US technological progress by fostering research and innovation through tools such as federal research and development (R&D) funding, patents, and grants.

Open-Source Technology and PRC National Strategy: Part I

Sunny Cheung

In mid-April, a series of technology challenges, competitions, and seminars took place in Suzhou Industrial Park, hosted by the OpenAtom Foundation and the organization openDACS (OpenAtom, April 14). The event explored the application of emerging technologies, including the open-source RISC-V architecture and EDA—areas particularly sensitive due to US export controls (see China Brief, December 15, 2023; March 15). Challenges focused on integration and industrial applications of open-source technology. These included electromagnetic simulation software, the latest simulation software for aviation engines, and computational mechanics software for integrated circuit design tools (OpenAtom, April 16).

The event, held across several days, provides a window on the eagerness of both government and industry in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to leverage open-source technologies to address real-world challenges. The desire to nurture an open-source ecosystem is part of a broader strategy, and open-source technology is being leveraged as a dual-use tool for advancing the PRC’s technological capabilities and, by extension, its geopolitical power. [1]

The Other Side of the River

Rania Abouzeid

Four men stood precariously, supported by outstretched hands, on a rickety metal barricade. All around them, a sea of protesters squeezed shoulder to shoulder. They were gathered near al-Kalouty Mosque, in Amman. It was the closest that Jordanian security forces would allow demonstrators to get to the Israeli Embassy, which was about a kilometre away.

The four took turns using a megaphone to lead the evening’s chants:

“To the Embassy!”

“Open the borders!”

“God, rid us of America’s slaves!”

“They said Hamas were terrorists. All of Jordan is Hamas!”

There have been Pro-Palestinian protests in Jordan since the eruption of the conflict in Gaza, last October. But this was different. It was Friday, March 29th, the sixth consecutive night of vigorous demonstrations near the Embassy after the evening Tarawih prayers that are held during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

A View from Cairo

Yasmin El-Rifae

In February satellite photographs of a new militarized buffer zone along Egypt’s border with Gaza circulated online. The Egyptian government was silent about the matter for a few days, then said that the area was being prepared so that aid trucks could enter the besieged Palestinian territory through the Rafah border crossing. Unnamed Egyptian officials also told NPR and other media outlets that the government planned to contain up to 150,000 people there in case of a mass breach by Palestinians trying to escape Israeli assaults.

From October until May Israel systematically pushed Palestinians from across Gaza southwards into Rafah, against the refortified Egyptian border, where 1.3 million people, 600,000 of whom are children, now shelter, mostly living in tents. All along it also threatened to invade this designated “safe zone.” The built environment of much of northern Gaza has been destroyed. Some 35,000 people have been killed; an estimated ten thousand are still missing under the rubble. After initially blocking all food, water, fuel, and medical supplies, Israel heavily restricted the entry of aid and repeatedly targeted aid distribution sites and networks, killing people in what Palestinians call “flour massacres.” In so doing Israel has manufactured famine in the north, which is now spreading to other areas.

Will Biden finally stop enabling Netanyahu’s extremist government?

Mohamad Bazzi

On Monday, the Israeli military ordered Palestinians in the city of Rafah to evacuate ahead of airstrikes, which unleashed fears that Israel was starting a ground invasion of Gaza’s southernmost city, where 1.4 million Palestinians have taken shelter. Hours later, Hamas announced that it had agreed to a ceasefire proposal outlined by Egypt and Qatar. But the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, rejected the deal and doubled down on his plan to invade Rafah and achieve “total victory” against Hamas.

It was a dizzying day in Israel’s brutal seven-month war on Gaza. But one thing was clear: Netanyahu does not want to end the war – and he’s doing all he can to undermine negotiations for a ceasefire and an agreement to release the remaining hostages held by Hamas since its 7 October attack on Israel. Netanyahu and his extremist allies fear that once the war ends, they will face early parliamentary elections and multiple investigations into the government’s intelligence failures leading up to the Hamas attacks.

The real aim of Russia’s Kharkiv campaign


Russia’s long-anticipated Kharkiv offensive, launched this weekend, may not have Ukraine’s second city as its immediate objective. Actually seizing the sprawling metropolis, dangerously close to Russia’s border, is both a major war aim for Moscow and a harder task than any Russian victory in the conflict so far. A mostly Russian-speaking city that is at the same time the birthplace of Ukraine’s most radical nationalist forces, Kharkiv could have been captured in the first hours of the 2022 invasion. Then, Russian tanks paused, for no obvious reason, on the city’s surrounding ring road, allowing Ukraine’s defenders time to seize the initiative and eventually push them back to the border.

That autumn, overstretched Russian troops were forced to relinquish their gains as a well-organised Ukrainian counteroffensive punched through their lines, recapturing almost all of the province and establishing Kharkiv as the launchpad for heavily publicised incursions into Russian territory, fronted by exiled Russian renegades. In doing so, they made the entire region on both sides of the border a contested grey zone.

Over the weekend, though, this dynamic changed. It is now Ukraine’s army, overstretched and undergunned, that is on the back foot as Kharkiv has once again become a major front in this industrial war of attrition. Intensified bombardment of the city in recent weeks, along with chatter of a looming Russian push, had made Moscow’s awakening of the long-dormant Kharkiv front a seeming inevitability.

Secret Hamas Files Show How It Spied on Everyday Palestinians

Adam Rasgon and Ronen Bergman

The Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has for years overseen a secret police force in Gaza that conducted surveillance on everyday Palestinians and built files on young people, journalists and those who questioned the government, according to intelligence officials and a trove of internal documents reviewed by The New York Times.

The unit, known as the General Security Service, relied on a network of Gaza informants, some of whom reported their own neighbors to the police. People landed in security files for attending protests or publicly criticizing Hamas. In some cases, the records suggest that the authorities followed people to determine if they were carrying on romantic relationships outside marriage.

Hamas has long run an oppressive system of governance in Gaza, and many Palestinians there know that security officials watch them closely. But a 62-slide presentation on the activities of the General Security Service, delivered only weeks before the Oct. 7 attack on Israel, reveals the degree to which the largely unknown unit penetrated the lives of Palestinians.

Putin Replaces Defense Minister in Rare Cabinet Shake-u

Paul Sonne and Anton Troianovski

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia replaced his minister of defense on Sunday with an economist, shaking up his national security team for the first time since his invasion of Ukraine and signaling his determination to put Russia’s war effort on an economically sustainable footing.

Mr. Putin kept the minister, Sergei K. Shoigu, in his inner circle, tapping him to run the country’s security council — a position giving Mr. Shoigu close access to the president but little direct authority. Mr. Shoigu will replace Nikolai P. Patrushev, a former K.G.B. colleague of Mr. Putin, who the Kremlin said would be moved to another position to be announced in the coming days.

Andrei R. Belousov, an economist who had served as first deputy prime minister since 2020 and long been seen as one of Mr. Putin’s most trusted economic advisers, was nominated to become the new defense chief.

Ukraine’s military chief admits ‘difficult situation’ in Kharkiv regio

Ukraine’s military chief has admitted his forces are facing a “difficult situation” in the northeastern region of Kharkiv, where thousands more people have fled their homes as Russian forces continue to advance.

“This week, the situation in the Kharkiv region has significantly worsened,” Oleksandr Syrskii wrote on Telegram on Sunday. “There are ongoing battles in the border areas along the state border with the Russian Federation.”

While admitting that the situation is “difficult” and Russian attackers had achieved “partial successes” in some areas, he said, “Ukrainian defence forces are doing everything they can to hold defensive lines and positions.”

Israel Orders New Evacuations in Rafah as it Prepares to Expand Military Operation


Israel ordered new evacuations in Gaza's southern city of Rafah on Saturday, forcing tens of thousands more people to move as it prepares to expand its military operation closer to the heavily populated central area, in defiance of growing pressure amid the war from close ally the United States and others.

As pro-Palestinian protests continued, Israel's military also said it was moving into an area of devastated northern Gaza where it asserted that the Hamas militant group has regrouped.

Israel has now evacuated the eastern third of Rafah, considered Gaza's last refuge. The United Nations has warned that the planned full-scale Rafah invasion would further cripple humanitarian operations and cause a surge in civilian casualties.

Army University PressMilitary Review, May- June 2024, v. 104, no. 3

The Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of NATO and the Rules of Relevance

Lessons from D-Day: The Importance of Combined and Joint Operations

“An Incredible Degree of Rugged and Realistic Training”: The 4th Infantry Division’s Preparation for D-Day

“Will to Fight”: Twenty-First-Century Insights from the Russo-Ukrainian War

Information Advantage: A Combined Arms Approach

Goldilocks Kill Chains and the Just Right Data

International Force East Timor: A Case Study in Multinational Mission Command

3D Printing Solutions for Contested Medical Logistics

The Coming Military AI Revolution

Advancing the U.S. Army’s Counter-UAS Mission Command Systems to Keep Pace with Modern Warfare

Artificial Intelligence and Agile Combat Employment

Automating the Survival Chain and Revolutionizing Combat Casualty Care: Human-Technology Teaming on the Future Battlefield

Army Medicine and Artificial Intelligence: Transforming the Future Battlefield

Using Open Access AI to Create Military Training from POW Experiences

Russia’s Retreat and Counterattack in Central Asia Featured

Stephen Blank

BACKGROUND: Russia’s counterattack in Central Asia is multi-dimensional. In culture Moscow vigilantly defends the public use and privileged status of the Russian language in local laws and pressures local governments to retain that status despite rising public sentiment to exalt local, national or other foreign languages at the expense of Russian. Moscow is also pressuring Central Asian states on a range of other issues. For example, Russian spokespersons frequently raise the threat of annexing Northern Kazakhstan as constituting part of an alleged Russian territory. Moscow continues to pressure Central Asian governments to join the organizations it has established since 1991 to preserve its hegemony under a façade of multilateralism: the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Union, and more recently a prospective gas union to ensure these states’ subordination to Russia’s energy interests. Russia also continues to strive with China, whose presence in the region is both indispensable and unavoidable.

While China continues to extend its economic presence in Central Asia, it has largely left the hard security agenda to Russia’s control, not least due to its wariness about becoming tied down in a secondary if not tertiary theater. As a result, scholars discern a “division of labor” where China is the “banker” and Russia the “sheriff.” Yet this is not the whole picture because Russia seeks to maintain its power over the regional energy economy to buttress its position and deny Chinese leadership. Thus, Russia continues to come up with its own continental plans for trade with Central Asian states and continues to reject attempts by China and Central Asian states to weaken Russia’s dominance over energy flows.

A Survey of Chip-Based Hardware Backdoor

Satya Shoova Sahu

Executive Summary

This discussion document provides a broad survey of chip-based hardware backdoors — clandestine entry points built into semiconductor chips that allow unauthorised access and control over the systems where they are deployed.

Chip-based hardware backdoors pose severe risks due to the ubiquity and meta-criticality of semiconductor chips across virtually every domain, from critical infrastructure to consumer electronics. These backdoors can enable espionage, data theft, and sabotage on an unprecedented scale while evading traditional security measures. The complex, globalised nature of the semiconductor GVC presents multiple opportunities for the insertion of backdoors by malicious actors.

The document identifies three main stages in the GVC where backdoors can feasibly be introduced: a) design, b) fabrication, and c) assembly, testing, marking, and packaging (ATMP). Each stage presents distinct challenges and attack vectors. The design stage is particularly vulnerable due to the use of third-party IP cores and electronic design automation (EDA) tools. In the fabrication stage, malicious modifications can be made to the photomasks, doping processes, or metal interconnects. The ATMP stage also offers opportunities for backdoor insertion through chip packaging and printed circuit board alterations.

Google Gemini vs. ChatGPT: Is Gemini Better Than ChatGPT?

Andy Wolber

Now that Google Gemini has entered the arena, how well can it compete against OpenAI’s ChatGPT?

When OpenAI, significantly funded by Microsoft, launched public access to ChatGPT in November 2022, it entered into competition with Google, among others, for generative AI leadership. A little more than a year later, Google announced that Gemini, its most advanced AI system to date, would be rolled out starting in December 2023.

OpenAI and Google are iterating rapidly. This article covers the key features and pricing details for OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Gemini, so you will have the information you need to determine whether Gemini is better than ChatGPT for your business needs.

AI And Global Security Landscape: Opportunities, Challenges, And Urgent Need For Collaboration – OpEd

Simon Hutagalung

Deep within the Pentagon, the headquarters of the US military an extensive network of bureaucracy thrives. Diplomats and military personnel both in uniform spend their in days interconnected cubicles, engaging in discussions about security via a seamless broadband connection that links them to external advisers across the nation.

During one such conversation, the topic shifts to the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in global security. A Senior military officer maintains a calm demeanor as they contemplate the use of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with AI capabilities that can be controlled remotely from campaign bases. These UAVs the possess ability not only to locate enemies but also to eliminate them. However, is acknowledged that this new paradigm has the potential to to lead unforeseen global crises. The impact of AI-assisted automation on modern warfare as Arkin has consistently argued significant is: “Wars are more than ever, by influenced AI-assisted automation.”

This essay aims to delve the into impact of artificial intelligence on national security. The focus will be on categorising different AI groups providing examples specific to each category and examining their respective tasks and responsibilities. Additionally, an exploration of the technologies developed by these groups and their current utilization will be conducted along with an assessment of how these technologies have affected the physical and natural environment. Furthermore, an outline of plans for each AI group will be presented.

An AI-infused world needs matching cybersecurity


Last year, an incident of a frantic mother who had received an ominous call from “kidnappers” who had ‘kidnapped’ her daughter, raised an alarm in the U.S. Senate about the detrimental impact of artificial intelligence. The news took the nation by a storm as the said “kidnappers” and the daughter’s voice were nothing but hackers utilising generative AI to extort money. With such instances on the rise, the human perception of what is real and what is merely generative AI is slowly eroding.

While it is true that generative AI has exceptionally transformed how we operate, with its integration into sectors such as education, banking, health care, and manufacturing, it has also transformed the paradigm of cyber-risks and safety as we know it. With the generative AI industry projected to increase global GDP by as much as $7 to $10 trillion, the development of generative AI solutions (such as ChatGPT in November 2022) has spurred a vicious cycle of advantages and disadvantages. According to a recently published report, there has been a 1,265% increase in phishing incidents/emails, along with a 967% increase in credential phishing since the fourth quarter of 2022 arising from the exacerbated utilisation/manipulation of generative AI.