4 May 2021

How Long Can the Afghan Security Forces Last on Their Own?

By Thomas Gibbons-NeffNajim Rahim and C. J. Chivers

MAZAR-I-SHARIF, Afghanistan — The Taliban attack on a police outpost at the edge of the city began at dusk, with the muted chatter of machine-gun fire and the thud of explosions. The men under attack radioed Capt. Mohammed Fawad Saleh at his headquarters, several miles away, desperate for help.

The police captain replied that he would send more men, along with one can of machine-gun ammunition — 200 rounds, not enough for even a minute of intensive fire.

“One can?” the voice on the other end of the radio responded, incredulously.
Ammunition shortages are just one of the serious and systemic issues plaguing soldiers and police officers who will soon have to defend Afghanistan — and themselves — without U.S. aircraft overhead or American troops on the ground.

“We’re holding the weight of the war,” Captain Saleh said as the attack unfolded in January. Yet one ammunition can was all he could spare.

President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks that first propelled the United States into conflict, has prompted deep fears about the Afghan security forces’ ability to defend what territory remains under government control.

Biden’s Afghan gamble

Bruce Riedel

President Biden has made a big decision on Afghanistan, with significant risks. After much consideration, I believe he has done the right thing — but it’s a big gamble. It will have particularly serious consequences for Pakistani behavior.


I have been involved in U.S. policy vis-à-vis the wars in Afghanistan since Christmas Eve 1979, when I was in the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) operations center as the Russians invaded the country. The National Security Agency reported detecting 300 Russian flights that day from Soviet bases in Central Asia to Kabul, air-lifting an elite airborne division to the capital.

Washington was taken by surprise, but in less than a month President Jimmy Carter put together a strategy and an alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviets that went on to win the final and decisive battle of the Cold War. Two weeks after the invasion, the CIA shipped the first weapons to Karachi for the mujaheddin.

We have made many mistakes in Afghanistan. We paid almost no attention to the country after the Soviets left, and it descended into a failed state that was misruled by the Taliban and hosted al-Qaida. President George W. Bush took his eye off the ball after the invasion in 2001 and let Osama bin Laden escape into Pakistan. By 2005, he was encased in his hideout in Abbottabad. With America bogged down in Iraq, al-Qaida regenerated.

Taiwan accuses Beijing of waging economic war against tech sector

Taiwan’s government has accused China of waging economic warfare against the Chinese-claimed island’s technology sector by stealing intellectual property and enticing away engineers, as its parliament considers strengthening legislation to prevent such alleged activity.

Taiwan is home to a thriving and world-leading semiconductor industry, used in everything from fighter jets and cars to smartphones, and the government has long been worried about China’s alleged efforts to copy that success, including by industrial espionage.

Four Taiwanese policymakers from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party are leading a proposal to amend the commercial secrets law to widen the scope of what is considered a secret and toughen penalties.

In a report to Parliament published on Wednesday about the proposed amendments, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau blamed China for most cases of industrial espionage by foreign forces discovered in recent years.

“The Chinese Communists’ orchestrated theft of technology from other countries poses a major threat to democracies,” it said.

‘Mandatory’ Cyber Info Sharing Bill Coming, Says Senate Intel Chair Warner


WASHINGTON: The powerful chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee said today a bill that will likely include “mandatory reporting” on cyber incidents and public-private cyber threat intelligence sharing is in the works.

Sen. Mark Warner was clear in his speech to the US Chamber of Commerce that there’s a “recognition that our current system is not working.” For example, if the “bad guys” had wanted the SolarWinds campaign to be something other than cyberespionage, Warner said, then we could have seen a “crushing” result. The SolarWinds campaign was discovered and publicly disclosed by private security company FireEye in December, months after it was launched in March 2020.

SolarWinds was not a “one-off,” and the Microsoft Exchange server campaign is a “potentially huge incursion.” He added, “Good cyber hygiene alone will not stop Tier-1 adversaries.”

The senator’s remarks were carefully worded because the issue of public-private cyber information sharing — while widely viewed as necessary and even long overdue by many — is still politically and legally sensitive.

France And EU Launch Strategic Reviews: China As ‘Systemic’ Rival


Four years after France’s first strategic review, the Macron government is updating it: Strategic Update 2021. Its primary conclusion: Europe may become less relevant as Great Powers such as Russia and China gain strength. France and its allies are also worried about emboldened regional powers such as Turkey and Iran.

The COVID-19 pandemic has sparked French leaders to stress sovereignty as far as their defense industrial base is concerned. The goal is today the “creation of mutual dependencies with partners (…) agreed upon as opposed to be subjected to.” The military rise of China, now rising as a “systemic rival” of Europe is clearly highlighted in the French document.

How to deal with the Chinese threat will probably be one of the most difficult questions for the European Union to address as it executes its first-ever strategic review, to be published in 2022 and called ‘’Strategic Compass.’

The Number of Chinese Nuclear Warheads

By Mark B. Schneider

Early in the Biden administration, there may have been a significant change in the assessment of the scope of the Chinese nuclear threat. In April 2021, STRATCOM Commander Admiral Charles Richard characterized the buildup of Chinese nuclear capability as “a breathtaking expansion.” The Defense Department may be in the process of changing the ridiculous assessment contained in its 2020 annual report on Chinese military power that the Chinese nuclear warheads numbered only in the “low 200s” and that it would at least double this figure in the next 10 years. In his sobering February 2021 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article, Admiral Richard wrote, “China’s nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to double (if not triple or quadruple) over the next decade.” This essentially doubles the 2020 Pentagon report's estimate, increasing the number to about 1,000 warheads by 2030. This is quite credible. China expert Richard Fisher has written, “…the breadth of the PLA’s missile building indicates that it could increase this number [300-400] rapidly, perhaps exceeding the 1,000 warheads called for by the editor of China’s hardline Global Times.”

In an article, I wrote in October 2020 entitled “The Chinese Nuclear Threat,” I pointed out that the “low 200s” estimate was one of the lowest in the world, lower than previous Pentagon estimates and the evidence outlined in the report did not support such a low number. Specifically, I noted:

After repeating every year that China was increasing the number of its nuclear weapons, the 2020 Pentagon China report says the Chinese nuclear stockpile is “currently estimated to be in the low-200s…” This clearly creates the impression that the number of Chinese nuclear weapons has declined since 2011, which is nonsense. Since 2011, there has been a substantial expansion of Chinese strategic nuclear capability. The Pentagon’s 2011 China report said China had 50-75 nuclear ICBMs, 5-20 nuclear IRBMs and no SLBMs. The 2020 Pentagon report indicates that China has 100 nuclear ICBMs, four ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 12 nuclear missiles, two additional missile submarines fitting out, 200+ nuclear-capable DF-26 IRBMs, and that some of China’s current ICBMs could carry up to five nuclear warheads each. If the 1984 declassified DIA report is used as a baseline [150-160 nuclear warheads], the addition of all these forces (not to mention Chinese non-strategic nuclear weapons modernization) has increased the Chinese nuclear forces by only 70-80 warheads. This is not credible.

The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone

The Gulf War is often remembered as a “good war,” a high-tech conflict that quickly and cleanly achieved its objectives. Yet, new archival evidence sheds light on the extended fallout from the war and challenges this neat narrative. The Gulf War left policymakers with a dilemma that plagued successive U.S. administrations. The war helped create an acute humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and the United States struggled to find a way to contain a still recalcitrant Saddam Hussein while alleviating the suffering of innocent Iraqis. The failure of American leaders to resolve this dilemma, despite several chances to do so, allowed Saddam’s regime to drive a wedge into the heart of the American-led, post-Cold War order. While in the short term the war seemed like a triumph, over the years its afterlife caused irreparable harm to American interests.

In June 1991, nearly 5 million onlookers enthusiastically welcomed American troops returning home from the Gulf War as they marched in a ticker-tape parade through New York City’s “Canyon of Heroes.”1 This image of the Gulf War as a triumph has proved enduring. As two historians of the war wrote a decade later, the Gulf War was “one of the most successful campaigns in American military history.”2 For many Americans, the war exorcised the demons of Vietnam.3 Others have contrasted the success of the 1991 Gulf War with the failure of the 2003 Iraq War.4 Such praise has transcended domestic American politics. Both the Clinton and Obama administrations admired the way President George H. W. Bush handled the conflict.5 Despite some handwringing about Saddam Hussein remaining in power and the fact that there was no World War II-style surrender, the conflict is still remembered as a “good war” or, as one Marine Corps general described it, a “beautiful thing.”6 Unsurprisingly, it has had an outsize impact on the way Americans think war should be conducted.7

Who Will Intervene in the World’s Hot Spots?

As conflicts and crises persist around the world, there is growing uncertainty about how—or if—they will be resolved. The international order is fraying, generating uncertainty about who will intervene and how these interventions might be funded.

There are interminable conflicts, like the situations in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan, which have produced years of violence, countless thousands of deaths and even more refugees. Then there are the emerging hot spots, including northern Mozambique and the China-India frontier, and any number of potential flashpoints, like the Eastern Mediterranean. Even in situations where there is some tenuous hope of reconciliation, there is also uncertainty—such as South Sudan, where a 2018 peace deal that put an end to years of civil war is for now holding, even as widespread violence continues to plague the country.

At the same time, the nature of terrorism is also changing. After a period of recalibration following the loss of its caliphate in western Iraq and Syria and the subsequent death of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State has once again become more active in the two countries, even as it shifts its attention to new theaters of operation, like the Sahel, Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. In so doing, the group and its affiliates are taking advantage of dwindling international interest in mounting the kinds of counterinsurgency campaigns needed to meet these new challenges. And a recent spate of seemingly lone-wolf attacks in Europe show that the threat terrorism poses there has faded, but not disappeared.

Iraq: The Missing Keystone in U.S. Policy in the Gulf

April 29, 2021One of the odd side effects of both the U.S. focus on withdrawal from Afghanistan and on the possible revival of the JCPOA agreement with Iran is that U.S. relations with Iraq seems to be getting passing attention at best. In practice, U.S. relations with Iraq, its development as a stable and secure state, and ensuring that it can become independent of Iranian influence may well be far more important than leaving Afghanistan and reviving the JCPOA.

Important as the dealings with Iran and other issues driving stability and instability in the MENA region are, retaining U.S. ties to Iraq, building it up as a stable state and counterbalance to Iran, reducing its deep internal tensions and the lasting threat of extremism may well represent America’s most important immediate strategic challenges in the region. The U.S. has many strategic objectives in the MENA region, but forging a successful strategic relationship with Iraq is now be one of America’s highest priorities.

This commentary addresses some of the key issues involved in creating both successful U.S. relations with Iraq and a successful Iraq, but both the security and civil dimensions are highly complex. Accordingly, two separate Annexes have been developed that explain the security and civil challenges involved in depth.

Analysis: Syrian missile explodes near Israeli nuclear facility


On Thursday morning the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) bombed several Syrian anti-aircraft batteries in a retaliatory response to an anti-aircraft missile exploding within 30 kilometers of Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor.

The IDF published a statement acknowledging the incident and its retaliation against the Syrian forces.

“A surface-to-air missile was fired from Syria to Israel’s southern Negev. In response, we struck the battery from which the missile was launched and additional surface-to-air batteries in Syria,” the IDF tweeted.

IDF spokesperson Hidai Zilberman elaborated further about the incident and stressed that he did not believe the attack targeted the country’s nuclear reactor in the southern Negev.

“There was no intention of hitting the nuclear reactor in Dimona,” Zilberman remarked.

Additionally, the IDF acknowledged that it had launched an investigation into why its air defense systems failed to intercept the Syrian missile.

Syrian state-controlled media, citing a military source, reported Israel’s attack resulted in the injury of four Syrian soldiers and some material losses.

African Development Can’t Be a Casualty of Climate Change Policy

Howard W. French 

When an obscure rebel group briefly laid siege to a hotel in Palma—a tiny enclave of the global energy industry in northern Mozambique—in late March, the story briefly became one of those one- or two-day wonders common to the Western media’s coverage of Africa.

This typically means momentary headlines from a place that most readers have never heard of, and that most mainstream editors traditionally exhibit little interest in delving into more deeply. As is so often the case with the coverage of violence from outposts like these, what made this particular news “newsworthy” was the fate of a small number of white people who were holed up in the hotel and eventually evacuated. .

U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned

The Biden administration, as well as future administrations, should look to the national security strategy planning efforts of previous administrations for lessons on how to craft a strategy that establishes a competitive approach to America’s rivals that is both toughminded and sustainable in order to guide U.S. foreign, defense, and budget policies and decision-making. In this article, Paul Lettow gives a history of the processes and strategies of past administrations, beginning with the Eisenhower administration, and draws out the lessons to be learned from them.

In keeping with the practice of U.S. administrations for the past several decades, the Biden administration is likely to produce a national security strategy within its first year or two. Indeed, it has already signaled that it will begin work on one.1 It will do so while confronting an international environment characterized by increasingly intense geopolitical challenges to the United States — most prominently and comprehensively from China, but also from a Russia determined to play spoiler and destabilizer when and where it can, and from Iran, North Korea, and other powers and threats at a more regional level.

President Joe Biden has stated that the United States and China, in particular, are engaged in “extreme competition,”2 while CIA Director William Burns has said that China is the “most significant threat [and] challenge” to the United States throughout the foreseeable future and that “[o]ut-competing China will be key to our national security.”3 To increase the likelihood of long-term outcomes that favor the United States, the administration should focus its national security strategy on establishing a competitive approach to America’s rivals — especially China — that is both toughminded and sustainable in order to guide U.S. foreign, defense, and budget policies and decision-making. The president and his team should look to the national security strategy planning efforts of previous administrations for lessons on how to do just that. A number of those lessons are positive but are underappreciated today — and some are cautionary, pointing to flaws in outlook or process that the Biden administration and future administrations ought to avoid.

The EU path towards regulation on artificial intelligence

Valeria Marcia and Kevin C. Desouza

Advances in AI are making their way across all products and services we interact with. Our cars are outfitted with tools that trigger automatic breaking, platforms such as Netflix proactively suggest recommendations for viewing, Alexa and Google can predict our search needs, and Spotify can recommend songs and curate listening lists much better than you or I can.

Although the advantages of AI in our daily lives are undeniable, people are concerned about its dangers. Inadequate physical security, economic losses, and ethical issues are just a few examples of the damage AI could cause. In response to AI dangers, the European Union is working on a legal framework to regulate artificial intelligence. Recently, the European Commission proposed its first legal framework on Artificial Intelligence. This proposal is the result of a long and complicated work carried out by the European authorities. Previously, the European Parliament had issued a resolution containing recommendations to the European Commission. Before that, the EU legislators enacted the 2017 Resolution and the “Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things, and Robotics” accompanying the European Commission “White Paper on Artificial Intelligence” in 2020.

Partnership and Narrative in National Security Strategy

Jason Phillips


The new National Security Strategy must tell a compelling, meaningful story about who the U. S. is and what the U.S. values. Hyperconnectivity is transforming how power is mobilized and the National Security Strategy must reflect this reality. John DeRosa describes narrative as the way human beings understand “how the world is, how people are, and how to respond to disruptions of that worldview.”[1] Narrative, then, is rooted in what people, cultures, and nations value. Because hyperconnectivity is transforming how power is mobilized, understanding the power of narrative can transform strategy. Sam Wilkins, in his article, “‘Why Are We in Africa?: The Dilemmas of Making American Strategy Towards the African Continent,” identifies a key strategic challenge of the U. S. Wilkins’ insight plays out on the global stage as well as what he describes in Africa. China is spending billions of dollars a year on their Belt and Road Initiative and the U. S. does not have the resources to match the infrastructure spending of China.[2] However, Wilkins also discusses the potential of leadership as a way for the U. S. to compete with adversaries. But, the question is, how? Solon Simmons, in his book entitled Root Narrative Theory Conflict and Resolution: Power, Justice and Values, provides insight into how “root narrative theory” can be a “force that can be used to change the world.”[3] The power of narrative, as strategy, can be a strategic approach for the Biden administration to draw a clear difference between aligning with the worldview of the United States and the worldviews of great power competitors. In today’s world of hyperconnectivity, can the United States utilize narrative to mobilize strategic power?

The strategic power of narrative is possible as a result of our current hyperconnected world. Nathan Freier writes, “the strategic significance of hyperconnectivity cannot be overstated. Currently, imagination is the only barrier to the worst possible manifestations of this increasingly complex challenge to U.S. interests and enduring defense objectives.”[4] Senior strategic leaders in the U.S. military should not relegate cyber, information warfare, disinformation efforts, and the power of narrative to supporting roles within the operational and tactical realms. Himanil Raina explains shortcomings of contemporary strategic thinkers to exclusively look at strategy through the lens of the triumvirate of Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz. In his article, Raina discusses these blind spots in terms of international law.[5] However, these same blind spots stymie strategic thinking about how power is mobilized and used in a hyper-connected age of infotech.

Why Planting More Trees Cannot Solve Our Climate Crisis

by Bonnie Waring

One morning in 2009, I sat on a creaky bus winding its way up a mountainside in central Costa Rica, light-headed from diesel fumes as I clutched my many suitcases. They contained thousands of test tubes and sample vials, a toothbrush, a waterproof notebook and two changes of clothes.

I was on my way to La Selva Biological Station, where I was to spend several months studying the wet, lowland rainforest’s response to increasingly common droughts. On either side of the narrow highway, trees bled into the mist like watercolours into paper, giving the impression of an infinite primeval forest bathed in clouds.

As I gazed out of the window at the imposing scenery, I wondered how I could ever hope to understand a landscape so complex. I knew that thousands of researchers across the world were grappling with the same questions, trying to understand the fate of tropical forests in a rapidly changing world.

Our society asks so much of these fragile ecosystems, which control freshwater availability for millions of people and are home to two thirds of the planet’s terrestrial biodiversity. And increasingly, we have placed a new demand on these forests – to save us from human-caused climate change.

Dead Drones: The Army Is Sending Its New Air Defense Vehicles to Europe

by Kris Osborn

Hellfire, Stinger and Javelin missiles will deploy with new drone-killing, counter-air mission possibilities now that the Army is sending its first Stryker M-SHORAD (Mobile Short Range Air Defense) vehicles to Germany.

In development for several years, M-SHORAD Strykers are armed with a first-of-its-kind drone, fixed wing and helicopter-killing counter air ability as part of the Army’s broader push to prepare the force for massive land war on the European continent against a great power adversary like Russia.

An Army report says the service will field 144 M-SHORAD systems to four battalions in Ansbach, Germany, beginning this year, as a first step toward a larger deployment. The vehicles will support the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, a unit naturally focused upon protecting advancing ground forces from a growing range of incoming air attacks.

Not only will M-SHORAD offer advancing infantry a new ability to destroy enemy drones and helicopters, but it will also protect them from incoming artillery, rockets and mortar fire as they maneuver to “close with an enemy.”

The Cybersecurity 202: Lawmakers want to create a reserve corps of cybersecurity experts to respond to the next SolarWinds

By Tonya Riley

A bipartisan group of lawmakers wants to create a National Guard-like program to address growing cybersecurity vulnerabilities faced by the U.S. government.

Legislation introduced today would pilot two separate reserves of trained cybersecurity professionals for the Department of Homeland Security and the Defense Department, according to bill text shared with The Cybersecurity 202.

The legislation comes as federal agencies are experiencing a growing shortage of cybersecurity talent. The problem has taken on new urgency as the United States faces escalating threats from foreign hackers and cybercriminals. Lawmakers say the threat is underscored by the Russian SolarWinds campaign infiltrating nine federal agencies, including DHS, as well as the rising problem of hackers holding data and computers for ransom.

“The recent, unprecedented cyber-attacks targeting the United States demonstrate the risks of not addressing our severe cyber workforce shortage,” Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), who is leading the proposal, said. “As cybersecurity threats continue to grow in scale, frequency, and sophistication, it’s critical that we find innovative solutions to address this deficiency.”

Participation in the “Civilian Cybersecurity Reserve” would be voluntary and by invitation only. Applicants would need prior federal government or military service. The number of people in the reserves would be up to the discretion of the agencies, according to Rosen's office.


Daniel Jasper 

Editor’s note: This article is the seventh in a series, “Full-Spectrum: Capabilities and Authorities in Cyber and the Information Environment.” The series endeavors to present expert commentary on diverse issues surrounding US competition with peer and near-peer competitors in the cyber and information spaces. Read all articles in the series here.

Special thanks to series editors Capt. Maggie Smith, PhD of the Army Cyber Institute and MWI fellow Dr. Barnett S. Koven.

Every day, military aircraft move people and parts around the globe. As part of United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), planes are used to transport resupply to the European theater, insert special operations forces into Iraq and Syria, and—if necessary—transport the nation’s nuclear weapons in its hour of need. In an average week, USTRANSCOM completes more than 1,900 air missions, supporting everything from humanitarian relief operations to personal property shipments. But when it comes to a shipment of spare parts—or a routine trip to a conference—using military aircraft is both impractical and expensive compared to commercial air solutions. In the case of transport, the Department of Defense relies on a reasonable mix of government and commercial solutions. Similarly, when it comes to cloud computing, a reasonable mix is also in order: certain use cases are better suited to commercial clouds, like Amazon Web Services (AWS), however, government-owned clouds can often get the job done inexpensively and without cost overruns.

Book Review Roundtable: Surveying H.R. McMaster’s “Battlegrounds”

Jim Golby

In this roundtable, our contributors review H.R. McMaster's book "Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World." They explore the implications of McMaster's core arguments for U.S. national security policy, the future of conservative national security policy, and American civil-military relations.

1. Introduction: Defending the Free World in the Post-Trump Era

H.R. McMaster is one of the most distinguished and rightly heralded soldier-scholars of his generation. With his appointment to the role of assistant to the president for national security affairs, he was also thrust into the role of statesman in the midst of one of the most controversial administrations in recent history. McMaster’s appointment also raised some civil-military concerns. The three-star general was only the third active-duty military officer to fill this highly political role and one of a handful of appointees dubbed the “adults in the room,” who many Americans hoped would serve as a check on President Donald Trump’s worst tendencies.

Against this backdrop, it is understandable that McMaster didn’t want to write a tell-all memoir about his White House tenure that focused primarily on his experiences and interactions with Trump. Already the author of an acclaimed civil-military history of the Vietnam War, McMaster instead staked out a more ambitious task:

I wanted to write a book that might help transcend the vitriol of partisan political discourse and help readers understand better the most significant challenges to security, freedom, and prosperity. I hoped that improved understanding might inspire the meaningful discussion and resolute action necessary to overcome those challenges.1

As this roundtable demonstrates, the retired general already has inspired meaningful dialogue about some of the central national security challenges America will face in a post-Trump world. But these discussions are not without controversy. These impressive contributors engage McMaster’s core arguments and explore their implications for U.S. national security policy, the future of conservative national security policy, and American civil-military relations. They often disagree on key aspects or implications of McMaster’s claims, including what brought about the current challenges on each of the “battlegrounds” he describes and whether “resolute action” is necessary to overcome those challenges in some, or perhaps even all, cases.2 There should be little doubt that the debates McMaster sparked with this volume will be of far greater value to U.S. national security than the gossip he would have created by writing one more Trump-centric tabloid.

The Battlegrounds

Military Intelligent Systems Pose Strategic Dilemmas

By Peter Denning, Doron Drusinsky, and James Bret Michael

Militaries around the world believe that artificial intelligence (AI) is of immense strategic importance and is the only technology that can keep up with an accelerating operations tempo. Good AI can recognize the content of photographs, track targets in satellite imagery, classify objects in large datasets, control weapon systems, advise on strategy from wargames, manage swarms of small ships and drones, and team with humans. The competition to master this technology is global.

As military AI becomes more complex, the challenges increase for designers to guarantee reliable system operation and commanders to know when they can trust these systems. But there are vexing dilemmas designers face in confronting these challenges. Education can prepare warfighters for applying AI in their domains, resolving new dilemmas that arise, and accelerating the pace of adoption of new generations of AI systems. Knowledge of the dilemmas will help focus research to resolve them and will caution against rushing to implementations that are not mature enough to be trusted.
Dilemmas in Current Generation AI Systems

Most of the eye-popping recent advances in AI are the result of artificial neural networks. But military systems depend on other components as well, all of which affect their complexity, dependability, and trustworthiness. Core components of traditional military systems include sensors, weapons, command-and-control, battle management, and communications. AI adds three major new components to these systems: