Indian Strategic Studies: 06/12/25

12 June 2025

The 100-hour War: India Versus Pakistan

Ajai Shukla

After 40 days of tension in South Asia, during which Indian and Pakistani officials exchanged claims and counter-claims over their clashes in early May, India’s top-ranking military official, General Anil Chauhan, injected a note of clarity.

In interviews to Reuters and Bloomberg news agencies on May 31, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Chauhan, who is the chief of defense staff (CDS) of the Indian armed forces, admitted that India’s military had been forced to modify its tactics after an unspecified number of Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter aircraft were shot down by Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fighters and missiles.

India has provided scant evidence to rebut expansive PAF claims of IAF losses. Talking to the media in Singapore on May 31, Chauhan admitted that the IAF had suffered an unknown number of casualties, but again offered no details.

IAF versus PAF

The confrontation between the two South Asian neighbors began on April 22, when a group of heavily armed terrorists from Pakistan shot down and killed 26 unarmed civilians – 25 tourists and one local – in Pahalgam, a scenic high-altitude meadow in the territory of Kashmir, which remains contested between India and Pakistan.

Then, on the night of May 6-7, India launched Operation Sindoor, missile strikes that initially targeted terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Pakistan. Strikes and counter-strikes followed over the next few days.

The four-day armed confrontation between the IAF and PAF, which some aerospace analysts refer to as the 100-hour war, has been carefully studied by air power experts worldwide. For others, this has been an invaluable opportunity to compare, in a live air combat environment, the surveillance architecture, command and control structure, and flying skills of Eastern Bloc and Western Bloc pilots and aircraft.

Red-Teaming for India’s Military Establishment: Concepts, Contexts, and Consequences

Wargaming has been described as the “one tool that enables defence professionals to break out of the stories we have locked ourselves into.”1 The exercise helps in the examination of concepts and doctrines under simulated operational environments, thereby aiding the assessment of operational plans and their efficacy. Wargaming is also an analytical tool for how operational scenarios might unfold under various contingencies, including unforeseen and worst-case scenarios.

The criticality of testing the efficacy of operational planning is thus based on a deep understanding of one’s own and the adversary’s political and military objectives, judgment, and decision-making process. Therefore, there is a need for a deep and clear understanding of strategic (including cognitive) and operational thinking. For instance, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chinese Science of Military Strategy document offers insights into drivers of Chinese strategic thinking, judgement, decision-making,

planning, implementation, and strategic evaluation[2] to evaluate how the intentions of an adversary will impact the PLA’s overall operational strategy and planning. This understanding is best gained through employing the ‘red team’,[a] which plays the role of an adversary and is tasked with identifying vulnerabilities and weaknesses in one’s own defence strategies and operational planning.

In the absence of a critical evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities, the tendency is to mirror one’s own operational perceptions on the adversary, resulting in the blue-team[b] bias prevailing in real-time situations and leading to faulty conclusions.

The red team ensures that blue-team commanders understand the depth and dimensions of adversaries’ critical operational thinking, defined by their doctrines and capability augmentation. This approach entails evaluating the nature of threats and vulnerabilities and determining how these challenge preconceived assumptions. Such a detailed assessment is required to develop one’s own credible operational concepts and doctrines to meet future operational challenges.

Toward a New Understanding of Air Dominance

Nolan Peterson

Back in the day when I was an Air Force Special Operations pilot flying missions over Afghanistan, I belonged to what we called a “stack” of aerial assets that orbited over a target location both prior to and during an operation.

To support a raid on a terrorist hideout in the Hindu Kush, we might have fighters or strike aircraft orbiting overhead, as well as unmanned and manned ISR platforms. We’d also have tankers flying tracks somewhere nearby, offering aerial refueling options to those who needed it, as well as airborne battle management platforms monitoring the whole shebang.

With all this iron in the air, we could monitor a target location (typically a walled-in Taliban compound) for many hours prior to a special operations raid. Different aircraft would tag in and out of the stack, maintaining constant overwatch. We’d observe patterns of life and update the inbound American special operators about the enemy force they’d face.

Once combat began, we were the eyes in the sky for our teams on the ground. Using our advanced sensors, we called out play-by-play updates on what the enemy militants were doing, and where they might be hiding. If one fled the target compound, we’d label them a “squirter” and keep tabs. Sometimes, a clever “squirter” would bring along a wet blanket to use as a form of thermal concealment from our sensors — some ran to a nearby wadi where, if it had recently rained, they’d try to conceal their body heat with water or mud, like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s character in the movie Predator.

Years later, we now see Ukrainian and Russian soldiers attempting similar tactics to evade detection by small drones equipped with thermal sensors.

Minerals for Recognition: The Taliban’s Shadow Diplomacy

Islomkhon Gafarov

Since the Taliban’s return to power, Afghanistan’s mineral and extractive industries have assumed growing strategic importance in the broader context of sustaining the country’s fragile economy. The abrupt loss of access to international financial assistance,

the freezing of foreign-held assets, and the enforced curtailment of opium poppy cultivation have pushed the Taliban leadership to refocus on domestic resources,

particularly the country’s vast mineral reserves. Yet, there is little indication that the Taliban intend to pursue full-scale exploitation or large-scale export of these resources in the immediate term. Rather, their approach appears deliberately cautious, treating Afghanistan’s natural wealth less as a means of short-term economic gain and more as a tool of political leverage and diplomatic bargaining on the international stage.

Afghanistan’s Mineral Wealth

According to estimates by the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the total potential value of Afghanistan’s mineral resources exceeds $1 trillion. More than 1,400 deposits have been identified across all 34 provinces of the country. The Hajigak iron ore deposit alone is believed to contain up to 2 billion metric tons of high-grade ore. Even more significant is the Mes Aynak copper deposit in Logar Province, which holds over 12 million metric tons of copper – resources valued at more than $50 billion on the global market. Particularly noteworthy are the country’s substantial lithium reserves, located primarily in the provinces of Ghazni,

Nuristan, and Helmand. Afghanistan also possesses approximately 47 oil wells, with the majority concentrated in the Sar-e Pol, Sheberghan, and Amu Darya basins.

Official data indicate that the extractive sector has already attracted roughly 10 billion Afghanis (around $110 million) in domestic investment, in addition to over $7 billion in foreign direct investment. The mining sector has emerged as a vital source of employment, officially providing jobs for an estimated 150,000 Afghan citizens. This endows the industry with not only economic significance but also pronounced social relevance – especially against the backdrop of protracted unemployment and severely limited access to international assistance.

Engaging Pakistan in a New Era of US Foreign Policy

The recent India-Pakistan crisis reportedly brought the two nuclear-armed South Asian countries to the brink of war before the United States intervened and pulled them back. This crisis highlights the need for continued US engagement with Pakistan, a critical country in a geostrategic location with which Washington has historically had a complex relationship.

The relationship between Pakistan and the United States has weathered many ups and downs. In the opening months of his second term, President Donald Trump has indicated that he intends to adopt a more pragmatic foreign policy, one that maintains relations even with countries that hold beliefs or values different from his own. As a result, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan has a better chance of improvement than it has enjoyed in recent years—if both countries’ leaders are able to focus on shared interests rather than ideological differences.

American critics of Pakistan have often accused Islamabad of accepting US military assistance without aligning with Washington’s priorities on India or Afghanistan. Pakistanis, on the other hand, have complained that the United States has failed to consider Pakistan’s concerns and interests in the region while demanding its unconditional support.

More than its predecessors, the Trump administration has acknowledged that a country’s geography may dictate its strategic calculus. Pakistan considers both India and Afghanistan critical to its security interests; accordingly, Islamabad’s view on these countries is likely to be different from Washington’s.

Rather than insisting that Pakistan see its neighborhood through a Western lens, if the US accepted Islamabad’s different understanding of its geopolitical realities, Washington would have a better chance at a functional transactional partnership with Pakistan. Such a move would not prohibit the US from promoting democratic values or demanding accountability from Islamabad for its past support of militancy and terrorism.

Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025

Christopher Clary

The recent India and Pakistan crisis was the most significant between the two nuclear-armed adversaries in several decades. It saw military action unfold that crossed previous thresholds in geographic reach, systems employed, and impacts produced, and concluded with significant diplomatic engagement, primarily by the United States.

It also generated unprecedented levels of mis- and disinformation that continue to cloud understandings of what actually transpired between May 7-10. This working paper reviews and assesses the available evidence in order to distill an initial understanding of the conflict’s trajectory—albeit one that will no-doubt evolve as additional information becomes available. Given the unprecedented nature of the military action and the likelihood that this crisis will not be the last between the two sides,

such an effort is vital in seeking to build a shared understanding of the Four-Day Conflict.

Following a terrorist attack on April 22, India launched punitive strikes on Pakistan on May 7. This began a four-day conflict between India and Pakistan from May 7-10, which became the most serious military crisis in decades between the two rival nuclear states.

Both sides have declared victory amid considerable misinformation and disinformation about what occurred. This essay seeks to offer a factually grounded narrative of the evolution of the crisis, while mindful of severe data limitation problems in the public domain that complicate analysis. Even with the limited or contested information currently available, some tentative conclusions are possible.

China’s $278B Data Industry Gains Momentum With 10 New Zones

Liz Ticong

China is unveiling 10 national data pilot zones to boost growth in its $278 billion data sector and solidify its global leadership in AI.

The National Data Administration announced the plan this week, with state broadcaster CCTV reporting that local governments will be tasked with “nurturing data-related market entities and expanding the data market” to drive digital growth across key industries.

Beijing’s role as a data powerhouse

China’s National Data Administration, in collaboration with 16 government agencies, has announced plans to launch 10 new data pilot zones in Beijing, Zhejiang, Anhui, and other regions. These zones aim to double data transaction volumes and develop hundreds of AI-driven application scenarios by 2026, accelerating the country’s digital economy. Local governments will lead efforts to build data markets and infrastructure that link digital resources with traditional industries.

The sector’s market value has exceeded 2 trillion yuan, or around $278.4 billion, and is expected to reach 7.5 trillion yuan by 2030. This staggering growth highlights the immense economic opportunities driving the initiative.

Beijing plays a significant role in the strategy, managing over 700 billion data entries and implementing extensive governance standards. As the base for key national data institutions, the city serves as the main hub for data circulation and management nationwide.

With 80% of AI data centers unused, are China’s data zones at risk?

MIT Technology Review recently reported that up to 80% of China’s newly built AI data centers remain unused or underutilized, based on local sources Jiazi Guangnian and 36Kr. Between 2023 and 2024, more than 500 AI data center projects were launched, with at least 150 completed by the end of last year. Despite heavy government support and local efforts to establish AI hubs, many centers, especially in central and western parts of the country, struggle to attract clients and face demand shortfalls.

America Relies on Chinese Minerals, and Beijing Wants to Keep it That Way

Farrell Gregory

Minerals are the newest front in US-China economic warfare. In recent months, the People’s Republic of China has accelerated its usage of mineral export controls to choke American access to critical minerals, prompting many policymakers to fear a complete Chinese embargo. But that’s a misunderstanding of Beijing’s goals. Instead, it’s become clear that Chinese policymakers are balancing strategic disruption with the desire to keep America dependent on Chinese markets.

If China were to entirely shut off exports to America, the US economy would lose the ability to manufacture essential military and commercial goods. But an embargo like this would also accelerate US efforts to find alternative sources of key inputs, reducing US demand for Chinese goods. That’s the last thing China wants.

China doesn’t want to crash our economy; it wants to keep us hooked in order to shape our policy. The selective usage of export controls keeps us reliant while demonstrating their leverage. And as long as Chinese imports are cheap and available, and America fails to develop domestic sources, their dominance will continue.

China’s recent restrictions on rare earth elements (REEs) are a perfect example. In April, China shut off rare earth element shipments and introduced a licensing regime to curtail largely heavy REE exports. PRC officials are pressuring companies in other countries, such as South Korea, not to export products that use restricted REEs.

That’s a problem for the United States. REEs are used in specialized magnets, cars, sensors, aircraft, and other advanced commercial technologies. They’re also vital for major weapon platforms such as Tomahawk missiles, Predator drones, and F-35 aircraft. For such critical hardware, we never should have become so reliant on China.

But geological reality will complicate the path to American REE production. Compared to light REEs, heavy REEs are less commonly found and less densely concentrated. Condensed heavy rare earth sources are most frequently contained within ionic clay deposits, which can be about forty times more bountiful than major REE sites.

Egypt's energy gamble has left it beholden to Israel

As the scorching summer season approaches, Egypt finds itself once again in the throes of an uncomfortable ritual: the annual scramble for natural gas.

Recent reports paint a concerning picture of what's to come, industrial gas supplies to vital sectors like petrochemicals and fertilizers have been drastically cut, some by as much as 50 percent. The proximate cause? Routine maintenance at Israel’s Leviathan mega-field, leading to a significant drop in imports.

But this is merely the latest symptom of a deeper, more chronic ailment. Egypt, once lauded as a rising energy hub, has fallen into a perilous trap of dependence, its national security and foreign policy options increasingly constrained by an awkward reliance on Israeli gas.

For years, the Egyptian government assured its populace and the world of an impending energy bonanza. The discovery of the gargantuan Zohr gas field in 2015, hailed as the largest in the Mediterranean, was presented as the dawn of a new era. By 2018, when Zohr began production, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi declared that Egypt had "scored a goal," promising self-sufficiency and even the transformation into a regional gas exporter. The vision was that Egypt, once an importer, would leverage its strategic location and liquefaction plants to become a vital conduit for Eastern Mediterranean gas flowing to Europe.

Billions were poured into new power stations, further solidifying the nation's reliance on gas for electricity generation, which today accounts for a staggering 60 percent of its total consumption.

However, the dream of abundant domestic gas has, like so many ambitious projects in the region, begun to wither. Just three years after its peak, Zohr’s output alarmingly declined. Experts now suggest Zohr’s recoverable reserves may be far less than initially estimated. Furthermore, as Egyptian energy expert Khaled Fouad notes, the political leadership's "impatience" to accelerate production for quick economic returns — especially to capitalize on European demand amid the Russia-Ukraine war — led to technical problems and damage to the wells.

Iran’s proxy war paradox: strategic gains, control issues, and operational constraints

Proxy war strategy offers advantages along with inherent risks and limitations. This study analyzes the strategic benefits, challenges, and limitations of this approach. While proxies offer flexibility and plausible deniability, Iran faces challenges in controlling them,

as seen in Hezbollah’s 2006 war and Hamas’s October 7 attack, which led to significant costs and strategic blowbacks. The inefficacy of Iran’s proxies in large scale operations in Syria and Iraq exposed their limits in conventional warfare. The challenges and limitations of the proxy war strategy underlined in this study raise questions about the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of the proxy war strategy.

Proxy war is a common form of indirect intervention in international relations, used by states to initiate and influence conflicts while pursuing their objectives without direct engagement.Footnote1 By waging proxy wars, states can achieve their interests while reducing the costs and potential risks inherent in direct intervention.Footnote2 Historically,

the practice of proxy warfare predates World War II.Footnote3 However, proxy wars became prominent during the Cold War as states sought to avoid the costs of direct conventional military conflict and the risks of nuclear escalation.Footnote4 Since the end of the Cold War,

proxy warfare has become more common due to the increasing role of non-state actors in the security environment of the 21st century.Footnote5

The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the most prominent practitioners of proxy warfare. Since the early 1980s, Iran has placed proxy wars at the center of its grand strategy.Footnote6 Iran has established specialized units within the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) for the purpose of indirect interventions and united them under the name of Quds Force.Footnote7 Through the Quds Force (QF) and its antecedents, Iran has cultivated a network of proxies.Footnote8

Walking Into Spiderwebs: Unpacking the Ukraine Drone Attack

In the rapidly evolving landscape of modern warfare, technological innovations have contributed to some particularly stunning moments on the battlefield. Few compare, however, to the feat the Ukrainians pulled off on June 1, in an audacious and historically significant attack on Russian military infrastructure. The attack,

codenamed “Operation Spiderweb,” was a massive special operation carried out by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) to target multiple Russian air bases, with a particular aim of destroying Russian bomber aviation fleets. The Ukrainian SBU claims that they struck 41 aircraft, although independent assessments have currently identified only about a dozen targets.

Operation Spiderweb was uniquely clever. Taking a page from the Greeks, the Ukrainians built their own Trojan horses—dummy modular wooden houses, containing special drone carriers inside the “roofs.” These unsuspecting, faux homes were then transported within a few kilometers of the targets, allowing the Ukrainians to penetrate deep inside Russia. Moments before the attack,

the roofs were remotely opened and the attacking drones were released, which the Ukrainians operated under long-range control.

Operation Spiderweb has effects that will continue to inflict remarkable damage long after June 1. Russia now has to consider any ISO container a potential Ukrainian aircraft carrier, necessitating significant economic investment and carrying consequences for national morale. The Ukrainian attack is unlikely to be the last, as technological innovations make the possibility of a fully autonomous strike increasingly probable—with implications extending beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Ukraine’s Strategic Game-Changer

Ukraine has just demonstrated, in spectacular fashion, that a small but determined and innovative country can deploy cheap, scalable, and decentralized technology to challenge a much larger, conventionally superior foe. The implications for the war with Russia, and for modern warfare, could be profound.

NEW YORK – On June 1, Ukraine conducted one of the most extraordinary asymmetric operations in modern military history. Using domestically built first-person view (FPV) drones deployed from deep inside Russian territory, the Ukrainians launched a coordinated assault against multiple military airbases – some as far away as eastern Siberia, the border with Mongolia, and the Arctic.

Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb Was Smart, Not Reckless

Rebeccah Heinrichs

In a stunning operation, on June 1, 2025, the Ukrainian SBU Security Service carried out Operation Spiderweb. The operation included a large-scale coordinated drone strike on five Russian air bases: Belaya, Dyagilevo, Ivanovo Severny,

Olenya, and Ukrainka stretching more than 2,000 miles into Russian territory and miles from one another. The Russians had sought to keep their strategic bombers dispersed to lower the risk of damage to a significant portion of the fleet if Ukraine could pull off a larger-scale attack. According to Ukraine, the Ukrainians damaged or destroyed 41 Russian aircraft including bombers. (It’s important to note that there has been no third-party verification of these numbers.)

Much of the public response from those who have been fearful of escalation was predictably alarmist due to Ukraine’s choice of target—those Russian bombers are highly valuable to Russia and can carry either conventional or nuclear weapons.

The concern for Ukraine escalating the war is in keeping with the Biden administration’s constant fear of escalation, which motivated the Biden policies to limit US support to Ukraine and to restrain the range and type of Ukrainian attacks.

The effect was that Ukraine could defend itself but only in limited ways that would not hurt the Russians “too much.” Thus, the war never had a strategy to enable Ukraine to win a battlefield advantage over the Russians or to impose such a military defeat,

even tactically, to convince the Russians that even though they had help from China, North Korea, and Iran, the defending nation — Ukraine — had committed backing from the entire NATO alliance, including the United States. Thus, the Russians grew in confidence and the war basically stayed even and is grinding on in a terrible and tragic war of attrition.

The new global arms race: who’s buying, who’s selling, what’s at stak

Welcome to the new global arms race: faster, smarter, more dangerous and more expensive than ever. In 2024, world military spending surged toa record $2.7 trillion, the steepest annual increase since the Cold War's end, driven largely by European, Asian and Middle Eastern nations.

Who's buying?

Faced with threats from Russia, Europe has ramped up defense budgets, with Poland's spending growing by 31% to $38 billion and Sweden’s by 34% to $12 billion in its first year of NATO membership. Germany increased military expenditure by 28% to $88.5 billion, making it the fourth-largest spender globally and rearming the nation that precipitated the two major world wars of the last century.

In the Middle East, Israel's military spending soared by 65% per cent to $46.5 billion, the largest annual rise since 1967, amid its war with Hamas in Gaza and conflict with Hezbollah in South Lebanon. In Asia, China spent 7% more on its military in 2024, adding an estimated $314 billion, raising fears of an imminent operation against Taiwan, which boosted its military spending by 1.8% in 2024 to $16.5 billion. Fellow Asia-Pacific power Japan saw its military budget rise by 21% to $55.3 billion, its largest annual increase since 1952.

Who's selling?

Traditional arms exporters like the United States, France, Russia, China, and Germany continue to dominate the market. However, emerging players such as India, Turkey, and Israel are increasing their share. Notably,Israel's defense exports reached a record $14.8 billion in 2024, with Europe accounting for 54% of sales, up from 35% the previous year.

Turning the tables in age of AI cyber warfar

Nadir Izrael, co-founder and CTO at the cyber exposure management company Armis explores how AI is tipping the scales in cyber warfare and how organisations can reclaim the advantage.

The headlines scream familiar warnings: ‘geopolitical tensions escalate’ and ‘massive AI cyberattacks surge.’ These recurring stories are a stark indicator of the evolving landscape: traditional approaches to cybersecurity are no longer enough.

We must move beyond passive defence and actively prepare for this new era of cyber warfare. The statistics underscore this urgency. Research from Armis found that 88 per cent of UK IT decision-makers expressed concern about the impact of cyber warfare, a 32pc jump from the previous year.

This is against a backdrop of an expanding attack surface, with a projected 50 billion connected devices by the end of 2025, alongside growing global instability. Yet, the biggest driver behind this change is inexplicably linked to AI.

The question then becomes: “What can organisations do to prepare?” Fortunately, the key to effective preparation lies in the very tool being used against us.

Cost of falling behind

The news cycle constantly highlights how AI is rapidly supercharging the capabilities of nation-state attackers, cybercriminal groups and bad actors alike – and with good reason. Most, 70pc of UK IT decision-makers now agree that AI-powered attacks pose a significant threat to their organisation’s security. Yet, those threats are already slipping through the cracks.

Four in five (82pc) UK IT leaders admit that offensive techniques regularly bypass their existing security tools. Additionally, as IT and operational technology (OT) environments become more connected, the illusion of isolated ‘air-gapped’ systems offering fool-proof protection is fading fast. AI cyber threats are bypassing traditional barriers as organisations integrate IT and OT systems for efficiency, unintentionally exposing new attack surfaces.

And the attack surface is only becoming more complex. Alongside traditional sources such as networks, endpoints and applications, bad actors are also using AI to power more deceptive techniques, such as voice cloning, deepfakes and synthetic social engineering. And yet, most defences remain reactive.

Assessing Progress on Air Base Defense

The growing cruise and ballistic missile threat to U.S. Air Force (USAF) bases in the Pacific has led the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) to assess progress on air base defense. Air bases, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region,

are increasingly vulnerable to current and evolving threats from China and other actors. Although such vulnerabilities are well-known, air base defense has not kept pace with the continued technological threats to air bases and other military installations.

In this report, RAND researchers provide a clear-eyed assessment of what progress the joint force has made on air base defense and offer recommendations moving forward.

They put together a streamlined effort to answer the following questions: To what extent have the services, particularly the USAF,

invested in air base defense in recent years, and what does this level of investment suggest about commitments to defending air bases? They also probe the issue of how the USAF can and should prioritize investments in air base defense moving forward. They specifically focus on the Indo-Pacific Command theater to assess how the USAF can allocate resources across the investment options.

The Battlefield AI Revolution Is Not Here Yet: The Status of Current Russian and Ukrainian AI Drone Efforts

Kateryna Stepanenko

Russia and Ukraine are engaged in an active technological race to develop and deploy drones with artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) capabilities. Russia and Ukraine are competing to advance these AI/ML-powered drones to automate drone interoperability, targeting, and battlefield analysis. The successful integration of AI/ML drones could enable Russian and Ukrainian forces to reduce their reliance on human drone operators and defenders, bypass electronic warfare (EW), including jamming,

reduce human limitations in target identification, and speed up decision-making processes involved in drone warfare.[1] Russian and Ukrainian forces will seek to operate unmanned systems in multiple domains: unmanned aerial systems (UAVs),

unmanned surface vehicles (USF), and unmanned ground systems (UGVs).[2] Neither Russia nor Ukraine has leveraged AI/ML drones on the battlefield at scale as of early June 2025.[3] Russia and Ukraine are, however, increasingly integrating ML capabilities with some limited AI adaptations into new drone variants on the path to developing fully AI/ML-powered drones.

This paper uses AI and ML to refer to different implementations and varied degrees of development complexity, although there can be considerable overlap in definitions and discussions frequently lump ML functionality into a general bucket of AI. ML capabilities can be more scalable and easier to implement into drones when these models are trained to perform predictable and specific tasks that do not require significant processing power, memory, or data clouds.[4] Some examples of specific tasks include navigation in a GPS-denied environment and terminal guidance, image and pattern recognition, homing,

and target locking, although some of these tasks may require AI and other more advanced tools.[5] Drones with ML-powered capabilities still require general guidance and analysis from a drone operator, such as identifying a target or modifying and training the model to operate in new or complex environments, and generally require some communication with the operator.[6] ML capabilities, in other words, can enable drones to perform some pre-programmed and pre-trained tasks, but lack the autonomy and necessary reasoning skills to adapt to battlefield conditions without human intelligence and fine-tuning.[7]

Countering the Drone Threat: Steps for the U.S. Military

Vice President J.D. Vance has warned that unmanned drone systems pose a serious challenge to national security. He emphasized the urgent need to equip U.S. forces with the tools and capabilities required to defend the homeland and U.S. interests from these emerging technologies, which have the potential to disrupt military operations and endanger the lives of American troops on the battlefield.1

Ka’Von Johnson and Wilson Beaver, “The Deadly Role of Drones in Ukraine,” The Daily Signal, February 27, 2025, https://www.dailysignal.com/2025/02/27/the-deadly-role-of-drones-in-ukraine/.

The United States must invest in and adapt to the rise of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) while pursuing integration and interoperability in counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) to optimize joint capabilities.

This need is underscored by the increasing frequency of drone incursions on U.S. military bases, attacks against U.S. forces, lessons from the war in Ukraine, and the expanding UAS capabilities of non-state actors. Of particular concern is the potential for drone swarms—coordinated masses of unmanned systems that can overwhelm traditional defenses through sheer volume.

To defend itself against such threats, the United States must prioritize the rapid development and deployment of countermeasures capable of neutralizing both individual drones and drone swarms. Equally important will be the development of C-UAS that is economically sustainable in light of the growing number of cheap drones among U.S. adversaries.

A cautionary note: Despite some claims to the contrary, drones have not revolutionized every aspect of warfare, and traditional systems—such as armor, manned warships, and fighter jets—will continue their prominent roles in military operations. The proliferation of drones among non-state actors and the potential for large states to deploy drones at scale do,

however, present an increasingly lethal challenge to which the United States will need to adapt. Militaries around the planet are engaged in the development of C-UAS to deal with this threat, and the impressive success of Israeli and U.S. air defenses in shooting down the drones and missiles of the large Iranian salvo in April 2024 should be some comfort to defense planners contemplating the threat posed by unmanned systems.

Context and Background

Online Hate Speech and Discrimination in the Age of AI

This conference report summarises the discussions at a roundtable covering online hate speech and discriminatory rhetoric and the implications of AI in their spread and amplification.

The closed-door roundtable took place on 31 March 2025, and included both presentations across three sessions and participants from academia,

civil society, advocacy groups, legal non-profit organisations and the private sector. The event provided a space to discuss online hate speech and discriminatory rhetoric – ranging from antisemitism,

misogyny and anti-LGBTQI+ narratives to racism and xenophobia – as well as the implications of AI in their spread and amplification. Discussions centred around the complexities introduced by AI-generated and targeted hate speech, and explored potential responses,

from regulatory measures and content moderation to educational initiatives promoting critical thinking skills. This conference report summarises key themes and points raised during the roundtable, none of which are attributable to individual participants and presenters.a

Measuring the Reach of Russia’s Propaganda in the Russia-Ukraine War

Composite image by Sara Herbst/RAND from Adobe Stock images by Pattadis, deagreez, supamas, elen31, and Ammak.

On February 24, 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, he claimed that Ukraine was led by “far-right nationalists and neo-Nazis” and that the purpose of Russia’s invasion was to “demilitarize and denazify Ukraine.” Russia’s propagandists have sought to weaponize extremist ideologies and anti-Ukrainian ethno-national animus to mobilize domestic and international audiences.

The concern that Russia's extremist narratives could gain popularity with international audiences and even catalyze violent extremism against groups that these narratives target is warranted—but should not be overstated. Although Russian propaganda does spread far and wide, recent research suggests that not all of it is as successful as it might seem.

RAND Researchers Examined Four Hate-Filled Narratives

A recent RAND study examined how some of Russia’s most extremist and most hate-filled narratives have spread on social-media platforms, such as X and Telegram. It identified four such narratives and looked at which audiences these narratives reach and who is spreading them. Researchers reviewed statements from Russian officials, state media, and social media to identify Russian-originating narratives that echo violent extremist tropes to target and denigrate Ukrainians. The four narratives are summarized in Table 1.

Littoral Crisis and Conflict

This scenario document is a companion to the previously published Information Warfighter Exercise Wargame Second Edition: Rulebook. The scenario is intended as a resource for anyone considering administering an Information Warfighter Exercise (IWX) Wargame; this is not for players.

The scenario encompasses competition, crisis, and large-scale combat operations between two fictional countries: Khorathidin and Bagansait. The scenario begins with humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, progresses to include an attempted fait accompli, and concludes with a division-level multidomain fight. Each team must plan influence activities to support semiscripted military operations in its attempt to destroy enemy forces and gain control of a disputed littoral region.

This document will allow IWX exercise control personnel to run a wargame without first building their own scenario by providing the following resources:

(1) background information on two fictional, adversarial countries and a road to crisis that escalates them through the competition continuum;

(2) a default turn-by-turn overview of Red and Blue team objectives and concepts of operations;

(3) orders of battle and information environment overviews for both the Red and Blue teams,

initially drawn from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Decisive Action Training Environment and then modified and augmented to meet the needs of the IWX; references and supplemental materials to augment the information environment; and a step-by-step guide for developing more IWX Wargame scenarios, with explanations of how and why this particular scenario was developed.

The new attack surface: from space to smartphone

Jamie Munro

Imagine having seamless mobile broadband access anywhere on Earth, from the most remote deserts and oceans to disaster zones, all without the need for cell towers. That’s the promise of direct-to-cell (D2C) satellite communication,

a breakthrough technology that allows ordinary, unmodified, smartphones to connect directly with satellites in low Earth orbit. Pioneered by companies like AST SpaceMobile, Lynk Global and SpaceX’s Starlink, this tech is set to change global connectivity. But as the barriers to connectivity fall, a flood of cyber threats emerge.

What is D2C and why should I care?

Traditional cellular networks rely on dense, ground-based infrastructure: ugly cell towers, fibre optic cables and data centers. D2C turns this model on its head. Satellites function like flying cell towers, using standard radio bands to connect directly with everyday smartphones, no satellite phone and no spoiled views (sorry astronomers!).

The benefits are clear: universal coverage, faster disaster response and access for underserved regions. But with the race to deployment ongoing, complex cybersecurity threats stretching from the screen to the sky may be overlooked by engineers who are simply moving too fast to see them.

The expanding attack surface

D2C systems face distinct and unique threats. Attackers don’t need physical proximity to interfere and broadcasts from orbit can be jammed or spoofed by anybody with modest technical gear. It’s not a question of if, it’s a question of when threat actors, like nation-states, test their luck on these systems.

Cyber Commanders’ Handbook 2

The CCDCOE Cyber Commanders’ Handbook 2 is a practical guide designed to support commanders and decision-makers in understanding, integrating, and employing cyber capabilities within multi-domain operations. It outlines key concepts, planning considerations, organisational structures, and real-world challenges relevant to cyberspace operations at the operational and strategic levels. The handbook bridges the gap between technical cyberspace expertise and military command decision-making, enabling leaders to make informed choices in complex and contested digital environments.

The Cyber Commanders’ Handbook 2 has been developed in close cooperation with subject matter experts from national cyber commands and other relevant national and NATO entities. Building on the foundation of Version 1, the concept, structure, and content were shaped through a series of workshops and written contributions. This collaborative process gathered expert insight, best practices, and real-life lessons learned to ensure the handbook’s relevance and practical value for its target audience. The final version incorporates feedback and comments from all contributors.

Reflecting the evolving landscape of national cyber commands, doctrine, and operations, the handbook addresses the rapidly changing nature of cyberspace. While not a formal NATO doctrine, it is widely referenced across the Alliance and CCDCOE member nations as a trusted resource on cyberspace and for integrating cyber operations into military planning.

Digital copies

A digital copy of the handbook is available to CCDCOE Member Nations upon request and can be obtained through the national steering committee point of contact or by contacting publications@ccdcoe.org using a government email address.

Foreword

In our increasingly interconnected world, the IT systems and critical infrastructure that underpin our societies have become frequent targets for cyber exploitation. The systems that sustain our daily lives are under constant threat, and the potential consequences are more severe than ever. Cyberspace represents both an opportunity and a risk, providing adversaries with new avenues to disrupt national security and economic prosperity. This complexity means we must use our limited resources efficiently to respond swiftly and effectively.

Securing AI: Addressing the OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is frequently portrayed as a disruptive force with the potential to revolutionize industries, optimize workflows, and enhance decision-making in ways that were often seen as unattainable. While this perspective highlights AI’s impact, it overlooks a fundamental reality. AI is still software at its core—it runs on code, processes data, and operates within an infrastructure like other enterprise systems. Yet, despite these similarities, AI introduces critical differences that cannot be overlooked.

Unlike traditional software, which follows predefined logic and executes tasks based on explicit

programming, AI systems—particularly large language models (LLMs) are designed to operate probabilistically. These models do not adhere to fixed decision trees or structured workflows. Instead, they generate responses dynamically, relying on statistical relationships between words, phrases, and concepts. This distinction is not merely a technical detail; it has significant implications for security, governance, and

Organizations that deploy AI cannot rely solely on the security frameworks and best practices traditionally applied to conventional IT systems. For example, a firewall will not prevent an AI model from inadvertently leaking sensitive information if prompted in a specific way.

Similarly, a traditional endpoint detection system will not stop an attacker from poisoning a model’s training data or manipulating embeddings to alter the responses generated by the AI. Therefore, AI security requires an expanded approach that considers the unique ways AI models process input, generate output, and interact with enterprise systems.

New university under mysterious PLA force to offer training in AI, unmanned operations

A new university under the Chinese military’s mysterious Information Support Force plans to offer training in artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned operations and other key technology, according to its first public enrolment notice.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Information Support Force Engineering University in the central city of Wuhan will offer 10 undergraduate majors in information and intelligent technology, according to a Thursday report by state broadcaster CCTV.

It added that students who have taken the college entrance exam and passed political evaluations may apply this month.

According to the report, the school will also offer more traditional disciplines such as communication engineering, allowing students to study electromagnetic fields and wave propagation, satellite communication and 6G technology to cultivate commanding officers who can understand, operate and design communication systems.

A new data link engineering major, designed for “informationised, intelligent, and unmanned operations in modern warfare”, will teach students about signals and systems, information fusion and processing, and data link technology. This technology is used on missiles, warships, fighter jets and early warning aircraft systems, according to CCTV.

Other majors include big data, command and information systems engineering, software engineering, and intelligent vision engineering, which focuses on pattern and intelligent target recognition on the battlefield.

Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)