The Profession of Arms: A Guide for Young Army Officers
It takes courage, especially for a young officer, to check a man met on the road for not saluting properly or for slovenly appearance, but, every time he does, it adds to his stock of moral courage, and whatever the soldier may say, he has respect for the officer who does pull him up.
Read Document →The Dragon's Teeth: Assessing China's Military Modernization
PLA has focused on modernising its capabilities across all warfare domains to achieve these goals. This includes land, air, and maritime operations, nuclear, space, counter-space, electronic warfare and cyberspace operations, aiming to become a fully integrated joint force.
Read Document →Transforming the PLA: A Decade of reorganisation from SSF to ISF
PRC has engaged in a sustained and broad effort to transform the PLA from an infantry-heavy, low-technology, ground forces-centric military into a high-technology, networked force with an increasing emphasis on joint operations and naval and air power projection.
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Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is gaining prominence with the rise of social media, the digital society and the vast growth of publicly and commercially available information (PAI and CAI).
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The PLA’s Developing Cyber Warfare Capabilities and India's Options
Informationised warfare blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. A nation in the information age cannot wait for the hostilities to break out to collect intelligence, carryout influence operations, develop antisatellite systems or design computer software weapons.
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Galwan and After
Why did China did this when he is under tremendous pressure in all fronts, is this China's salami slice tactics being progressed rigorously, what will be new Rules of Engagement, what will be escalatory control mechanism, who has taken this decision, will there be some pressure put by China in India's North-East through insurgency.
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India’s Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations: A Critical Review
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan and Secretary, Department of Military Affairs, formally released declassified versions of the Joint Doctrines for Cyberspace Operations during the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in New Delhi.
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Know your Enemy General(now Field Marshal) Syed Aseem Munir
Gen SA Munir's position in the hierarchy of Pakistan was not very comfortable. The state of economy, insurgency in Pakhtoonistan and Balochistan, attack on the Jaffar Express, constant protests by supporters of Imran Khan's supporters inside and outside of parliament.
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Decoding Operation SINDOOR: Key Aspects and Implications
Precision strikes were carried out on nine sites—four in Pakistan and five in PoK—linked to anti-India terrorist groups such as the LeT, JeM and the Hizbul Mujahideen. The targeted sites included Muridke (LeT headquarters) and Bahawalpur (JeM headquarters).
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Chinese Cyber Exploitation in India's Power Grid - Is There a linkage to Mumbai Power Outage?
The New York Times (NYT), based on analysis by a U.S. based private intelligence firm Recorded Future, reported that a Chinese entity penetrated India’s power grid at multiple load dispatch points. Chinese malware intruded into the control systems that manage electric supply across India, along with a high-voltage transmission substation and a coal-fired power plant
Read Document →3 November 2015
India and Pakistan: Vulnerable Border
Book Review in E Mail Format. From My Memory Vault : Reflections of a Veteran Soldier
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Statement by the Defence Minister regarding NEFA enquiry, New Delhi Sep 2, 1963
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Chinese Nationalist Sentiment After the US South China Sea Patrol
Chinese Air and Naval Forces Have Conducted Live Fire Exercises in South China Sea
BRITAIN’S MERCANTILE DIPLOMACY WITH CHINA
3 Chinese Weapons of War America Should Fear in the South China Sea
How Will China Respond In the South China Sea? Ask the Soviet Union
An American Hostage in Iran—Again
The reports of another hostage will almost certainly complicate Iran’s recent overtures to the West, discourage foreign business, and undermine further
Iran Starts Shutting Down Its Nuclear Centrifuges
Russia’s Military Operations In Syria – Analysis
Australia Facing Heavy Criticism For Nuclear Agreement With India – Analysis
Obama's move in Syria reignites war powers debate
Russia Confirms Jet Broke Up in Mid-Air; Did 2001 Accident Doom It?
A Solution For Syria and the Kurds That Turkey and the U.S. Can Agree On
Killers in the Sky: The 5 Most Lethal Combat Aircraft Going to War in Syria
7 Steps to an Effective U.S. Peace Policy
Preparing For The Cyber Battleground Of The Future – Analysis
The Campaign for a High and Frustrating Office
Why the U.S.-China Cyber Spying Ban Will Inevitably Fail
The Strange Silence Surrounding an Indian Military Exercise
HOW DO WE MAKE OUR CARRIERS DEADLIER WITH WHAT WE ALREADY HAVE?
A Lot of What We Think We Know About World War II Is Wrong
Getting the B-3 Off the Ground
U.S. Army tests swarms of drones in major exercise
The U.S. Navy Packs More Firepower into Shrinking Submarine Force
November 1, 2015
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The U.S. Navy’s latest shipbuilding plan underscores what service leaders and lawmakers have long known — the Navy is going to have too few attack submarines. To compensate, the sailing branch wants to pack more firepower into the subs it will have.
The Navy’s goal is to maintain at least 48 attack subs as part of a roughly 300-ship fleet. But the 2016 edition of the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, published in April, shows the total number of Los Angeles-, Seawolf– and Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack subs declining from 54 in 2015 to a low of 41 in 2029.
“The decline is the result of the retirement … of Los Angeles-class attack submarines,” Eric Labs, an analyst with the official Congressional Budget Office, wrote in an October report. “Those ships are reaching the end of their 33-year service life, having generally been built at a rate of three or four per year during the 1970s and 1980s. The Navy would replace those submarines with Virginia-class attack submarines and their successors, at a rate of one or two per year.”
There’s little chance of the Navy boosting production of new submarines, which cost more than $2.5 billion apiece. Even the current shipbuilding plan is arguably too expensive. “If the Navy received the same amount of funding (in constant dollars) for new-ship construction in each of the next 30 years that it has received, on average, over the past three decades, the service would not be able to afford its 2016 plan,” Labs wrote.