Reconstitution Under Fire: Insights from the 1973 Yom Kippur War

Nathan Jennings

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The 1973 Arab-Israeli War confronted Israel’s military with a sudden and existential crisis. Initiated by simultaneous Syrian and Egyptian offensives from the north and south, the bitter conflict demonstrated the value of operational endurance as each side sustained unexpected attrition. Within hours, Israeli assumptions about intelligence overmatch, maneuver superiority, and air dominance collapsed under the weight of the Arab assaults. Responding to significant losses in men and materiel, Israel subsequently initiated a painful process of battlefield regeneration to recreate combat power and establish conditions for large-scale counteroffensives that could end the war on favorable terms. While combatants on both sides demonstrated courage and commitment in the face of daunting challenges, the Israeli capacity to persevere ultimately paid the highest dividends and yielded a conditional strategic victory.

How did the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) achieve, albeit at a tremendous societal cost, this systemic regeneration across both ground and air services while continuously engaged on multiple active fronts? The Israelis’ desperate response to simultaneous crises in the Sinai and the Golan Heights—which derailed prewar plans for synchronized air-ground maneuver designed to achieve rapid decision—combined important aspects of veteran leadership, logistical resiliency, and strategic adaptation with critical functions of tactical recovery and tiered mobilization to achieve formation reconstitution at echelon. Characterized, as US Army General Donn Starry described it, by “enormous equipment losses in a relatively short time” and “lethality at extended ranges,” the conflict now underscores the enduring imperative for military institutions to avoid the quicksand of wishful thinking and instead prepare to fight, and win, in the bitter crucible of attritional combat.

Recovery, Regeneration, and Reconstitution

Can Syria Recover?

Natasha Hall and Ninar Fawal

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During his trip to the Middle East in mid-May, U.S. President Donald Trump did something extraordinary. On the Saudi leg of his four-day tour, the president issued a sweeping change to U.S. policy toward Syria. First, he announced, to riotous applause in Riyadh, that the United States would suspend all sanctions on the country as the Syrian government navigates a difficult transition following the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December. The following day, Trump met publicly with Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Shara, a former al-Qaeda fighter who just months ago had a $10 million U.S. government bounty on his head. After the meeting, Trump referred to Shara as a young, attractive guy with a “strong past.”

In taking these abrupt steps, Trump skirted what in any other U.S. administration would likely have been a long and tedious policymaking process. For months, many Syrians and Syria watchers had worried that the United States might never lift its sanctions. Washington first imposed sanctions on Syria in 1979, when it declared its regime to be a state sponsor of terrorism, triggering a ban on arms sales and other restrictions on exports to the country. Congress imposed additional sanctions in the early years of the twenty-first century. After Syria’s civil war began in 2011, both the United States and Europe added further restrictions. Armed groups within Syria—some of which are now represented in the government in Damascus—were also issued terrorist designations and therefore remain subject to sanctions. Together, these measures largely cut Syria off from international trade and investment and have been a major barrier to economic recovery in the war-ravaged country.

Comparative Insurgencies: Strategic Lessons for Myanmar’s Resistance from Syria’s Regime Collapse

Tin Shine Aung 

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On the morning of December 8, 2024, the world was stunned by the news that Syrian rebel groups, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), had captured Damascus and overthrown President Bashar al-Assad’s government after 13 years of civil war. This unexpected turn in one of the Middle East’s most protracted conflicts holds vital lessons for other movements seeking to overthrow entrenched dictatorships. Answering a set of questions helps bring those lessons forward: (1) How did Syrian rebel groups topple the Assad regime quickly this time? (2) What stance has Syria’s interim government taken toward ethnic and religious minorities for national reconciliation? (3) How is HTS navigating international legitimacy, given its designation by many Western governments as a terrorist group, while positioning itself as the de facto authority in Damascus?

This article explores these lessons through the lens of the Myanmar Revolution, offering insights that the Myanmar National Unity Government (NUG) and other rebel groups can draw from the Syrian Revolution. The involvement of external powers in the Syrian conflict is far more pronounced and significant than that of Myanmar, where direct interventions have been limited, with the notable exception of China’s involvement. While the situations in Syria and Myanmar differ significantly, certain parallels can be drawn between the two conflicts. These include (1) the shared aspiration of civilians in both nations to be liberated from oppressive regimes, (2) the presence of diverse ethnic and religious communities within both countries, (3) ongoing international legal proceedings against both regimes at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for alleged crimes against its civilians; (4) the involvement of numerous militia groups with divergent agendas in both conflicts; (5) repeated vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions targeting these regimes by permanent members such as Russia and China; (6) the strategic interests of regional powers – such as Iran & Turkey in Syria, and China & India in Myanmar – that shape the dynamics of both conflicts; and (7) the inefficient roles of regional blocs like the Arab League in Syria and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Myanmar.

How Could Syrian Rebel Groups Topple the Assad Regime So Swiftly?

Trump's photo with Syrian President al-Sharaa symbolizes new world order - analysis

SETH J. FRANTZMAN

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US President Donald Trump met the new Syrian leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The photos from this historic moment that surfaced on Wednesday symbolized that a new world order is emerging.

This is a major event in the Middle East.

Syrians celebrated throughout the night between Tuesday and Wednesday due to Trump saying that he would work to end sanctions on Syria.

Many people have commented on the rapid turn of events. Sharaa led his Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham forces into Damascus on December 8, 2024. It has only been five months since then, and Sharaa is already in Saudi Arabia meeting the US president.

When he first rolled into Damascus, he had a $10 million bounty on his head from the US owing to accusations of his involvement in terrorism in the past.

The US was quick to note in December 2024 that it would cancel the bounty. However, it remained to be seen if Washington would move quickly to establish ties.

European countries moved faster, and Sharaa visited France first, before meeting the American president.

The Trump meeting is symbolic on many levels. It brings to a close a chapter of US president George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror. That war began after 9/11 and saw US troops go to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Sharaa went to Iraq to oppose the US occupation there around 2005. He was held at a US-run detention center called Camp Bucca, according to reports.

Syria’s Biggest Problem

Jesse Marks and Hazem Rihawi

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The shocking defeat of Bashar al-Assad’s regime by rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham prompted a groundswell of domestic and international optimism. But already, Syria’s post-Assad future is on a knife’s edge. The obstacles to reconstructing the country are immense. Chief among them is the question of refugees forced from the country during Syria’s decadelong civil war. The return of these refugees could become the largest repatriation operation in decades, with over six million Syrian refugees abroad and seven million displaced within Syria. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians have already returned to their homeland, driven

The Coming Fight for Syri

Rob Geist Pinfold

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Before sunrise on 8 December 2024, Bashar al-Assad boarded a plane and left the country he had ruled with an iron fist for so long. Curiously, he opted for the longer flight to Moscow rather than the much shorter hop to neighbour and long-term ally Iran.

For many, Assad’s destination was inconsequential. What mattered was that the hated autocrat, who had killed at least 600,000 of his own people, was gone. But concerned pundits tempered the enthusiasm, invoking recent instances where an Arab dictator had fallen to illustrate that Syria’s future was far from bright: looting, instability and violence could be expected to follow. Optimists claimed that this time was different. Syria is not Iraq, nor is it Libya. Syria is Syria. And in Syria, it was not a foreign occupier that made regime change possible. Quite the opposite: this was the product of the Syrian people’s own blood, sweat and tears. They had finally not just removed a home-grown dictator but also freed themselves from Russian and Iranian domination.

Both the optimists and the pessimists are right. This was the Syrian people’s triumph. Likewise, Syria has seen some looting, but nothing like the widespread anarchy after the fall of Saddam Hussein. But pessimists are right to focus on ‘the day after’. Once the celebrations end, Syrians will have to decide what kind of country they want and who should lead it. Yet Syria is not a coherent, unified state. It is made up of multiple armed groups with different goals and foreign backers. Thus, the country’s future – and which external powers will control a significant stake in a post-Assad Syria – will not be a decision that the Syrian people will make alone.

The Former Status Quo

Syria under Assad was neither free nor sovereign. Assad’s rule was brutal, yet his regime did not enjoy the monopoly over power within Syria’s borders that is a necessary component of statehood. Before Assad’s fall, the country was de facto partitioned: the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) held eastern Syria, the Islamist Hayut Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ruled the northern Idlib province, and the Syrian National Army (SNA) was sandwiched between SDF and HTS-controlled territory. Even in areas Assad nominally controlled, such as the southern Daraa province, in practice it was local militias from the Southern Front (SF), whose loyalty flipped between the rebels and the regime, who really called the shots.

What Syria’s Revived Civil War Means for the Region

Steven A. Cook

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Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations.

How did opposition fighters gain control of Syria’s second-largest city eight years after they were routed? How significant is this?

During the height of the conflict in Syria nearly a decade ago, Aleppo was divided between government-controlled and rebel areas, but with the help of Russian airpower and the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah, the regime of President Bashar al-Assad was able to regain control over the entire city by the end of 2016. Since about that time, conflict in Syria was static with the rebels largely confined to the Idlib governate, which is adjacent to the Aleppo governate.

Clearly, the armed opposition to Assad has taken advantage of the fact that Israel has done significant damage to Iran’s so-called axis of resistance, especially Hezbollah. A greatly weakened Hezbollah and a Russia distracted by its fight in Ukraine make it harder to defend the Assad regime. That does not mean that Hezbollah or the Russians will not help. Both are deeply invested in Syria, but they do not have the forces they had in 2015 and 2016 that were used to crush the insurgency.

After Aleppo’s fall, Assad’s grip on power seems tenuous. A major question is what is happening in Damascus. There were unconfirmed reports not long after Aleppo fell that Assad and his family were in Moscow, that there were scuffles on the streets of the capital, that different units of the Syrian army were in conflict, and most dramatically, that the presidential palace was overrun. Most of these reports are likely the result of disinformation, but what is happening within the councils of power in Damascus will be critical for how this new phase of the Syrian conflict unfolds.

Erdoğan’s risky play in Syria

Jamie Dettmer

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Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor at POLITICO Europe. He covered Syria’s civil war from 2013 to 2016 for Voice of America and the Daily Beast.

As Syrian dictator Bashar Assad’s forces turned tail and fled Aleppo in the face of a long-planned and stunning offensive by an alliance of Islamist militias in the country’s northwest, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was left fulminating, casting around for an explanation.

The fall of Syria’s second-largest city to the alliance led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — an al Qaeda breakaway — isn’t just a humiliation for Assad. It’s also a humiliation of his allies Iran and, to some extent, Russia.

In 2016, Iran-commanded Shiite militias — aided by a scorched-earth bombing campaign from Russia — had helped the Syrian autocrat grab Aleppo back from insurgents who had controlled around half the city for four years. After that, it was meant to be safe in Assad’s hands. But last week, it took all of 72 hours to overrun Aleppo, reigniting the long-running Syrian civil war initially sparked by Assad’s brutal repression of pro-democracy protests.

Why?

Upon his arrival in Damascus for urgent talks, Araghchi offered the most damning explanation he could think of — it was all a “plot by the Israeli regime to destabilize the region.” But while it’s convenient for Tehran to blame the Zionists — Israeli missiles and airstrikes may have marginally helped the insurgents — Aleppo’s fall has little to do with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s aspirations to reshape the Middle East and much more to do with the state of Assad’s armed forces.

Why Assad’s Regime Is Collapsing So Quickl

Charles Lister

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A coalition of armed opposition factions has gone on the offensive in northern Syria, capturing some 250 cities, towns, and villages and more than doubling the territory under its control. Syria’s second-largest city of Aleppo was captured in 24 hours, as Syrian regime front lines collapsed one after the other. After nearly five years of territorial lines of control being frozen across the country, these are dramatic, game-changing developments.

Local rebels take most of key southern Syrian region - reports

Barbara Plett-Usher and Kathryn Armstrong

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Rebel forces in southern Syria have reportedly captured most of the Deraa region - the birthplace of the 2011 uprising against President Bashar al-Assad.

A UK-based war monitor reports that the "local factions" were able to take control of many military sites there following "violent battles" with government forces.

According to the Reuters news agency, rebel sources saying they had reached a deal for the army to withdraw and for military officials to be given safe passage to the capital, Damascus - roughly 100km (62 miles) away.

The BBC has been unable to independently verify these reports, which come as Islamist-led rebels in northern Syria claimed to have reached the outskirts of the city of Homs.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a UK-based war monitor, said on Friday that the rebels in the south now control more than 90% of the Deraa region and that only the Sanamayn area is still in government hands.

Deraa city has both strategic and symbolic importance. It is a provincial capital and is close to the main crossings on the Jordanian border, while also being where pro-democracy protests erupted in 2011 - sparking the country's ongoing civil war, in which more than half a million people have been killed.

Jordan's interior minister said the country had closed its side of the border as "a result of the surrounding security conditions in Syria's south".

Why Syria Matters to the Kremlin

Nicole Grajewski

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Rebel forces swept into Aleppo on Saturday, capturing the city center in a lightning three-day offensive that seemed to show the slackening of Moscow’s grip on Syria. The symbolism was impossible to ignore: The Syrian regime’s brutal reconquest of that very city in 2016 had demonstrated Russia’s military effectiveness. Now Vladimir Putin’s Russia is preoccupied with Ukraine, and Aleppo has slipped from regime control.

But Russia’s commitment to Syria has not actually wavered, and Russia is not really distracted. The advance of Syria’s rebels, led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), reflects the degradation not of Russian attention but of the multinational ground forces supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. And Russia is not only not contemplating withdrawing from Syria—it looks poised to double down on its investment there, even if it has to rely on Iranian-backed forces and the cooperation of regional powers to do so.

Syria is important to Moscow because intervening there in 2015 allowed Putin to reverse the narrative of Russian decline that had taken hold since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia would no longer be what then-President Barack Obama dismissed as a declining “regional power”—it was to be a decisive great-power patron of the Assad regime, and as such, it would rewrite the playbook of outside intervention in the Middle East. American-led interventions, such as the invasion of Iraq and the NATO campaign in Libya, shattered states and bred chaos. Russia would have the opposite effect, preserving Syrian sovereignty and regional order.

Syria’s Assad and Iran Face Tough Choices as Rebels Advance Story

Sam Dagher 

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(Bloomberg) -- Syria-based rebel forces are seeking to build on recent gains and capture more territory controlled by the government, raising the question of whether President Bashar Al-Assad can hold onto power.

There are a lot of unknowns in how the latest twist in Syria’s 15-year conflict will play out, and much depends on the agendas of powerful external actors as much as the internal enmities that have influenced events. For Assad, 59, that means Iran, which considers Syria part of its so-called axis of resistance against Israel and the West and has for years provided the bulk of ground forces, and Russia, an old Cold War-era ally that stepped in to save him in 2015.

A major game changer would be if Russia, which has an airbase in the country, commences a sweeping aerial bombardment against the rebels like it did nine years ago. The difference this time is that Russia is occupied with its war in Ukraine.

Syrian Rebels Take Over Aleppo, Control Airport | Rebel forces — Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a breakaway faction of al-Qaeda — push toward Hama after taking Aleppo© Bloomberg News

Assad has ground Syria down with its population struggling with poverty, shortages and power outages. The conflict so far has left between 300,000 to 500,000 dead, more than 7 million internally displaced, at least 6.4 million refugees and caused almost half a trillion dollars of damage, according to United Nations agencies and Syrian NGOs.

Here are some of the key questions:

The Return of ​​Syria’s Rebels: Neither Unexpected Nor Final

Arman Mahmoudian 

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The sudden territorial gains of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria, including Aleppo—Syria’s second-largest city—have reawakened the nation’s dormant civil war. Although these developments may catch some off guard, they are neither unexpected nor unprecedented. In fact, they have been a long time coming; the regime of Bashar al-Assad has been vulnerable to such upheaval for years.

First, for over a decade, the Syrian army had struggled to obtain the upper hand in a brutal civil war, resulting in a decline in its military capabilities and morale. While the situation had notably stabilized in favor of Assad’s regime since 2018, the Syrian army never received a chance to recover. Once considered a proud military force, the Syrian Arab Army has, in recent years, devolved into a fragmented patchwork of factions and militias heavily influenced by foreign powers, including Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.

The presence and activity of external forces, establishing bases and asserting control across the country, have likely impacted troop morale. Many have begun to question the extent to which they are truly fighting for their country’s sovereignty. Additionally, the Syrian army’s infrastructure, command centers, and bases have been relentlessly targeted by Israeli airstrikes over the past decade. Hundreds of these strikes have critically weakened its operational capacity. These external pressures, alongside the army’s decline and frustration, dealt a serious blow to the overall effectiveness of the Syrian army.

The second factor behind the current developments in Syria is Russia’s so-called “Ukrainian fatigue,” or more precisely, the strain caused by its protracted war in Ukraine. Back in 2015, when Russia declared its support for Assad, it played a pivotal role in restoring the regime’s health. Massive Russian airstrikes were critical in shifting the balance of the civil war, allowing the Syrian regime, supported by Iranian forces and allied Shia militias, to gain the upper hand.

The Syrian tragedy continues

Tim Black

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The terrible 13-years-long conflict in Syria has been mainly framed as a civil war between the government of Bashar al-Assad and domestic opponents. The sight of jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capturing villages and towns in north-west Syria, before advancing on and taking the city of Aleppo on Friday, has largely been interpreted through this civil-war lens – as the reignition of a conflict between ‘rebel’ groups and ‘regime’ or ‘government’ forces.

This, though, is to tell only part of the story. Not just of the latest direct challenge to Assad’s hollow rule, but also of Syria’s long-standing descent into violent instability. (For one thing, ‘rebels’ seems like an oddly anodyne way to describe the vicious Islamists of HTS.)

Throughout this long conflict, there have certainly been domestic factors involved, chief among which is the illegitimacy and chronic lack of authority of Assad’s de facto, tin-pot dictatorship. This weakness gave rise to the initial popular uprisings against him in 2011. But since that initial eruption of anti-Assad protest during the Arab Spring, this has ceased to be a conflict determined by social, political forces internal to Syria itself.

Syrian Rebels’ Surprise Offensive Highlights Assad Regime’s Weakness

Natasha Hall

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On November 27, Syrian opposition-armed groups launched a surprise offensive. With Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the lead, rebels in northwest Syria quickly swept through the western Aleppo countryside. With little to no resistance from the Syrian regime and their allies, rebels were able to capture Syria’s second-largest city, Aleppo, within a day. By the evening of November 30, the rebels had taken over 100 kilometers of the strategic M5 highway linking Aleppo and Damascus. This is the first rebel offensive and a major shift in frontlines in years. The last significant change was in early 2020 when the regime displaced nearly a million people into Idlib from other parts of the province and Hama province.

Q1: What led to the surprise rebel offensive?

A1: Prior to this offensive, the frontlines in Syria’s long-running war had been relatively frozen for four years. To maintain those frontlines, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah protected the Assad regime, while Turkey preserved the opposition-held northern parts of the country, and the United States maintained forces in northeastern and eastern Syria.

That fragile stasis collapsed as Assad’s allies, Iran and Hezbollah, have been significantly weakened. In recent months, Israel decimated Hezbollah leadership and rank and file and penetrated highly secure locations in Iran. Hours before the offensive in Syria, Hezbollah struck a ceasefire deal with Israel, in which Israeli forces vowed to prevent weapon transfers to Hezbollah, and they have continued to strike arms shipments in Syria and Lebanon.

Syrian Military Launches Counterattacks in Attempt to Halt Insurgents’ Surprise Advance

KAREEM CHEHAYEB

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BEIRUT — The Syrian military rushed reinforcements to the northwest and launched airstrikes Sunday in an attempt to push back insurgents who seized the country’s largest city of Aleppo, as Iran pledged to help the government counter the surprise offensive.

Iran has been a key political and military ally of Syrian President Bashar Assad in the country's long-running civil war, but it was unclear how Tehran would support Damascus in this latest flareup that began Wednesday. Insurgents led by jihadi group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham launched a two-pronged attack on Aleppo and the countryside around Idlib, before moving toward neighboring Hama province.

On Sunday, government troops created a “strong defensive line” in northern Hama, according to Britain-based opposition war monitor the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, as they attempted to stall the insurgents' momentum. Meanwhile, jets pounded the cities of Idlib and Aleppo, killing at least 15 people, according to a group that operates in opposition-held areas.

The surge in fighting has raised the prospect of another violent, destabilizing front reopening in the Middle East at a time when Israel is fighting Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, conflicts that have repeatedly threatened to ignite an even wider regional war. It also risks drawing Russia and Turkey — each with its own interests to protect in Syria — into direct heavy fighting against each other.

The insurgents announced their offensive Wednesday, just as a ceasefire between the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Israel began, raising some hope that tensions in the region might be calming.

Bowen: Syria's rebel offensive is astonishing - but don't write off Assad

Jeremy Bowen

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Rebel groups launched an offensive against Syria's government on 27 November, and have since taken control of large parts of Aleppo

The reignited war in Syria is the latest fallout from the turmoil that has gripped the Middle East since the Hamas attacks on Israel on 7 October last year.

The attacks, and Israel’s response, upended the status quo. Events in Syria in the last few days are more proof that the war gripping the Middle East is escalating, not subsiding.

During a decade of war after 2011, Bashar al-Assad’s rule survived because he was prepared to break Syria to save the regime he had inherited from his father.

To do that he relied on powerful allies, Russia, Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. They intervened on his side against rebel groups that ranged from the jihadist extremists of Islamic State to militias supported by the US and the rich Gulf monarchies.

Now Iran is reeling from severe blows inflicted by Israel, with US support, on its security in the Middle East. Its ally Hezbollah, which used to send its best men to fight for the Assad regime in Syria, has been crippled by Israel’s attacks. Russia has launched air strikes in the last few days against the rebel offensive in Syria – but its military power is almost entirely earmarked to fight the war in Ukraine.

The war in Syria did not end. It dropped out of the place it used to occupy in headline news, partly because of turbulence across the Middle East and beyond, and because it is almost impossible for journalists to get into the country.

In places the war was suspended, or frozen, but Syria is full of unfinished business.

Second Fall of Aleppo Marks New Phase in Syrian Civil War

Paulo Aguiar

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The swift capture of Aleppo by rebel forces, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), marks a pivotal turning point in the Syrian civil war. This development not only highlights the fragility of Bashar al-Assad’s regime but also underscores how regional and broader international dynamics are reshaping the conflict. The city, which symbolized the Assad regime’s resurgence after its recapture in 2016, is once again at the center of Syria’s shifting battlefield.

The rebels’ lightning advance reflects deeper geopolitical currents. The Ukraine war has taken a toll on Russia, Assad’s most powerful ally, while Iran and Hezbollah are grappling with the fallout from Israel’s military campaigns. Meanwhile, Turkey has leveraged the situation to expand its influence in northern Syria by utilizing HTS as a proxy force. These overlapping dynamics have given rise to a volatile environment, making Aleppo’s fall a critical turning point.

HTS: From Insurgent Group to Major Player

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has evolved significantly since its origins as an offshoot of al Qaeda in Syria. After splitting from its parent organization and consolidating power in Idlib, HTS has established itself as the dominant force in Syria’s northwestern rebel-held areas. Operating under Turkish protection, the group has transformed Idlib into a de facto Islamist state, with functioning governance structures, military discipline, and strategic autonomy.

This transformation has made HTS a potent actor on Syria’s battlefield. Its leadership has sought to distance itself from the group’s jihadist roots, projecting an image of pragmatism and moderation, at least compared to other Islamist factions. This strategy has helped HTS consolidate power and attract Turkish support, even as it remains classified as a terrorist organization by the United States.

The Aleppo offensive showcases HTS’s growth into a cohesive and capable military force. The group’s fighters demonstrated effective coordination, utilizing modern tactics and weaponry, including drone warfare—a hallmark of contemporary conflicts, starting with the Ukraine war. The rapid pace of the advance, which cut through Assad’s forces in a matter of days, underscores HTS’s enhanced capacity and strategic planning.

What Syria’s Revived Civil War Means for the Region

Steven A. Cook

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Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations.

How did opposition fighters gain control of Syria’s second-largest city eight years after they were routed? How significant is this?

During the height of the conflict in Syria nearly a decade ago, Aleppo was divided between government-controlled and rebel areas, but with the help of Russian airpower and the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah, the regime of President Bashar al-Assad was able to regain control over the entire city by the end of 2016. Since about that time, conflict in Syria was static with the rebels largely confined to the Idlib governate, which is adjacent to the Aleppo governate.

Clearly, the armed opposition to Assad has taken advantage of the fact that Israel has done significant damage to Iran’s so-called axis of resistance, especially Hezbollah. A greatly weakened Hezbollah and a Russia distracted by its fight in Ukraine make it harder to defend the Assad regime. That does not mean that Hezbollah or the Russians will not help. Both are deeply invested in Syria, but they do not have the forces they had in 2015 and 2016 that were used to crush the insurgency.

After Aleppo’s fall, Assad’s grip on power seems tenuous. A major question is what is happening in Damascus. There were unconfirmed reports not long after Aleppo fell that Assad and his family were in Moscow, that there were scuffles on the streets of the capital, that different units of the Syrian army were in conflict, and most dramatically, that the presidential palace was overrun. Most of these reports are likely the result of disinformation, but what is happening within the councils of power in Damascus will be critical for how this new phase of the Syrian conflict unfolds.

The Demise Of The Nation Formerly Known As Syria – OpEd

Artis Shepherd

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The most recent bombing campaign undertaken by the Biden regime, ostensibly against Iran-backed targets in eastern Syria, is the latest such event in a long line of war and misery for that country. But unlike others, Syria appears to be a nation with no sovereign agency and therefore no way to influence events on its own soil, with the Syrian government relying instead on regional supporters to push for certain outcomes – usually those that benefit a small group of individuals within that government.

Far from being a sovereign nation with citizens capable of self-determination, Syria now appears to be a battleground for tribes and empires fighting wars of their own interest. While the Syrian people flee the country in droves, the fabric of Syria as a nation of any sort has frayed.

Brief History

For several decades prior to 2011, Syria was a country in tentative equilibrium. While majority Sunni Muslim (65-70%), Syria’s population also comprised a substantial number of Christians, at 10-15%. Filling in the remaining 15-20% were various Shi’a offshoots including Ismailis, Druze, Yezidi, and Alawites. From this latter group, the Alawites, came the ruling Asad family, with Hafez al-Asad officially taking power in 1971.

From this context – a Shi’a minority elite ruling over a largely Sunni population – much can be interpreted in terms of the events and dynamics that subsequently took shape in Syria.