13 November 2023

The Economic Consequences of the Gaza War


Hamas’s barbaric massacre of at least 1,400 Israelis on October 7, and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza to eradicate the group, has introduced four geopolitical scenarios bearing on the global economy and markets. As is often the case with such shocks, optimism may prove misguided.

In the first scenario, the war remains mostly confined to Gaza, with no regional escalation beyond the small-scale skirmishes with Iranian proxies in countries neighboring Israel; indeed, most players now prefer to avoid a regional escalation. The Israel Defense Forces’ Gaza campaign significantly erodes Hamas, leaving a high civilian casualty toll, and the unstable geopolitical status quo survives. Having lost all support, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu leaves office, but Israeli public sentiment remains hardened against accepting a two-state solution. Accordingly, the Palestinian issue festers; normalization of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia is frozen; Iran remains a destabilizing force in the region; and the United States continues to worry about the next flare-up.

The economic and market implications of this scenario are mild. The current modest rise in oil prices would recede, because there will have been no shock to regional production and exports from the Gulf. Though the US could try to interdict Iranian oil exports to punish it for its destabilizing role in the region, it is unlikely to pursue such an escalatory measure. Iran’s economy would continue to stagnate under existing sanctions, deepening its dependence on close ties with China and Russia.

Why Israel’s invasion of Gaza has been delayed

It all began so fast. An unprecedented barrage of rockets served as cover for a murderous rampage, which led to a frantic manhunt and ferocious air strikes. Reservists rushed to don uniforms and report for duty. Generals promised a massive ground offensive. What began as a sleepy autumn weekend ended with Israel making ready to invade Gaza.

Israel Discovers Never-Before-Seen Weapons in Gaza

Nick Mordowanec

Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have reportedly discovered new, never-before-seen weapons utilized by Hamas militants while targeting the militant organization's underground infrastructure in the Gaza Strip.

The IDF reportedly discovered "means of warfare unknown to the security system," including new rockets found by IDF engineering forces in Gaza laboratories.

When reached for comment, the IDF told Newsweek via email that it does not "discuss specific operational capabilities."

Fighting has escalated in the Middle East over the past month following a surprise attack by Hamas on October 7 that resulted in thousands killed and hundreds taken as hostages.

In response to the actions of Hamas, designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Israel retaliated by launching its heaviest-ever airstrikes on the Gaza Strip as part of a war declared by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

As of November 7, over 1,400 people had been killed in Israel, and an additional 242 were kidnapped and taken to Gaza as hostages. The Palestinian death toll in the Israel-Hamas war surpassed 10,300, including more than 4,200 children, according to the Health Ministry in Gaza, according to The Associated Press.

An IDF spokesman said Wednesday that combat fighters of the force's 460th Brigade located and destroyed several tunnel shafts belonging to Hamas, according to a translation from Hebrew published by the Israel Broadcasting Corporation.

Israel-Hamas Conflict Lead Cyberwar Too! 100 Hacker Groups Involved

A recent cybercrime report reveals over 100 hacker groups exploited the Israel-Hamas conflict, with some posing threats to Israeli critical infrastructure. Ransomware also impacted 46% of affected organizations in critical sectors, demonstrating the vulnerability of essential services. As criminal affiliations and geopolitics continue to shape cyber threats, organizations must remain vigilant against an evolving landscape of attacks. 

Cybercrime is shaping into a wild tech monster every other day! It may sound overdramatic but the latest data narrates the same. The recently released Q3 2023 Crimeware Report by Arete Advisors, a cyber risk management company, sheds light on the alarming trends observed in ransomware and extortion attacks during this period. The report provides valuable insights into the changing landscape of cyber threats and the impact of these attacks on critical infrastructure sectors. 

One of the most disturbing findings of the report is that the end of Q3 2023 witnessed deadly attacks in Israel, reigniting the conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Middle East. Over 100 cyber threat groups were involved in malicious cyber activity surrounding the conflict. While most of the activity consisted of low-skill website destructions and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks with little long-term impact on organizations, some malicious activity posed a significant threat to Israeli critical infrastructure. 

Threat actors accessed an alert app used by the Israeli government to communicate with citizens, and a fake version of the app preloaded with spyware was distributed. Additionally, historically Russian-aligned cyber threat actors engaged in pro-Palestine activity, and multiple pro-Palestine organizations launched low-skilled attacks against NATO countries in support of Russian objectives. The overlap between these groups is expected, as both seek to introduce chaos into already chaotic situations.

Is Hamas losing the media battle to Israel in the Arab press?


Most of the media in the Arab world is hostile toward Israel. A slew of condemnations, some with undeniably antisemitic overtones, have been flooding the print, electronic, and social media since October 7. Most ignore the Hamas killing and captivity of women, children, and elderly Israelis. Those who do admit that Hamas perpetrated atrocities, justify them by citing Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, its prolonged siege of Gaza, and its soldiers’ alleged deliberate killing of Palestinians.

Qatar’s widely popular Al Jazeera media outlet is a leading propagator of this vitriol, mobilized to spread lies in the service of Hamas. Hostile coverage and commentary are also prominent in countries that have signed peace agreements with Israel, such as Egypt and Jordan.

But there are other voices, too. Although these are drowned out by the predominantly negative media coverage, they must not be ignored because they point readers and listeners to the Hamas savagery and the damage it inflicts on the Palestinian cause. Clearly, the media campaign is no less important than the military campaign.

Is the Arab world condemning Hamas?

Harsh criticism of Hamas is particularly noticeable in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. Unlike Qatar’s Al Jazeera, Saudi competitor Al-Arabiya has clearly adopted a more moderate stance in its coverage of the war. Thus, for example, in an interview with former Hamas head, and still a leading figure, Khaled Mashaal, the channel’s anchor Rasha Nabil criticized him for harming Israeli civilians and asked him if he would apologize for these acts.

The IDF’s war on Hamas is going better than it expected… for now


After a period of doubt as IDF troops idled on the Gaza border for weeks, Israel’s government has shown a serious commitment to the ground invasion of the Hamas-run enclave.

Three divisions are inside the northern half of the Gaza Strip, cutting the territory in half and making steady progress toward the heart of Gaza City.

A month into the war, launched in the wake of the Hamas massacres on October 7, the military and Israel’s political leadership boast of significant achievements against Hamas. Israel’s allies continue to support its attempts to destroy the terrorist organization, and the unity government running the war appears stable.

But there are reasons for concern, even if the war seems to have gone even better than expected at this point.

‘Very wisely, very carefully’

After October 7, experts warned that the impending ground invasion would be “very, very messy.” The US sent military experts to Israel to reportedly convince its leaders that urban combat would be too bloody, and that a more prudent path would be an operation consisting of airstrikes and special forces raids.

Israel instead went a different route, dispatching tanks, infantry, and combat engineers in deliberate maneuvers across the territory’s dunes and fields along the border before reaching Gaza City’s suburbs. Thousands of reservists joined much of the military’s active ground force inside the Strip.

1 Month After Oct. 7: Mideast Was ‘Quieter Than It’s Been in Decades,’ Then Hamas Struck Israel

Carlo Versano

On Sept. 29, White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan took the stage at The Atlantic Festival in Washington, D.C., looking upbeat.

Sullivan, a former adviser to both President Obama and Hillary Clinton now running point on foreign policy for the Biden administration, was there for a conversation about “American Democracy at a crossroads” centered mostly on the war in Ukraine.

“The Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades,” Sullivan said toward the end of his remarks, using a line he had written in an essay for Foreign Affairs magazine about America’s geopolitical strategies.

It was a statement that reflected the views of policymakers and well-respected analysts around the world.

Eight days later, as the sun was rising on an early autumn Saturday just after the Jewish high holidays, Hamas terrorists breached the security perimeter where the Gaza Strip borders southern Israel by land and air, launching a brutal day-long, multi-pronged attack.

When it was over, some 1,400 people were dead, and more than 200 others had been taken back to Gaza as hostages. Another casualty was that “quieter” Middle East, and the long-held belief among Israelis that their borders and homes were secure.

Now, one month after the attack, Israeli troops are mired in the nation's first ground war in Gaza in nearly a decade.

Israel advances rapidly in Gaza, but eliminating Hamas leaders to take time

Ben Caspit

The Israeli army has been advancing quicker than its own commanders anticipated in encircling Gaza City and reaching Hamas headquarters, but accomplishing the goal of eliminating the group’s political and military leadership would take time, a commodity Israel is currently short of.

Taking into account American pressure for a humanitarian pause, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told American broadcaster ABC News on Monday that Israel might agree to "small cease-fires, an hour here and an hour there," for delivering humanitarian aid, emphasizing that a full cease-fire "will delay the war effort."

Israel’s vision of a knockout victory over Hamas is simple: assassinating or capturing the organization’s entire military and political leadership, killing all the planners and perpetrators of the Oct. 7 massacre in southern Israel, eliminating all Hamas arsenals and firepower, and denying the organization any ability to run the Gaza Strip or maintain its sovereignty there.

'Give us time'

No Israeli decision-maker is willing to bet on how long it will take to achieve such ambitious goals. Politicians and generals have been preparing the Israeli public for a long war. When pressed, they talk about a month or two of high-intensity warfare, followed by a force drawdown and continued operations in Gaza to complete the tasks.

China has a sweeping vision to reshape the world — and countries are listening

Simone McCarthy

Xi Jinping has a plan for how the world should work, and one year into his norm-shattering third term as Chinese leader, he’s escalating his push to challenge America’s global leadership — and put his vision front and center.

That bid was in the spotlight like never before last month in Beijing, when Xi, flanked by Russian President Vladimir Putin, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and some two dozen top dignitaries from around the world, hailed China as the only country capable of navigating the challenges of the 21st century.

“Changes of the world, of our times, and of historical significance are unfolding like never before,” Xi told his audience at the Belt and Road Forum. China, he said, would “make relentless efforts to achieve modernization for all countries” and work to build a “shared future for mankind.”

Xi’s vision — though cloaked in abstract language — encapsulates the Chinese Communist Party’s emerging push to reshape an international system it sees as unfairly stacked in favor of the United States and its allies.

Viewed as a rival by those countries as its grows increasingly assertive and authoritarian, Beijing has come to believe that now is the time to shift that system and the global balance of power to ensure China’s rise — and reject efforts to counter it.

In recent months, Beijing has promoted its alternative model across hefty policy documents and new “global initiatives,” as well as speeches, diplomatic meetings, forums and international gatherings large and small — as it aims to win support across the world.

Pakistan’s long journey toward sustainable growth requires timely, free, and fair elections

Uzair Younus

Pakistan has been facing growing political and economic instability over the past few months. Inflation has continued to hover around 30 percent, economic growth has plummeted, and the country remains reliant on support from the International Monetary Fund and from bilateral partners such as China and Saudi Arabia to keep its economy afloat. Imran Khan, the country’s most popular politician, remains in jail while his political rival, Nawaz Sharif, has returned to Pakistan after spending years outside the country.

These challenges have been compounded by major geopolitical events, including the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict.

To discuss these and a host of other issues facing Pakistan, the Atlantic Council and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies hosted their second annual Pakistan conference on November 1-2. This year’s theme was resilience and reforms, and speakers addressed topics including the future of artificial intelligence, the role of middle powers in today’s volatile geopolitical environment, and ways in which Pakistan’s economy can be reformed so that it generates opportunity for the many, not just for the few. A central tenet of both panel discussions and sidebar conversations was that Pakistani policymakers must pursue reforms in a way that builds resilience across millions of households. To do this, policymakers must turn their focus away from simple notions of economic growth and toward a more rigorous interest in improving overall human development in the country.

Below are several key takeaways I heard from scholars and practitioners from Pakistan and the United States:

Addressing Critical Minerals Governance in Indonesia-US Relations

Bhima Yudhistira, Yeta Purnama, and Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat

On Monday, Indonesian President Joko Widodo will hold a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House on Monday, prior to next week’s APEC Leaders’ Meeting in San Francisco. There will no doubt be a number of issues on the agenda, but according to some reports, one shared interest is both countries’ desire to reach an agreement in the field of critical minerals, especially nickel.

Both the U.S. and Indonesia have much to gain from closer cooperation on critical minerals. Indonesia has the world’s largest potential reserves of critical minerals for battery raw material components, especially nickel. At the same time, Indonesia needs to diversify foreign investment in this sector and prevent one country, namely China, from dominating. In the last three years, the Indonesian government has been quite aggressive in wooing the U.S.-based electric vehicle manufacturer Tesla to invest in Indonesia, as part of its ambition to establish itself as a regional hub for EV production. Jakarta views the recent passage of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which includes hefty EV subsidies, as an opportunity to include Indonesia in the U.S. EV supply chain.

The U.S. also has an interest in encouraging imports of critical minerals from countries other than China, due security considerations regarding the long-term sustainability of the supply of raw materials for the production of EV batteries. Given Indonesia’s abundant supply of these minerals, and desire to diversify its sources of investment, it is some ways a natural partner.

Despite this shared interests, however, the IRA has hampered U.S.-Indonesia cooperation in this crucial sector. Under the IRA, the U.S. government will issue $370 billion in tax credits for battery and EV manufacturers, as well as subsidies $370 billion, including subsidies to EV consumers and solar facilities. However, Indonesia faces a number of obstacles in benefiting from the IRA. First, there is specific condition that subsidies can only be used by countries which has a FTA status with US.

Asia’s Island Nations Need Satellite Internet

Sribala Subramanian

A “trail of bright lights” in the night sky is making governments around the world nervous.

The network of communications satellites, known as Starlink, proved to be a lifeline for Ukraine after Russia invaded the country in February 2022. Without space-beamed internet, “we would have been losing the war already,” a Ukrainian platoon commander told the Wall Street Journal.

But Starlink, operated by the company SpaceX, has also courted controversy. In September 2022, Ukraine’s request to activate coverage near Crimea was denied, raising questions about the role of tech companies in combat zones. Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX, waded into another minefield last week when he offered to “support connectivity” to aid organizations in Gaza.

Musk insists the satellite internet service is a benign “civilian system.” “Starlink was not meant to be involved in wars. It was so people can. . . do good peaceful things, not drone strikes,” he told the author of a recently published biography.

When SpaceX began assembling the network in 2015, the goal was to operate a system that would deliver high-speed internet to parts of the world that lacked physical infrastructure, such as fiber optic cables. In a 2016 speech, SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell said: “Let’s build little communications satellites and provide global broadband capability for reasonable prices.”

The Dwindling Prospects For Russian and Chinese-Backed Infrastructure Projects in Myanmar

Syah Vaghji

Following the Myanmar military’s seizure of power in 2021, analysts speculated that Chinese companies would take advantage of the military-appointed State Administration Council (SAC)’s diplomatic and economic isolation to push through infrastructure projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a component of the Belt and Road Initiative. Almost three years since the putsch, however, progress on pre-project work has been snail-paced, with little hard evidence to suggest that any CMEC projects are actually moving closer to the construction phase.

Only the Kyaukphyu special economic zone and deep-sea port projects in Rakhine State appeared to be making concrete progress since the military seized power. In September 2021, a consortium comprising CITIC Construction and CCCC FHDI won a tender to carry out geotechnical investigation and survey work. In February 2022, consultancy Myanmar Survey Research (MSR) was awarded a tender to conduct an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) for the construction of the deep-sea port components and a 15 kilometer road linking Made and Ramree islands.

MSR previously said it was aiming to complete its ESIA in July 2023, and project construction was expected to begin after the geotechnical surveys and ESIA were completed. The MSR website, however, does not show any ESIA progress updates since August 2022. In June 2023, CITIC Group (Myanmar), the developer of the Kyaukphyu projects, stated that “the geo-survey of the project is closing while steady progress is made in ESIA,” although there was no mention of plans to begin construction. No further updates have been published since specifying when the survey and ESIA will be completed.

The Right Way to Deter China From Attacking Taiwan

Ryan Hass and Jude Blanchette

As debate over China policy rages in the United States, the discussion in Washington is increasingly focused on the question of how to deter Beijing from invading or blockading Taiwan. This is for good reason: like their predecessors, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his colleagues have signaled a determination to exercise control over Taiwan and will, if necessary, resort to force to do so. Responding to these threats, a growing number of U.S. military leaders—including the former head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday—have warned that

Size isn’t everything: China’s new chip is less earthshaking than you may have heard


When Huawei released its new Mate 60 Pro phone earlier this year, it set off alarm bells in Western media, which fixated on the ultra-tiny 7-nanometer circuits in the phone’s Chinese-made chipset. Just a year earlier, the U.S. had imposed export controls meant to keep China from obtaining circuits of 16 nanometers or smaller. The announcement seemed to demonstrate not just China’s technical prowess but also the failure of a signature element of Western technology policy in its competition with China, that has become all the more timely with new Biden administration new chip controls and AI policy efforts, seeking to block American chipmakers from selling semiconductors to China that circumvent government restrictions.

Typical headlines were “New phone sparks worry China has found a way around U.S. tech limits” (Washington Post) and “Is Huawei's new phone proof China is gaining ground in the chip wars?” (ABC). Not so coincidentally, the news broke during the visit to Beijing of U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, whose Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security administers those export controls. A Chinese state media editorial crowed, “While the tech war is ongoing and the U.S. maintains an advantage in the high-tech sector, the momentum of the Chinese people's determination to catch up despite the pressure, and a strong sense of moral conviction, are something that the U.S. cannot match. This also determines that while the US' suppression might bring us some troubles in the short term, in the long run, these ‘wars’ are not ultimately in their favor.”

Yet, as in so many issues of technology and China, the story is more complex.

China’s Misunderstood Nuclear Expansion

M. Taylor Fravel, Henrik Stålhane Hiim, and Magnus Langset Trøan

Among the many issues surrounding China’s ongoing military modernization, perhaps none has been more dramatic than its nuclear weapons program. For decades, the Chinese government was content to maintain a comparatively small nuclear force. As recently as 2020, China’s arsenal was little changed from previous decades and amounted to some 220 weapons, around five to six percent of either the U.S. or Russian stockpiles of deployed and reserve warheads.

Since then, however, China has been rapidly expanding and modernizing its arsenal. In 2020, it began constructing three silo fields to house more than 300 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A year later, it successfully tested a hypersonic glide vehicle that traveled 21,600 miles, a test that likely demonstrated China’s ability to field weapons that can orbit the earth before striking targets, known as a “fractional orbital bombardment system.” Simultaneously, the Chinese government has accelerated its pursuit of a complete nuclear triad—encompassing land-, sea-, and air-launched nuclear weapons—including by developing new submarine- and air-launched ballistic missiles. By 2030, according to U.S. Defense Department estimates, China will probably have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads—a more than fourfold increase from just a decade earlier.

China’s nuclear expansion is unlikely to be a focus of U.S. President Joe Biden’s expected meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit next week, but it is too important to be left entirely to defense strategists. Rather than maintaining only enough forces to be able to retaliate if attacked—China’s policy for decades—many in the United States now fear China’s nuclear buildout will give it offensive options as well. In 2021, Charles Richard, then the leader of U.S. Strategic Command, described China’s nuclear expansion as a “strategic breakout” that will provide it “with the capability to execute any plausible nuclear employment strategy.”

Developing countries owe China at least $1.1 trillion – and the debts are due

Simone McCarthy

Developing countries owe Chinese lenders at least $1.1 trillion, according to a new data analysis published Monday, which says more than half of the thousands of loans China has doled out over two decades are due as many borrowers struggle financially.

Overdue loan repayments to Chinese lenders are soaring, according to AidData, a university research lab at William & Mary in Virginia, which found that nearly 80% of China’s lending portfolio in the developing world is currently supporting countries in financial distress.

For years, Beijing marshalled its finances toward funding infrastructure across poorer countries – including under an effort that Chinese leader Xi Jinping branded as his flagship “Belt and Road Initiative,” which launched a decade ago this fall.

That funding flowed liberally into roads, airports, railways and power plants from Latin America to Southeast Asia and helped power economic growth among borrowing countries. Along the way, it drew many governments closer to Beijing and made China the world’s largest creditor, while also sparking accusations of irresponsible lending.

Now, 55% of China’s official sector loans to developing countries have entered their repayment periods, according to the analysis of more than two decades of China’s overseas funding across 165 countries released by AidData.

Those debts are coming due during a new and challenging financial climate of high interest rates, struggling local currencies and slowing global growth.

Tracking China’s Control of Overseas Ports

Zongyuan Zoe Liu

The China Overseas Ports interactive visualizes degrees of China’s overseas port ownership by types of investment across regions and time. It also evaluates the dual-use (commercial and military) potential of ports owned, constructed, or operated by Chinese entities. The database supporting this interactive includes 101 port projects of which Chinese entities have acquired varied equity ownership or operational stakes. China operates or has ownership in at least one port in every continent except Antarctica. Of the 101 projects, 92 are active, whereas the remaining 9 port projects have become inactive due to cancellation or suspension by the end of September 2023. Reasons for cancellation or suspension include environmental concerns, souring of political relations, financial problems, and security issues raised domestically and internationally. Suspended projects, such as China’s construction of the Khalifa Port in the United Arab Emirates, could resume construction.

China has become the world’s largest trading country and second-largest economy, and conducts about 95 percent of its international trade through sea-lanes. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and the introduction of the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road, which connects China to Europe and the Arctic Ocean via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, have supercharged China’s overseas port investment and construction activities. President Xi has personally emphasized the importance of ports for economic development. When visiting Tieshan Port in Guangxi Province in April 2017, Xi highlighted the importance of ports in economic development: “We often say that to get rich we must first build roads; but in coastal areas, to get rich we must also first build ports.”

Security remains a challenge as Pentagon broadens 5G plans


5G communications could help U.S. military pilots fly better sorties and allow ground units detect and outmaneuver their adversaries—but only if U.S. telecommunications companies can find ways to keep that battlefield data safe from China, a top Pentagon communications official said.

The Defense Department is spending heavily on 5G—roughly $650 million over the past three years—but most of that is going to pilot programs to demonstrate military-specific use cases for the next-gen technology standard, according to Thomas Rondeau, the Defense Department’s principal director for FutureG. The research and development needed to make 5G secure is largely being handled by private companies.

“We estimate roughly $100 billion a year of R&D that the commercial industry puts into telecommunications. So that's how they're advancing,” Rondeau said at an Atlantic Council event.

That’s great news for the Pentagon: industry is taking the lead in trying to make 5G more secure. What the DOD can provide is testing and experimentation opportunities to prove out 5G technologies that could also have value in the commercial sector, such as smart warehouses.

The Pentagon is also experimenting with how 5G might fit into battlefield scenarios, such as combat-aircraft missions.

“The F-35, that is a beast of a sensor system,” Rondeau said. “The amount of data that comes off of that thing is incredible. How do we make sense of that fast enough that by the time that that F-35 is ready to go back into its next sortie, it's reprogrammed with the data that it needs to fight its mission?

In the First Known Combat Incident in Space, a Ballistic Missile is Shot Down Above the Kármán Line


An Israeli Defense destroyed a ballistic missile above the earth’s atmosphere, “a notable technological achievement, but one with potentially serious legal and geopolitical implications.”

Humanity Just Witnessed Its First Space Battle

Early last week, Israel’s Arrow 2 missile system successfully intercepted and destroyed a suborbital ballistic missile suspected of launching from Yeme…The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) shot down an Iranian-manufactured ballistic missile using its Arrow 2 anti-missile system, Haaretz reported. The incident happened on Tuesday, October 31, with Yemeni forces possibly targeting Eilat, an Israeli city on the coast of the Red Sea. The Telegraph claims the missile was intercepted and destroyed above the Kármán line, which at 62 miles (100 kilometers) above sea level is widely recognized as the boundary of space.

Ballistic missile defense systems generally engage threats within the Earth’s atmosphere. While anti-satellite tests have demonstrated higher-altitude capabilities, such as those conducted by the U.S., Russia, China, and India, these have been distinct from intercepting a missile in flight. Ballistic missile defense systems generally engage threats within the Earth’s atmosphere. While anti-satellite tests have demonstrated higher-altitude capabilities, such as those conducted by the U.S., Russia, China, and India, these have been distinct from intercepting a missile in flight.

Space has become the new theater of war after Israel shot down a rocket soaring ‘outside of Earth’s atmosphere.’

Photos of Reporters With Hamas Spark New Theory About Attacks

Andrew Stanton

A report from the news organization HonestReporting, which says its goal is "exposing anti-Israel media bias," alleged that freelance photographer Hassan Eslaiah, among the first photographers to capture footage of the October 7 attack, had previously taken photographs with members of Hamas leadership. The report quickly drew outrage from supporters of Israel, who questioned if news outlets for which Eslaiah worked had prior knowledge of the attack.

Eslaiah did freelance work with several United States-based news outlets, including the Associated Press, Reuters and CNN.

However, the claim that news outlets had prior knowledge of the attack have not been backed up by evidence and remain unverified. Several news outlets have cut ties with Eslaiah following the report and say they did not know of the attacks before they occurred.

An Israeli army artillery howitzer moves near the Gaza strip in southern Israel on November 3, 2023. A new report showing a freelance photojournalist with Hamas leadership fueled new theories about the organization’s October 7 attack on Israel.

Americans Don't Want to Fight For Their Country Anymore

Aleks Phillips

A majority of American adults would not be willing to serve in the military were the U.S. to enter into a major war, recent polling has found, while public confidence in the armed forces appears to be waning.

The figures come as all branches of the armed forces have in recent years struggled to meet their recruitment targets, suggesting a growing apathy towards a career of military service. In 2023, the Army and Air Force fell short of their respective goals by around 10,000 recruits, while the Navy was under by 6,000. Since 1987, the number of active-duty personnel has fallen by 39 percent.

Experts say that such shortfalls are worrisome in an increasingly volatile global picture with American leadership unsure when it will next have to bring its full military force to bear.

"We have strike groups, aircraft carriers with a Marine Expeditionary Unit outside Israel now," Justin Henderson, a former transport operator for the U.S. Marines turned military recruiter, told Newsweek. "We're funding two wars, but we're actually boots on the ground, drones above Gaza. So we're already involved in there—and we're not sure what's happening in Taiwan. So this is a very tumultuous time for us, because we don't know what's going to happen."

"How much it matters depends on what kind of people you're talking about and which bit you're not getting," Tom Shugart, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a former Navy attack submarine commander, told Newsweek.

While infantry recruits could be trained in a matter of weeks, the same was not true for other roles. "Let's say the Navy misses recruiting targets for an extended period and wasn't able to bring on the people that it needs to manage submarines and fly its airplanes...if you end up in a major conflict, it's going to take time to train those people," he said.


Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10. The GUR published satellite imagery and reported that the Ukrainian surface attack drone strike on Uzka Bay near Chornomorsk, occupied Crimea sunk one Project 1176 Akula-class small landing ship and one Project 11770 Serna-class small landing ship.[1] The GUR reported that the Serna-class ship was carrying a crew and was loaded with armored vehicles, including BTR-82 armored personnel carriers, and that Russian forces previously used Serna-class ships to provide cover for Russian BSF ships during raids when Russian forces lacked naval air-defense equipment.[2] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike on Uzka Bay with four unmanned boats and that it was one of three series of Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea on November 10.[3] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attempted to conduct a drone strike on an oil depot in Feodosia and a Neptune cruise missile strike on BSF and Federal Security Service (FSB) bases in Chornomorsk.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down a Neptune missile over the Black Sea off the coast of Crimea and intercepted two drones over Crimea.[5] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces have been conducting an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.[6]

Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger reiterated common complaints about inadequate Russian counterbattery fire, electronic warfare, air defense, and assault operations along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[7] The milblogger especially complained about improper usage of the Russian 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) to conduct frontal assaults like standard infantry against Ukrainian positions on the east bank even though these frontal assaults are ineffective in this area. The milblogger expressed concerns about possible future Ukrainian operations in the Kherson direction, but other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are currently unable to achieve a breakthrough in this direction.[8]

Elon Musk Is the Messy Hero of Our Messy Age

Zachary Karabell

In the midst of a noisy and chaotic culture, one thing is increasingly clear: We live in an age of fleeting fame. Anyone can amass enormous followings on social media, but very few influencers of yesterday (in this case, almost literally) remain influencers of today. That is true not just of the passing social media star, but even of icons. And even if they do remain at center stage, they are likely to confront strong backlash. We live in an unheroic age, or at least an age where we seek to knock our heroes off the pedestals we recently erected.

That is palpably the case for Elon Musk. The South African-born Musk, only 52 years old, has lived a lifetime of this cycle—from hero to tarnished icon—and all in less than 15 years. His story is by no means done, but he has already received more attention, both good and bad, than most will, and far more wealth than all but a few ever could. There’s no question that he is worthy subject of a biography, titled simply Elon Musk and published in September, from one of the premier biographers of our days, Walter Isaacson.

There is, however, a question of whether, for all his fame and cultural impact, Musk the man is nearly as compelling as the Musk the icon.

Since the mid-2000s, Musk’s profile has risen almost as vertiginously as one of his SpaceX rockets. He was anointed “person of the year” by Time magazine in 2021, which may not carry its former cache but is still a symbol of standing globally. For the past two years, he has been in an unofficial “who is the world’s richest man” competition with Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, who also has a competing rocket company, which along with a space venture led by Virgin Group’s Richard Branson has led to a derisive dismissal of these private space companies as billionaire boys and their toys.

Rival powers agree that AI poses new risks. Can they work together to address them?

Dame Wendy Hall and Trisha Ray

Last week, industry representatives, researchers, and government officials from twenty-seven countries descended upon Bletchley Park, an estate an hour outside of London where British mathematician Alan Turing and his team broke the Nazis’ Enigma code in World War II. But the group assembled last week sought to break a code of a different kind: how to tackle the risks associated with the latest advancements in artificial intelligence (AI). The inaugural AI Safety Summit, hosted by the UK government, wound up a busy couple of weeks in AI. On October 30, US President Joe Biden issued an executive order on the safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of AI, and a few day earlier the United Nations launched a high-level advisory body on AI, to which one of the authors has been appointed.

The most notable outcome from the UK gathering was the Bletchley Declaration, which struck all the right chords. It emphasized the importance of involving multiple stakeholders and international cooperation, and it underscored the responsibilities of “actors developing frontier AI capabilities.” Headlines have largely focused on the remarkable feat of bringing China, the European Union, and the United States together to sign a declaration on AI governance, at a time when they seem to agree on very little else. The declaration reveals that countries across the ideological spectrum are worried about the potential for harms caused by AI systems and recognize that solutions cannot be built by one country alone. And thus, on the same stage, US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo declared that “even as nations compete vigorously, we can and must search for global solutions to global problems,” while Chinese Vice Minister of Science and Technology Wu Zhaohui called for collaboration to mitigate potential unintended harms of frontier AI models. Wu’s presence at the closed-door government leaders’ meetings on the second day of the summit—which was not publicly acknowledged at the time—was also notable, but necessary given China’s position of influence in AI development and global uptake of the technology outside of Western democracies.

From the military to the workforce: How to leverage veterans’ skills

Scott Blackburn

US employers face multiple challenges when it comes to filling jobs and retaining workers, including a shortage of skilled labor and an aging workforce. To meet the moment in this era of technological change, some companies are broadening their hiring lens beyond the traditional college résumé. They are evaluating candidates on their capacity to learn, their intrinsic capabilities, and their transferable skills.

This is where military veterans can make a difference. Veterans represent a source of labor potential that is untapped relative to the breadth of experience and depth of skills that they acquire and develop during their service. Members of the military receive technical training, operate under pressure in austere environments, and develop strong interpersonal skills throughout their service, making them well qualified for numerous civilian occupations. While not every military role is directly transferrable to a civilian job, most skills are—including those that correspond to US industries experiencing labor shortages, such as infrastructure and manufacturing.

And veterans aren’t the only ones who stand to benefit from a longer look by employers: the economic opportunity of unleashing the value of veterans’ work experience through skills-based hiring could reach almost $15 billion over a ten-year period, new McKinsey research shows.

In this article, we explore the complex employment picture for military veterans, including in jobs and industries that will be most affected by automation and generative AI. We look at actions the military can take to help service members prepare for their transition to civilian work. We focus particularly on enlisted veterans, who make up the majority of those shifting out each year but who tend to fare worse in the labor market because employers don’t recognize their technical skills. We then discuss ways that the military and the private sector can close the veteran opportunity gap by improving employment outcomes.