Indian Strategic Studies: 06/04/25

4 June 2025

Lessons From Operation Sindoor

NEW DELHI – Just three weeks after “Operation Sindoor,” during which India’s military struck nine known terrorist basecamps and other facilities in Pakistani territory, an analysis of the military and operational dimensions of the strikes provides some preliminary but clear conclusions.

For starters, India hit hard, but its strikes were carefully targeted and calibrated, even taking place at night to avoid collateral damage to civilians. In fact, Operation Sindoor was a remarkable logistical and military achievement. Although Pakistan was on the highest alert, India succeeded in breaching the country’s defensive lines, striking its intended targets, and eliminating some known terrorists (whose funerals were attended by high-level Pakistani military and police officials).

While Operation Sindoor targeted a wider set of targets than any previous Indian counter-terrorist action, India deliberately avoided striking military and governmental targets at first. This sent a clear signal: India’s actions were a reprisal against terrorism, not the opening salvo in a war against Pakistan. It was the Pakistani military’s decision to respond with escalation that invited additional retribution.1

The second conclusion is that the terms of India’s engagement with Pakistan have irrevocably shifted, as India has shed its hesitations regarding military action. For too long, fears of “internationalizing” the Kashmir issue led India to pursue the same futile diplomatic processes, presenting dossiers and evidence to the world but getting little in return. Even the terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council has long allowed Pakistan to find shelter behind one of its permanent members.

China’s Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Journey

Bonnie Girard

In 2017, the Chinese government was the largest cryptocurrency market in the world. It is estimated that as many as 80 percent of all Bitcoin transactions were taking place in Chinese currency, the yuan (also known as the renminbi), at that time. Cryptocurrency exchanges in China were busy and proliferating. The availability of cheap electricity, particularly in regions like Sichuan, made Bitcoin mining a lucrative business.

However, at the height of what seemed like an unqualified success for China’s adoption and use of digital currencies, on September 17, 2017, Coindesk reported that a document leaked on social media “appeared to confirm rumors that all local Bitcoin exchanges must close by the end of the month.”

Indeed, that’s exactly what happened. With no public consultation, no advance notice, and no appeal mechanism, the Chinese government shuttered an international financial product that had gained acceptance and then thrived among everyday Chinese investors. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had let the Bitcoin party run for as long as it was expedient. Once the venture became too strong for its own good, and therefore too risky should it fail, the government had no choice but to eliminate it before either eventuality played out.

There are three reasons that China has a problem with cryptocurrencies.

‘The keyboard has become a weapon of war’: John Healey explains decision to splash £1 BILLION on cyberattacks against Russia and China

Ben Chapman

Healey said Labour will focus on delivering a supercharged cyber force

Labour Defence Secretary John Healey has explained why the UK Government is seeking its biggest defence expansion since the Cold War.

Speaking on GB News, Healey said Labour will focus on delivering a supercharged cyber force to target ‘hostile states’ like Russia and China.

He told Camilla Tominey: “I’ve been quite shocked by this. I took over as Defence Secretary 10 months ago and defence has been the subject of 90,000 cyber attacks linked to other states.

“With that level of aggression, with that level of threat, it is quite clear that the keyboard has become a weapon of war.

TRENDING

China in the Indian Ocean: A stronger Indo-Pacific presence

Since its first continuous deployment to the Indian Ocean in 2008, China has significantly increased its regional activities. Along with securing its interests, Beijing has established itself and its capabilities in the area, anticipating any potential future conflict in the Western Pacific.

The Indian Ocean is an important theatre for China’s energy imports from the Middle East. It is also critical for Beijing’s broader maritime ambitions and to continue engagements with Africa, Europe, the Middle East and South Asia. While there is a growing debate on a potential Taiwan Strait crisis and China’s increasing capabilities in the Western Pacific, what is the role of the Indian Ocean, if any?

These infographics review China’s engagements across the Indian Ocean between 2007 and April 2025 through military exercises, arms sales, infrastructure development and a seabed-exploration contract.

China conducts a range of air, land and maritime exercises with partners along the Indian Ocean coastline.

China’s exercises (which do not include port visits or passing exercises) are primarily bilateral, with some being trilateral or multilateral.

China’s military exercises have expanded across the Indian Ocean, from the Red Sea to the Malacca Strait.

China has held maritime exercises with Iran and Russia every year between 2022 and 2025.

China has deployed assets with anti-submarine warfare capabilities. These assets are located close to key chokepoints.

Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates are the primary recipients of China’s arms sales.

Since 2017, most of China’s infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean have focused on the eastern coast of Africa and the western Indian Ocean islands.

China has a seabed-exploration contract for critical minerals in the southwest Indian Ocean.

Can Japan fill the leadership void as America steps back from Asia?

The presidency of Donald Trump posed serious challenges to the legitimacy of America’s global leadership. A recent Lowy Institute Poll found that 64 per cent of Australians expressed diminished trust in the United States. In Japan, a Yomiuri Shimbun survey conducted on 18 May reported that 73 per cent of respondents were concerned about the future of US–Japan relations. These numbers point to a broader reputational deficit facing the United States among key allies.

China has sought to exploit this credibility gap. President Xi Jinping has portrayed Beijing as a defender of global multilateralism in contrast to Washington’s unilateralism. The Global Times cited the Democracy Perception Index, which suggested that a significant proportion of surveyed countries viewed China more favourably than the US. While the veracity of these claims is questionable, they underscore a perceptual shift that Beijing is actively encouraging.

However, China’s effort to position itself as a responsible stakeholder is complicated by its assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and its opaque alignment with Russia. For many countries in the Indo-Pacific – particularly Southeast Asian nations – these actions have raised serious concerns. Despite scepticism about Washington’s global conduct under Trump, the US remains a key security partner and a symbol of the rules-based order. Regional states, therefore, face a dilemma: growing wariness of both great powers but continuing dependence on US strategic assurances and China’s economic relations.

Peak repayment: China’s global lending

Riley Duke

Soaring debt repayments and a sharp reduction in lending have transformed China’s role in developing country finances from capital provider to debt collector. Mounting pressures from Chinese debts are especially severe for many of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries. A retrenchment in Western aid and trade is compounding these challenges while undermining any geopolitical advantage for the West.

Key findings

In 2025, the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries will make record high debt repayments totalling $22 billion to China. Beijing has transitioned from capital provider to net financial drain on developing country budgets as debt servicing costs on Belt and Road Initiative projects from the 2010s now far outstrip new loan disbursements.

China continues to finance strategic and resource-critical partners despite a broader collapse in its global lending. The largest recipients of new lending include immediate neighbours, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, and developing countries that are critical mineral or battery metal exporters, such as Argentina, Brazil, Congo DR, and Indonesia.

China is grappling with a dilemma of its own making: it faces growing diplomatic pressure to restructure unsustainable debt, and mounting domestic pressure to recover outstanding debts, particularly from its quasi-commercial institutions. But a retrenchment in Western aid and trade is compounding difficulties for developing countries while squandering any geopolitical advantage for the West.

The End of Erdogan

How the Turkish Leader Has Engineered His Own Undoing

HENRI J. BARKEY is Cohen Professor of International Relations Emeritus at Lehigh University and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Turkey’s populist authoritarian leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is now fighting for his political survival. His predicament is entirely of his own making: in the early hours of March 19, Erdogan orchestrated a raid on the home of Ekrem Imamoglu, Istanbul’s popular mayor, deploying some 200 police officers. Imamoglu, a political rival who was widely seen as a future presidential contender, was arrested and indicted on highly dubious charges, including baseless accusations of corruption and terrorism. Despite bans on public gatherings, the arrest triggered Turkey’s largest antigovernment demonstrations in more than a decade, which spread throughout the majority of the

Polish Armed Forces Modernization

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine pushed Polish decisionmakers to launch military modernization and expansion at a pace, scale, and direction that was unprecedented in Poland's post-communist history.

Given Russia's planned reconstitution, the extent of military aid that Warsaw provided to Ukraine, and previous problems with modernization, Poland's armed forces are at a crossroads. If Poland fails to realize its plans,

it might come out of this moment relatively weakened and vulnerable. However, if Poland is successful, it will be able to take a much larger role in ensuring the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) eastern flank,

thus providing the United States more flexibility to advance its interests in other parts of the world. In this report, the authors outline Poland's plans for modernization and expansion of the armed forces and provide a preliminary assessment of where U.S.

support might be most useful to maximize the return on this joint U.S.-Polish investment in deterrence and defense.

Key Findings

If modernization and expansion are successful, the Polish Armed Forces will be a top contributor to NATO's land capabilities while still being able to provide meaningful contributions in the air and maritime domains. This plan is supported across Poland's political spectrum. It is estimated that, in 2025, Poland will spend approximately 4.7 percent of its gross domestic product on national defense, a considerable share of which goes to the United States in arms contracts.

Europe Tried to Trump-Proof Itself. Now It’s Crafting a Plan B.

Rosa Balfour

This piece is part of a Carnegie series examining the impacts of Trump’s first 100 days in office.

At some point between February 12, when U.S. President Donald Trump spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the televised humiliation of Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky on February 28, Europe realized it could no longer rely on its longtime ally, the United States.

The shocking depth and breadth of this realization cannot be overemphasized. Political leaders in European states, the European Union, and NATO displayed composure and coordination, but behind the scenes, the soundtrack was a frantic free jazz jam session with dramatic thuds and a long pause—the silence at the realization that the European comfort zone was over.

This revelation shattered the “Trump-proofing” preparations, which included a mix of appeasement, “cheque book diplomacy,” flattery, and moves to dodge direct hits. Some countries were—or thought they were—better placed to seek a relationship with the new president, but the U.S. administration has displayed widespread antagonism toward the EU. The deep entanglement between the two sides of the Atlantic (worth $9.5 trillion and 16 million jobs) means that the dramatic changes in policy have an existential impact on the continent. But the building blocks of a response strategy are coming into focus in three key areas.

Does Europe feel the urgency, or does it sink into defeatism?

Steven Everts

This opinion piece by Steven Everts was originally published in Dutch in NRC on 2 May 2025 under the title 'Voelt Europa de urgentie, of zakt het weg in defaitisme?'. It is reproduced here in English with the permission of NRC.

“Chaos, capriciousness, and amateurism. One day there’s rapprochement and an agreement on raw materials; the next we hear shameless Russian propaganda—straight from the White House. But the trend is clear: Donald Trump wants to get rid of the Ukraine file. How that happens, what others think about it, or the reputational damage for the US—it all seems to matter little. As long as there's a ‘deal’ and relations with Russia can be restored.

This is the moment of truth for Europe. It's easy to criticise Trump, but what are we going to do? The hard truth is that Europe, despite tough rhetoric and numerous emergency summits, risks failing the test.

The Franco-British plan for a deterrent force on Ukrainian territory appears to be floundering—due to the lack of an American ‘back stop’. Even the Poles have little enthusiasm for joining such a force. And the political unity of the 27 EU member states to extend sanctions against Russia will be even harder to sustain, if the US lifts its own sanctions.

Thus, Europe—including Ukraine—risks being presented with a fait accompli. And not about something marginal, but about the core of our own security.

Scientists Looking to Leave the U.S. for More Welcoming Environments

Claus Hecking, Kerstin Kullmann

The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is making life difficult for academics and scientific researchers. Many are looking to leave the country as a result. We spoke with four of them.

Marion Schmidt had actually traveled to one of the most important gatherings of researchers to present recent developments at her university. The annual event held by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) is one of the most prestigious scientific conferences in the world, with AI researchers, astrophysicists, biologists and others making the pilgrimage to Boston.

Together with her colleagues from the Center for Tactile Internet at the Technical University of Dresden, Schmidt was eager to share their recent results, including smart gloves with the ability to recognize early on the next object a person is likely to grab.

Ultimately, though, says Schmidt, the podium discussion focused less on her research results and more on possible career opportunities in Germany. She says she felt almost like she was at an academic recruiting event: "Young students wanted to know how university studies in Germany work. Professors were asking how they could get an appointment at a university.”

Trump’s attack on science is growing fiercer and more indiscriminate

SCIENTISTS IN AMERICA are used to being the best. The country is home to the world’s foremost universities, hosts the lion’s share of scientific Nobel laureates and has long been among the top producers of influential research papers.

Generous funding helps keep the system running. Counting both taxpayer and industrial dollars, America spends more on research than any other country. The federal government doles out around $120bn a year, $50bn or so of which goes towards tens of thousands of grants and contracts for higher-education institutions, with the rest going to public research bodies.

d 2025

The Cost of Defunding Harvard

Atul Gawande

It did not take long for Harvard’s leadership to realize that the university would have to stand up to the Trump Administration. On March 31st, the White House announced that the status of nine billion dollars in multiyear federal funding to the university and its affiliated hospitals was in question, pending review of alleged antisemitism on campus. A week and a half later,

the Administration delivered an ultimatum that dispensed with that pretense: it issued no findings on the university’s antisemitism response but instead issued far more extensive demands.

In order to “maintain Harvard’s financial relationship with the federal government,” the letter stated, it must agree to, among other things:

share with the government all hiring and admissions data through 2028, including on rejected student applicants; submit to the government an external audit of the views of all faculty, staff, and students, to show that every department and unit has established “viewpoint diversity”; reduce the power held by selected faculty members based on their “activism”; and audit numerous departments, including in the medical school, the school of public health, the divinity school, and the school of education, for alleged antisemitism.

Who Pays the Price in Trump’s Crusade Against Universities?

Christina Lu

a reporter at Foreign Policy.Two people stand in front of a crowd as they hold up signs at a rally in support of international students on the Harvard University campus.

One woman wears a tube top and holds a sign above her head reading: "Harvard is NOT Harvard WITHOUT International Students." Another person, wearing glasses,

holds a sign reading: "We stand with international students."People hold up signs during the “Harvard Students for Freedom” rally in support of international students at the Harvard University campus, just outside of Boston, Massachusetts, on May 27. Rick Friedman/AFP

In its crusade against American universities, the Trump administration now appears intent on choking off incoming flows of international students—a group that has long driven scientific innovation in the United States and pumped tens of billions of dollars into the U.S. economy.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on Wednesday that the Trump administration would “aggressively revoke” the visas of Chinese students, “including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields.” Nearly one-quarter of all international students pursuing higher education in the United States come from China.

Navigating the AI frontier: Insights from the Ukraine conflict for NATO’s governance role in military AI

As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly integrated in the military domain, calls for its regulation are growing. In this paper,

I argue that although civil society, academics and citizens support the strong regulation of military AI, such regulation is unlikely to materialise, even less so via formal organisations such as NATO. The current war,

in which Ukraine is defending itself against a Russian invasion, underscores three key reasons for this: blurred borders with the civilian sector; the weaponisation of civilian life; and meaningful steps towards autonomy.

Given these factors, the paper argues that behavioural steps are most likely to be feasible in the short term.

With the increasing use of different applications of artificial intelligence (AI) in the military domain, calls for their regulation have intensified among civil society and policymakers alike. Formal discussions have taken place within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), while more informal talks have taken place within the framework of major diplomatic conferences such as the Summit on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM). Civil society,

Understanding Escalation

Understanding the potential sources of escalatory risk is an increasingly important priority for U.S. policymakers. If rivalries produce a series of crises or even proxy or limited conflicts, the danger of those confrontations escalating to higher levels of violence will be an ever-present concern for U.S. decisionmakers.

To support current planning, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and U.S. Army Pacific requested that the RAND Arroyo Center investigate potential sources of escalatory risk from U.S. policy actions and build a tool to assess such risks. This report summarizes that work and concludes with the components of the framework.

The analysis combines theoretical and historical research with a current assessment of Chinese and Russian views of escalation and a recognition of the way emerging technologies are changing the context for escalatory dynamics.

Escalatory pressures can be highly unpredictable and derive from many independent factors. The tool developed in this research can help decisionmakers think more broadly about such risks. However, an actual crisis or wartime situation will involve a complex and nonlinear interaction of these and other factors, including mistakes and accidents, that can be very difficult to control

Will Europe Rebuild or Divide?

The Strategic Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War for Europe’s Future

The Russia-Ukraine war has compelled European leaders to ask fundamental questions about European security and defense, confront the realities of modern interstate conflict, and reassess the tools available to manage the current emergency and defend against future threats. Since the war began, European nations working collectively through the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and sub-regional coalitions have come together in opposition to Russia’s invasion and in defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty.

It remains to be seen, however, whether the war will drive broader changes in European understandings of the threat to their collective interests and what is required to ensure their collective defense.

RAND researchers examined the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war and how U.S. allies in Europe understand and pursue their security. To assess whether the conflict is likely to drive long-lasting changes in European security priorities, investments, and relations,

the researchers analyzed the conflict’s effects on (1) European attitudes toward relations with Russia; (2) European collective security strategies, institutions, and resources; and (3) prospects for increased integration with Ukraine.

Implications of Russia's War on Ukraine for the U.S. and Allied Defense Industrial Bases

The Russia-Ukraine war has begun to shape U.S. and European policies on defense industrial investment, procurement, and production and likely will have consequences for future production capacities. This report presents an analysis of U.S. and European defense industrial bases (DIBs) before the war, challenges that have been identified because of the war, and ongoing efforts to respond to those challenges and improve the DIBs. Studying U.S. and European DIBs in tandem contributes to an understanding of the shared and distinct challenges that these DIBs face, including structural issues, supply chain vulnerabilities, workforce matters, and government procurement and competition policies.

With governments aiming to improve their DIBs, RAND researchers identified potential future indicators of progress for U.S. policymakers to consider. Also, given that the Russia-Ukraine war is ongoing, researchers identified factors that may change their conclusions. These insights may contribute to future decisionmaking on transatlantic DIB cooperation. Although this research was motivated by the Russia-Ukraine war, its findings and implications extend beyond the ongoing conflict and may inform how the United States approaches potential future conflicts.

Key Findings

Transatlantic reforms have been positive but modest.

Key production lines still face challenges.

Sustained funding for U.S. and European DIB modernization and production is essential to overcome persistent constraints on production capacity but is not guaranteed.

DIB growth could create new coordination challenges.

Ongoing investments in Ukraine’s DIB offer promise for a new defense industrial power in Europe, especially if initial joint production agreements meet expectations.

DIB requirements are evolving with the changing character of war.

The Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War

This volume presents findings from a series of RAND reports examining the Russia-Ukraine War’s geopolitical and military consequences and identifies cross-cutting implications for U.S. policymakers. In the series of reports and in the present volume, the authors employed a threefold approach. First, they surveyed historical wars of similar size, duration, and scope to bound expectations for the Russia-Ukraine War’s likely effects and aftermath. Second, they identified diplomatic, military, economic, and normative changes that have occurred as a result of the war using government documents and senior leader statements; discussions with subject-matter experts; and prior open-source research. Third, because the war is ongoing, they highlighted plausible future events or changes that could alter states’ responses to the conflict and, in turn, affect the report’s preliminary findings.

Key Findings

The war’s primary geostrategic effect has been to strengthen the relationship between the United States and its European allies while simultaneously weakening relationships between Europe and Russia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the People’s Republic of China.

Russian and Chinese incentives to undermine the transatlantic alliance have increased.

U.S. and allied adaptations are necessary to prepare for future large-scale protracted conflicts and preserve extended deterrence.

The U.S. defense community may be neglecting the implications of the war in Ukraine for future contingencies beyond the Indo-Pacific region, including in Europe.

Trump Wants Big Tech to Own the Dollar

Two parallel monetary systems – one based on public monies issued in China, India, and maybe the eurozone, and the other comprising private money, increasingly dominated by dollar-pegged stablecoins – appear to be emerging. Central bankers are not the only ones who should feel anxious.

ATHENS – The Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are usually placid, forgettable affairs. Not this year. Several central bankers returned home with a visceral sense of dread. The reason? The specter of the GENIUS Act – the stablecoin bill barreling toward passage by the US Congress hot on the heels of President Donald Trump’s March 6 executive order establishing a strategic cryptocurrency reserve.

Free Market Involvement in AI Is the Key to the US Military’s Future Success

Pat Fallon

US military success depends on tapping free market innovation to rapidly develop AI systems and outpace emerging threats.

Houthi Attacks Expose a Costly Gap

For the better part of two years, Houthi drone and missile attacks threatened commercial shipping and US naval assets in the Red Sea. And while Houthi attacks on US assets have subsided for the time being, US Central Command has raised the alarm that the current status quo in terms of recognizing and deterring these threats is unsustainable in the long term.

Not only is it not fiscally possible to continue to spend millions of taxpayer dollars on expensive countermunitions to take down cheap, mass-produced Houthi drones and missiles, but the US military currently lacks a means to develop the AI software needed to quickly locate and counter these attacks.

Funding Delays Hinder AI Progress

As part of its acquisitions process, the Department of Defense needs a way to be able to access different “colors” of money—the varied forms of funding, including research and development, procurement, operations and maintenance, and BA-8—at the speed of relevancy. The DOD needs to be able to quickly access each of the colors to use for AI development when and where it is needed most.

To develop critical AI architecture, we first need access to high-quality data and the software applications to process it. Unlocking varied forms of funding would accelerate private sector development of these essential tools.

Ukraine teaches us how to build a tank which can survive and win on a drone battlefield

An Israeli Merkava tank manoeuvres towards the southern Gaza Strip border near Khan Yunis. Merkavas equipped with Active Protection Systems and backed by sophisticated electronic warfare and drones have operated against Hamas and Hezbollah without trouble Credit: Atef Safadi/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock

The Strategic Defence Review, which should shape the UK’s military capability for the next decade, is set to drop at last next week. It is critical that the Review incorporates the lessons being learned in the Ukraine war, which is probably the most intense and prolonged “warfighting”-level conflict since WWII. It must drive much of our thinking when it comes to major combat operations in future. The delay to the Review is, I expect, due to the complexity, density and pace of change of modern war fighting, rather than political dithering and confusion amongst the Review team.

The key factor today is the electromagnetic spectrum – he who controls this, controls the battle space and will win the war. The ability to jam the enemy’s signals, and to push your own signals through enemy jamming, confers the ability to operate the most common kinds of drones in any given area. Often a nearby transmission relay – perhaps carried by a “mothership” drone higher above the battlefield – will let drones operate even inside the enemy jamming envelope, as the relay is nearer to the drones than the jammers are and has line of sight to them. In general the Ukrainians have tended to have the upper hand in this electromagnetic struggle, aided at times by harder-to-jam satellite communications such as Elon Musk’s well-known Starlink. But that doesn’t mean they’ve had things all their own way.

The BRICS and the Emerging Order of Multipolarity

Raoul Bunskoek

Expansion of the BRICS, coupled with shifts in US policy, have accelerated the emergence of a multipolar global order.

This new reality prompts the EU to diversify its strategic and economic partnerships to remain a competitive and effective global actor.

To do so successfully, the EU will have to engage with BRICS-countries, collectively accounting for some 41 percent of global GDP (PPP).

Such engagement requires the EU to accept diverse worldviews, prioritise shared utility over shared values, and support (some of) the BRICS’ diversification efforts.

For the BRICS group – originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – 2024 has been a year of enormous and sudden expansion.

First, the BRICS welcomed four new member countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – in its midst on January 1, 2024. Then, the group announced the adding of ten new ‘partner countries’ during its most recent Summit, held in Kazan, Russia in October 2024. According to Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov, the term ‘partner countries’ is meant to evaluate “how ready [countries] are for full-fledged or any other BRICS membership.” Indonesia then joined as full member on January 6, 2025, bringing the group’s official number of members to ten. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is listed on the website of the BRICS as a full member, but has yet to formally accept the membership. There is yet more potential for expansion, since some 40 more countries have voiced their interest in joining the group. The rapid expansion of BRICS prompts the need to address several key questions.

Governing the impact of emerging technologies: Actors, technologies, and regulation

The rapidly growing impact of emerging technologies has spurred calls to reign in their proliferation and use. How and to what end are different international actors governing and capitalising on the impact of emerging technologies,

and what regulatory strategies are successful? This special issue focuses on governance strategies to deal with emerging technologies, ranging from multilateral and bilateral regulation to unilateral deterrence policies.

Employing historical and comparative case studies and leveraging novel data sets, the authors find that the success of technology governance depends on a complex mix of actors involved, the timing of regulation, and the nature of technology.

Loyal Wingmen, Artificial Intelligence, and Cognitive Enhancement: A Warning Against Cyborg-Drone Warfare

Some states are planning to acquire armed drones that incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) and fly alongside inhabited aircraft. The use of drones according to this “Loyal Wingman” concept is an example of tactical human-machine teaming, and it could be militarily advantageous in future aerial warfare.

Incorporating AI into the operation of a weapon system’s critical functions (selecting and engaging targets) nevertheless carries an ethical risk: that a human will be unable to exercise adequate control over the use of force and unable to take responsibility for any injustice caused. To reduce this risk,

one potential approach is to pursue “meaningful human control” over armed and AI-enabled drones by increasing their human supervisors’ cognitive capacity. The use of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) to achieve such an increase might be beneficial from the perspective of military ethics if it enabled faster human interventions to prevent unjust,

AI-associated harms. However, as this article shows, that benefit would be outweighed by the ethical downsides of waging cyborg-drone warfare: the undermining of pilots’ hors de combat noncombatant status and of human moral agency in the use of force.

Lessons from the EU on Confidence-building Measures Around Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain

Integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into the military domain presents a number of significant challenges that have contributed to a deadlock in global governance deliberations.

The rapid evolution of AI, its dual-use nature and its impact on the strategic calculations of actors promote the perception that trade-offs are required between security imperatives and ethical and legal considerations.

Fortunately, a diverse toolbox of confidence-building measures (CBMs) offers a way forward for governance processes and initiatives by fostering trust and reducing uncertainty. Drawing on lessons from the content of and processes that led up to the European Union AI Act, this report examines how global governance deliberations might benefit from a focus on risks and risk mitigation in order to operationalize high-level principles,

as well as multi-stakeholder engagement and investment in an information-based oversight body to ensure that the outcomes of deliberations are relevant and implementable. At the same time, this report also emphasizes the value of EU actorness and the role of European small and middle powers in the global governance arena around AI in the military domain,

as well as the need to harmonize civilian and military regulation within the EU. By leveraging CBMs and drawing on the structured regulatory approach of the EU AI Act, global governance efforts can move beyond the current deadlock to foster a more coherent, risk-informed and practical framework for the responsible development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain

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