Securing the Connective Tissue of the Global Commons: The Indian Ocean Gap

Real Clear Defense | Sue Ghosh Stricklett

The United States and its Quad partners are launching new maritime security initiatives to address critical governance gaps across the Indian Ocean's vital sea lines of communication. This coordinated effort aims to protect global trade routes and undersea telecommunication cables from rising state-sponsored disruption. Historically, the region's vast geography and fragmented maritime jurisdictions have prevented the establishment of a unified multilateral security architecture.

As the People's Liberation Army Navy expands its deployment of intelligence-gathering vessels, securing these maritime corridors has become an operational priority. Chokepoints remain highly vulnerable. To counter these threats, coalition forces are deploying advanced uncrewed surface vessels and acoustic monitoring networks near key transit lanes like the Strait of Malacca. Ultimately, the long-term stability of this global commons will depend on the successful integration of real-time sensor data among littoral states, ensuring rapid response capabilities against asymmetric threats.

China’s Maritime and Military Strategy in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean

Institute for Security and Development Policy | J. Mohan Malik

China is expanding its naval presence and infrastructure across the Bay of Bengal to secure critical sea lanes and project power into the wider Indian Ocean. This strategic push directly addresses Beijing's vulnerability at the Strait of Malacca, where sixty-five per cent of Chinese seaborne crude oil and gas imports must pass through a narrow chokepoint.

To mitigate this geographic bottleneck, the People's Liberation Army Navy is operationalising its "far seas protection" doctrine by developing a layered network of commercial ports and logistics hubs. These facilities span Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, India is countering this expansion by reinforcing its Andaman and Nicobar Command and developing the Great Nicobar Project. This initiative establishes a formidable forward-operating hub capable of sea denial. Geopolitical volatility in Bangladesh and Myanmar further complicates this maritime rivalry. The strategic competition is intensifying rapidly. Ultimately, the region is transforming into a contested arena where commercial access and military power projection are inextricably linked.

Indian summer: The BRICS summit and warming New Delhi-Beijing relations

European Council on Foreign Relations | James Crabtree

India and China have initiated a significant diplomatic de-escalation following a breakthrough agreement on border patrolling along the Line of Actual Control. This crucial pact enabled the first formal bilateral meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in five years during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia.

The bilateral breakthrough addresses the severe military standoff that has persisted since the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clash. While the agreement restores patrolling rights to pre-2020 positions, deep-seated strategic mistrust remains unresolved. Strategic competition will persist. Consequently, New Delhi continues to strengthen its security partnerships with the United States and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to counter Beijing's regional assertiveness. Meanwhile, China seeks to stabilise its contested periphery to mitigate domestic economic pressures and navigate intensifying geopolitical competition with Western powers, though structural tensions will continue to shape their long-term relationship.

BRICS Agreed to Build Payment Alternatives in New Delhi

Frame the Globe News

At the BRICS summit held in New Delhi on September 12, 2026, an official technical mandate was set up to enable local-currency settlements and link the payment systems of its eleven member states. The move is intended as a way of decreasing reliance on Western financial infrastructure after the €210 billion in assets of Russian central banks had been frozen. Because of the geopolitical concerns caused by unilateral sanctions, the finance ministries have been looking for alternative channels for cross-border payments and for deposit services.

There are, nevertheless, serious internal disagreements within the group, especially between the strategic rivals India and China, as well as differences between the various countries concerning the adoption of currency. While India is advocating the use of its Unified Payments Interface in order to reduce transaction costs, China is aiming at extending the international usage of the renminbi. As a result, there arises operational friction. In the end, the creation of a single 'BRICS Pay' system is hampered by the absence of common clearing houses, capital controls, and liquid hedging markets. It is therefore the dollar that still holds the position of being used for international trade invoicing and in the legal infrastructure.

Only China, India, and Russia Can End the Iran War

Foreign Policy | Amir Handjani

The fact that Washington is depending on China, India, and Russia to bring about an end to the war in Iran shows a significant change in Middle Eastern diplomacy, since the United States can no longer achieve a peaceful settlement by itself. Western sanctions and military deterrence have not been able to secure the special diplomatic and economic influence that these three major powers have over Tehran.

The fact that the United States is now dependent on diplomatic means arises from the fact that it has reached the limit of its ability to act alone and has therefore had to depend on the major powers in order to achieve stability in the region. Beijing, New Delhi and Moscow have established important energy partnerships and diplomatic links with the Iranian government which Washington does not have. Cooperation among the great powers is still the only feasible option. In the end, the course that the conflict will take will depend on whether these opposing countries decide to use their combined influence to reduce tensions in the region or else take advantage of the current instability to systematically diminish American influence in the Middle East.

BRICS Grits Its Teeth Through a New Delhi Breakthrough

RealClearDefense | Aarti Betigeri

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted leaders from eleven Global South nations at the eighteenth BRICS summit in New Delhi, securing unanimous adoption of a joint declaration comprising nearly 140 clauses. The gathering marked Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first official visit to India in seven years despite ongoing bilateral border friction.

Coming amid an expanding Middle East conflict entering its sixth month and persistent war in Ukraine, the consensus overcomes the diplomatic stalemate that blocked agreement at May's ministerial meeting. Multipolar institutions are asserting greater collective authority. The resulting text advocates structural reforms to the United Nations Security Council, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund while opposing unilateral Western sanctions. The declaration prioritises local currency settlement systems in international trade and peaceful space research cooperation. Side meetings enabled direct dialogue between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and UAE leadership, establishing a functional pragmatic platform for rival regional powers.

Why Have Indians Become a Regular Target of Hate in Singapore?

The Diplomat | Asif Ullah Khan

Singapore is experiencing a sharp rise in racial hostility and derogatory online attacks targeting its ethnic Indian community, threatening the city-state's long-cherished model of multicultural cohesion. Recent online backlash has targeted nine Singaporeans of Indian descent missing in Nepal, alongside xenophobic attacks against Temasek chief executive Dilhan Pillay Sandrasegara over corporate investments.

This friction challenges the foundational nation-building policies established when Lee Kuan Yew led Singapore out of the Malaysian Federation on August 9, 1965. To prevent alienation after the 1964 race riots left 36 people dead, Lee instituted English as the primary administrative language and mandated strict ethnic quotas in housing. Social media has now shattered this carefully managed peace. Resentment has intensified as Singapore Airlines, which owns 25 per cent of Air India, reported a 57.4 per cent net profit drop to S$1.2 billion for the year ending March 2026, fueling conspiracy theories that the Indian-origin executive would prioritise the loss-making airline.

The US Economic World War Part II

Frame the Globe News

Delegations representing eleven member states gathered at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi for the 18th BRICS Leaders’ Summit without establishing a common currency or a shared settlement system capable of displacing the US dollar. Despite China recording a $1.19 trillion goods surplus in 2025 and a current-account surplus of 3.3 per cent of GDP according to the IMF’s February Article IV assessment, Beijing remains unwilling to open capital markets or surrender currency controls necessary for reserve status.

Capital controls restrict renminbi liquidity. A Strait of Hormuz crisis forced Indian refiners to import a record 2.78 million barrels a day of Russian crude in July 2026, defying trade commitments with Washington to preserve domestic energy security. Concurrently, Brazil signed the EU-Mercosur agreement in Asunción on January 17, 2026, creating a trade area of over 700 million people while retaining access to Western financial architecture. These divergent national interests prevent the formation of a unified anti-dollar monetary bloc.

What the Modi Xi meet means for India China Relations

India China | Ananth Krishnan

At the two-day BRICS Summit in New Delhi, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a high-level bilateral meeting on September 12, 2026. This visit by Xi to India was his first in almost seven years and shows that relations between the two countries are slowly being stabilised after the serious border clashes which took place along the Line of Actual Control.

Even though officials have promoted a strategic and long-term approach, tensions are still very strong. India insists that peace along the frontier is a necessary foundation for wider relations, while Chinese officials see boundary management and bilateral relations as mutually supportive and are pushing for simultaneous advances in diplomatic, trade, and cultural contacts. The two leaders have instructed their officials to make progress on the demarcation of the border in the Middle and Sikkim areas as well as to deal with the economic disagreements. Structural trade imbalances still exist, and ongoing problems concerning Indian market access, Chinese investment screening, and visa restrictions continue to hinder the process of normalisation.

India’s Growth Machine Now Runs Through Two War Zones

Frame the Globe News

In July India imported a record 2.8 million barrels of Russian crude oil each day, this amount being more than half of its total petroleum imports. This massive increase in purchases shows how vulnerable New Delhi is to growing geopolitical disruptions in key maritime straits such as the Strait of Hormuz, where regional conflicts pose a threat to global energy routes.

Eighty-eight per cent of the country's need for crude oil has to be met through imports. As a result, Washington is now more and more basing its decision about allowing India access to Western markets on the countries in South Asia from which India obtains its energy supplies. Ensuring national energy security is still the top priority. The pressure being exerted means that New Delhi is having to engage in a sensitive diplomatic balancing act between preserving its strategic independence and obtaining essential energy supplies from states that are sanctioned. In the end, the combination of the conflict in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East could threaten India's domestic growth programme if secondary sanctions or maritime blockades stop these vital crude supplies from reaching the country.

What Cements the BRICS?

Eye on China | Amit Kumar

India recently hosted the 18th BRICS summit as renewed issue about de-dollarisation arise; the existing trade imbalances come to make local currencies a route to Chinese renminbi dominance. Because it imports 88% of its crude oil, New Delhi faces significant economic exposure, and its financial system is therefore susceptible to sudden price spikes tied to the dollar.

In order to overcome these weaknesses, the member states have suggested settling trade using local currencies, a common currency basket, or Central Bank Digital Currencies. Yet India had a trade deficit of $226 billion with its BRICS partners in fiscal year 2026. Such trade deficits benefit Beijing. Moreover, China's use of trade as a tool—for example, imposing discriminatory export controls on rare earths and semiconductor equipment—demonstrates the group's inability to reform the existing global geoeconomic order. In the end, India's effort to achieve strategic autonomy within BRICS is still limited by its security ties to the Quad.

BRICS meets in India: What’s on the agenda, why it matters

Al Jazeera | Priyanka Shankar

The 18th annual BRICS Summit, which Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is hosting in New Delhi from September 12 to 13, 2026, will bring together more than a dozen world leaders to discuss global economic problems and the severe geopolitical conflicts. The summit is taking place at a time when the United States and Israel are engaging in a growing war against Iran and Russia is still at war in Ukraine.

An enlarged group consisting of eleven members—accounting for forty per cent of the global gross domestic product—wants to secure its supply chains and set up cross-border payment systems as a means of going around Western sanctions. However, disagreements within the group endanger this common goal. The ongoing border disagreements between India and China, together with the tensions existing between Iran and the United Arab Emirates, make it difficult to produce a single, unified declaration. Moreover, the Houthi forces in Yemen are still attacking infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, and the Yemeni government has recently lost control of the strategic Bab al-Mandeb strait. The summit offers Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping a vital opportunity to make use of the Global South's policy of hedging.

Is BRICS Losing Its Mojo?

Foreign Policy | Sarang Shidore

The BRICS group is struggling with internal divisions as ongoing security disputes put its strategic unity at risk before the New Delhi summit. Growing tensions between key members have made it harder for the bloc to act as a united economic and political force, raising doubts about its future.

BRICS was once mainly about economic cooperation and reforming global institutions, but now it faces challenges as its members have different security interests. Disputes over borders, maritime issues, and rival partnerships have led to serious diplomatic divisions. The group’s unity is weakening quickly. To fix this, members need strong ways to resolve conflicts and should keep economic projects separate from security disagreements. The New Delhi summit is a key moment for BRICS to either start a real security dialogue or risk slowly breaking apart.

Indian nuclear weapons, 2026

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists | Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight-Boyle

India is modernising its nuclear weapons arsenal and operationalising its nascent triad. It is expanding its estimated stockpile to approximately 190 warheads as of 2026. This expansion is driven by escalating strategic competition with China and persistent, volatile border tensions with Pakistan, which recently led to open military hostilities in May 2025.

In April 2026, the 500-megawatt Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam reached first criticality in order to obtain the fissile material needed for its expanding arsenal; the reactor is capable of producing 140 kilograms of Plutonium-239 each year, which in turn allows for the manufacture of up to 35 additional warheads annually. The risk of accidental escalation is still high. Although New Delhi has a strict no-first-use policy, the fact that longer-range Agni ballistic missiles have now been deployed shows a fundamental move towards building a credible deterrent against Beijing's stronger conventional and nuclear forces, possibly leading to a separation of India's strategic position from that of its two nuclear-armed neighbours.

India: New Drug Frontier In Meghalaya

Eurasia Review | Deepak Kumar Nayak

In 2026, the Meghalaya Police Anti-Narcotics Task Force (ANTF) stepped up its work along the main drug routes. They seized large amounts of heroin and synthetic drugs. The biggest catch was on 6 March 2026: over 10 kilograms of crystal meth. This is a clear sign that Meghalaya is no longer just a stopover for drugs. It is fast becoming a big market itself.

Earlier, drugs from states on the Myanmar border used to just pass through Meghalaya on their way to Assam and Bangladesh. Now, things have changed. Criminal groups are setting up shop in cities like Shillong. More people are using drugs locally. The numbers tell the story: drug seizures jumped from about 1,400 kilograms in 2023 to over 5,000 kilograms in 2024. To deal with this, the state started the ANTF and the DREAM project. The idea is to go after the money behind the drug trade and help people get off drugs. Both local sellers and outside financiers are in their sights.

China’s Taiwan Tryst and The 2027 Question

Takshashila Institution | Anushka Saxena

China's People's Liberation Army is focusing on building up its overall capabilities, rather than sticking to a set timeline for a cross-strait invasion ahead of its 2027 centenary. This approach, which differs from earlier American intelligence warnings, centers on using different levels of pressure to make Taiwan surrender without risking a large-scale amphibious attack.

Challenges like keeping troops supplied, getting semiconductors, and having enough ports make a long-term cross-strait attack difficult. As a result, the military is focusing on joint blockades, strikes, and law-enforcement actions instead. The main challenge is still logistics. Recent military exercises from 2022 to 2025 show a mix of naval blockades and Coast Guard inspections to avoid direct fighting. If there is a crisis over Taiwan, China could put pressure on the Line of Actual Control, but might also offer India early border deals to keep it neutral.

Ground vs. Air Sensing: India’s Multi-Domain Defence Strategy

Frontier India | Brig Arun Sahgal, PhD (Retired) and Dr. S.K. Vasudeva

India is advancing its multi-domain defence strategy through the initiation of the Netra Mk.2 and Embraer ERJ-145 AEW&C Mk.1A programmes to address a significant airborne early warning shortfall relative to China and Pakistan. This strategic initiative seeks to counter the closely coordinated Beijing-Islamabad intelligence alliance, which has rapidly enhanced its space-based and unmanned intelligence capabilities along disputed borders.

The operational urgency arises from a pronounced imbalance: the Indian Air Force maintains only five airborne warning platforms, whereas Pakistan operates thirteen and China possesses more than thirty such systems. To address this vulnerability, New Delhi is allocating Rs 19,000 crore to retrofit Airbus A321 aircraft with indigenous active electronically scanned array radars and to expand the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System. The effectiveness of ground-based radar is constrained by terrain masking. Therefore, the integration of space-based assets and artificial intelligence is essential to match the advanced orbital and unmanned surveillance capabilities deployed by adversaries along the Line of Actual Control.

Ukraine war: What to make of Modi's plea to Putin to end conflict

BBC News | Vikas Pandey

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine, reiterating New Delhi's stance of strategic autonomy. Despite Western pressure to condemn Moscow's invasion, India maintains a neutral posture while preserving deep economic and security ties with Russia. This diplomatic balancing act is vital, as Russia supplies approximately 40% of India's defence equipment alongside discounted crude oil.

Simultaneously, India participates in Western security groupings like the Quad alongside multilateral structures including BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Moscow remains unfazed by diplomatic appeals. Putin responded vaguely to Modi's statement, with the Kremlin maintaining that time works in Russia's favour amidst intensified strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on Russian refineries have caused domestic fuel shortages, yet Russian operations continue unabated. Ultimately, Moscow's conviction in a military victory ensures diplomatic overtures from strategic partners will not halt the conflict.

Bangladesh Is Reshaping Its Relationship with India

RealClearWorld | Saima Afzal

Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s decision to delay his initial diplomatic visit to India signals a structural transformation in South Asian geopolitics following the 2024 collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s government. New Delhi had sought to reset bilateral relations by inviting Rahman to the BRICS outreach summit, but friction persists over Hasina’s continued presence in India after her August 5 public remarks in New Delhi.

This diplomatic stall highlights how smaller regional states are leveraging multi-alignment strategies with China, Pakistan, and the United States to reduce political deference toward New Delhi. Decades of geographic proximity and a shared 4,000-kilometre border no longer guarantee exclusive Indian strategic influence. Proximity no longer ensures exclusivity. Consequently, India faces a more competitive regional environment where structural dominance across cross-border energy, transit, and security networks must be actively earned through reciprocal institutional partnerships rather than assumed through close ties with individual political elites.

India’s Private Space Race: From Sarabhai’s Vision to the Commercialization of Space

BESA Center | Tal Inbar, Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos

Skyroot Aerospace’s Vikram-1 rocket reached a 450-kilometer orbit on July 18, 2026, establishing India as the fourth country with demonstrated private orbital-launch capability. The milestone highlights a strategic reorientation driven by growing national security imperatives and severe state capacity constraints. Triggered by China’s 2007 antisatellite test and reinforced by Mission Shakti in 2019, New Delhi enacted institutional reforms in 2020 to commercialize launch vehicle production.

ISRO's $2 billion budget and 16,000 workforce proved insufficient to simultaneously manage military satellites, civil missions, and commercial demand. State-enabled commercialization addresses this bottleneck directly. By directing IN-SPACe to transfer mature launch platforms to industry, India expanded its space startups from one in 2014 to 189 by late 2023. This distributed architecture builds operational redundancy, accelerates technology refresh cycles, and aims to expand India's current $8 billion space economy toward $50 billion by 2030.