Indian Strategic Studies: 11/29/24

29 November 2024

Beyond 26/11: How military satellites can redefine India's security framework

Omkar Nikam

The harrowing events of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008 were a stark reminder of vulnerabilities in India's national security framework. The coordinated terror attack showed weaknesses in India's intelligence gathering, inter-agency coordination, and real-time situational awareness. In the context of modern warfare and hybrid threats, the need for a robust military satellite network had never been more urgent.

Lessons in Vulnerabilities

The 26/11 attacks were well-planned and executed by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives with significant backing from external state and non-state actors. The attackers utilised advanced communication tools, GPS navigation, and intelligence provided through reconnaissance to evade Indian authorities and maximise damage. Key vulnerabilities exposed during the attacks were:

Poor Maritime Surveillance: The terrorists infiltrated Mumbai via the sea route, undetected by coastal radar systems. Despite having warning signals, intelligence was not actionable.

Lack of Real-Time Communication: Delays in inter-agency communication hampered quick response efforts, allowing attackers to move freely between locations.

Inadequate Situational Awareness: Security forces lacked comprehensive situational awareness, delaying operations and contributing to avoidable casualties.

Tajikistan’s Afghan Conundrum – Analysis

Bruce Pannier

(FPRI) — Tajikistan’s policies toward neighboring Taliban-ruled Afghanistan are reaching a pivotal moment. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and his government have always viewed the Taliban as a threat, and that position has not changed since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. However, there is a bigger threat to Tajikistan growing in Afghanistan, and it might take cooperation with the Taliban to neutralize it.

Additionally, the other Central Asian countries and China, Iran, and Russia are engaging with the Taliban government. Tajikistan risks missing out on opportunities that these countries are opening in Afghanistan. Following the lead of these countries presents Tajikistan with a different set of problems. Tajik authorities have been warning the country’s people and the international community about the Taliban threat for nearly 30 years. Tajikistan’s rigid stance against the Taliban government has brought Rahmon’s government support from Tajikistan’s people and other countries. Making peace with the Taliban will be difficult to explain to Tajik citizens. It will also remove one of the greatest incentives for foreign governments to continue decades of generous financial and security support for Rahmon’s government.

Enemies from the Start

President Rahmon is unique among the current leaders of countries bordering Afghanistan. He is the only leader who was in power when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s.

In the late 1990s, all the Central Asian presidents, except the Turkmen president, viewed the Taliban as a threat and shunned any contact with them. Rahmon’s government and the government of Uzbekistan’s then-President Islam Karimov aided ethnic Tajik and Uzbek groups fighting the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. The potential danger from the Taliban was acutely felt in Tajikistan where there was civil war from 1992 to 1997. The Rahmon government’s battlefield opponent was the United Tajik Opposition, a coalition of groups in which the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was the backbone. In the early years after the Taliban appeared, most people knew little about the group except that they were Islamic extremists.

A Critical Analysis of the US Army’s Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

John A. Nagl

Key Findings

The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved.

Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization.

Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.

Introduction

In 2014, the Iraqi army, into which tens of billions of American taxpayer dollars had been invested, collapsed in the face of an offensive by the terror group the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Only a major coalition intervention prevented the fall of Baghdad. In 2021, within just a few months of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Afghan National Army (ANA) collapsed in the face of an offensive by the Taliban. Between 2002 and 2021, some $88 billion had been invested in the ANA. In both cases, the U.S. military had devoted vast amounts of time and money to the training of the host-nation’s security forces. Yet, with a few notable exceptions (the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force and some units of Afghan commandos), both armies severely underperformed once they could no longer rely on extensive American air, ground, and logistical support. Why did the U.S. effort to train and advise these forces fail so spectacularly?

Underwater Geopolitics

Carlo J.V. Caro

How China’s Control of Undersea Cables and Data Flows Reshapes Global Power

Cable Routing Protocols

The rapid construction of undersea cables has brought a hidden but crucial issue into focus: the manipulation of the protocols that control how data travels beneath the sea. These protocols determine the pathways internet data takes, influencing speed, costs, and even exposure to surveillance. Even small changes in these pathways can tilt the global balance of digital power. China’s increasing role in this area demonstrates how technology can be used strategically to reshape geopolitics.

At the heart of this issue is a technology called Software-Defined Networking (SDN). SDN allows data traffic to be managed and optimized in real time, improving efficiency. But this same flexibility makes SDN vulnerable to misuse. Chinese tech companies like HMN Tech (formerly Huawei Marine Networks), ZTE, and China Unicom are leading the way in SDN development. China also holds sway in international organizations that set the rules for these technologies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). This influence gives China a hand in shaping global standards and governance.

Africa illustrates how this influence plays out. Chinese investments in digital infrastructure across the continent are massive. For example, the PEACE (Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe) cable, which links East Africa to Europe, was designed to avoid Chinese territory. Yet, thanks to SDN technology, its traffic can still be redirected through Chinese-controlled points. This redirection could introduce delays of 20 to 30 milliseconds per hop—not much for casual browsing, but a serious issue for latency-sensitive activities like financial trading or encrypted communication.

In Southeast Asia, similar risks are evident. The Southeast Asia-Japan Cable (SJC), which connects Singapore to Japan, relies on several landing stations influenced by China. During a period of heightened tensions in the South China Sea, some data intended for Japan was mysteriously routed through Hainan Island, under Chinese jurisdiction. Such cases suggest technical routing decisions may sometimes have political motivations.

Soviet Lessons for China Watching

Ford Hart

Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Ford Hart argues that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political institutions, the CCP’s practical behavior, and continued veneration of Marxism-Leninism in the CCP constitution highlight the Soviet model’s deep influence on Beijing. As such, lessons from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) can help us understand the CCP’s approach to governance today.

Soviet-origin governing institutions and processes exert enduring influence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Its substantially imported political structure arguably has at least as much practical impact on Beijing’s behavior as the ideology it also imported from Moscow. While the PRC is not a carbon copy of the USSR, Soviet lessons still have much to teach observers about Chinese governance.

PRC policy shifts over the past two decades have reinforced the relevance of these lessons, and the increased opacity of the Chinese political system makes it necessary to exploit all available tools to assess its behavior. The Soviet experience illuminates, for instance, the impact of the Leninist apparatus on PRC regime behavior, the challenges for understanding China, and the future of its political system. Key insights include the following:The Leninist system’s functional requirements substantially account for China’s conservative departure in recent years.

The PRC system is opaque by design, with information deployed solely to advance the party-state’s current goals.

China will ultimately transition from Leninist rule but under unpredictable circumstances and probably only after many more years.

The Soviet model is not China’s destiny; it is only one of several factors that have shaped PRC history and will continue to influence its future. Nonetheless, understanding it is indispensable to making sense of China’s behavior and prospects for change.

How Islamists Influence the UK Government

Connor Tomlinson

Last week, the Runnymede Trust published a report, forecasting a ‘bleak and dystopian’ future for Muslims in the UK. Chief executive Shabna Begum told the Guardian that

“Sayeeda Warsi coined the term ‘the dinner table test’, but I think we’ve got even beyond that… The way politicians talk about Muslims now is so derogatory, it’s in the most brutally divisive terms.

“Politicians are engaging in a popularity contest and that popularity contest is measured by how far they are willing to bully and demonise Muslims. And that has become not just an acceptable kind of currency, but a way in which to earn your political stripes.”

The Trust is infamous for having introduced the term “Islamophobia” into common parlance in 1997 — the same year the Blair government came to power, and proceeded to revolutionise Britain’s legal system. “Islamophobia” was devised as a means to silence criticism of Islam by the terrorist group the Muslim Brotherhood. Former Islamist, Abdur-Rahman Muhammad confirmed a meeting took place where members of a Muslim Brotherhood outfit, the International Institute for Islamic Thought, plotted to “emulate the homosexual activists who used the term ‘homophobia’ to silence critics.” It seems to have been successful, given former Prime Minister, Lord David Cameron refused to ban the Brotherhood in 2015 — despite them being banned in multiple Islamic countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and sanctioned in Qatar and Turkey.

The report was supported by both Baroness Warsi and the Muslim Council of Britain. In September, Warsi, the former Chair of the Conservative Party under Cameron, announced that she had withdrawn her party whip in protest against “how far right my Party has moved”. She used the news to promote her new book, titled Muslims Don’t Matter. As our review on Courage noted, this book about Islam features staggeringly few references to the Quran (two) or the Prophet Mohammed (four).

Putin Isn't Bluffing: Intermediate-Range Hypersonic Missile 'Warning'

Anna Matveeva

Throwing caution aside, President Biden decided to use the transition period to raise the war stakes in Ukraine. He sanctioned the U.S. military contractors to deploy inside the country, authorized the U.S.-made ATACMS missiles to strike deep into Russia, and transferred anti-personnel mines to Ukraine. The last act is not illegal since the United States never signed the Ottawa Convention, although it is still morally dubious. Altogether, the desire to maximize the U.S. support to its ally is clear so that Ukraine can hold on beyond Biden’s time in the White House. More aid is expected.

Militarily, ATACMS and UK-produced Storm Shadows are unlikely to be game-changers for Ukraine. The Russian military is familiar with them from the battle they fought and likely has moved their valuable assets out of the range of fire. Ukraine does not have large missile stocks, and its priority lies in defending its territory rather than keeping a foothold in Russia’s Kursk indefinitely.

Moreover, if a navigation error makes a Western missile land on a Russian kindergarten, it will add to international reputation damage for the West.

What appears obvious is that Joe Biden is determined to leave as complicated a foreign policy legacy to his successor as possible and disrupt Donald Trump’s ambitions to bring peace between Russia and Ukraine. The impression is that Russia is being provoked into a reckless response, making peace negotiations with Putin far too difficult—even for Trump. The upcoming president’s approach to the conflict is not based on Russia’s defeat, but it may be unable to withstand serious escalation. This is what Trump reportedly warned Putin against doing.

Thus, the U.S.-sanctioned strikes on Russia’s Kursk and Bryansk regions on November 19 and 21 presented Moscow with a dilemma: respond strongly and abandon the hopes for peace or swallow its pride and wait for two months until the inauguration. Given that Putin thrives on the premise that he does what he says, he cannot let a blow pass. Otherwise, the image of Russian strength would be tarnished, and its threats to the West would lack credibility. Putin had to act, at least out of “self-respect.”

Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) – Analysis

Jennifer DiMascio

The U.S. Army is developing the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) to serve as a next-generation aircraft for vertical lift, air assault, maritime interdiction, aeromedical evacuation, combat search and rescue, humanitarian relief, and tactical resupply.

The Army intends for FLRAA to eventually replace the Sikorsky UH- 60 Black Hawk medium-utility helicopter, which was designed more than 50 years ago. Army Futures Command Commanding General James E. Rainey testified that the Army needs FLRAA to have the ability to fly twice as far and twice as fast as previous rotorcraft, a capability he called essential for operations in the Pacific region.

The Army is under contract with Textron Bell to build a FLRAA prototype of its V-280 demonstrator aircraft. The Administration has asked Congress for $1.26 billion for FLRAA research, development, test, and evaluation in FY2025 (see Table 1).

UH-60 Black Hawk

The Army plans to begin operating FLRAA in the 2030s and, in the meantime, continue to purchase Black Hawk helicopters. According to Army budget documents, the UH- 60M is “the Army’s utility helicopter for the near and midterm force,” supporting maneuver commanders in airassault, general support command and control, and aeromedical evacuation.

The Administration’s FY2025 budget request proposes continuing the purchase of 24 Black Hawks annually under a five-year contract that began in 2022 and ends in 2026. The service may also follow through on another multiyear proposal to purchase up to 255 UH-60s from FY2027 to FY2031. The Black Hawk is operated by at least 35 governments.

Putin Isn't Bluffing: Could Russia Test a Tactical Nuclear Weapon?

Harrison Kass

-This shift in policy comes as Ukraine uses U.S.-supplied ATACMS and UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles to strike targets within Russian territory. A nuclear test, while unlikely due to its potential to further alienate Russia internationally, would mark a dramatic escalation not seen since the end of the Cold War.

-The Oreshnik test underscores Russia's capability to deliver nuclear strikes, heightening tensions as both sides brace for further escalation.

Russian Tactical Nuclear Test Coming Soon?

Russia has modified its nuclear doctrine, lowering the threshold for unleashing a nuclear attack to include conventional weapons strikes on targets within Russian soil. The threshold-lowering seems to come in direct response to Ukraine’s use of American-supplied ATACMS, and UK-supplied Storm Shadow, missiles against targets in Russia. As Ukrainian conventional attacks against Russian-based targets continue, the world is left to wonder how Russia will respond. One response being pondered: is the testing of a tactical nuclear device.

Would Putin Test a Tactical Nuke?

Were Putin to test a nuclear weapon it would mark an escalation in the ongoing conflict and would likely serve to alienate Russia from the international community further. The upside, from Russia’s perspective, would possibly be the enhancement of Ukraine’s respect for Russia and its nuclear capabilities, which would possibly inspire Ukraine to stop unleashing conventional weapons attacks against Russian-based targets.

Closing the US Military’s Public Trust Deficit

Luke High

Imagine a society where the cornerstone of national defense—its military—faces eroding confidence from the very citizens it serves. This crisis is not just a theoretical threat, but a reality reflected in a startling 2023 survey by the Reagan Foundation, which revealed that public trust in the US military has plummeted to 45 percent, down sharply from 70 percent in 2018. This decline, coupled with a shrinking pool of eligible recruits, jeopardizes the nation’s ability to maintain its security. The erosion of trust in the military not only challenges its operational capacity but also strikes at the heart of national identity. While the US military has long been seen as a pillar of strength and professionalism, its current struggle to maintain public confidence poses profound risks for national security, recruitment, and global standing. Addressing this crisis requires a deep examination of its causes, implications, and solutions.

Public trust in the military has ebbed and flowed in response to major events and societal shifts. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, widespread disillusionment left military confidence at an all-time low. Yet moments of triumph, such as the swift and decisive Operation Desert Storm in 1991, demonstrated the military’s competence and effectiveness, helping to restore its standing in the eyes of the public. The September 11 attacks represented another high-water mark for trust, with the military hailed as the nation’s protector in a time of unprecedented crisis. By 2009, confidence in the armed forces had climbed to an impressive 82 percent, according to Gallup polling. However, the optimism of the post-9/11 era has since eroded, with recent years characterized by a significant decline in public trust. The Reagan Foundation’s 2023 findings underscore the urgency of this issue, particularly among younger Americans. Only 33 percent of this demographic reported trust in the military, a stark reminder of the growing generational divide in perceptions of the institution.

DoD Needs This Change Agent

S.L. Nelson

Success in today’s world favors smart, creative leaders who can quickly adapt and make decisions that benefit their organizations. President Trump's choice of Pete Hegseth to lead the DoD marks a significant shift from his first administration. Hegseth, with fewer ties to the traditional defense establishment, is expected to transform the DoD in two vital areas: first, he will expose generals and admirals who act out of self-interest; second, he will refocus the military on its core function of lethality—the use or threat of deadly force to win wars and deter enemies.

Hegseth’s appointment threatens senior military officers who are more concerned with their legacy than with mission accomplishment. These officers feel susceptible to changes that will threaten their carefully curated norms. Many current leaders have avidly promoted DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) and CRT (Critical Race Theory), and Hegseth’s threat to remove these programs stokes their fears. These leaders have promoted subordinates who share their views, creating a cycle of making leaders in their own image. To break this cycle, Hegseth will also need to ensure that general officers are held accountable for the officers they promote. These actions will ensure that his and President Trump’s ‘Warrior Boards’ achieve their desired effect and weed out the right leaders. Civilian leaders and politicians should also scrutinize the retired officers who placed these generals in their positions in the first place. If multiple legacies are at risk, flag officers will develop and implement more objective metrics for recommending general officer positions.

Hegseth's leadership will refocus DoD on its core purpose. By removing ineffective leaders who prioritize social theories over military effectiveness, he will eliminate a major obstacle. These changes will encourage accountability and forward-thinking approaches. A clear message will echo from the top down that adapting to change means manning, training, and equipping the military to win wars, rather than allowing military officers to succumb to the self-loathing which places individual egos above selfless service to the country.

The Ukraine War May Spiral Out of Control Before Trump Takes Office | Opinion

Sergey G. Maidukov

On Thursday, Ukraine claimed that Russia launched an ICBM at the eastern city of Dnipro. What actually struck was not an intercontinental ballistic missile, but rather a new, shorter-range type that is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. But whatever the weapon's capabilities, it was another escalation in a war that has been intensifying in recent weeks.

On Sunday morning, Russia launched another massive drone and missile attack on Ukraine's energy and other critical infrastructure.

Most of the 120 missiles and 90 drones were shot down or otherwise neutralized, but some got through, leading to power outages and a resurgence of blackouts.

This photograph shows inside a damaged rehabilitation centre for people with disabilities following a Russian attack in Dnipro, on Nov. 21. FLORENT VERGNES/AFP via Getty Images

Some observers suggested that this was Putin's way of reminding Ukraine that it is facing another brutal winter with heat and light meaning survival. I interpret this as Russian President Vladimir Putin's anxious response to the United States' decision to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles for attacks on targets within Russia.

While a formal announcement of the U.S. decision came a few hours after the attack, it would be imprudent to assume that Russian intelligence was unaware of it beforehand.

Even before Donald Trump's election victory, the president-elect expressed his intention to bring the Russia-Ukraine war to an end as soon as possible. Both sides, therefore, are preparing for negotiations in one way or another. Although Russia is in a hurry to consolidate its gains on the various fronts, overall, it had notably decreased its missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukraine, for its part, had avoided deploying combat drones against Russian oil refineries.

The populist backlash against global institutions may be good for them

Jolyon Ford

Multilateralism is not necessarily under threat from populist anti-globalism.

The rise of populism in democracies does not inevitably threaten the rules-based international order (that tired but vital staple of Australian policy-speak). On the contrary, this populist moment creates opportunities to make international institutions more legitimate and effective by pushing for long-overdue reforms.

In theory, and where they are capable and neutral, global governance bodies from the well-known (such as World Health Organization) to the less high-profile (such as the UN International Telecommunications Union) can coordinate action and set standards on shared global challenges. They are also vital to advancing Australia’s own interests as a relatively vulnerable and trade-dependent power. Yet the purpose and value of multilateral bodies is probably not evident to the average voter. The ‘rules-based international order’ has become an easy but lazy phrase routinely rolled out in our policymaking.

If nothing else, popular scepticism about global governance is an opportunity—even within Canberra policy circles—to work smarter at always making a compelling, practical and positive case for why multilateral engagement matters.

‘Populism’ can signify many things. In foreign policy terms, it refers to domestic political portrayal of global governance bodies as illegitimate technocratic elites, foreign anti-sovereign impositions frustrating the will of the people. Scholars write of a populist ‘backlash’ against the international order, beginning in the mid-2010s, one that is strongest in the very Western powers that have long championed and benefited from that order.

From Starlink to High Strategy: Musk’s Growing Role in US Foreign Policy

Vivek N.D.

Elon Musk’s role in shaping US foreign policy through his leadership of a yet-to-be created “Department of Government Efficiency” in the new Donald Trump administration could signal a dramatic shift in both domestic governance and international relations. Musk, a billionaire entrepreneur known for his work with Tesla, SpaceX and Neuralink, has increasingly positioned himself as a global figure with influence that transcends the business world. This potential move into government could capitalize on Musk’s ability to integrate technological innovation into policy, though its implications for US foreign policy are complex and multifaceted.

The Vision: Efficiency and Innovation at the Heart of Government

Musk’s hypothetical appointment as the head of a Department of Government Efficiency, alongside political entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy, could bring a new perspective to US foreign policy. This novel department would ostensibly focus on eliminating bureaucratic inefficiencies within the federal government while promoting the rapid adoption of technological solutions. Musk’s past ventures, such as SpaceX’s Starlink internet service, could serve as a key tool in advancing US diplomatic and strategic goals.

Starlink, Musk’s satellite internet initiative, has already demonstrated its utility in regions with limited infrastructure, from war-torn Ukraine to remote villages. By providing internet connectivity where traditional methods fail, Starlink offers a unique form of technological soft power. Its potential deployment in foreign policy could be revolutionary, positioning the United States as a provider of cutting-edge communication technology while sidestepping traditional geopolitical conflicts associated with infrastructure projects. Musk’s vision for leveraging these technologies could transform US engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region central to global economic and security dynamics.

Israel’s Trump Delusion

Shalom Lipner

Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election could not have come at a better time for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. More than 13 months since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attack, Israel finds itself on a roll. Since the beginning of the year, Israel has assassinated much of the senior leadership of both Hamas and Hezbollah, decimated their ranks, and conducted precision strikes in Iran. At home, after seeing his approval rating hit rock bottom following October 7, Netanyahu has watched his popularity start to rebound.

Now Netanyahu and his government see a rare opportunity for a comprehensive realignment of the Middle East. Resisting calls for a truce, Netanyahu—with potent stimulus from his extreme right flank—is pledging to double down on his pursuit of “total victory,” however long that might take. In addition to continuing the Gaza war and laying the groundwork for a protracted Israeli security presence in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, this narrative involves imposing a new order on Lebanon; neutralizing Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; and ultimately, eliminating the Islamic Republic’s nuclear threat. Some members of Netanyahu’s governing coalition also aspire to bury the prospects of a two-state solution forever. At the same time, Netanyahu thinks that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries will eventually agree to normalization with Israel. And with Trump returning to the White House, the prime minister is confident that the United States will support him.

This scheme is seductive and even carries a certain logic: after all, Trump is viewed in Jerusalem as a staunch patron of Israel who is far less concerned about international norms and institutions—and the need for restraint—than his Democratic predecessor. Moreover, the president-elect has already telegraphed plans to resume his “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran and prioritize the expansion of the Abraham Accords.

How Europe can save NATO

Hans Binnendijk and Timo S. Koster

President-elect Donald Trump will likely return to office skeptical about NATO’s value and Europe’s contribution to its own security. Officials who worked directly with Trump in his first term are convinced that he has no qualms about reducing or even ending the United States’ commitment to the Alliance. But Trump will again be a transactional president who wants to demonstrate strength. With the proper initiatives, European allies can save the Alliance. These allies should start by focusing the June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague on Europe’s strategic responsibilities, agreeing on ways that Europe can remove some of the United States’ defense burden.

Major European powers are faced with flagging economic growth, weakened leadership, and Ukraine war-weariness. Therefore, much of the leadership burden will fall on new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. He is up to the task. As a former center-right Dutch prime minister, Rutte is known to have a cordial relationship with Trump, and like Trump, he is a dealmaker.

Ukraine will be first on the docket. Trump is pushing for a quick settlement that would probably result in continued Russian occupation of some Ukrainian land. Rutte has already stressed that the United States’ security interests lie in preventing a Russian victory. Europe should seek to shape Trump’s initiative accordingly. Whatever the terms of a ceasefire, key to lasting peace will be a solid Western commitment to long-term Ukrainian security. That should be Europe’s principal focus. Ideally, that would mean NATO membership for Ukraine. Europe should encourage that outcome, but Trump may resist. If so, the European Union (EU) could step up by prioritizing Ukrainian EU membership, which includes the somewhat weaker Article 42.7 defense commitment. It should also deploy European troops to Ukraine post-conflict to underscore its pending commitment and pledge to provide the majority of long-term military aid to Kyiv.

The Operational and Strategic Genius of the Kursk Offensive

Dan Cox

Current analysis of the recent offensive conducted by Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of Russia is incomplete at best and misguided at worst. Most of the pundits are focused on speculating whether the recent offensive will anger American politicians, lead to an eventual victory, or halt the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Dealing with the anger of American politicians first, it is unlikely that Ukraine conducted this counteroffensive in a vacuum. American politicians were likely aware of the operation. Dealing with the next question, speculating on whether one operation will “tip the scales” fits into the American culture of viewing events, wars, and almost everything as a black-and-white or win-lose dichotomy. Finally, the attack on Russia was not intended to halt the main Russian offensive in Pokrovsk. At most, this attack was aimed at drawing troops from the Russian attack on Kharkiv, which, being one of the largest population centers in Ukraine, would represent a major loss for Ukraine, should it fall into Russian hands.

Instead of entering this American cultural quagmire, this essay examines the situation by looking at the Kursk campaign holistically and through the intersection of military operations and strategy. This intersection is often referred to as the area where operational art occurs. By examining the Kursk offensive holistically, this approach does not fall into the rut of determining winners and losers. Instead, myriad potential opportunities and pitfalls can be examined simultaneously. The evidence shows a great deal of cleverness and foresight in developing the Kursk battle plan. The West should support this new propensity in the system as it puts Vladimir Putin and his military planning staff on the horns of multiple dilemmas.

Too Good to Lose: America’s Stake in Intel

Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell

In 2022, Congress enacted the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS Act), a pivotal initiative which seeks to ensure U.S. leadership in semiconductor technology—the backbone of everything from cars to household appliances to defense systems. The CHIPS Act represents a national effort to reverse recent trends, driven by major industrial policies of other countries, that have led to the loss of U.S. leadership in the technology needed to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors. The United States has also seen an erosion of onshore chipmaking, which now accounts for only about 10 percent of global capacity. The urgency of the situation was brought into sharp relief by highly disruptive chip shortages during the Covid-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, China—the United States’ most formidable strategic competitor—is making rapid strides in semiconductor technology, particularly in defense-related areas.

In its plan for implementing the CHIPS Act, the U.S. government has earmarked substantial federal assistance for the world’s three most advanced chipmakers, among others, to construct leading-edge manufacturing facilities and grow U.S. regional semiconductor ecosystems. Two of these firms, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Samsung, are slated to receive substantial funding to support major investments in such ecosystems, which bring manifold opportunities for local growth and employment. Both firms are headquartered outside the United States and have, in the past, kept the lion’s share of their research and development (R&D) and technology development in their respective home countries.

Project Atom 2024: Intra-War Deterrence in a Two-Peer Environment

Heather Williams, Reja Younis, Lachlan MacKenzie, Christopher A. Ford, Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Ankit Panda, Melanie W. Sisson, and Gregory Weaver

There is a growing risk that the United States and its allies could face scenarios in which one or more adversaries might resort to nuclear weapons use in a regional conflict. In response to these growing risks, U.S. decisionmakers are revisiting the concept of intra-war deterrence, which is about influencing enemy actions during an ongoing conflict. The risks of deterrence failure have been a focal point in the testimony of recent U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commanders, including General Anthony Cotton, who said, “We must be ready if deterrence fails” in testimony in February 2024.

To assist in this thinking and to develop actionable insights for the U.S. policy and strategy communities, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure. The project’s current contributors were each asked to respond to a scenario involving near-simultaneous battlefield nuclear use by Russia and China. The strategies focused on four specific themes: strategic objectives, assurance to allies, military responses, and non-kinetic responses. The strategies demonstrate agreement on key issues, such as the importance of deterring conventional aggression and the relevance of non-kinetic responses to adversary nuclear use. But the strategies also highlight important areas of disagreement about the relative importance and feasibility of assuring allies, at least relative to other strategic objectives; the advisability of a nuclear versus conventional response to deterrence failure; and what “winning” in a strategic deterrence failure scenario would look like.

Bringing Geopolitics Back: Ukraine, Peace, and the Art of the Deal

Michael Hochberg & Leonard Hochberg

President-elect Donald Trump has promised to end the Russian-Ukraine war soon after entering the White House. Peace, however, is only one value in an array of American interests. Of greater significance is re-ordering Eurasian geopolitics in the interest of the United States.

Ever since Halford John Mackinder delivered his 1904 masterpiece, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” the grand strategy of the dominant maritime power has been to “distract” the territorial power occupying the Eurasian “heartland.” According to Mackinder, this required identifying “bridge heads” on the Eurasian landmass to capture the attention of the heartland power and prevent them from building fleets that might threaten the maritime power. If circumstances permitted, as was the case in the aftermath of World War I, the USSR might be “confined” to the heartland by advancing national independence for states from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and Black Seas.

Today, an emerging alliance among the autocratic powers of Eurasia – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) – is the primary threat to maritime powers. These allies have launched three fronts of a four-front war (here, here, and here): Russia’s war on Ukraine, Iran and its proxies against Israel, Iran and the Houthis against maritime shipping. What remains to be attempted is the Chinese conquest of Taiwan, either through economic coercion, blockade, or military action. Beyond sharing military hardware and knowhow among the CRINKs, their common purpose is also revealed by the North Korean commitment of troops to reconquer the Kursk region.

Small Drones Pose Big Technology, Policy Challenges for Army

Allyson Park

Drones are changing the nature of modern warfare, and as small unmanned aerial systems proliferate above battlefields, the Army is focusing on developing and procuring new technology to counter them.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George announced at the Association of the United States Army’s annual meeting and exposition in October four major areas where the service will “step on the gas” in 2025, and counter-UAS technology was at the top of the list. He called for Army formations to “dramatically improve” their ability to counter adversary unmanned systems.

Maj. Gen. David Stewart, director of the counter-unmanned aircraft systems office and director of fires in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, said in a panel discussion that the drone threat is “not going anywhere anytime soon,” nor is it limited to conflict. Unmanned aerial systems can function both as peacetime threats and conflict-based threats, and that shapes the way the Army views the evolving problem, he said.

“The department is moving toward [counter unmanned systems], so that’s air, sea and land, not just the air part,” Stewart said. “When we wrap our arms around that as a department, we’re really seeing that this uncrewed, unmanned threat is coming from all different areas. … We have to stay ahead of the threat, which is evolving every day.”

The Patterns and Pitfalls of Technology Diffusion to Proxy Forces

Amos Fox

To continue on the topic of proxy not being pejorative, it is important to understand how technology diffusion in proxy strategies benefits and hurts states using proxy strategies in 21st century armed conflict. Many scholars and commenters have outlined that proxy strategies are a cost-effective way for one party to wage war against another party through an intermediary actor. To be sure, scholars like Tyrone Groh refer to a state’s use of proxy strategy as “the least bad option” for how to address many of the changes of strategic competition.

Considering the idea of a ‘least bad option,’ many features contribute to a good proxy strategy. This includes how to control (or manage) the proxy force in the field, how to overcome (or offset) a proxy’s agency costs, and how to support the proxy with technology to enable it to compete with state-based opponents. This latter consideration – technology diffusion to proxies – is a long-standing pillar of good proxy strategy. Technology diffusion, or providing proxies with weapon systems, intelligence gathering tools, and communications systems, is crucial for any proxy strategy to succeed, but it is not without cost.

This article examines the benefits and pitfalls that a state experiences when engaging in technology diffusion to proxies. I address this subject by looking at two questions. First, how does technology diffusion to proxies impact a conflict’s duration? Second, how does the diffusion of technology to proxies impact an adversary’s ability to understand principal-provided technology? This article uses the US-led war to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the Russo-Ukrainian War to support three findings.

The Evolving Interpretation of the Use of Force in Cyber Operations: Insights from State Practices

Anusha Pakkam

In an era when cyber activities are reshaping global security dynamics, the interpretation and application of international law, especially concerning the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, has become increasingly complex. This post delves into how States have addressed the prohibition. It aims to tease loose where there appears to be consensus, as well as potential fault lines. A forthcoming companion post will do the same concerning the right of self-defense in cyberspace. Both posts draw on deeper treatment of the subject in Cyberspace and the Jus ad Bellum: The State of Play, an article I published with Professor Michael Schmitt in International Law Studies. Our paper analyzed the positions of 39 individual States, as well as those of NATO and the African Union (AU), which represent the views of 30 and 55 States, respectively.

The primary aim of the article was to understand how States are responding to the critical question of when a hostile cyber operation rises to the level of a “use of force” under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and what this means for the application of international law in cyberspace. Given the rapidly evolving nature of cyber threats and the lack of consensus on applying traditional legal frameworks to cyberspace, this study is crucial for identifying emerging trends in State practice and providing insights into the evolving interpretation of the jus ad bellum, helping to inform legal advisors on these developments.

The Core Issue: Article 2(4) of the UN Charter

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter lies at the heart of legal discourse surrounding the use of force in cyberspace. A cornerstone of international law, it sets forth the fundamental rule that States may not engage in the threat or use of force. Specifically, Article 2(4) states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

ATACMs? What are they thinking?

Grant Newsham

Handcuffing an incoming President? Or even just giving him a worse situation to deal with? This was once unthinkable, but is the sort of churlishness one expects from this administration.

Washington, DC: It’s perhaps appropriate that the Biden administration is finishing up with another foreign policy move that leaves one wondering “what could they possibly be thinking?”

Team Biden’s late-in-the-day authorization for Ukraine to use US-provided ATACMs mid-range missiles to attack targets inside Russia is the latest—but far from the first—head scratching move by the “adults in the room”.

From a purely military perspective, these weapons are helpful—especially when you are allowed to use them against more targets. But hitting targets inside Russia won’t have a decisive effect on the Ukraine fighting either way.

In warfare, timing is everything. If Ukraine had been given ATACMs (and other weapons it requested) earlier, say, about nine months into the war when the Ukrainians had the Russian forces discombobulated, a clear-cut victory might have been possible. Or at least a negotiated settlement on very favorable terms.

However, Team Biden dithered and the window of opportunity closed on the Ukrainians, who in short order found themselves battering against Russian forces in fixed, defensive positions, and are now worrisomely stressed by Russian forces on the offensive—which presumably explains Team Biden’s recent authorization to supply anti-personnel mines to Ukraine.

The administration hasn’t explained its latest move regarding ATACMs in any useful way. So observers are left speculating. The two most common reasons offered are that Biden (or whoever is making the decisions) are:

The Dawn of Pivotal Powers in Artificial Intelligence

Sharinee Jagtiani, Kristina Kausch

This is a chapter from "Pivotal Powers 2024: Innovative Engagement Strategies for Global Governance, Security, and Artificial Intelligence".

A universal force multiplier, artificial intelligence (AI) is likely to be among the elements to influence the geopolitical balance of power in a newly emerging global order. The United States and China have already placed the technology front and center among their national priorities. But AI’s evolution and governance is less likely than those of other technological breakthroughs to rest solely on the decisions of great powers. Certain middle powers also seek to influence the rules. They see AI as an opportunity to boost their economic, military, political, and socio-cultural competitiveness, and their prestige on the world stage. Further, AI is a unique emerging technology that relies on a complex and diverse supply chain that middle powers can leverage geopolitically. As a result, a new category of pivotal powers in the international order is emerging, one that is investing in AI. India and Saudi Arabia are among the key cases. Ranked, respectively, 10th and 14th globally in terms of overall AI capacity (see graphic below), both countries are looking to AI to advance their strategic interests and their regional and global leadership positions.

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