21 March 2025

Charting Geopolitical Waters: Hydrographic Diplomacy And India’s Strategic Role In The Indian Ocean Region – Analysis

Aritra Banerjee

In the age of yore, when Britannica ruled the globe and the sun never set in the British Empire, several factors contributed towards the Royal Navy’s global sea dominance. While maritime aspirations owing to unfavourable conditions and lack of resources at home was a major reason for the outwards pivot, the hydrographic prowess demonstrated by able Naval surveyors provided the necessary means to create sea-based ‘in-roads’ into erstwhile unfamiliar and uncharted waters.

In modern times, the field of hydrography has evolved from being a pre-condition for expeditionary and exploratory operations overseas to the benign role of assuring global maritime safety with major hydrographic players freely sharing data and products with each other under the overarching umbrella of the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO). This noble aim assumes significance for smaller littoral countries, who do not possess the necessary hydrographic resources, which are technically intensive and, in turn, highly expensive, in charting safe navigable passages for maritime trade that are often hindered by archipelagic features and underwater obstructions.

Within the Indian Ocean Rim, several littorals regularly seek hydrographic assistance from capable Navies such as the Royal Navy, United States Navy or the Indian Navy. As they are committed to ensuring the safety of the global commons, these requests are usually actioned upon, albeit at a substantial cost to the service provider government. As an example, a study conducted by the IHO for a hydrographic survey off Vanuatu, a small archipelagic nation located in the South Pacific, placed the cost of a basic hydrographic survey, excluding the price of publishing electronic and paper charts, to a whooping USD 383 Mn in 2013.

India’s Intelligence Edge: Navigating Tensions with China and Pakistan

Yashaswi Mishra

India’s military intelligence infrastructure faces the largest challenge in history since it has to contend with a geopolitics of security threats in the form of two nuclear-capable neighbors, China and Pakistan. With the borders tense, proxy wars, and technical surveillance on the rise, India’s Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Corps of Military Intelligence (CMI) are adapting at an unprecedented rate to contend with hybrid threats. This shift involves employing new technologies, realigning strategies, and enhancing interagency coordination to maintain strategic leverage. The two-front challenge of Pakistan and China compels India to adopt a multi-dimensional approach. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has enhanced its surveillance and cyber warfare capabilities, inducting advanced systems like AI-powered drones along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The recent events, such as the 2020 Galwan Valley confrontation, revealed shortfalls in real-time situational awareness. Indian intelligence is presently concentrating on PLA facility monitoring using space, security from Chinese state-sponsored hacking units such as APT41, and countering psychological operations (PSYOPS) to destabilize border towns. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), meanwhile, continues to sponsor cross-border terrorism, the most recent instance being the 2019 Pulwama attack. Indian Military Intelligence (IMI) is closely monitoring terrorism financing by hawala networks in Jammu & Kashmir, thwarting weapon smuggling using drones along the Punjab border, and neutralizing efforts at conducting radicalization campaigns against Indian youth through social media. The application of newer technologies like AI and machine learning helps analyze large amounts of data for forecasting and prevention of such attacks. India is fighting back by spending a small fortune on advanced technologies. The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) operates the NETRA system that uses AI to scour social media for extremist messages and intercept satellite communications. NETRA picked up over 12,000 suspicious posts in 2023 that were tracked back to Pakistani proxies. RISAT-2BR1, launched in 2022, provides all-weather surveillance of Chinese military activity on the Tibet border and terror camps at Pakistan’s Balakot to support preemptive strikes.


Jaffar Express Hijacking Exposes Pakistan’s Failing Strategy in Balochistan

Mehrzaad Baluch

The hijacking of the Jaffar Express in Balochistan has once again drawn attention to the region’s long-running insurgency. For decades, the Baloch people have resisted Pakistan’s military control, demanding self-determination, an end to enforced disappearances, and a stop to resource exploitation, yet their pleas have been ignored. The state’s continual dismissal of Baloch grievances has led some to take up arms, joining militant groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which was behind the hijacking this week.

This standoff was not an isolated incident but a clear sign of Pakistan’s failing policies in Balochistan. If the international community continues to ignore this conflict, the violence will only escalate.

The Hijacking

On March 11, BLA fighters derailed the Jaffar Express, a passenger train traveling from Quetta to Peshawar, in the Mashkaf region of Bolan, Balochistan. The fighters took control of the train and captured security personnel on board. The BLA stated that the attack was a direct response to Pakistan’s decades of oppression in Balochistan.

Afghanistan, Pakistan Point Fingers Over Islamic State Presence

Sahibzada Muhammad Usman

The arrest of an alleged Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) operative in Pakistan has reignited long-simmering tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, with both sides trading pointed accusations over the transnational terrorist group’s operational base.

Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, seized on the detention of Mohammad Sharifullah to assert that Pakistan, not Afghanistan, offers ISKP safe havens. This claim, however, has been met with vehement rebuttals from Pakistani authorities, who argue that Afghanistan’s lax border controls and ineffective counterterrorism strategies have allowed ISKP militants to infiltrate Pakistan, destabilizing regional security. Pakistan says Sharifullah is an Afghan national, a claim denied by the Taliban. The exchange underscores a deepening rift between the neighboring nations, which each attempting to deflect blame while the threat of ISKP looms larger.

Mujahid’s statement framed Sharifullah’s arrest as irrefutable proof of ISKP’s entrenchment in Pakistan, declaring the group’s activities “unrelated to Afghanistan.” This narrative aligns with the Taliban’s broader effort to position its regime as a responsible governing force that has eradicated terrorism within its borders since retaking power in 2021. By distancing Afghanistan from ISKP’s cross-border operations, the Taliban aim to legitimize their rule and counter international criticism of their counterterrorism record.

Uncertainty and Strategic Shifts in Taiwan-US Defense Cooperation Under Trump 2.0

Hong-Lun Tiunn

U.S. President Donald Trump has signaled that Taiwan should shoulder a greater share of its own defense costs, while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stressed that the United States should no longer be responsible for fully subsidizing the protection of its allies abroad. Moreover, ​Elbridge Colby, the nominee for undersecretary of defense for policy, criticized Taiwan’s defense spending – currently “well below” 3 percent of GDP – as insufficient. During his Senate confirmation hearing, he suggested increasing Taiwan’s defense spending to approximately 10 percent of GDP to enhance Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

Although Trump’s remark was initially dismissed as an offhand comment, the follow-up statements from Hegseth and Colby now suggest a significant strategic recalibration in U.S. defense policy toward Taiwan. These statements offer insight into a rapidly evolving Taiwan-U.S. defense relationship.

As U.S. military aid and strategic support for Taiwan are being reshaped, all eyes are on the question: How will Taiwan-U.S. defense relations evolve during Trump’s second term? Will arms sales, military assistance, and strategic commitments undergo fundamental changes?

Declining Caspian Water Levels Threaten Russian and Chinese Corridor Plans

Paul Goble

Declining water levels in the Caspian Sea are reducing the amount of cargo ships this body of water can carry, as well as the functioning of major ports. This decline threatens both Russia’s North-South corridor and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) One Belt, One Road initiative (Caspian Herald, March 15). Although Russia is the more profoundly affected of the two due to problems moving cargo east and south in the Caspian, the PRC has also increasingly relied on the Caspian to ship container traffic across to Central Asia, which it then transports via train (see EDM, April 11, 2023). The water levels of the Caspian have been declining for years, leading to an expanding shoreline, which has sparked academic debate about whether this is a permanent issue or one that can be reversed in the coming decades (Window on Eurasia, March 27, 2024; September 21, 2024). Declining water levels have also led to political discussions about whether the Caspian could be developed to serve as the primary route for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s North-South corridor (see EDM, April 11, August 8, 2023). It only emerged as a high-level political issue, however, when Moscow found that the falling water levels meant it could no longer move its Caspian Flotilla across the Caspian and through the Volga-Don canal to take part in Russia’s war against Ukraine (Window on Eurasia, March 27, 2024). The issue further gained importance in August 2024, when Putin focused on how the declining water levels could affect his North-South trade corridor during a meeting with the Governor of the Astrakhan Oblast, which borders the Caspian (URA.ru, August 27, 2024).

China, science and technology: Advancing geopolitical aims

Charles Parton

Introduction

Clarity on the question of whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a threat is vital. 1 Firstly, the obvious needs restating: ‘China’ means the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, likes to say, ‘South, north, east and west, the communist party leads everything.’ 2 Secondly, the current world order is under threat – the system of global governance, laws and values established after the Second World War by the victors. Western powers were buttressed by the institutions and norms established. The CCP wishes to change current global governance and is prepared to fight hard and outside the hitherto accepted rules of competition.

The CCP puts out two types of narrative. The first it terms ‘foreign propaganda’ [外宣], the language of ‘win-win’, ‘community of shared destiny for mankind’, and the Global Development, Global Security, and Global Civilisation initiatives. The second narrative is what it puts out to party members for guidance and reassurance. It is this which better represents its true intentions and therefore to which foreign governments should pay attention

The CCP declares its ‘Second Centennial Goal’ as being, by 2049, to establish a PRC which is a ‘modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious’. Behind this reassuring language lies a more muscular intention: to ensure that the PRC replaces the United States (US) as the leading superpower, and to reorder global governance better to suit CCP interests and values.

Rebuilding a Pluralistic Syria to Keep ISIS Down and Iran Out

William Roberts

President Trump’s return to office has fortuitously coincided with the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria as well as ceasefire agreements between Israel and both Hamas and Hezbollah. These developments have weakened Iran’s Axis of Resistance and present a historic opportunity for regional stability. While Israel’s military operations in Lebanon and Gaza could resume, Syria’s civil war has seemingly reached a conclusion. The U.S. should maintain cautious engagement with the Syrian transitional government through strictly enforced conditions for further normalization. The outcome of Syria’s transitional government will be highly consequential for the region and so ensuring a positive outcome in Syria must be a top priority.

The large and loose coalition of militias led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist paramilitary group with past ties to ISIS and Al-Qaeda, had planned a long campaign to Aleppo. Instead, the unexpected disintegration of Assad’s security forces brought this coalition to Damascus in mere days. The new transitional government of Syria is unprepared and will have to navigate serious challenges to preserve the peace. In his first national address after the fall of the Assad regime, the new President of Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly Muhammad al-Jolani), promised to hold a “national dialogue conference” to prepare a new constitution that would guarantee democratic governance and protect the rights of women and religious minorities.

What Trump’s Latest Houthi Strike Really Means

Burcu Ozcelik

President Donald Trump, in his first week in office, pledged to designate Ansarallah (“Partisans of God”), commonly known as the Houthis in Yemen, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The decision came into effect in early March. Weeks later, on March 15, President Trump ordered large-scale air and naval strikes against dozens of targets in Yemen in areas controlled by the Iran-backed group.

By greenlighting the largest military bombardment yet in Trump’s second term, the United States has set out to meet several objectives at once: erode the Houthi’s military capability, implement “maximum pressure” against Iran’s ability to finance its proxies, and send a warning to buyers of Iran’s sanctioned crude oil, chiefly China.

The Trump administration has justified its use of lethal force against the Houthis as a necessary measure to uphold the “core principle of freedom of navigation upon which international trade and commerce depend.” However, Washington’s calculations extend beyond maritime security.

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

What Exactly Do Europe’s Leaders Want To Defend?

Mick Hume

Defence is the new buzzword in European politics, since U.S. President Donald Trump made clear that America can no longer be expected to act as the West’s world policeman.

Ursula von der Leyen, president of the unelected European Commission, is pushing an extraordinary €800 billion plan to “ReArm Europe”, starting with a €150 billion ‘emergency’ loan. She considers rearmament so urgent that the Commission will bypass the elected European Parliament to get the money.

Meanwhile President Emmanuel Macron of France and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer claim to have assembled a “coalition of the willing” of governments prepared to step up and defend Ukraine as the U.S. withdraws its support. (Although few seem willing to commit to doing much more than talk.)

Many questions remain about how these rearmament schemes might work in practice. But take a step back, and there are bigger political and moral questions that are not being asked loudly enough.

For a start: What exactly is it that European leaders want to defend today? What is the supposed coalition of the willing actually willing to fight for?

Liberal Dreams Collide with Geopolitical Realities in Brussels - Opinion

William J. Jones

Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House for a second term, the world of international relations has been upended by dramatic shifts in US foreign policy. Trump’s on-again-off-again threats of tariffs on allies and adversaries aside, the most striking area of change has been his foreign policy stance toward the Ukraine war and treatment of erstwhile allies small states in America’s traditional sphere of influence.

Washington’s traditional North Atlantic allies in the European Union have been taken aback by Trump’s about-face foreign policy and reproachment of Russia. The 180-degree turn in policy should not have surprised Europeans given that Trump campaigned on transforming the Middle East and Eastern Europe from war and conflict to peace. His bellicose and braggadocio claims to ‘solve the Ukraine war in 1 day’ belie a very real commitment to get the U.S. out of this quagmire that the Biden administration caused and threatens the foundations of US global power.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio signaled for the world to see that US foreign policy had changed in an interview with Megyn Kelly. He stated unequivocally that the era of Unipolar American dominance was over, and it was an idiosyncrasy of international relations in the first place. He further alluded to a multipolar world where ‘great powers’ would exercise ‘spheres of influence,’ harkening back to time previous. He did not elaborate on US conceptual notions of great power relations, but nonetheless, he clearly signaled the end of the post-Cold War order.

With forced withdrawal, Russia takes away Ukraine's Kursk cards

Ian Proud

President Zelensky should have pressed ahead with peace talks in August 2024, rather than invading Kursk. Ahead of talks between Presidents Trump and Putin this week, he has no cards left to play.

According to the New York Times on Sunday, Ukrainian troops are all but gone from the Russian Kursk region. At the peak of last August's offensive, Ukraine held 500 square miles of the Russian territory. After fierce fighting it holds just a sliver of that today.

It is perhaps ironic that President Volodymyr Zelensky’s audacious offensive took place in the midst of secret talks in Qatar towards a partial ceasefire. It is no coincidence that Russia’s offensive in Kursk over the past week took place while Ukraine was agreeing with the U.S. on the notion of a possible ceasefire during talks in Saudi Arabia.

The inauguration of President Trump in January made U.S.-led pressure to end the fighting both inevitable but also, more importantly, predictable. It is absolutely clear to me that for President Putin, retaking Kursk was essential to putting him in the best possible place to negotiate.

The Fragile Axis of Upheaval

Christopher S. Chivvis

Even regional wars have geopolitical consequences, and when it comes to Russia’s war on Ukraine, the most important of these has been the formation of a loose entente among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Some U.S. national security experts have taken to calling this group “the axis of upheaval” or “the axis of autocracy,” warning that the United States must center this entente in its foreign policy and focus on containing or defeating it. It is not only Washington policymakers who worry about a new, well-coordinated anti-American bloc: in a November 2024 U.S. public opinion poll by the Ronald Reagan Institute, 86 percent of respondents agreed that they were either “extremely” or “somewhat” concerned by the increased cooperation between these U.S. adversaries.

There is no question that these countries threaten U.S. interests, or that their cooperation has strengthened lately. But the axis framing overstates the depth and permanence of their alignment. The coalition has been strengthened by the Ukraine war, but its members’ interests are less well fitted than they appear on the surface. Washington should not lump these countries together. Historically, when countries roll separate threats into a monolithic one, it is a strategic mistake. U.S. leaders need to make a more nuanced and accurate analysis of the threats that they pose, or else the fear of an axis of autocracies could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. When the war ends, the United States and its allies should seize opportunities to loosen the coalition’s war-forged bonds.

President Trump’s Address to Congress: Global Reactions

Héctor Cárdenas

Why Mexico Should Raise the Stakes

President Donald Trump’s recent address to Congress reaffirmed his earlier foreign policy positions, signaling a significant break from post–Cold War norms. In recent weeks, his administration has recast the United States as merely one among several great powers—albeit the most dominant—and less committed to upholding the existing international order. Instead, Washington has pursued transactional agreements with nations like China and Russia, sidelining Europe and treating regional partners as lesser players.

For Mexico, this shift is worrisome. A decades-long vision of North American economic integration now faces an outlook in which neighboring countries are treated more as vassals than partners. Trump’s frequent remarks expressing hopes for Canada to become the fifty-first 51st state mirrors the harsher tone directed at Mexico’s leadership—even as he professes personal respect for President Claudia Sheinbaum. This approach weakens cooperation and heightens uncertainty, forcing Mexico and Canada to respond to abrupt tariff threats and shifting demands. Meanwhile, the impact on U.S. financial markets signals that Americans themselves may soon feel the economic fallout more broadly.

Putin's Dilemma Part 2: "Yes, But..."

Roderic Lyne

Since Lawrence’s post of 12 March on “Putin’s Dilemma”, Putin has given a “yes, but” response to the American-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal. This is now under discussion between Washington and Moscow. Trump is due to speak to Putin today (19th March) and says that they will be talking about land, power plants and dividing up certain assets. He expresses optimism. Many in America are concerned that Putin is playing Trump.

The conflict cannot simply be resolved as a property transaction. Trump needs to square Russian demands with the minimum Ukrainian requirement for the preservation of their country’s sovereignty and security. He could cut off American aid to Ukraine. In extremis, he could impose sanctions on Ukraine. But he cannot force the Ukrainians to stop defending themselves.

In this post I shall try to explore Putin’s position and where he is leading Russia. I shall argue that a ceasefire is possible, though far from certain; but that an enduring peace, a definitive settlement, will not happen while Putin holds power, which probably means in his lifetime.

The Ukrainian position is clear. They can accept a ceasefire leading into negotiations for a settlement so long as it does not entail a formal surrender of territory, restrictions on their ability to defend themselves (including their ability to import arms) or a requirement to hold elections by a defined date.

Trump Is Not a Revolutionary

Stephen M. Walt

If you were asked to picture a “revolutionary leader,” you’d probably think of a bearded figure in combat fatigues (such as Fidel Castro or Che Guevara), a rabble-rousing firebrand like Leon Trotsky or Maximilien Robespierre, or perhaps the glowering image of a turbaned Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. You probably wouldn’t picture an obese 78-year-old American real estate heir with a combover, in a dark suit and a long red tie.

The Latest Russian Missile Is Bad News for NATO - Analysis

Decker Eveleth

Last November, Russia launched a new kind of missile into Ukraine. Moscow debuted the intermediate-range ballistic missile Oreshnik (meaning “hazelnut tree” in Russian) in an attack on Dnipro. Though it used only inert submunitions, it marked yet another attempt by Russian President Vladimir Putin to signal his willingness to escalate.

Footage of the strike and analysis of satellite imagery suggests that the Oreshnik can likely carry six warheads each armed with six submunitions, for a total of 36. As the missile descends toward Earth, it can disperse these submunitions to blanket a wide area with explosives, similar to how a shotgun sprays shot.


Russia’s Shadow War Against the West

Seth G. Jones

Introduction

Russia is engaged in an aggressive campaign of subversion and sabotage against European and U.S. targets, which complement Russia’s brutal conventional war in Ukraine. The number of Russian attacks in Europe nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024, after quadrupling between 2022 and 2023. Russia’s military intelligence service, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (or GRU), was likely responsible for many of these attacks, either directly by their own officers or indirectly through recruited agents. The GRU and other Russian intelligence agencies frequently recruited local assets to plan and execute sabotage and subversion missions. Other operations relied on Russia’s “shadow fleet,” commercial ships used to circumvent Western sanctions, for undersea attacks.

The data indicate that Russia poses a serious threat to the United States and Europe and that the Russian government, including President Vladimir Putin, cannot be trusted. Roughly 27 percent of the attacks were against transportation targets (such as trains, vehicles, and airplanes), another 27 percent were against government targets (such as military bases and officials), 21 percent were against critical infrastructure targets (such as pipelines, undersea fiber-optic cables, and the electricity grid), and 21 percent were against industry (such as defense companies). Many of these targets had links to Western aid to Ukraine, such as companies producing or shipping weapons and other matériel to Ukraine. Russia also used a variety of weapons and tactics. The most common (35 percent) involved explosives and incendiaries. Other weapons and tactics included blunt or edged instruments (27 percent), such as anchors used to cut undersea fiber-optic cables; electronic attack (15 percent); and the weaponization of illegal immigrants (8 percent).

Ukraine Has Been Jamming Russian Glide Bombs. Now We Know How.

David Axe

A year ago, Russian air force fighter-bombers were lobbing a hundred glide bombs every day all along the 800-mile front line of Russia’s wider war on Ukraine.

The satellite-guided KAB or UMPK glide bombs, each traveling 25 miles or farther under pop-out wings, were a “miracle weapon” for the Russians, the Ukrainian Deep State analysis group noted at the time. And the Ukrainians had “practically no countermeasures.”

That has changed. Now the Ukrainians not only have countermeasures—some of these countermeasures appear to be extremely effective.

“Previously, the enemy used glide bombs with high accuracy to attack objects in the territory of regional centers such as Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia,” a manufacturer, whose 10-person Night Watch team in Ukraine develops electronic warfare systems, told Forbes.

Night Watch’s new Lima jammer is partly responsible for the recent degradation of Russian glide bombing, the manufacturer claimed.

Lima isn’t a traditional jammer that simply blasts radio noise toward the enemy. “We use digital interference,” the manufacturer explained. It’s “a combination of jamming, spoofing and information cyber attack on the navigation receiver.”

Carrots, Sticks, and Sledgehammers

Clayton Seigle

Since his second term began on January 20, 2025, President Trump has clearly signaled a desire for lower oil prices. Executive orders, including “Unleashing American Energy,” as well as his remarks to the Davos World Economic Forum audience on January 23, outline Trump’s case for bringing down the price of oil.

Apart from the obvious direct advantage of reducing costs for consumers and businesses, Trump has associated the benefits of lower energy prices with two strategic priorities: first, as an instrument for taming inflation. Trump believes that a lower energy price environment will pave the way for the Federal Reserve to reduce interest rates and stimulate economic activity.

Second, Trump has asserted that lower oil prices will hasten an end to the war in Ukraine, ostensibly because Moscow would be deprived of oil export revenues sufficient to sustain its war effort. This reason, however, may have been superseded by recent events, including a February 12 phone call between Trump and Putin, a bilateral meeting of advisors in Riyadh on February 18, and Trump’s February 24 prediction that the war could end within a few weeks.

The Electricity Supply Bottleneck on U.S. AI Dominance

Cy McGeady, Joseph Majkut, Barath Harithas, and Karl Smith

It is now well understood that the rapid technological progress of artificial intelligence (AI) has profound energy sector implications. AI technology is effectively the result of three inputs: chips, data, and electricity. This paper focuses on electricity on the basic premise that electricity supply is the most acutely binding constraint on expanded U.S. computational capacity and, therefore, U.S. AI dominance.

This paper starts with a survey of demand-side forecasts. It then highlights data on the geographic distribution of data center development currently underway in the United States, the supply-side dynamics underway in response to demand growth, and challenges to meeting this new demand. The role of coal, gas, renewables, and nuclear power in meeting new demand are each assessed. The central principle for understanding these developments is speed-to-power, or the measure of how fast a potential data center site can access the electricity needed to power its stock of chips.

Machine Learning Meets War Termination: Using AI to Explore Peace Scenarios in Ukraine

Ian Reynolds and Benjamin Jensen

Introduction

Talks to end the war in Ukraine are in motion. As the Trump administration seeks to keep its promise to end the war in Ukraine, negotiators must consider long-standing research on war termination and peace negotiations. Despite calls for a swift ceasefire, this body of work shows that peace talks tend to take longer than initially anticipated. War is an extension of politics, and negotiations are shaped by a broad range of factors beyond simply tallying battlefield successes or assessing when combatants will exhaust their resources.

A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), drawing on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), found that 60 percent of all wars conclude through some form of compromise. While wars can end in various ways, a negotiated settlement remains a distinct option for Ukraine. Therefore, identifying the factors that influence the complex process of war termination is essential for understanding how negotiations between the United States, Russia, Ukraine, other key states in Europe, and the broader international community may unfold.

The Effects of Climate Change on GDP in the 21st Century: Working Paper 2025-02

Chad Shirley and William Swanson

Introduction

Climate change is expected to affect the United States in a variety of ways in the 21st century. Although those effects will be positive in some ways or in certain areas of the country, the overall effect is expected to be negative: Temperatures will increase, the risk of damage from storms and wildfires will increase, and the productivity of outdoor workers will decline. Lawmakers have expressed an interest in understanding the range of possible outcomes from climate change. CBO recently released a report describing some of those effects.1 In that report, CBO estimated that there is a 5 percent chance that future increases in temperature will cause U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) to be at least 21 percent lower in 2100 than it would be if temperatures remained unchanged. Similarly, there is a 5 percent chance that changes in temperatures will cause GDP in 2100 to be higher by 6 percent or more than it would have been otherwise. The distribution of GDP losses is skewed so that the probability of large negative GDP outcomes relative to the median is higher than the probability of small negative outcomes. The mean of the distribution is a 4 percent GDP loss from climate change.

Criminals use AI in ‘proxy’ attacks for hostile powers, warns Europol

Laura Dubois

The EU’s police agency Europol has warned criminal organisations increasingly use artificial intelligence to stage attacks on behalf of hostile powers, posing an “unprecedented” security challenge to national governments.

In its report on the threats posed by organised crime published on Tuesday, Europol warned criminals were becoming “proxies” in hybrid attacks such as sabotage allegedly committed by Russia and China.
“Geopolitical tensions have created a window for hybrid threat actors to exploit criminal networks as tools of interference,” Europol wrote, adding this was having a destabilising effect on EU countries.

AI and other technologies such as blockchain or quantum computing have become a “catalyst” for crime, as they “drive criminal operations’ efficiency by amplifying their speed, reach, and sophistication”, the agency said.

“Cyber crime is evolving into a digital arms race,” said Europol executive director Catherine De Bolle. “AI-driven attacks are becoming more precise and devastating. Some attacks show a combination of motives of profit and destabilisation, as they are increasingly state aligned and ideologically motivated.”

The End of the Office of Net Assessment: A Shortsighted Blow to American Military Strategy

Monte Erfourth

Introduction

The Pentagon’s recent decision to shut down the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) is a devastating blow to America’s long-term military strategy. For over fifty years, this relatively small and cost-effective office—established under the legendary Andrew Marshall—provided invaluable foresight into future conflicts, shaping strategic thinking and guiding defense planning. Its abrupt closure signals a dangerous shift away from forward-looking military preparedness and leaves a glaring void that will not be easily filled.

A Legacy of Strategic Foresight

The Office of Net Assessment was founded in 1973 under the guidance of Andrew Marshall, a towering intellectual figure in the realm of defense strategy. His role was not to provide immediate battlefield solutions but to assess long-term trends, adversary capabilities, and emerging technologies that would shape future conflicts. His influence was felt at the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DoD), shaping strategies that ultimately led to critical advancements in military doctrine.

One of ONA’s most impactful contributions was its role in the development of the AirLand Battle doctrine, which defined U.S. military operations against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. More recently, ONA spearheaded studies on China’s military rise, championing the Air-Sea Battle concept that sought to counter Beijing’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. The office’s ability to think ahead—sometimes decades ahead—allowed the U.S. military to preemptively address challenges before they fully materialized.

20 March 2025

Cooperation, Coexistence, and Contestation in India’s and China’s Overlapping Strategic Spaces

Tanvi Madan

By dint of their geographies, partnerships, development imperatives, and broader objectives, China and India have had overlapping strategic spaces since India became independent in 1947 and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) came into being in 1949. As their interests and capabilities—and thus reach—have grown, the theater of their strategic interaction has expanded to encompass a wider geography and multiple domains. It has evolved from primarily the bilateral space and a focus on their borderlands to include regional and global spaces, as well as the diplomatic, geopolitical, economic, technological, and ideological spheres.

There has been some Sino-Indian cooperation in these spaces, but more often there has been competition—and it has become more intense over time. The phases of cooperation and contestation have been sequential, with both elements present but one dominant. This essay outlines these periods of early competition and collaboration, of coexistence and cooperation, and then a return to contestation.

President Trump 2.0, China, And Southeast Asia: Security Challenges And Strategic Dilemmas – OpEd

Simon Hutagalung

In the evolving landscape of global politics, the emergence of a leadership style reminiscent of President Donald Trump—now often referred to as President Trump 2.0—has created a seismic shift in international security strategies, particularly within Southeast Asia.

As 2025 unfolds, the intertwined relationship between a reassertive United States under a nationalist banner, an increasingly assertive China, and the multifaceted security facing challenges in Southeast Asia forms a complex web of geopolitical contestation. This essay examines critically these emerging issues, arguing that President TRUMP 2.0’s recalibrated policies, China’s aggressive regional posturing, and Southeast Asia’s adaptive responses collectively represent both significant a challenge and a pivotal moment in redefining regional dynamics security.

The reemergence of a Trump-inspired approach in American leadership signals a renewed emphasis on nationalist policies, the recalibration multilateral of alliances, and an unpredictable foreign policy that frequently prioritizes economic protectionism over traditional diplomatic engagement. Recent data from early 2025 indicates that U.S. defense spending has risen by approximately 3% compared to the previous year, reflecting a deliberate shift toward bolstering military capabilities to counterbalance China’s burgeoning influence. This strategic pivot is particularly significant in Southeast Asia, where nations balance their lucrative economic ties with China against the need for security guarantees traditionally provided by Washington. The dynamic illustrates a broader recalibration in which security considerations are increasingly interwoven with economic imperatives.

Strategic Reorientation on A.I. Competition with China


The view from London

The first roundtable explored the UK and China’s competitiveness on AI, examining what the drive behind competition reveals about the UK’s geopolitical aspirations and positioning, while also addressing its domestic policy priorities.

Held three months after the UK general election, the event welcomed a diverse group of opinion-shapers and experts from: policy and government; security, intelligence, and defence; research and academia; civil society and advocacy; and the private sector. The convening was held under the Chatham House Rule.

With welcoming remarks, two plenary sessions, and issue-focused breakout sessions (on the technology, trade, and talent “drivers” of competitiveness), Rethinking UK-China Competitiveness on AI aimed to establish a shared understanding of what makes the UK—and other diverse democracies—competitive. The following event summary captures areas of agreement and divergence in the characterization of the UK’s net competitiveness vis-à-vis China, in addition to platforming several takeaways specific to the UK.

How China Is Weaponizing Education to Erase Tibetan Identity

Tsering Dolka Gurung

For the past two years, reports have laid bare the systematic erasure of Tibetan identity, and Tibetans across the world have been staging protests, demanding accountability from China. Most recently, on February 18, Tibetan activist Namkyi shared her testimony at the Geneva Summit. At the age of 15, she staged a peaceful protest alongside her sister – an act that led to years of relentless surveillance, intimidation, and repression. She told the summit that Chinese authorities followed her every move until she escaped Tibet for good in 2023.

The weight of China’s rule has been growing for decades in Tibet, but incidents over the past few years have revealed an intensifying effort to wipe out Tibetan culture through a strategy of forced assimilation, particularly targeting children. Under the guise of promoting “national unity” and “economic progress,” the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has embarked on a systematic campaign to integrate Tibetans into the dominant Han Chinese culture, diminishing their language, religion, and traditions. What Beijing calls “unity” is a methodical erasure of Tibetan identity – a slow-motion cultural genocide taking place in one of the world’s most isolated regions.

Ten books to understand the world we're now in

Sam Freedman

Trump’s second term is on track to be more damaging than his first. He has a more loyal central team, unwilling to push back against his madder ideas, and, critically, a co-President in Elon Musk charging around breaking things. Meanwhile those Republicans in Congress who aren’t fully signed-up to the cult, are cowering in fear and, as yet, unprepared to make even the smallest gesture of defiance.

The consequences for the global economy are only just starting to be felt. In Europe there has been a much more dramatic switch to thinking about military and economic independence than almost anyone expected a few months ago.

This is all pretty alarming, especially when combined with some of the wider global trends that contributed to Trump’s victory. Russia’s journey back into full blown totalitarianism happened a while ago, but in more recent years we’ve seen the rise of Putin-backed politicians in Eastern European countries that had transitioned to democracy. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán was the first – in the EU at least – but now Robert Fico is the Slovakian Prime Minister, and the Romanians have had to use the courts to block Călin Georgescu. In the upcoming Polish Presidential elections the spectacularly unpleasant Sławomir Mentzen may make the run-off.

CFR President Michael Froman on Trump, Global ‘Polyamory’ and AI

Edward Felsenthal

What’s the role of America’s most influential foreign-policy institution at a moment when the rules of U.S. engagement in the world are being completely rewritten? When I saw Michael Froman, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in the first few days of the Trump Administration, he was already describing the current geopolitical moment as the most complex in 80 years. Since then, as he noted in an appearance at Princeton earlier this month, “the last five or six weeks may well have been the most important five or six weeks in American history in 80 years.” Questions that had long seemed resolved—about the nature of the global economy and America’s role in the world—are suddenly getting new answers.

That obviously complicates the task of leading an organization like the Council, which was founded after World War I to underscore the importance of U.S. engagement in the world. Over the years, its mission has evolved more toward informing than underscoring, but it has long had deep connections to the foreign policy establishment that Donald Trump came to power promising to upend. Steering it through this period, Froman notes in our interview, “puts a premium” on CFR’s nonpartisanship and independence.

A veteran of the Clinton and Obama Administrations as well as the private sector at Citigroup and Mastercard, Froman took the helm of the Council two years ago, at a time of deepening global instability and growing distrust in institutions. In our conversation, edited for length and clarity, he discusses why the world is becoming more “polyamorous,” what Trump is right about, and why America’s economic and technological strength remains its greatest geopolitical asset.

An Open Letter to His Excellency Volodymyr Zelenskyy - Opinion

Yurij Holowinsky & Keith D. Dickson 

By early 1940, it was clear that the aggressor forces would keep what they currently held and continue a relentless war of attrition, whatever the cost. The defense of the Finns was epic, and still remembered to this day with awe and great respect. The Finns had done the impossible and were in a position militarily and strategically to save Finland from destruction.

It was a bitter and temporary peace. The Russians gained all of their original demands plus some additional concessions. The losses of population, economic resources, and defensible terrain in the Karelian Isthmus-Viipuri area were especially serious. Yet, it gave the Finns the means to survive, and in another year, conduct offensive operations against the enemy. Mannerheim had saved his country, built alliances and set the stage for a long-term peace treaty in 1948, allowing Finland incrementally to move closer to the West, and by 2023, become a member of NATO.

As Commander-in-Chief, you have the same military-strategic opportunity as Mannerheim did in 1940. You, like Mannerheim, have demonstrated inspiring leadership, the courage and skill of your soldiers and the resolute response of your citizens has won the world’s admiration and respect. Mannerheim chose to preserve his country’s long-term survival in the face of unrelenting attacks. Finland had to fight again and had to accommodate its aggressor neighbor, but that opened the path to eventual integration with Europe and peace along a shared border with a former aggressor. After 1948, it took 45 years for Finland to join the European Union and 75 years for Finland to realize its strategic position as a member of NATO. Without that initial peace of 1940, none of these outcomes could have been possible.

'Bloody Saturday' at Voice of America and other U.S.-funded networks

David Folkenflik

Journalists showed up at the Voice of America today to broadcast their programs only to be told they had been locked out: Federal officials had embarked on indefinite mass suspensions.

All full-time staffers at the Voice of America and the Office for Cuba Broadcasting, which runs Radio and Television Martí, were affected — more than 1,000 employees. The move followed a late Friday night edict from President Trump that its parent agency, called the U.S. Agency for Global Media, must eliminate all activities that are not required by law.

In addition, under the leadership of Trump appointees, the agency has severed all contracts for the privately incorporated international broadcasters it funds, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.

The termination notices for grants for the funded networks, two of which were reviewed by NPR, carried the signature of Trump's senior adviser Kari Lake, whom he placed at USAGM, not the agency's acting chief executive. Lake does not appear in her current job to have the statutory authority to carry out that termination.

Voice of America channels fall silent as Trump administration guts agency and cancels contracts

Brian Stelter

The Voice of America may not live up to its ambitious name for much longer.

Michael Abramowitz, the director of VOA, said in a Facebook post on Saturday that he was placed on leave, along with “virtually the entire staff” of 1,300. The announcement comes one day after President Trump signed an executive order to gut VOA’s parent agency.

Some of VOA’s local-language radio stations have stopped broadcasting news reports and switched over to music to fill the airtime, according to listeners.

Even top editors at VOA have been ordered to stop working, so employees expect the broadcaster’s worldwide news coverage to grind to a halt, according to half a dozen sources who spoke with CNN on the condition of anonymity.

“The Voice of America has been silenced, at least for now,” a veteran correspondent said.

Voice of America is part of the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which also runs networks like Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, and Middle East Broadcasting Networks. Those networks are also on Trump’s chopping block, as networks’ contracts with the operators have been terminated.

Hegseth shuts Pentagon 'think tank' analyzing future conflicts

KEN MORIYASU

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has instructed the closure of a specialized unit often referred to as the Pentagon's "internal think tank," a group that focuses on evaluating the future of American military capabilities relative to potential rivals like China.

Hegseth has directed the "disestablishment" of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and ordered the development of a plan to rebuild the office in alignment with the department's strategic priorities, chief Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell said in a statement Thursday night.

All ONA personnel will be reassigned to "mission-critical" roles within the department, the statement said.

The Pentagon remains committed to conducting "rigorous, forward-looking strategic assessments that directly inform defense planning and decision-making," Parnell said.

The ONA has had only two directors since its establishment in 1973. For four decades, the office was led by legendary strategist Andrew Marshall, who served eight presidents from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama. Since 2015, the office has been led by James Baker, a retired Air Force colonel who holds four graduate degrees.

Overcoming the Six Unspoken Barriers That Impede Defense Innovation

Matthew Schlueter, Marc Giesener, Lauren Mayer, Laura Key, and Mishaal Hassan

Ministries of defense (MoDs) are not meeting their innovation goals. In 2022, the Munich Security Conference Innovation Board (MSC) and Boston Consulting Group (BCG) first identified the defense innovation readiness gap—the gap between ministries’ aspirations for innovation and their ability to generate results. Since then, the gap has widened. External factors such as heightened geopolitical tensions play a role, as do supply chain disruptions and the complexity of emerging technology. Yet many aspects of the forces responsible for expanding the gap lie within MoDs’ control.

As in prior years, we surveyed leaders at 59 ministries of defense, the European Union, and NATO. We benchmarked the results relative to results from the prior three years, as well as to the innovation capabilities of private-sector counterparts, across 11 key dimensions of innovation. We supplemented our quantitative findings with interviews of key public and private national security leaders worldwide.

The results show that the innovation readiness gap continues to widen. On average, MoDs scored 59 against a threshold score of 80—a 5% decline from the 2022 average. Across most innovation dimensions—including ambition, talent and culture, and project management—MoDs’ scores fell below last year’s average and below top-quartile commercial innovators. (See Exhibit 1.) During the same time period, public defense funding increased by up to 12% annually across the G-7 and China.

Achieving “peace through strength” in the 2020s

Michael E. O’Hanlon

Introduction

How should President Donald Trump, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the helm of the Department of Defense, shape American defense strategy and budgets in his second term? The good news is that Trump himself, with Secretaries of Defense Jim Mattis and Mark Esper, did much to set the American armed forces on a sound and sensible post-war-on-terror path that President Joe Biden and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin then largely sustained. The foundations of U.S. defense strategy, policy, and budgets are in reasonably good shape as the nation aspires to a period of what Ronald Reagan called “peace through strength”—a goal that Trump has wisely endorsed. But in light of the newfound coordination and cooperation within the “axis of autocracies”—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—as well as challenges to the U.S. defense industrial base revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic and then the Russian war against Ukraine, some changes will be needed. Specifically, I advocate five ways of strengthening American defenses in the years ahead.

The sum total of these changes would cost up to $60 billion a year, only partially offset by a total of $10 billion in annual savings from the reforms and efficiencies discussed below. In broad brush, I calculate that these changes together would increase the real-dollar U.S. national defense budget from its current level of just under $900 billion to roughly $950 billion next year—and likely to $1 trillion by decade’s end since many defense costs rise faster than inflation (expressed in constant 2025 dollars). These numbers include funds for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration as well as the $100 billion annual intelligence budget but do not account for the Veterans Affairs or Homeland Security budgets).

US must prioritize cybersecurity training for the military’s engineers

Alison King, Annie Fixler &RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

The Trump administration begins under the shadow of a series of consequential Chinese cyber hacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure. While incoming officials grapple with long-standing failures to deter China and other adversaries from launching cyberattacks on the U.S. homeland, the Department of Defense (DOD) faces a startling capability gap: The civilian and military professionals responsible for protecting the same type of assets that China compromised receive inadequate training in recognizing, defending against, and recovering from malicious state-sponsored cyber activity. There is no institutional home for this vital training.

The U.S. military maintains an extensive global footprint, with 800 installations spanning more than 70 countries and territories. Public and private utilities own and operate the power lines, water pipes, and fiber optic cables that supply these bases. Yet once those systems cross the fence line onto military facilities, the U.S. military is responsible for ensuring their safe and reliable operation and restoration during an attack.

The problem is many of the professionals tasked with maintaining these critical systems might not recognize a cyberattack for what it is because they’ve received no specified training. They often see an operational disruption, assume it is just a system malfunction, and move quickly to restore systems, potentially wiping out the forensics data that cyber professionals need to discern how an attacker got in and disrupted the system.



Europe’s Economic Decoupling From America Is Underway

Anchal Vohra

After the Trump administration imposed tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and China, the European Union was expected to be the next in line. Washington did, in fact, impose 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the EU this week, as well as on a range of other commodities including cars and agricultural products by early April.

The Europeans have tried to win over U.S. President Donald Trump with flattery and alluded they could buy more U.S. gas and weapons in exchange for a reduction in threatened tariffs. But at the same time, Europeans are brainstorming about what decoupling from the United States in trade and defense could mean for them. They are also wondering if they have any realistic options left, other than appeasing Trump.


The Cost of Ignoring Geopolitics

Jo Inge Bekkevold

Europe finds itself in the greatest peril since the 1940s. As Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, the Trump administration’s policy shifts mean that Europe suddenly faces the possibility of war with Russia without the United States’ full backing. Washington is now negotiating a possible peace directly with Moscow and Kyiv, without the participation of other Europeans. It also seems willing to reach a deal largely on Russia’s terms.

In addition, the Trump administration demands that any security guarantees to Ukraine be provided by European countries without U.S. backing, and it has signaled uncertainty about its willingness to adhere to NATO’s Article 5 commitments to help defend Europe in case of attack. This is a state of affairs that Europe’s armed forces are ill-prepared to handle.

What military members need to hear from their leaders now

PAULA THORNHILL

The four-star firings, anti-DEI campaign, and flurry of directives and counter-directives from the Pentagon have sown confusion within the ranks—and among their leaders, many of whom are grappling with how, when, and even if they should discuss these actions and their implications with their subordinate units.

Some leaders have chosen to do no more than pass along these sweeping, hastily issued, and, in some cases, poorly explained orders. Their reasons for remaining quiet range from uncertainty over what to say to their people, to being misunderstood if they speak, to fearing retribution for having spoken incorrectly. At a minimum, this approach confuses the force, invites speculation, and potentially leads to discontent.

Now more than ever, leaders at all levels must communicate clearly and routinely with those they lead. This means providing detailed guidance for implementing new policies. But it also means reaffirming timeless messages that transcend presidential administrations and partisan politics.

Why the U.S. and Europe Are No Longer Friends

Pavlo Kuliuk

The new world order being built by Donald Trump excludes major military conflicts and confrontations between military blocs. In this world order, identical ideology becomes a disadvantage rather than an advantage. In this context, Europe, which is trying to strengthen itself through a war with Russia and has an identical ideology to the United States, is turning into an opponent rather than an ally of America.

Europe's influence on the U.S. has become too great

By 2025, European politicians have achieved such great influence in the United States that this gives them the opportunity to carry out coordinated actions in order to influence the decisions of the American authorities. These actions are expressed both in political statements by American politicians and in public protests in which U.S. citizens participate. American politicians and citizens condemn the decisions of the legally elected U.S. president but support the interests of European politicians. These actions inside the United States are supported from outside by European politicians. This situation can be assessed in different ways. It can be assessed as a manifestation of American democracy or a violation of the unity of the American nation in the interests of a foreign state. Judging by the actions of Donald Trump, the American president is inclined to the second version of events. There are many reasons for this.

For example. Even representatives of the U.S. Republican Party publicly disagree with Donald Trump’s actions regarding Ukraine. “I am sick to my stomach as the administration appears to be walking away from our allies and embracing Putin, a threat to democracy and U.S. values ​​around the world,” said Sen. Lisa Murkowski (1) after the scandalous scene in the Oval Office of the White House on February 28, 2025.(2)