5 July 2020

India’s Great Firewall Against China Could Backfire

By Mohamed Zeeshan

In an unprecedented move this week, India banned 59 Chinese smartphone apps, including popular applications such as TikTok and CamScanner. The government justified the decision on the basis of “data security” and “privacy” concerns which, the Ministry of Information Technology said, also pose a threat to India’s “sovereignty and security.”

Privacy concerns have been buzzing around India’s digital economy for years, but the timing of the move suggests that its impetus lies elsewhere. The Modi government hopes that this decision will serve as retaliation against Beijing for the long-running border tensions between the two countries.

During the course of the ongoing standoff, many Indians have repeatedly called for economic boycott measures against China. The problem is that India’s share in Chinese trade is far too small to make much of a dent (by some estimates, Vietnam is statistically more influential on this count).

But the internet is a different battlefield. Chinese apps have proven increasingly popular in India’s massive market in recent years: According to one report, they accounted for over 60 percent of the Indian market in 2019, after having been only a fraction of that in 2015. Last year, TikTok clocked over 300 million downloads in India – nearly 80 million more than the second-placed WhatsApp. And six out of the top ten most popular apps in India were Chinese.

Why a Trade War With China Is a Bad Idea for India

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Relations between the United States and China have sunk to such lows in recent years that it is now easy enough to imagine the two nations eventually going to war. Yet this month’s deadly Himalayan skirmishes suggest China is far likelier to usher in a new era of military conflict with its neighbor India.

Both nations now face dilemmas as they seek to avoid that prospect, after their monthlong standoff degenerated into a bloody fracas in mid-June, leaving 20 Indian soldiers dead alongside an unknown number of Chinese. Deescalating the crisis will be hard enough. More important will be how each side rethinks the countries’ long-term relationship as strategic competitors. Of the two, India faces tougher challenges: With limited military options, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is facing growing pressure to boycott Chinese goods as part of a more general turn toward self-reliance and protectionism—a strategy that would be precisely the wrong way to tackle the long-term threat of a rising China.

China’s dilemma is simpler: namely, whether it is wise to antagonize all of its competitors at once. That Beijing is riling its neighborhood is obvious. Australia complains about Chinese cyberattacks, albeit without directly naming China. Japan is alarmed about Chinese patrols near the disputed Senkaku or Diaoyu islands. And now China is clashing with India, a country whose security establishment increasingly views its northern neighbor as a threat, and is currently puzzling through how to respond.

Why Russia’s relations with India and China will survive Galwan border clash

Danil Bochkov

The rise in tensions along the China-India border in the Himalayas began in early May and resulted in bloodshed earlier this month with violence in the Galwan valley. This border stand-off bears similarities to the skirmish in 2017, with the only exception being a lack of fatalities three years ago.

The intensification of this dispute has spurred concern among Nepal, Japan and other regional players who have to balance their foreign policy between China and India. It has also drawn the attention of larger powers such as the United States and Russia, with the former offering mediation but to no avail.

China and India’s current impasse poses a huge political challenge for Russia, which has established long-term strategic ties with both countries.

Russia-India relations are officially described as a “special and privileged strategic partnership”, a formula that was originally promulgated during President Vladimir Putin’s official visit to India in 2010. The special nature of their bilateral relations has been underscored several times in recent years, such as Putin’s 2018 state visit to India and a 2019 meeting between Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Indian counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. The two sides adopted “India-Russia: an Enduring Partnership in a Changing World”, a 2018 joint statement in which they recognised the importance of adjusting relations in a new global reality.

China’s Indian Ocean ambitions Investment, influence, and military advantage

Joshua T. White
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China has significantly expanded its engagements in the Indian Ocean region over the past three decades, raising fears among American and Indian strategists that its growing naval presence, together with its use of so-called “debt-trap diplomacy,” might provide it with meaningful military advantages far from its shores.

Although China’s ultimate aims in the Indian Ocean remain somewhat ambiguous, it is clear that the Chinese leadership is actively pursuing capabilities that would allow it to undertake a range of military missions in the region. This paper explores five such mission objectives — ranging from relatively “benign” activities to those that would be more alarming to U.S. and Indian policy planners — and describes the kinds of defense and economic investments that China would require to carry them out. These objectives are: 1) conduct non-combat activities focused on protecting Chinese citizens and investments, and bolstering China’s soft power influence; 2) undertake counterterrorism activities, unilaterally or with partners, against organizations that threaten China; 3) collect intelligence in support of operational requirements, and against key adversaries; 4) support efforts aimed at coercive diplomacy toward small countries in the region; and 5) enable effective operations in a conflict environment, namely the ability to deter, mitigate, or terminate a state-sponsored interdiction of trade bound for China, and to meaningfully hold at risk U.S. or Indian assets in the event of a wider conflict.

Pakistan’s Climate Wake-up Call

By Kunwar Khuldune Shahid

On April 19, almost a month after a nationwide lockdown had been imposed, Pakistan’s second largest city, Lahore, witnessed a 63 percent plunge in average PM2.5 particulate matter pollution. Lahore was the world’s most polluted city this past October, when seasonal smog takes air pollution to hazardous levels; the air was given a much-needed respite by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Similar falls in air pollutant levels were witnessed across Pakistan’s urban centers – with nitrogen dioxide (NO2) levels in five major cities dropping by 20-56 percent – as lockdowns halted transportation, along with industrial and agricultural activities. The unrecognizable blueness of the skies brought out soul-searching vis-à-vis the current development plans and the environmental hazards that they churn out.

According to the U.S.-based Health Effects Institute (HEI), 135,000 people died in Pakistan because of air pollution in 2015. The medical journal The Lancet puts the annual figure over 300,000, maintaining that 22 percent of all deaths in Pakistan are linked to pollution.

A report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and the Punjab government notes that the transport sector contributes almost half (43 percent) of the air pollution in the province. Industries contribute 25 percent, while 20 percent comes from agricultural activity.

Taliban Bounties Would Be a New Low Even for Putin

James Stavridis

James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is a retired U.S. Navy admiral and former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is also an operating executive consultant at the Carlyle Group and chairs the board of counselors at McLarty Associates.

As Americans consider news reports that Russia offered Taliban fighters bounties to kill U.S. service members, it’s worth recalling the tortured history the two nations have in Afghanistan.

Going back to the days of the Afghan mujahideen and “Charlie Wilson’s War,” Washington provided weapons — notably, surface-to-air missiles — and training to Soviet adversaries in the 1980s. When I visited Moscow as the NATO commander of the Afghan mission almost 30 years later, I met with the man who had been the last Soviet general in Afghanistan (he had retired and gone into politics). He said to me that we Americans had “Russian blood on your hands.”

Gulf-Asia Connectivity After the COVID-19 Crisis

By Guy Burton

What are the prospects for connectivity between the Arab Gulf monarchies and Asia, especially as the impact of COVID-19 recedes on the global economy? The short answer is that despite the slowdown of the past few months, there will be a recovery. Trade and investment will continue, albeit at a slower pace than before.

While trade and investment may require a longer period to recover similar levels or more, there may be a more immediate reckoning in the security sector. With several of the Arab Gulf and Asian states allies or partners of the United States, they may face pressure to take a position in the emerging Cold War between it and China.

The revitalization of economic ties between the Gulf and Asia will be welcomed, although the degree to which that happens will depend greatly on the wider global outlook. The WTO reported that trade was already slowing from last year, owing in large part to the trade war between the United States and China. It predicts that world trade will fall between 13 and 32 percent this year, but should recover next year.

Taiwan Opens Office to Help People Fleeing Hong Kong in Wake of National Security Law

By Nick Aspinwall

A Hong Kong protester in Taiwan waves a flag to mark the first anniversary of a mass rally in Hong Kong against the now-withdrawn extradition bill at Democracy Square in in Taipei, Taiwan, June 13, 2020.Credit: AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying

Taiwan on Wednesday opened an office to help people fleeing Hong Kong, its strongest response yet to calls to provide humanitarian assistance to Hong Kongers leaving the city due to ongoing pro-democracy protests and a newly imposed national security law.

The Taiwan-Hong Kong Services and Exchange Office will serve as a hub for a task force established last month to provide direct assistance to Hong Kongers who wish to stay in Taiwan.

“China’s disregard for the will of Hong Kong’s people proves that ‘one country, two systems’ is not viable,” President Tsai Ing-wen said Tuesday on Twitter. “Taiwan’s commitment to supporting those HKers who want freedom and democracy has never changed.”

China’s Approach to Global Governance

For more than two millennia, monarchs who ruled China proper saw their country as one of the dominant actors in the world. The concept of zhongguo—the Middle Kingdom, as China calls itself—is not simply geographic. It implies that China is the cultural, political, and economic center of the world. This Sino-centrist worldview has in many ways shaped China’s outlook on global governance—the rules, norms, and institutions that regulate international cooperation. The decline and collapse of imperial China in the 1800s and early 1900s, however, diminished Chinese influence on the global stage for more than a century.

In the past two decades, China has reemerged as a major power, with the world’s second largest economy and a world-class military. It increasingly asserts itself, seeking to regain its centrality in the international system and over global governance institutions.

These institutions, created mostly by Western powers after World War II, include the World Bank, which provides loans and grants to developing states; the International Monetary Fund, which works to secure the stability of the global monetary system; and the United Nations, among others. President Xi Jinping, the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, has called for China to “lead the reform of the global governance system,” transforming institutions and norms in ways that will reflect Beijing’s values and priorities.
Journalists watch an image of Chinese President Xi Jinping speaking at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in April 2019.

What Is the World Doing to Create a COVID-19 Vaccine?

by Claire Felter

A global race is underway to develop and mass-produce an effective vaccine to counter the new, deadly, and highly infectious coronavirus disease, COVID-19, which has brought much of the world to a standstill. Many governments have warned that daily life cannot return to normal until their populations have built up antibodies to fend off the virus. Accelerated clinical trials are already underway, but vaccine development often takes years.

Developing a successful vaccine is not enough. Many countries also face the looming challenge of producing quantities necessary to provide immunity to all their citizens, and competition is already emerging over who will have access once a vaccine is ready.
What is the status of a COVID-19 vaccine?

There are more than one hundred vaccines in preclinical development by pharmaceutical companies, academic institutions, government agencies, and others. More than seventy of these are being tracked by the World Health Organization (WHO) [PDF]. Seventeen vaccine candidates, across at least ten countries, are already undergoing clinical trials. One of these has been approved for limited use by the Chinese military. While several of these candidates are already spurring hope, experts warn that it’s too early to determine which, if any, will be successful on a large scale.

Xi Jinping’s Internal Great Wall

by Rep. Mark Green

If the Great Wall of China was the symbol of its past reclusiveness from the rest of the world as some have asserted, then Xi Jingping’s thought policing has created an Internal Great Wall that still exists today.  

Before building the Great Wall, China was technologically advanced. The Chinese people had accurate clocks, crossbows, compasses, and even successfully deep-drilled for natural gas. Yet when China built the Great Wall for protection during the Ming Dynasty, they began to lag increasingly further behind. By decreasing their interaction with the rest of the world, they wound up missing out on the Industrial Revolution. Their own only started some forty years ago.  

Since China began to open its economy in the 1980s, it has made incredibly rapid steps and become a near-peer economically to the United States. Yet though China appears technologically advanced today, since Xi Jinping’s arrival as president and paramount leader, the Chinese Communist Party’s increasing thought suppression of its own citizens—Xi’s Internal Great Wall—has driven the country further backward, not forward.  


Heather A. Conley, Cyrus Newlin and Tim Kostelancik


The impact of Russian and Chinese malign influence activities within democratic states has come into sharp focus in recent years. In 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic has created new opportunities for Moscow and Beijing to advance geopolitical goals through disinformation and other influence activities. Despite greater public awareness of the challenge, governments have struggled to respond.

The “3 Cs” framework, coined by former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, defines “malign” influence activities as covert, coercive, or corrupting. These influence activities disrupt the normal democratic political processes in a targeted country by:

Manipulating public discourse;
Discrediting the electoral system;
Biasing the development of policy; or
Disrupting markets for the purpose of advancing a political or strategic goal.

These activities are typically non-transparent, outside the rule of law, and run counter to liberal democratic norms. Activities that are covert, coercive, or corrupting differ from legitimate or benign public diplomacy efforts conducted in a transparent and open manner.


China has deployed a network of sensors and communications capabilities between Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands in the northern South China Sea. These capabilities are part of a “Blue Ocean Information Network” (蓝海信息网络) developed by China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), a state-owned company, to aid in the exploration and control of the maritime environment using information technology. The network constructed in the northern South China Sea between early 2016 and 2019 is referred to as a demonstration system. However, future plans for the Blue Ocean Information Network involve expanding the sensor and communications network to the rest of the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and other ocean areas far from Chinese territory. While the Blue Ocean Information Network is largely cast as an environmental monitoring and communications system, the military utility of its sensing and communications functions makes its development important to monitor.

The most visible elements of this network are two types of “Ocean E-Stations” dubbed “floating integrated information platforms” (IIFP) (浮台信息系统) and “island reef-based integrated information systems” (IRBIS) (岛礁信息系统). AMTI previously identified one of the latter systems after it was deployed to Bombay Reef in the Paracels in mid-2018.

The Monarchs’ Pawns?

By: Alexandra Stark

This report examines the combined influence of four factors by about 2014 led three Gulf monarchies to change their calculations and adopt proxy warfare strategies aimed more consistently at managing crises that threatened their spheres of interest and maintaining the political status quo for the region rather than revising the regional balance of power. After introducing you to the three Gulf monarchies the report is divided into four sections. The first section examines each of these three Gulf monarchies’ strategic interests in the early post-Arab Spring period from 2011 through 2014 and goes on to look at how these interests shaped their proxy interventions in Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. The second section examines the four factors that led the Gulf states to change their strategic assessments, and the third section examines the interventions that followed that turning point in Yemen. Finally, the conclusion discusses what the Gulf states’ shifting approach means for U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Europe Portrays Both America and Iran As Rogue States At the UN

by Matthew Petti 

The top U.S. diplomat began his term in office in May 2018 by pulling out of the JCPOA, a 2015 deal between Iran and six world powers over the Iranian nuclear program. And he is heading into Election Day with a move that could kill the deal on a global scale.

Pompeo has been hinting for months that the United States wants to restore United Nations sanctions on Iran. He formally set the process in motion last week, just in time for a biannual UN Security Council meeting on the JCPOA scheduled for June 30.

The video meeting followed a familiar pattern. The United States claimed that the JCPOA has failed to clamp down on Iran’s rogue activities. Iran and its allies accused the United States itself of being a rogue actor that tramples on international law. The European nations urged restraint on both sides, warning that any move to kill the JCPOA would be dangerous.

But it was the first time all three sides had a chance to duke it out directly.

The Black Lives Matter Movement Must Solve Its Violence Problem

by Amitai Etzioni

The issue is an old one; however, current events require that we revisit the question of whether it is justified to resort to violence to gain social change in democratic societies (however flawed they are). The Black Lives Matter movement deserves great credit for mainly peaceful demonstrations, and for working hard to limit looting and violence. However, the use of force by some demonstrators has received support from a significant segment of the public. A recent CNN poll found that one out of four (27 percent) Americans believe that violent protests are justified. This is a considerable increase from the 14 percent who felt this way in 2016. Almost half of the Democrats hold that violent protests are justified; the same is true of 23 percent of White respondents. 

A troublingly large line-up of public intellectuals are again providing justifications for violent protest. Wellesley College assistant professor of African studies Kellie Carter Jackson recently wrote, “Violence disrupts the status quo and the possibility of returning to business as usual. . . . The American Revolution was won with violence. The French Revolution was won with violence. The Haitian Revolution was won with violence. The Civil War was won with violence. A revolution in today’s terms would mean that these nationwide rebellions lead to black people being able to access and exercise the fullness of their freedom and humanity.” Northeastern University associate professor of sociology Gordana Rabrenovic argues that the violence that African American people experience in their interactions with state-sponsored individuals and systems leads them to ask, “If they use violence, why shouldn’t we use violence?” American University provost Daniel J. Myers offers another justification: “Violent protest . . . advertise[s] the cause in a uniquely powerful way.” University of Pennsylvania professor, historian, and author of The Loud Minority Daniel Q. Gillion reports, “Nonviolent protest brings awareness to an issue; violent protest brings urgency to an issue. It forces individuals to pay attention to these important discussions of race relations.” Finally, New York Times columnist Charles Blow wrote: “Some of the people now breaking things and burning things and looting things are ironically participating in a storied American tradition. There has long been a penchant for destruction in this country, an insatiable bloodlust, that the country conveniently likes to forget. American violence is learned violence. It is the American way. . . . White riots have often, historically, targeted black people, while black people have rioted to protest injustice. On either side, racism is the root. And we have refused to sufficiently address it. Now, that chicken is coming home to roost.” 

The Fatal Flaw in America’s Counterterrorism Strategy

by Carlo J. V. Caro

The FBI has concluded that the Pensacola shooting perpetrated by a Saudi Arabian military member had been motivated by Al Qaeda. On December 6, 2019, Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani killed three young American Navy sailors, robbing them of their futures. Personally, I have believed that America’s obsession with the Islamic State has been detrimental to its national security.

While the Islamic State was and remains a threat, America assigned its relative importance because of its brutality and ability to capture territory in a short amount of time. The Islamic State, however, did not have a brilliant strategy. Instead, it wielded its massive strength at a time when Syria and Iraq were both suffering from state collapse. The group was never able to hold onto the territory it captured, as its sheer brutality ran counter to establishing itself as an alternative mode of governance, and many of their members defected to other groups. Unlike its former ally and later competitor, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State created too many enemies, isolated the populations under its control, and made itself a target, both formally and informally, to Western and Muslim governments.

American Military Leaders have Forgotten American History

President Donald Trump may have been channeling former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright when he considered invoking the Insurrection Act of 1807 and deploying active-duty troops to Washington, D.C. to support local law enforcement and the D.C. National Guard as they responded to rioting following the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis.

A chorus of nay-sayers was joined by several retired generals and admirals who decried the use of active-duty troops in any situation that appeared to be interfering with Americans’ legitimate right to protest. Their sentiment seemed heartfelt, but other than an aside by retired General James Mattis about a “small number of lawbreakers,” they forget that Americans don’t have a legitimate right to loot, burn, and riot. Or that business owners have a right to not lose their property to a mob; such is the myopia that comes from lifetime of government employment.

But the pile-on was glorious.

Generals Are People Too: And Their Involvement in Politics Is Part of the American Tradition

By Sam Canter

In the long history of this nation, American generals have participated in coups and insurrections, ran for President while on active duty, and disregarded the Commander-in-Chief's lawful orders. Given this past, one might reasonably think that Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley’s accidental participation in an ill-conceived photo-op represents something less than a constitutional crisis.

Predictably, the latest wave of retired and active generals involving themselves in the national political conversation wrought another round of the now perennial debate. Brimming with words like “unprecedented” and “dangerous," writers often lament that such incidents threaten to erode the American people’s trust in their military, and thus damage the nation’s one true apolitical and professional organization.

Or so the thinking goes, but as with just about any topic in today’s incredibly myopic and ahistorical media landscape, context is everything. If there is an aberration here, it is not the retired vocal general, but rather expecting that a military service career deprives one of the rights to a controversial opinion for life. Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that active-duty generals become tangentially exposed to political situations during their duties. This reality appears less troubling when one considers that politically involved generals – retired or otherwise – have been the norm for the majority of American history. Understanding this history also has broader implications for the modern professional military and the public’s trust in it.

Global Economic Prospects, June 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic has, with alarming speed, dealt a heavy blow to an already-weak global economy, which is expected to slide into its deepest recession since the second world war, despite unprecedented policy support. The global recession would be deeper if countries take longer to bring the pandemic under control, if financial stress triggers defaults, or if there are protracted effects on households and firms. Economic disruptions are likely to be more severe and protracted in emerging market and developing economies with larger domestic outbreaks and weaker medical care systems; greater exposure to international spillovers through trade, tourism, and commodity and financial markets; weaker macroeconomic frameworks; and more pervasive informality and poverty. Beyond the current steep economic contraction, the pandemic is likely to leave lasting scars on the global economy by undermining consumer and investor confidence, human capital, and global value chains. Being mostly a reflection of the recent plunge in global energy demand, low oil prices are unlikely to provide much of a boost to global growth in the near term. While policymakers’ immediate priorities are to address the health crisis and moderate the short-term economic losses, the likely long-term consequences of the pandemic highlight the need to forcefully undertake comprehensive reform programs to improve the fundamental drivers of economic growth, once the crisis abates.

Europe as a Neutral Giant?

From Emmanuel Macron to Ursula von der Leyen, many European leaders dream of the European Union (EU) asserting itself one day as a geopolitical superpower in its own right.

There is still a long way to go, however. True, the Europeans manage to play some degree of power politics vis-à-vis Moscow—the EU economic sanctions over the annexation of Crimea certainly help contain a resurgent Russia. But on almost all other geopolitical hot-button issues, Europeans fail to formulate any meaningful foreign policy that can’t be ignored by the big powers.

In Syria, the EU has been AWOL despite millions of Syrians having fled the civil war to Europe. In Libya, EU members cancel each other out. Berlin and Rome back the internationally recognized government in Tripoli, while Paris lends at least diplomatic support to military strongman Khalifa Haftar. In Iran, Europeans fail to deliver on their obligations under the 2015 nuclear deal, as Washington’s secondary sanctions prevent EU companies from trading with Tehran. In the Balkans, Brussels is struggling to uphold its influence, which is further complicated by France, the Netherlands, and Denmark making it clear that they are not keen on allowing EU enlargement into Albania and North Macedonia anytime soon.

Exploring Blockchain Technology for Government Transparency: Blockchain-Based Public Procurement to Reduce Corruption

In partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia (Procuraduría General de Colombia), the Forum has led a multistakeholder team to investigate, design and trial the use of blockchain technology for corruption-prone government processes, anchored in the use case of public procurement. The project, led by the Blockchain and Digital Currency team housed within the World Economic Forum Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, is called Unlocking Government Transparency with Blockchain Technology.

Algorithmic Warfare: Army Bolstering Electronic Warfare Arsenal

By Yasmin Tadjdeh

The service recently awarded Lockheed Martin a $75 million contract for phase two of the Multi-Function Electronic Warfare-Air Large, or MFEW-AL, program, which will give the service enhanced digital firepower through the use of a podded system on an unmanned platform.

“This is very critical because this capability will enable all the [brigade combat teams] and division commanders the ability to see deep in the battlespace” and engage targets, said Col. Kevin Finch, program manager for electronic warfare cyber at the Army’s program executive office for intelligence, electronic warfare and sensors.

The pod — which can fit on an MQ-1C Gray Eagle drone — had successful flight demonstrations at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, he noted during the Association of Old Crows’ Electromagnetic Spectrum Summit in May. The event was held virtually because of the ongoing COVID-19 crisis. 

“We’re very excited about this capability and what it brings to the force,” Finch said.


Shmuel Shmuel 
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The reality of American military power has long been that the United States must project its forces into the enemy’s territory. This brings with it a host of challenges, some inflicted by the adversary and others that are self-inflicted (such as lack of strategic lift or production capacity). In any future war, the US military will likely play an “away game,” and an adversary will probably not allow the United States to leisurely amass personnel and equipment on its borders, but will actively try to prevent it. As a result, the US military will suffer from an inherent asymmetry and have immense costs imposed on it, at least in the initial phases of the war. This challenge lies at the heart of what is colloquially called the “anti-access/area denial” family of military concepts.

To solve the challenges associated with this inherent asymmetry, a range of ideas have emerged—Multi-Domain Operations from the US Army, distributed lethality from the US Navy, Joint All-Domain Command and Control from the US Air Force, “mosaic warfare” from DARPA, and various “sweeping changes” from the Marine Corps.

A review of the commonalities between these concepts, however, reveals inherent challenges in them—and as such, at the heart of American military thought.

So Say We All

These Are the 7 Anti-Drone Weapons the US Military Plans to Invest In

By Oriana Pawlyk
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The U.S. Army has come up with an initial list of the best usable counter drone technologies to destroy or deter quadcopters and other unmanned systems that pose a threat to troops and bases overseas.

The service, which was tasked with overseeing the Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office in November, has authorized seven defensive countermeasures out 40 systems "needed to primarily detect, access, and engage with enemy drones," it said in a release.

In January, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord announced that the Defense Department had established an office focused on addressing the growing challenge of targeting often-lethal adversary drones. The goal of the 60-person counter-drone team, led by Army Maj. Gen. Sean A. Gainey, was to determine the best systems for the task.

The Army also identified a single streamlined command and control, or C2, system that will work as the standard for its counter drone operations, Gainey said.