Why Bhutan hopes tourists will put a smile back on its face

Chas Newkey-Burden, The Week UK

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The "kingdom of happiness" is feeling sad as it faces unprecedented emigration and rocketing youth unemployment alongside other economic challenges.

As Bhutan tries to restore its fortunes, "tourism is seen as a major lever to pull", said Bangkok Post (BP), so there's "good reason" to visit the tiny Himalayan nation now, "before bigger crowds descend", added Bloomberg UK.

Major lever

When he was running for office last year, Tshering Tobgay, now prime minister, pointed to an average economic growth rate of just 1.7% over five years and said Bhutan's economy was "on the brink of collapse".

There are now high levels of youth unemployment, dwindling foreign currency reserves and one in eight Bhutanese lives in poverty, according to a report from the World Bank. This has led to many residents trying their luck elsewhere: "last year, 1.5% of the population moved to Australia to work and study", wrote The Guardian.

As more people leave, fewer arrive. Bhutan welcomed 103,000 visitors in 2023, about two-thirds below its pre-pandemic record reached in 2019, so tourism is considered vital to address the economic problems. The new target is to return to 300,000 visitors annually, but with a "more diverse consumer base", said BP, including at least 50% from non-Asian markets.

Since Bhutan started welcoming tourists in 1974, it has focused on "low-volume crowds and high-paying guests" who are drawn to panoramas of "sweeping Himalayan mountain vistas and Buddhist monasteries perched on cliffs", but it has also "earned a reputation" for being "inaccessible to the average tourist".

A New Era in Bangladesh? The First Hundred Days of Reform

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What’s new? Three months after an uprising toppled former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the reform agenda of Bangladesh’s interim government is becoming clearer – along with the pitfalls that lie in its path. Led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the administration is expected to remain in office for another year and maybe longer.

Why does it matter? After fifteen years of Hasina’s rule, Bangladesh has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to improve governance and put checks in place that would stop another autocratic regime from emerging. If the interim government falters, however, the country could revert to the status quo ante or even enter a period of military rule.

What should be done? The interim government should aim to produce quick results to maintain public support for more ambitious reforms. It should avoid staying in power too long and build consensus on new measures among political parties. External actors should offer aid; India should work to repair its image with the Bangladeshi people.

The interim government in Bangladesh has a monumental task before it. Taking the reins on 8 August, three days after a mass uprising ousted the increasingly authoritarian Sheikh Hasina, the administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has moved quickly to delineate a bold agenda of political, governance and economic reforms. Many Bangladeshis describe Hasina’s downfall as a “second liberation” (a reference to the 1971 independence war), bespeaking the public’s appetite for major change. For now, Yunus and his colleagues have widespread support, but popular expectations are double-edged. If the interim administration falters in making reforms, the outcome is likely to be an early election with little progress; in the worst-case scenario, the military could assume power. The interim government should look to score a few quick wins to keep its social support base strong as it builds consensus around key reforms and prepares the country for credible elections. International actors should back Yunus’s administration and bolster the Bangladeshi economy to help inaugurate a new era in national politics.

US-India Subnational Innovation Competitiveness Index

Amit Kapoor, Stephen Ezell, Meghan Ostertag and Sheen Zutshi

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The United States claims the top 51 regions, with California, Massachusetts, and Washington ranking in the top three. The top three Indian states are Delhi, Chandigarh, and Tamil Nadu, although they rank below all U.S. states.

Indian regions excel in globalization indicators, taking top spots in inward FDI and high-tech exports. However, most of the FDI into India and most of the high-tech export activity are concentrated in five states.

Indian regions are behind U.S. regions in most indicators, most notably those related to R&D investment and R&D personnel. This represents a key challenge. Most R&D investment activity in India is performed by the government, not the private sector.

Regions with lower GDPs per capita consistently rank lower in indicator performance. The U.S. states with the lowest GDPs per capita (West Virginia, Arkansas, and Mississippi) rank in the bottom five states in the United States.

Policymakers must continue to strengthen U.S.-India relations, focusing on building and strengthening critical and emerging technology and R&D collaboration initiatives, which connect start-ups, universities, and venture capitalists in both countries.

Indian policymakers must utilize incentives to attract private R&D investment from venture capital funds and public-private partnerships to drive investment in innovation.

Russia’s grand geo-economic plan a step closer in Afghanistan

Andrew Korybko

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The Taliban, whose flags wave here above the Kabul airport, is nearing a deal with Russia. Image: X Screengrab

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Afghanistan this week aimed to advance Moscow’s “Greater Eurasian Partnership” (GEP), a grand strategic vision to forge new trade routes and institutional partnerships in Asia.

Considered by some as Russia’s version of the US’s “pivot to Asia” policy, Russia has given priority to GRP since the US and wider West imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia in 2022 after it invaded Ukraine.

Since then, Russia has revived the previously stalled International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) between itself and India via Iran, with branch corridors through Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

It’s also sought a larger regional role for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Eurasian political, economic and, security and defense organization established by Russia and China in 2001.

These are relevant to Afghanistan as an SCO observer and through its trade with India via the INSTC. Afghanistan is also strategically located at the crossroads of Central, South and West Asia.

Shoigu’s immediate priority is to expand military-technical cooperation with the ruling Taliban so that it can more effectively combat ISIS-K, which has a presence in Afghanistan and an offshoot of which has attacked Russia in the past.

To that end, Shoigu has vowed that Russia will remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations, a redesignation that will enable the two sides to better coordinate policies to contain regional security threats like ISIS-K.

China is armed and ready for trade war 2.0 with Donald Trump

Juliana Liu

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In the summer of 2018, when former President Donald Trump launched a trade war with Beijing, the Chinese economy was riding high. There was even talk it could soon overtake the United States as the world’s largest.

Now, with Trump months away from retaking office, what had appeared to be a juggernaut has been greatly diminished. Contending with property, debt and deflation challenges, China doesn’t look ready for another fight.

But appearances can be deceiving.

Armed with an understanding about the way the president-elect operates, the Chinese leadership is better equipped to deal with the real possibility of Trump making good on his promise to impose upwards of 60% tariffs on goods sold to the United States, according to economists and analysts, through a combination of trade diversification, targeted retaliation against US companies and support for domestic consumption.

“China has been preparing for this day for quite some time. The US is much less important to its trade network (than it was before),” said Dexter Roberts, author of the Trade War newsletter and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

In part because of the first trade war which continued under President Joe Biden, Beijing, as well as Chinese companies, have already started actively reducing its trade dependence on the United States. The impact is visible in trade data and has come at warp speed.

As recently as 2022, bilateral trade was at a record high. But last year, Mexico overtook China as the top exporter of goods into the United States, according to the Commerce Department. China had held that perch for 20 years before its exports to the United States fell by 20% to $427 billion last year.

How America’s War on Chinese Tech Backfired

Scott Kennedy

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In late September, the Biden administration issued a draft rule that would ban Chinese connected and autonomous vehicles and their components from the U.S. market. This is one of the latest of many steps that U.S. policymakers have taken to protect the United States’ economic security. Under the first Trump administration, Washington placed restrictions on the telecom companies ZTE and Huawei. President Joe Biden has maintained many of Trump’s policies toward China and advanced new ones, including initiating broad export controls in late 2022 on advanced semiconductors and semiconductor equipment. As the incoming Trump administration appears ready to accelerate and expand these restrictions further still, it’s worth considering the track record of these policies—and taking stock of the tradeoffs that they entail.

Washington’s array of tools is highly expansive: export controls, tariffs, product bans, inbound and outbound investment screening, constraints on data flows, incentives to shift supply chains, limits on scholarly exchange and research collaboration, industrial policy expenditures, and buy-America incentives. The goals of these measures are equally diverse: slow China’s progress in the most advanced technologies that have dual-use potential, reduce overdependence on China as a source of inputs and as a market for Western goods, deny China access to sensitive data, protect critical infrastructure, push back against economic coercion, protect the United States’ industrial competitiveness, and boost its manufacturing employment.

Beijing’s shift toward a more expansive and assertive form of mercantilist techno-nationalism poses genuine risks to the prosperity and economic security of the United States and others. Something must be done, to be sure, but Washington’s increasingly restrictive policies have yielded highly mixed results. Take the goal of slowing China’s technological progress at the cutting edge and maintaining the United States’ relative technological advantage. In pursuit of this objective, Washington has seen progress in some areas, such as slowing China’s semiconductor sector, but witnessed even more rapid Chinese success in others, such as in electric vehicles and batteries. There are inherent tensions between Washington’s various economic security goals, with progress in some inevitably slowing progress in others. Additionally, U.S. policymakers have not adequately considered how China and others would adapt to U.S. restrictions.

Can Trump do a deal with Iran?

Lawrence Freedman

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A ceasefire coming into force between Israel and Hezbollah comes as a relief and a rare bit of good news. In announcing it President Biden expressed hope that even during his final weeks in office this might be followed by yet more good news - in particular a ceasefire in Gaza and even more progress on the normalisation of relations between Israel and the Saudi Arabia.

After over a year of violence between Israel and all the members of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ is it possible that a corner might be turned, and that a virtuous cycle of conflict resolution is about to be set in motion? Might the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah be the start of a more hopeful trend?

Hamas has been left isolated, and with no reason to suppose that Donald Trump is going to be any more sympathetic to their cause, they may decide to call out a day and scale back their conditions for a ceasefire in Gaza, thereby making it possible to start meeting the urgent challenges of humanitarian relief while addressing the larger challenges of governance and reconstruction. Without more progress on these challenges, and recognition of Palestinian political aspirations, progress on Saudi-Israeli relations will be more of a stretch. Yet that is not the only big idea around at the moment. If the mood really turns to optimism then perhaps it might even be possible to get the US and Iran negotiating again.

How Biden Can Salvage Middle East Peace—and His Legacy

Jonah Blank

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When U.S. President Joe Biden leaves office in January, the already faint prospect of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may follow him out the door. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejects the very concept. Biden’s successor, President-elect Donald Trump, spent his first term actively promoting Netanyahu’s most expansionist dreams. Biden has so far failed to achieve his highest goals for the Middle East—but in his final days he can single-handedly reset the Israeli-Palestinian equation, preserve the potential for a two-state solution, and rescue much of his tarnished legacy. His status as a lame duck paradoxically gives him the power to do things possible only for a leader whose next step is retirement.

Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the only moments when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has seemed potentially solvable have been times when the United States has taken charge. And domestic politics have always limited the amount of pressure any American president can apply. Biden now has an opportunity that none of his predecessors had: he has been relieved of all domestic political constraints at a moment when U.S. pressure is clearly needed. Each of his predecessors has had a lame duck period, but none have coincided with such a decisive moment in the conflict.

The status quo suits nobody. Palestinians are the most obvious victims. In the past year, Israeli forces have killed over 40,000 people in Gaza, as well as around 700 in the West Bank (where Hamas is not in control). Israel is ensnared in a trap of its own making: it cannot retain its identity as both a democracy and a constitutionally Jewish state while maintaining an occupation through which it rules over five million Palestinians who are not citizens of Israel. The United States, by providing diplomatic cover for an occupation that most of the world considers illegal—and by providing the weaponry on which this occupation relies—has torpedoed its credibility, limiting its ability to champion international law and criticize bad actors such as China, Iran, and Russia. Something must give.

Biden Didn’t Really Try to End the War in Gaza

Nathan J. Robinson

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Until recently, the Biden administration has publicly insisted that it is conducting vigorous diplomacy to end Israel’s war in Gaza. That war has made Gaza unlivable and likely resulted in well over 100,000 deaths. Health care and aid workers have been killed in staggering numbers, and Gaza has been designated the most dangerous place on Earth to be a child. Every week brings new reports of massacres in Gaza, as one of the world’s most advanced militaries pounds a densely packed strip of land housing an impoverished, hungry, traumatized, and trapped population.

Over the summer, U.S. President Joe Biden made repeated public assurances that a deal between Israel and Hamas was close to being achieved—one that would ensure the release of the remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza and produce a lasting cease-fire. But the deal never happened, and the administration is no longer actively trying to secure a cease-fire, a possibility that has become even more remote as the war has expanded into Lebanon.

5 Questions About the Cease-Fire Between Israel and Hezbolla

Daniel Byman

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Israel and Hezbollah have reached a cease-fire deal, ending a war that has lasted more than 13 months. U.S. President Joe Biden announced the agreement on Tuesday, and it is supposed to go into effect overnight in the region.

To date, the war has killed almost 4,000 Hezbollah fighters and Lebanese civilians and more than 100 Israeli civilians and soldiers. Around 60,000 Israelis and 1.2 million Lebanese have been displaced.

Russia's War in Ukraine

James Black, Pauline Paillé, Charlotte Kleberg, Conlan Ellis, Maxime Sommerfeld Antoniou

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Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, there has been a high volume of publications (articles, tweets, commentaries) purporting to offer insights into the ongoing conflict and its wider implications for the changing character of warfare. While much of this open-source analysis has focused on the technical and tactical levels, some analysts have provided observations about what the fighting means for the future of joint doctrine at the operational and strategic levels.

To determine whether this outpouring of commentary and analysis may contain useful lessons for further consideration, the Doctrine team within the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) of the UK Ministry of Defence (which has subsequently become part of the new Integrated Warfare Centre [IWC]) asked RAND Europe to conduct a review of relevant open-source literature and to present implications for UK and NATO joint doctrine. RAND Europe conducted the research as lead of the Global Strategic Partnership, a consortium of organisations providing rolling strategic analysis and academic support to the IWC and Defence Futures, formerly known as DCDC.

Blended learning in joint professional military education

Lucia Retter, Mattias Eken, Ondrej Palicka, Huw Davies

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The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the integration of technology and online learning into professional education programmes worldwide, including within Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) environments. This shift towards blended learning, which combines traditional face-to-face instruction with online delivery methods, has gained traction due to its adaptability and efficient use of resources. Blended learning incorporates a variety of online tools, such as videos, discussion forums and assessments, to enhance learning through both synchronous and asynchronous approaches.

To explore the implementation and implications of blended learning in professional education, a research study was conducted by RAND Europe and King's College London, focusing on the Command and Staff Academic Provision at the UK Defence Academy. The study employed a mixed-methods approach, including literature reviews, focus groups with ASCS students and consultations with external experts. The research aimed to identify current practices, opportunities, challenges and potential impacts of blended learning in the context of UK JPME.

The findings from this study shed light on the benefits and obstacles associated with blended learning approaches, providing valuable insights for enhancing professional military education programmes through the integration of online and face-to-face instructional methods.

Political Priorities, Poor Intelligence Tradecraft and the Suppression of Dissenting Views: Why Israel Failed to Warn of Hamas’s October 7 Attack

Larry Hanauer, Michael P. Connell

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Although Israeli intelligence had collected intelligence that Hamas was preparing for an attack, senior officials ignored analysts' warnings. Had Israeli decisionmakers paid more attention to warning intelligence, the conflict would likely have been significantly contained. Lessons from an analysis of Israeli warning intelligence failures can inform future Israeli and U.S. Intelligence Community training, tradecraft and analysis to warn of strategically important events.

Jamestown Foundation

China Brief, November 15, 2024, v. 24, no. 22 

PRC Sees Opportunities in US Election Results

The Power Vertical: Centralization in the PRC’s State Security System

Diplomatic Data Signals Shifts over the Xi Era

Tibet-Aid Program at 30: Driving Tibet’s Development in Xi’s ‘New Era’

The Three I’s: Will We Learn from Decades of Quagmires? What I've Witnessed

Ken Robinson

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International decision-making hinges on a dynamic interplay of Interest, Ideology, and Institutions—the "Three I's." These factors shape how nations identify goals, justify actions, and organize efforts.

One clear example: We got the “Three I’s right, once upon a time, because “enough, was enough.”

We received the mission, “Capture, or Kill” Pablo Escobar, and destroy the entire “Medellin Drug Cartel.” Don’t come home till you get it done, give us a list of what you need.

We received an unambiguous, clear mission statement, we were properly resourced, properly led, we were allowed to do our job, without interference, and we got it done.

Then, they said, “Ok, do it again, and now “Capture or Kill Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela, and destroy the entire “Cali Drug cartel.”

Got it. We accomplished that mission too!

Clear guidance, national will, vigorous support from the chain of command, and the best Special Mission Unit’s in the Department of Defense, working seamlessly with the SOUTHCOM Commander, and American Embassy Country Team – including the CIA station, FBI, DEA, and our Colombian “Search Block” partners.

A whole of government effort.

Musk's government roles create 'clear avenues for serious conflicts of interest'

MIKE GRUSS

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As a SpaceX Starship rocket steered its way back to Earth Nov. 19 before ultimately landing in the Gulf of Mexico, President-elect Donald Trump watched from Texas alongside Elon Musk.

Musk is the founder of SpaceX, the space company that handles launches for NASA, the U.S. Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office. Following Trump’s election he is also the co-chair of the cheekily named commission, Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, which is a dog-themed cryptocurrency.

And Musk is once again a central figure, if not the central figure, at the hub of a web of complicated, sometimes contradictory, positions surrounding the U.S. government’s spending and policy on space.

He leads a company that has more than $10 billion in government contracts, and is also the face of a new body aimed at getting rid of government waste. He wants to win new space launch and satellite contracts with the U.S. Space Force and intelligence community, but his reported calls to Russian President Vladimir Putin according to the Wall Street Journal, have raised questions about national security. And his company is now accused of having a near monopoly on some space technologies, a charge he levied against United Launch Alliance a decade ago when he was trying to break into the market to launch national security satellites.

All of this comes as he’s sparred with government agencies, such as the Federal Communication Commission and the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Labor Relations Board.

Two defense analysts contacted by The Space Project said it was still unclear how Musk’s relationships and new role with the Trump administration may play out. (Musk has made a practice of not following convention. Gen. William Shelton, the former head of Air Force Space Command, once said of Musk, “Generally, the person you are doing business with, you don’t sue.”)

How generals and admirals get promoted now and how that may change under Trump

Patty Nieberg

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How the U.S. military chooses and promotes its generals and admirals — the highest-ranking officers in the military — rarely gets attention. That changed this month with reports that officials appointed under President-elect Donald Trump may take a far more direct role in shaping the military’s general officer corps.

Last week, the process that moves three- and four-star generals upwards came to the forefront when a promotion for Army Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue was blocked by a Republican senator — a potential early warning sign of the Trump Administration’s reported plan to target senior military leaders who were in command during the military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Donahue was the ‘last man out of Afghanistan‘ as the commander of the 82nd Airborne in the final days of the military’s exit from Kabul and was up for his fourth star to command Army Europe and Africa.

Donahue’s hold-up came just after a Wall Street Journal report that Trump officials have drafted an executive order that could put three- and four-star officers on the chopping block for “lacking in requisite leadership qualities.” To do that, Trump officials may assemble a “warrior board,” according to some reports, of retired generals to review and recommend removals of three- and four-star officers they deem “unfit.” How such a board would define “unfit” remains unclear but Trump’s pick for Secretary of Defense, Fox News host Pete Hegseth, has previously talked about firing senior generals who have been “involved in, any of the DEI woke s—,” referring to diversity, equity and inclusion policies, on the Shawn Ryan Show podcast. “Either you’re in for warfighting, and that’s it. That’s the only litmus test we care about.”

Retired generals and experts interviewed by Task & Purpose worried that any board designed by political figures could be a de facto loyalty test to Trump or an effort to get rid of generals who promote diversity policies instead of an assessment of leadership qualities, past performance and merit — something that the current process aims to look at when choosing officers.

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's speech to the NATO Cyber Defence Conference

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Thank you to Rob and Jean Charles, and it is a great pleasure to be here today.

Ladies and gentlemen, NATO is an organisation born out of the ashes of the Second World War.

An organisation for which the UK post-war Labour Government of the time saw an urgent need.

One which our post-war Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, worked night and day to bring into being because he saw the need for collective security.

NATO was founded on the belief that when it comes to the safety and security of our people, Europe and North America stand stronger together.

And that is as true today as it was all those years ago.

And today, our alliance is strong. It has grown in membership — and I’m very pleased to welcome our newest member, Sweden, to their first cyber defence conference as a full NATO ally.

And our alliance has been brought closer together by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

It is clear that 75 years after its foundation, we need NATO more than ever.

Now, my Party entered government in the UK a few months ago at a new and dangerous time for the world. The global picture is more turbulent now than it has been for decades.

As the UK’s Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin said a few weeks ago, we are witnessing a unique era of contest and competition:

One where our adversaries are becoming increasingly emboldened and aggressive, testing our collective security on a daily basis.

And that contest is played out in two realms: the physical and the cyber.

And as we meet here today, Ukrainian soldiers — many of them trained by our armed forces here in the UK — are fighting for their country’s freedom on the front lines of Donetsk and Luhansk, in their bid to repel Russia’s appalling invasion and to be able to decide their own future.

But the war is also raging on another frontline, in cyberspace.

Aided by allies, including the UK, Ukraine has had to defend itself from crippling Russian cyber attacks on its electricity grid, its airports, and other critical national infrastructure.

How worried should we be about a Russian attack on the UK's power grid?

Rob Waugh

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Russian cyber attackers could target the UK's power grids and ‘leave millions without power’, a senior minister has warned.

Speaking at a Nato conference on Monday, Cabinet Office minister Pat McFadden warned that Russia had “stepped up” its cyber attacks against Ukraine and its allies over the past year.

McFadden, whose brief as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster includes national security, went on to say Russian cyber attacks could “turn off the lights for millions of people” and accused Moscow of targeting British media, telecoms and energy infrastructure.

He added that Russian state-aligned groups have taken responsibility for at least nine separate cyberattacks of varying severity against NATO states, including unprovoked attacks against its critical national infrastructure.

But could such an attack really work? And how would it happen? Yahoo spoke to cybersecurity experts about the threat of attacks on Britain’s power.

How realistic is an attack on our power grid?

At a global level, cyber attacks are not only realistic, they are happening already. The International Energy Agency has estimated that attacks on energy infrastructure doubled between 2020 and 2022, up to 1,101 weekly attacks worldwide.

In 2023, those attacks doubled again. Leonhard Birnbaum, CEO of utility E.ON warned last year that Europe’s power grid was under a ‘cyberattack deluge’ since the invasion of Ukraine: “I am worried now and I will be even more worried in the future.”

The UK's electricity system - sometimes referred to as the national grid - is a series of networks spread across the country and operated by different companies. The 'grid' consists of wires and cables to take electricity from where it's produced to the homes and businesses that use it 24/7.

Europe is under attack from Russia. Why isn’t it fighting back?

LAURA KAYALI, DIRK BANSE, WOLFGANG BÜSCHER, ULRICH KRAETZER, UWE MÜLLER and CHRISTIAN SCHWEPPE

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If not for a delay in a connecting flight, the incendiary bomb would likely have burst into flames in the belly of a plane flying high above the European Union.

Instead, it ignited on the ground in Germany’s Leipzig airport, setting fire to a DHL air freight container.

Western intelligence officials believe the attack, which took place in July, was a trial run by Russian agents who planned to place similar bombs on flights to the United States.

“We have been observing aggressive actions by the Russian intelligence services for some time now,” said Thomas Haldenwang, who recently stepped down as president of Germany’s federal domestic intelligence agency.

“Russia is using the entire toolbox, from influencing political discussions to cyber attacks on critical infrastructure to sabotage on a significant scale,” he said.

The Kremlin has long carried out so-called hybrid warfare against European countries, including disinformation campaigns, hacking, cyberattacks and election interference to destabilize European societies and, in the past few years, push them to decrease military support for Ukraine.

Last week, Germany said that two undersea telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea were severed as a result of sabotage.

“We have to conclude, without knowing exactly who did it, that it is a hybrid action and we also have to assume — without knowing it — that it is sabotage,” said German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.

Why Is Microsoft Betting Big on Quantum Computing?

Tarunya S

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Microsoft recently announced a partnership with Atom Computing to drive the commercial adoption of quantum technology at the recent Microsoft Ignite 2024 event. Just two months later, the collaboration achieved a new world record by entangling 24 logical qubits.

The duo plans to launch a commercial quantum computer by 2025, which would unlock advancements in areas like chemistry and materials science.

“As we make progress on our journey to large-scale quantum computing, I’m thrilled to share that we have achieved the most performant logical qubits on record, and we’re bringing a new generation of reliable quantum hardware to customers,” said Microsoft chief Satya Nadella.

The Essential Role of Policy, Doctrine, and Education in Irregular Warfare

Sal Artiaga 

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Irregular warfare (IW) is vital in today’s military planning. It’s complex and constantly changing, using methods that aren’t typical and adapting strategies as needed. Conventional warfare aims to fight and beat enemy forces. IW, however, works in messy political and social situations where standard rules of engagement don’t always fit. Because IW covers so many areas, the armed forces need to improve how they handle it. This means updating their policies, battle plans, teaching, and practice to meet IW’s demands. Policy needs to address new challenges like threat networks, information operations, terrorism, and cyber-attacks within a greater strategic framework. It must be flexible to match military actions with national goals and the changing nature of irregular conflicts. The weaponization of transnational criminal organizations, the interference in countries’ elections via operations in the information environment (OIE), and other emerging threats require a policy that can adapt and respond effectively. Doctrine guides military operations; it needs to grow by taking concepts from different areas, like fighting cyber insurgents and intricate OIE, and focusing on a complete approach that mixes direct and indirect methods to handle IW. Education and training matter just as much. Military training centers must emphasize the social, political, and cultural parts of irregular activities. Training needs to go beyond the usual conventional combat. It should include live runs that look like IW to help people think fast and make good decisions. We train and educate our IW practitioners to enhance their cognitive dominance over adversaries. Combining these elements gives practitioners, academics, and policymakers an intelligent way to handle IW. This approach is critical to winning missions and keeping the country safe in today’s and tomorrow’s fights. DoD can achieve this by improving education, doctrine, and policy related to IW.

IW is an inherently political, often violent struggle that supports a political, social, or cultural change using or relying on established and evolving unconventional concepts, doctrine, and capabilities. Unlike conventional warfare, IW does not emphasize destroying the opposing armed forces or controlling territory. Instead, the focus is on gaining and maintaining the support of a population to influence and effect protracted political change. IW often occurs in complex operational environments, which involve combating irregular threats and potential or active-state adversaries who seek to deter, threaten, or initiate armed conflict. The concept of IW is not new; its roots can be traced through various forms, such as guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and other asymmetric combat methods. Historical figures like T.E. Lawrence and Mao Zedong conceptualized frameworks that underpin modern irregular tactics. Lawrence’s involvement in the Arab Revolt and Mao’s guerrilla strategies during the Chinese Civil War highlights how leveraging socio-political contexts, terrain, and civilian populations can offset the strengths of more conventionally powerful opponents. These early frameworks laid the foundation for understanding how IW can disrupt traditional military advantages and achieve strategic objectives through unconventional means.

Affordable Drones and Civilian Supply Chains are Transforming Warfare

David Kirichenko 

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The Washington Post previously reported that “cheap drones” deployed in Ukraine have fundamentally changed modern warfare, initially giving Ukrainian forces an edge on a battlefield where they are consistently outnumbered and outgunned. Drones now play a versatile and essential role in Ukraine’s defense, handling reconnaissance, directing artillery, evacuating soldiers, and executing bombing attacks. Notably, FPV (first-person view) drones are used to drop explosives or serve as single-use kamikaze drones, wreaking havoc on infantry sitting on the frontline trenches and limiting the use of heavy armor on the front.

In March 2023, Ukrainian officials revealed that the country required 20,000 artillery shells daily to sustain its ground operations, supported by around 300 Western-made artillery systems. This volume was essential for maintaining the intensity of Ukraine’s battlefield actions. However, supplies have consistently fallen short. At its peak, Ukraine managed to secure 9,000 shells per day—less than half the required amount—allowing for somewhat sustained operations. Recently, however, daily supplies have dwindled to just 2,000 shells most often.

In response to these shortages, Ukrainian units have increasingly relied on drones, especially FPVs, to strike targets when artillery fire is limited. These drones provide significant tactical advantages, offering precision strikes and reconnaissance capabilities that can disrupt enemy operations. For example, Ukraine has deployed “Dragon drones” that release thermite on Russian positions, igniting enemy cover and forcing exposure. However, as Stacie Pettyjohn pointed out in War on the Rocks, “even large numbers of small drones cannot match the potency or volume of artillery fire and thus cannot substitute for howitzers.”

Nonetheless, Ukrainian drone units are holding entire parts for the frontline like in Chasiv Yar. The Ukrainian drone unit Yasni Ochi, part of the 23rd Mechanized Brigade in the Avdiivka sector, in a six month period, the 150-strong team eliminated over 1,500 Russian soldiers, either killed or injured, while incurring minimal casualties.

Google reacts angrily to report it will have to sell Chrome

Liv McMahon

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Google has said it would harm consumers and businesses if it is forced to sell Chrome, the world's most popular web browser.

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) will propose the measure to a judge on Wednesday, Bloomberg has reported.

Judge Amit Mehta ruled Google operates an online search monopoly in August, and has been considering what remedies or penalties to impose.

The DOJ has not commented on the report - but Google has made clear it is a proposal it opposes.

"The DOJ continues to push a radical agenda that goes far beyond the legal issues in this case," said Google executive Lee-Anne Mulholland in a statement.

Google will also reportedly be asked to establish new measures around its artificial intelligence, Android operating system and use of data.

"The government putting its thumb on the scale in these ways would harm consumers, developers and American technological leadership at precisely the moment it is most needed,” Ms Mulholland added.

Chrome is the most used browser worldwide - with web traffic tracker Similarweb placing its global market share at 64.61% in October.

Meanwhile Google search corners an almost 90% share of the global search engine market as of October, according to Statcounter.

It is the default engine in Chrome as well as on many smartphone browsers, including Safari on iPhones.

"We can absolutely believe that the Third World War has begun"

Nick Sorrentino

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As many of us travel across the country to visit relatives and to indulge in some post-election crow, we mean turkey this Thanksgiving, the war machine is ramping up in the month and a half before Trump takes office. One gets the distinct sense that the governments of Europe (and the Biden administration), largely avowed enemies of Trump and all he represents, are trying to escalate the war in Ukraine. As we said last week in two of our posts, perfectly reasonable people can disagree about whether the US should be involved in any way in the Ukraine conflict. Reasonable people can disagree as to what drove the war in the first place. But it seems to us very hard to justify the outgoing administration allowing the Ukrainians to launch US-made missiles into Russia.

The truth is there were many people in the US who thought Trump colluded with the Russians (there are still some people today who cling to this manufactured nonsense) and so they saw the war in the Ukraine as an extension of the battle against Trump and Trumpism. These people thought anti-Trump “resistance” was “good”, and therefore US support for Ukraine was also “good”. They convinced themselves that deeply anti-democratic, oligarch ridden Ukraine was better than deeply anti-democratic, oligarch ridden Russia. (Which in fairness it likely is to a degree.) Both countries consistently were/are at the top of world corruption lists, often right next to one another.

Yet Putin DID invade and as such gave his critics (by the way we at ACC are very much anti-Putin who is a monster crony capitalist) every reason to support Ukraine despite being similar to Russia on the civil society front.

Beyond 26/11: How military satellites can redefine India's security framework

Omkar Nikam

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The harrowing events of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008 were a stark reminder of vulnerabilities in India's national security framework. The coordinated terror attack showed weaknesses in India's intelligence gathering, inter-agency coordination, and real-time situational awareness. In the context of modern warfare and hybrid threats, the need for a robust military satellite network had never been more urgent.

Lessons in Vulnerabilities

The 26/11 attacks were well-planned and executed by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives with significant backing from external state and non-state actors. The attackers utilised advanced communication tools, GPS navigation, and intelligence provided through reconnaissance to evade Indian authorities and maximise damage. Key vulnerabilities exposed during the attacks were:

Poor Maritime Surveillance: The terrorists infiltrated Mumbai via the sea route, undetected by coastal radar systems. Despite having warning signals, intelligence was not actionable.

Lack of Real-Time Communication: Delays in inter-agency communication hampered quick response efforts, allowing attackers to move freely between locations.

Inadequate Situational Awareness: Security forces lacked comprehensive situational awareness, delaying operations and contributing to avoidable casualties.

Tajikistan’s Afghan Conundrum – Analysis

Bruce Pannier

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(FPRI) — Tajikistan’s policies toward neighboring Taliban-ruled Afghanistan are reaching a pivotal moment. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and his government have always viewed the Taliban as a threat, and that position has not changed since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. However, there is a bigger threat to Tajikistan growing in Afghanistan, and it might take cooperation with the Taliban to neutralize it.

Additionally, the other Central Asian countries and China, Iran, and Russia are engaging with the Taliban government. Tajikistan risks missing out on opportunities that these countries are opening in Afghanistan. Following the lead of these countries presents Tajikistan with a different set of problems. Tajik authorities have been warning the country’s people and the international community about the Taliban threat for nearly 30 years. Tajikistan’s rigid stance against the Taliban government has brought Rahmon’s government support from Tajikistan’s people and other countries. Making peace with the Taliban will be difficult to explain to Tajik citizens. It will also remove one of the greatest incentives for foreign governments to continue decades of generous financial and security support for Rahmon’s government.

Enemies from the Start

President Rahmon is unique among the current leaders of countries bordering Afghanistan. He is the only leader who was in power when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s.

In the late 1990s, all the Central Asian presidents, except the Turkmen president, viewed the Taliban as a threat and shunned any contact with them. Rahmon’s government and the government of Uzbekistan’s then-President Islam Karimov aided ethnic Tajik and Uzbek groups fighting the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. The potential danger from the Taliban was acutely felt in Tajikistan where there was civil war from 1992 to 1997. The Rahmon government’s battlefield opponent was the United Tajik Opposition, a coalition of groups in which the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was the backbone. In the early years after the Taliban appeared, most people knew little about the group except that they were Islamic extremists.

A Critical Analysis of the US Army’s Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

John A. Nagl

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Key Findings

The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved.

Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization.

Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.

Introduction

In 2014, the Iraqi army, into which tens of billions of American taxpayer dollars had been invested, collapsed in the face of an offensive by the terror group the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Only a major coalition intervention prevented the fall of Baghdad. In 2021, within just a few months of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Afghan National Army (ANA) collapsed in the face of an offensive by the Taliban. Between 2002 and 2021, some $88 billion had been invested in the ANA. In both cases, the U.S. military had devoted vast amounts of time and money to the training of the host-nation’s security forces. Yet, with a few notable exceptions (the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force and some units of Afghan commandos), both armies severely underperformed once they could no longer rely on extensive American air, ground, and logistical support. Why did the U.S. effort to train and advise these forces fail so spectacularly?

Underwater Geopolitics

Carlo J.V. Caro

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How China’s Control of Undersea Cables and Data Flows Reshapes Global Power

Cable Routing Protocols

The rapid construction of undersea cables has brought a hidden but crucial issue into focus: the manipulation of the protocols that control how data travels beneath the sea. These protocols determine the pathways internet data takes, influencing speed, costs, and even exposure to surveillance. Even small changes in these pathways can tilt the global balance of digital power. China’s increasing role in this area demonstrates how technology can be used strategically to reshape geopolitics.

At the heart of this issue is a technology called Software-Defined Networking (SDN). SDN allows data traffic to be managed and optimized in real time, improving efficiency. But this same flexibility makes SDN vulnerable to misuse. Chinese tech companies like HMN Tech (formerly Huawei Marine Networks), ZTE, and China Unicom are leading the way in SDN development. China also holds sway in international organizations that set the rules for these technologies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). This influence gives China a hand in shaping global standards and governance.

Africa illustrates how this influence plays out. Chinese investments in digital infrastructure across the continent are massive. For example, the PEACE (Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe) cable, which links East Africa to Europe, was designed to avoid Chinese territory. Yet, thanks to SDN technology, its traffic can still be redirected through Chinese-controlled points. This redirection could introduce delays of 20 to 30 milliseconds per hop—not much for casual browsing, but a serious issue for latency-sensitive activities like financial trading or encrypted communication.

In Southeast Asia, similar risks are evident. The Southeast Asia-Japan Cable (SJC), which connects Singapore to Japan, relies on several landing stations influenced by China. During a period of heightened tensions in the South China Sea, some data intended for Japan was mysteriously routed through Hainan Island, under Chinese jurisdiction. Such cases suggest technical routing decisions may sometimes have political motivations.

Soviet Lessons for China Watching

Ford Hart

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Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Ford Hart argues that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political institutions, the CCP’s practical behavior, and continued veneration of Marxism-Leninism in the CCP constitution highlight the Soviet model’s deep influence on Beijing. As such, lessons from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) can help us understand the CCP’s approach to governance today.

Soviet-origin governing institutions and processes exert enduring influence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Its substantially imported political structure arguably has at least as much practical impact on Beijing’s behavior as the ideology it also imported from Moscow. While the PRC is not a carbon copy of the USSR, Soviet lessons still have much to teach observers about Chinese governance.

PRC policy shifts over the past two decades have reinforced the relevance of these lessons, and the increased opacity of the Chinese political system makes it necessary to exploit all available tools to assess its behavior. The Soviet experience illuminates, for instance, the impact of the Leninist apparatus on PRC regime behavior, the challenges for understanding China, and the future of its political system. Key insights include the following:The Leninist system’s functional requirements substantially account for China’s conservative departure in recent years.

The PRC system is opaque by design, with information deployed solely to advance the party-state’s current goals.

China will ultimately transition from Leninist rule but under unpredictable circumstances and probably only after many more years.

The Soviet model is not China’s destiny; it is only one of several factors that have shaped PRC history and will continue to influence its future. Nonetheless, understanding it is indispensable to making sense of China’s behavior and prospects for change.

How Islamists Influence the UK Government

Connor Tomlinson

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Last week, the Runnymede Trust published a report, forecasting a ‘bleak and dystopian’ future for Muslims in the UK. Chief executive Shabna Begum told the Guardian that

“Sayeeda Warsi coined the term ‘the dinner table test’, but I think we’ve got even beyond that… The way politicians talk about Muslims now is so derogatory, it’s in the most brutally divisive terms.

“Politicians are engaging in a popularity contest and that popularity contest is measured by how far they are willing to bully and demonise Muslims. And that has become not just an acceptable kind of currency, but a way in which to earn your political stripes.”

The Trust is infamous for having introduced the term “Islamophobia” into common parlance in 1997 — the same year the Blair government came to power, and proceeded to revolutionise Britain’s legal system. “Islamophobia” was devised as a means to silence criticism of Islam by the terrorist group the Muslim Brotherhood. Former Islamist, Abdur-Rahman Muhammad confirmed a meeting took place where members of a Muslim Brotherhood outfit, the International Institute for Islamic Thought, plotted to “emulate the homosexual activists who used the term ‘homophobia’ to silence critics.” It seems to have been successful, given former Prime Minister, Lord David Cameron refused to ban the Brotherhood in 2015 — despite them being banned in multiple Islamic countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and sanctioned in Qatar and Turkey.

The report was supported by both Baroness Warsi and the Muslim Council of Britain. In September, Warsi, the former Chair of the Conservative Party under Cameron, announced that she had withdrawn her party whip in protest against “how far right my Party has moved”. She used the news to promote her new book, titled Muslims Don’t Matter. As our review on Courage noted, this book about Islam features staggeringly few references to the Quran (two) or the Prophet Mohammed (four).

Putin Isn't Bluffing: Intermediate-Range Hypersonic Missile 'Warning'

Anna Matveeva

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Throwing caution aside, President Biden decided to use the transition period to raise the war stakes in Ukraine. He sanctioned the U.S. military contractors to deploy inside the country, authorized the U.S.-made ATACMS missiles to strike deep into Russia, and transferred anti-personnel mines to Ukraine. The last act is not illegal since the United States never signed the Ottawa Convention, although it is still morally dubious. Altogether, the desire to maximize the U.S. support to its ally is clear so that Ukraine can hold on beyond Biden’s time in the White House. More aid is expected.

Militarily, ATACMS and UK-produced Storm Shadows are unlikely to be game-changers for Ukraine. The Russian military is familiar with them from the battle they fought and likely has moved their valuable assets out of the range of fire. Ukraine does not have large missile stocks, and its priority lies in defending its territory rather than keeping a foothold in Russia’s Kursk indefinitely.

Moreover, if a navigation error makes a Western missile land on a Russian kindergarten, it will add to international reputation damage for the West.

What appears obvious is that Joe Biden is determined to leave as complicated a foreign policy legacy to his successor as possible and disrupt Donald Trump’s ambitions to bring peace between Russia and Ukraine. The impression is that Russia is being provoked into a reckless response, making peace negotiations with Putin far too difficult—even for Trump. The upcoming president’s approach to the conflict is not based on Russia’s defeat, but it may be unable to withstand serious escalation. This is what Trump reportedly warned Putin against doing.

Thus, the U.S.-sanctioned strikes on Russia’s Kursk and Bryansk regions on November 19 and 21 presented Moscow with a dilemma: respond strongly and abandon the hopes for peace or swallow its pride and wait for two months until the inauguration. Given that Putin thrives on the premise that he does what he says, he cannot let a blow pass. Otherwise, the image of Russian strength would be tarnished, and its threats to the West would lack credibility. Putin had to act, at least out of “self-respect.”

Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) – Analysis

Jennifer DiMascio

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The U.S. Army is developing the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) to serve as a next-generation aircraft for vertical lift, air assault, maritime interdiction, aeromedical evacuation, combat search and rescue, humanitarian relief, and tactical resupply.

The Army intends for FLRAA to eventually replace the Sikorsky UH- 60 Black Hawk medium-utility helicopter, which was designed more than 50 years ago. Army Futures Command Commanding General James E. Rainey testified that the Army needs FLRAA to have the ability to fly twice as far and twice as fast as previous rotorcraft, a capability he called essential for operations in the Pacific region.

The Army is under contract with Textron Bell to build a FLRAA prototype of its V-280 demonstrator aircraft. The Administration has asked Congress for $1.26 billion for FLRAA research, development, test, and evaluation in FY2025 (see Table 1).

UH-60 Black Hawk

The Army plans to begin operating FLRAA in the 2030s and, in the meantime, continue to purchase Black Hawk helicopters. According to Army budget documents, the UH- 60M is “the Army’s utility helicopter for the near and midterm force,” supporting maneuver commanders in airassault, general support command and control, and aeromedical evacuation.

The Administration’s FY2025 budget request proposes continuing the purchase of 24 Black Hawks annually under a five-year contract that began in 2022 and ends in 2026. The service may also follow through on another multiyear proposal to purchase up to 255 UH-60s from FY2027 to FY2031. The Black Hawk is operated by at least 35 governments.