Indian Strategic Studies: May 2025

14 May 2025

India’s war on terror: Will the West ‘stand up or kneel to fear?’

Konstantinos Bogdanos

Kashmir burns, and war looms. After the April 22 terrorist massacre in Pahalgam, India strikes back, hammering nine Pakistani sites with “Operation Sindoor.” Pakistan’s airspace is shut, its leaders cry “act of war”, and nuclear sabres rattle. Will the West back India’s fight against Islamic terror, or choke on its own cowardice, scared of its Pakistani diaspora and trade deals, as China watches?

On April 22, 2025, 26 tourists -mostly Hindus- were slaughtered in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir. The Resistance Front, a Lashkar-e-Taiba proxy, initially claimed the attack, targeting non-Muslims. India blames Pakistan’s secret service, ISI, long accused of fuelling jihadist proxies. Since then, the Line of Control, the military line between the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of Kashmir, has erupted with skirmishes, drone shootdowns, and missile strikes. On May 6, India’s “Operation Sindoor” hit terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, killing militants but also civilians, per Pakistani claims. Pakistan vows a “robust response,” and war teeters on the edge.

India’s right to self-defence is ironclad. Like Israel battling Hamas or what America claimed after 9/11, India faces a terrorist enemy shielded by a state: Pakistan. The Pahalgam attack, a calculated atrocity, fits Pakistan’s “thousand cuts” strategy to destabilize India. Modi’s response -expelling diplomats, suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, closing borders, and now missile strikes- is not escalation. It is survival. Any nation would act to crush such threats. India’s military, under “complete operational freedom”, is doing just that.

Russia’s Plans Are Bigger Than Conflict With the West or Camaraderie With China

Sophia Nina Burna-Asefi

There is a serious disconnect between Western pundits and the reality on the ground when it comes to understanding the Kremlin’s thinking. The current popular narrative surrounding Russia and its neighbors boils down to the following: Moscow poses a threat to the purported liberal world order; Russia is “destined” to remain on the “sidelines” of global politics; Central Asia is a “battleground” for Russia, China, and the West; the Russian economy is being “crippled”; and finally, Russia is supposedly growing “dependent” on China.

There are two common ideas guiding these beliefs. First, Russia is simultaneously a powerful and influential giant and a weak actor. Second, the actions of Russia’s neighboring countries are subordinate to Moscow’s interests rather than intrinsically derived. But these narratives miss a big point: There are more layers of affect that shape the Kremlin’s thinking and its assessment of the so-called near abroad. The way to understand how Russia works is to try and get inside this longer-term mindset.

Putin’s Growing Interactions Along Its Southern and Eastern Borders Have Deep Roots

Despite the talk of an eventual peace in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin will continue to step up in countries neighboring Russia, and the West needs to be better prepared. Areas to Russia’s south and east are considered particularly important to Putin. Putin’s Look East policy was first introduced in 2012, and predates the two Ukrainian wars. In the same year Russia adopted a critical new law, the 2012 Federal Law, which for the first time set a clear definition of the Northern Sea Route and its geographical scope.

Senior Officers Are Not the "Villain"

Steve Wills

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s plan to cut 20% of four-star officers and 10% of the rest of the general and flag officer community is yet another in a long series to manage what has been perceived as an excess of senior military leaders in the U.S. armed forces.

Critics of current flag officer numbers some times compare current rosters of admirals and generals to the much smaller number of such leaders relative to enlisted personnel during the Second World War. Large numbers of flag and general officers have been said to reduce efficiency and limit warfighting potential. Having more admirals and generals produces more retired officers in those ranks who often get accused of trying to influence defense acquisition choices as members of corporate boards after they retire. The real villain in this process is not the senior officers but rather the explosion of joint and interagency staffs since the end of the Second World War, and especially since the inception of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. This growth in joint and interagency positions has in turn demanded a larger number of senior leaders to manage them. Any meaningful reductions in the general and admiral ranks must begin with a look at the staff swamp that created them.

China has spent billions developing military tech. Conflict between India and Pakistan could be its first major test

Nectar Gan, Simone McCarthy and Brad Lendon

The escalating conflict between India and Pakistan could be offering the world a first real glimpse into how advanced Chinese military technology performs against proven Western hardware – and Chinese defense stocks are already surging.

Shares of China’s AVIC Chengdu Aircraft rose 40% this week, as Pakistan claimed it used AVIC-produced J-10C fighter jets to shoot down Indian combat aircraft – including the advanced French-made Rafale – during an aerial battle on Wednesday.

India has not responded to Pakistan’s claims or acknowledged any aircraft losses. When asked about the involvement of Chinese-made jets, a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry said on Thursday he was not familiar with the situation.

Still, as Pakistan’s primary arms supplier, China is likely watching intently to find out how its weapon systems have and potentially will perform in real combat.

A rising military superpower, China hasn’t fought a major war in more than four decades. But under leader Xi Jinping, it has raced to modernize its armed forces, pouring resources into developing sophisticated weaponry and cutting-edge technologies.

Pakistan’s Best Chance to Save Its Economy

AASIM M. HUSAIN

As the military confrontation between Pakistan and India continues to rumble, Pakistan’s economy could be caught in the crossfire. Two weeks after a terrorist attack in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir, India launched a series of strikes on Pakistani territory. The ongoing crisis has fueled concerns that India may try to halt the flow of the Indus River into Pakistan – a threat that Pakistan’s struggling economy can ill afford.

Five decades ago, Pakistan had the strongest economy in South Asia, outperforming India, Bangladesh, and even Sri Lanka in terms of per capita income. Today, the opposite is the case: Pakistan’s per capita income is half that of its neighbors, and it trails them in education, health care, and most other development indicators. While macroeconomic mismanagement has contributed to this decline, an often overlooked – but equally significant – factor is rapid population growth.

When population growth outpaces income growth, per capita income falls. The long-term consequences are far-reaching: a larger population – especially one with a high dependency ratio – means lower household savings, less investment, and slower economic growth. Pakistan’s population has more than quadrupled over the past half-century, and 36% of its residents today are under 15 – far higher than the 22-25% share in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, where population growth has slowed dramatically in recent decades. As a result, the share of working-age Pakistanis remains below 60%, compared to just over two-thirds in the rest of South Asia.

Military Officers Respond to Stu Scheller

How do you mold and choose better senior leaders in the uniformed military? A very interesting problem.

The unrestricted line communities do a pretty good job teaching new members how to be good at their particular warfare area/platform. But good (heck any) training on leadership skills is sorely lacking. Three decades ago, they tried to turn Deming’s TQM into TQL (leadership) but it was an abysmal failure. They pulled the plug and gave up. I did get a very good two-week command leadership course on my way to O-5 command but that was it. The Navy needs a leadership continuum that is required from O-3 to O-6. Some online is OK but classroom is still the best place.

As far as creating better operational and strategic leaders, the Navy’s problem is with their war college. The Navy only requires one (O-4/O-5 course or senior O-5/O-6 course) and they only do that grudgingly because Goldwater Nichols requires it. The Navy still believes that “Sailors belong on ships and ships belong at sea,” that everything else is a waste of time, unless you’re surface warfare.

The Army’s bold plan needs to watch out for these three pitfalls

John Ferrari

As the Army prepares to celebrate its 250th birthday, it appears poised for major changes, bolder than the Marine Corps Force Design effort. And as with the Marine’s Force Design push, the Army is almost certain to see some dissent from those who stand to lose from the new paradigm.

As the service tries to move fast, change its organizational structure, and rapidly acquire and integrate drones and other advanced technology-enabled weapons, leadership will have to withstand that pressure and hold firm.

Change of this scope is only possible because of the alignment of power and money. Internally, the Army’s entire leadership team is uniquely aligned in a way they have not been since the late 1970s. Much of the plan was clearly under development by Gen. Randy George before the arrival of Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll, but the two have so far appeared in lockstep, and having the plan officially rolled out by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth gives them top cover support for changes.

Perhaps most importantly, Congress has voiced limited objections to these changes, such as the potential reduction to the Blackhawk and some ground vehicles, and within the $150B reconciliation package, Congress is providing broad and flexible funding that is essential to carry out the procurement, at scale, of drones, network technologies, and AI infrastructure.

13 May 2025

THE RISE OF THE MILITARY PARTNERSHIP AMONG RUSSIA, CHINA, AND NORTH KOREA

YOUNGJUN KIM

Over the past decade, realism has dominated the international order. This is particularly true in Northeast Asia, where an arms race is escalating between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States, Russia, and Japan. As the international community continues its efforts to resolve the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, it is preparing for the possibility that the next crisis might begin in Northeast Asia.

During the Biden administration, the ROK-U.S. alliance emphasized extended deterrence to preclude any need for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal, while the historic Camp David Summit strengthened the trilateral security partnership between the United States, the ROK, and Japan. Although the Trump administration has so far reaffirmed U.S. support for this trilateral security partnership, the possibility of another summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un is a wild card in U.S.-ROK relations.

Trump says US-China relations 'reset' as markets surge on tariff pause

Jenna Moon

Pause in tariffs as US and China set to continue negotiations

Following months of back-and-forth tariff escalation, US and Chinese officials announced this morning that they would reduce levies on each other's goods for 90 days and start a new round of trade negotiations.

Both sides are set to slash tariffs by 115% starting from Wednesday - with US tariffs on Chinese products falling to 30% and China's reciprocal tariffs on the US falling to 10%. You can read more about the deal in our earlier post.

The announcement gave global stock markets a boost, with US markets in particular seeing a significant surge. This follows major losses after Trump's initial "Liberation Day" tariff announcement last month.

Our New York Business Correspondent Natalie Sherman reports that the share prices for companies bringing goods from China are, unsurprisingly, going up.

Later in the day, Trump struck a triumphant tone in a statement from the White House, during which he said his administration had achieved a "total reset with China".

U.S. and China Agree on Tariff Pause in Major Trade War Rollback

Callum Sutherland and Nik Popli

The U.S. and China agreed on Monday to significantly reduce tariffs on each other for an initial 90-day period in a major breakthrough in the trade war between the world’s two largest economies.

Coming into effect on Wednesday, May 14, both countries will reduce tariffs on the other by 115% for that initial period, according to U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. That effectively means that U.S. tariffs on Chinese exports will come down to 30%, while Chinese tariffs on American goods will climb down to 10%.

The higher U.S. rate is because 20% tariffs applied in February and March, which President Donald Trump said was in response to the flow of fentanyl, will remain in effect.

“They’ll be rewarded by not having to pay hundreds of billions of dollars in tariffs, so the fentanyl should stop," Trump told reporters after the announcement, adding that he intended to speak to President Xi this week.

"There's a big incentive for China to stop and I take them at their word they're going to work on that, I think, very hard."

China’s cybereconomic warfare

Newt Gingrich

Imagine what would happen if the lights suddenly went out in Taiwan. Its economy would grind to a halt. Food supplies would rot without refrigeration. Infrastructure systems wouldn’t function. Hospital patients would perish as vital machines shut down.

The island nation would essentially be decimated — not from bombs or missiles but from of cyberattacks and supply disruptions. That’s the scenario Adm. Mark Montgomery laid out for me in a recent episode of my podcast, “Newt’s World.”

Adm. Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He’s a seasoned national security expert with extensive experience in cybersecurity and defense policy. His insights on China’s growing cyber capabilities are timely and important. We had a remarkable conversation.

As Adm. Montgomery said on the podcast, China may never need to invade Taiwan militarily. Instead, he explained, “they could use cyberattacks, economic pressure and information warfare to bring Taiwan under control without ever firing a shot.”

Weaponizing the Electromagnetic Spectrum: The PRC’s High-powered Microwave Warfare Ambitions

Tin Pak & Yu-cheng Chen

The PRC broke new ground in its high-powered microwave (HPM) technology this past year. At the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2024—a biennial expo that is a major platform for showcasing advances in the aerospace industry–the PLA showcased at least three novel HPM ground-based weapons. These reportedly included the newly designed anti-drone Hurricane 2000 and Hurricane 3000 model HPMs (Foreign Military Studies Office, February 26). The third HPM system was the FK-4000, an anti-drone platform capable of precision single-point attacks and intercepting drone swarms, according to its designer, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) (CASC, November 12, 2024). These new weapon systems build upon rapid improvements in HPM industrial-programming software and the development of mobile-platform HPM systems.

The growing investment in HPM technology underscores the People Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategic emphasis on asymmetric capabilities. As an asymmetric weapon capable of quickly disabling an adversary’s electronic systems, HPMs target the central nodes that hold technologically advanced militaries together, making them a critical weapon in future conflicts. The PLA’s pursuit of HPM capabilities aligns with its broader strategic objectives and contributes to its vision of informatized and intelligentized warfare.

A Thousand Ways of Being Chinese

Gina Anne Tam

Western commentators frequently speak of Chinese identity in sweeping generalizations. They encompass cultural norms (that Chinese people all speak Mandarin, revere their elders, or celebrate the Lunar New Year); philosophy (that Chinese people think in “centuries” rather than years); and governance (that Chinese people prefer alternatives to democratic governance because they think collectively). A common theme links these tropes: the idea that the Chinese people are a singular mass, unified in belief, culture, and politics.

These presumptions of unity aren’t confined to foreign commentators. They are also actively promoted by the Chinese leadership. For Xi Jinping, and the party leadership as a whole, Chinese identity is unified and narrow, defined by the conflation of a cultural Chinese identity, national Chinese citizenship, and loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party. As Xi proclaimed in his 2018 speech to the National People’s Congress, “Over the past thousands of years, the Chinese people have been united.”

What Role for China in Ukraine?

THOMAS GRAHAM and ZONGYUAN ZOE LIU

The sight of Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting the Kremlin for Russia’s World War II Victory Day parade has rekindled the idea that China might finally pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine. But it has been more than three years since Russia invaded its neighbor, and little suggests that China is willing to support good-faith peace negotiations.

Trump’s Middle East Visit: A Calculated Power Play In The New Geopolitical Normal – Analysis

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh

President Donald Trump’s planned visit to the Middle East from May 13 to 16 is far more than a symbolic tour—it is a deliberate power maneuver shaped by economic urgencies at home, global geopolitical flux, and the enduring centrality of Gulf states to US strategy in the region. While the visit’s formal itinerary may remain diplomatically vague, the underlying objectives reveal a carefully calibrated agenda: securing economic relief, reinforcing political optics, and tightening the US grip on its most reliable Gulf allies, namely Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia.

These three countries are not only pillars of regional stability but also serve as functional proxies for US power projection without the costs of direct military involvement. From energy leverage and financial liquidity to regional conflict mediation, each of these states offers unique assets that Trump is likely determined to harness. But in doing so, he must navigate a minefield of competing agendas, rising global multipolarity, and shifting loyalties, especially amid the growing influence of China and the complex role of Russia.

America First, Gulf Funded

Trump’s foremost concern remains domestic: he must return to DC brandishing tangible wins to validate his “America First” doctrine. With inflationary pressures mounting due to tariff policies, Trump is keen to showcase deals that funnel Gulf wealth into the US economy. This includes multi-billion-dollar investment commitments from Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. Unlike previous administrations that emphasized diplomatic nuance, Trump is less interested in long-term statecraft and more focused on the transactionality of foreign policy.

The Israel-Iran Nuclear Rivalry: Can War Be Prevented?

Assaf Zoran

Over the past eighteen months, tensions in the Middle East have escalated dramatically. The launch of hundreds of missiles from Iranian territory toward central Israel and F-35 jets striking near Tehran last year marked some of the most critical moments of the regional confrontation that began on October 7, 2023. Now, Tehran and Jerusalem are on a trajectory that risks further escalation in an already volatile regional conflict. At the center of this tension remains Iran’s nuclear program, seen as an existential threat by Israel and a major regime safeguard in Iran.

The debate is not over whether Iran should be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons but over how. To assess the best path forward and its impact on Iran-Israel relations, three main scenarios should be considered.

The first and most probable is a partial nuclear agreement, which may temporarily curb escalation but risks renewed hostilities without additional leveraging. The second, a comprehensive nuclear resolution, could significantly reduce tensions but remains unlikely due to time constraints and the wide gap between U.S. desires and Iran’s willingness to compromise. The third, an Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear program, becomes increasingly probable in the absence of any agreement over the next months.

PERSUASION AND ITS LIMITS A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SOFT POWER

JENNA GIBSON

In his groundbreaking 2004 book on soft power, Joseph Nye described the concept of soft power in a deceptively simple way: “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it.” At first glance, the idea that a country can get what it wants in the world without resorting to the costly and dangerous realm of more traditional, “hard” power, is incredibly appealing. However, in the decades since, scholars and policymakers alike have realized that the concept is more complicated than it first appears. What are the “outcomes” that a state might want to achieve through soft power? What values and examples do they want to share, and who is open to those same values? Who is persuadable, and under what circumstances?

Because of its nebulous nature, those who study soft power, as well as those who want to wield it, run the risk of losing track of the actual goals and potential outcomes at play. This commentary will focus on four practical considerations for thinking about when, and how, to implement a strategy to cultivate soft power. I then conclude with a discussion of how these considerations have at times facilitated, and at other times frustrated, soft-power diplomacy between the United States and South Korea.

Joseph Nye Was the Champion of a World That No Longer Exists

Suzanne Nossel

It is poignant yet perhaps fitting to mourn Joseph Nye, the distinguished international relations scholar, just as his life’s work championing U.S. leadership and liberal internationalism has run aground in U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term.

Nye, who coined the term “soft power,” died at the age of 88 on Tuesday. His intellectual leadership, teaching, policy guidance, and diplomatic efforts shaped five decades of U.S. foreign policy. His thinking also molded the U.S. foreign-policy establishment—the collective of scholars, think tankers, officials, and civil society leaders that Ben Rhodes, a former advisor to President Barack Obama, once derisively labeled “the Blob.”

Economists warn Trump's research cuts could have dire consequences for GDP

Geoff Brumfiel

The International Space Station serves as an orbiting scientific laboratory where astronauts conduct experiments. The Trump administration has proposed cutting its budget by roughly $500 million and reducing research at the outpost.AP/Roscosmos Space Agency Press Service

When Casey Dreier saw President Trump's proposed budget for NASA, he couldn't believe the numbers.

"This is the worst NASA budget I've seen in my lifetime," says Dreier, the chief of space policy for the Planetary Society, a nonprofit that advocates for space exploration.

The budget proposes deep cuts for NASA's Science Mission Directorate, which oversees everything from telescopes peering deep into space to robotic probes exploring planets like Mars. Many of these projects cost billions of dollars to build and launch, but the budget cuts are so deep "that it will require NASA to turn off active spacecraft that are producing good science for pennies on the dollar for what the U.S. taxpayer paid for them," Dreier says.

It's not just spacecraft — Trump's proposed budget for the federal government would switch off huge swaths of America's scientific enterprise. The National Science Foundation (NSF) would be slashed in half. The National Institutes of Health would lose $17 billion in funding. Other agencies like the Energy Department, the U.S. Geological Survey and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration would all see deep cuts totaling billions of dollars.

Neocentaur: A Model for Cognitive Evolution Across the Levels of War

William J. Barry and Blair Wilcox

The US Army is at an inflection point. Geostrategic and technological shifts are requiring rapid adaptation. On May 1, the secretary of the Army and the Army chief of staff published a letter to the force recognizing several initiatives to deliver warfighting capabilities, optimize force structure, and eliminate waste. Among the guidance to increase warfighting lethality, the Army’s seniormost civilian and uniformed leaders noted the requirement to shift toward capability-based portfolios that integrate AI into command-and-control nodes to accelerate decision-making and preserve the initiative. At the US Army War College, new approaches to AI capabilities are both a concept and a reality. The neocentaur model, which describes human-hybrid intelligence across the levels of war, has been tested in the classroom and in strategic wargaming. Furthermore, our ongoing research presents a technical solution, presenting deterministic AI capabilities that are more suitable for military use when lives are on the line. To maintain military superiority, the United States must adopt a human-hybrid approach—the neocentaur model—that leverages deterministic models, rather than purely generative, to mitigate the risks of cognitive atrophy and formulaic decision-making.

Indo-Pacific Chessboard: Strategic Importance Of Indo-Pacific, Quad Alliance, And Maritime Power Plays – Analysis

Murray Hunter

The Indo-Pacific is generally regarded as a US construct covering the Indian Ocean from the African Coast, the western and central Pacific Ocean, to the seas and straits connecting the two oceans. As such, the Indo-Pacific includes nations such as Korea and Japan, down to Australia, south-east Asia, India, Pakistan, and the Persian and Arabian Gulfs. China features in the centre of the Indo-Pacific, and as such the Indo-Pacific paradigm is used as a template to view contested primacy. Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s speech in 2007, around the time when the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) began. The term became commonly used during the Trump 1.0 presidency.

US foreign and defence policy within the Indo-Pacific has been based upon the perception of US primacy within the region, in tandem with its allies including Japan, South Korea, and Australia. It’s only in this generation that US primacy is challenged by the rise of China into the South China Sea. This began in 2013, when the Tianjing dredger was sent to Cuarteron Reef to reclaim land to build a military base. A number have been built since around the Spratly Islands, and surrounding reefs, reflecting the Nine-Dash-Line protruding as far south as the coast of northern Borneo, that is seen by China as within their sphere of influence.

Are the U.S. and Europe Digital Allies or Adversaries?

Paul J. Saunders

As the global economy pivots toward digital innovation and AI supremacy, tensions are mounting not just between rivals like the U.S. and China, but also among traditional allies. In a panel discussion hosted by The National Interest on May 8, policy experts unpacked both the growing friction and potential cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union over tech policy.

The panel featured Yaël Ossowski of the Consumer Choice Center and Paul Steidler of the Lexington Institute. Moderated by Paul Saunders, president of the Center for the National Interest, the conversation provided a candid picture of a fragmented but interdependent transatlantic tech landscape.

Ossowski opened the discussion with a blunt assessment of U.S.-EU digital friction. While Europe advances sweeping tech regulations like the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, American firms such as Google, Apple, and Meta are finding themselves hit with growing compliance costs and regulatory penalties. “We have fines that have now been issued against most of the major American tech companies,” Ossowski explained. “At the same time, Trump is using the stick of trade relationships to protect American companies.”

The Twilight of Bretton Woods

GIANCARLO CORSETTI

This year’s annual spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank began with quiet fears that US President Donald Trump’s administration would seek to fatally undermine them. They ended with both institutions being sternly rebuked by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent for their increasing concern with climate change and diversity, but also with a sigh of relief that they had survived to fight for development another day.

Unwitting Pawns: Companies Are on the Front Lines of a New Global Conflict

Zev Faintuch

Today’s security landscape reflects threat convergence — a reality where no catastrophe remains localized and the lines between physical and cyber threats and war and peace blur. The result is a cascade of globally interconnected crises, accelerated by the splintering of the American-led order that has dominated geopolitics since 1945. A shipping disruption in the Suez, a pathogen outbreak in Eastern China, a terrorist attack in Southern Israel or even a policy U-turn in Washington — any of these events, once contained by geography or bureaucratic inertia, can now trigger sector-wide disruptions and boardroom emergencies. Conflict now extends beyond governments and nation-states, placing businesses of every size on the front lines.

Pawns of grand strategy

Using companies for mercantilist or geopolitical ends is nothing new. From colonial-era trade monopolies to Cold War-era technology embargoes, states have historically leveraged corporations as instruments of economic warfare. However, today’s efforts to undermine other nations do not stop with overt economic methods. A rising number of insidious attacks have recently taken place using tools such as arson, sabotage, ransomware, hacking or damaging infrastructure and even assassination. These irregular warfare tactics have blurred the distinction between war and peace, placing the boardroom on the front line of conflict.

What Is Strategy in War?

John Spencer & Liam Collins

In both popular discourse and professional military circles, few terms are more misused than “strategy.” It is invoked to describe everything from battlefield maneuvers to national policy, often without clarity or consistency. As military historian Hew Strachan warned in The Lost Meaning of Strategy, the word has become so elastic that it risks losing all analytical value. Too often, strategy is confused with a plan, a clever idea, or even just decisive action. But in war, strategy is something far more foundational—and far more consequential. It is not about how militaries fight, but why they fight, what they aim to achieve, and how armed force serves political purpose.

In the civilian world, “strategy” is often used interchangeably with planning—marketing strategies, business strategies, campaign strategies. But in the realm of statecraft and war, this understanding is far too narrow. Despite Strachan’s call for conceptual precision, even within the field of strategic studies, no universally accepted definition exists. Consider some of the leading definitions cited in Strategy in the Contemporary World:

“(is) the use of engagements for the object of war.” — Carl von Clausewitz
“the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.” — Basil Liddell Hart
“a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.” — Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley

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Kashmir’s forgotten war goes global

Suzanne Raine

Of all the misnomers, ‘frozen conflict’ signally falls short as a description of the situation in Kashmir since the partition of India in 1947. The UK, which bears historic responsibility for the unresolved division, is also uniquely close to the conflict since a significant number of Pakistani Kashmiris are UK citizens or dual nationals. This latest outbreak of hostilities was always going to happen; until a resolution is found, Kashmir will continue to inspire and foster terrorist acts and remain one of the core grievances in the Islamist narrative. It will define and disrupt not only the relationship between Pakistan and India but also between the other states of South Asia.

Shortly after 1am on the morning of Wednesday 7 May, India launched strikes on Bahawalpur and Muridke in Pakistani Punjab and on Kotli, Bagh and Muzaffarabad in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Indian military statements have said they targeted bases linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HuM), in response to the 22 April terrorist attack by five armed militants on tourists in Pahalgam which killed 26, and has been attributed to the Resistance Front, considered to be associated with LeT. It is worth looking in more detail at why these locations were chosen by India.

Under the Nuclear Shadow: India and Pakistan in Open Conflict

Fabian Hoffmann

On May 10, at approximately 14:00 CET, Donald Trump announced via social media that Pakistan and India had agreed to an immediate ceasefire, bringing a halt — at least temporarily — to a dangerously escalating conflict in South Asia.

Major hostilities began on 7 May when India launched a series of airstrikes — code-named Operation Sindoor — in retaliation for terrorist attacks the previous month that killed 26 people (see my assessment of the operation here). In the days that followed, India and Pakistan exchanged fire, including further airstrikes and drone attacks on military infrastructure. Targets included ground-based air defense systems, likely with the aim of suppressing enemy air defenses to pave the way for a broader air campaign.

On the night of 10 May, India carried out a larger wave of strikes on Pakistani military infrastructure, hitting three air bases: Nur Khan (near Islamabad), Murid, and Shorkot. In response, Pakistan initiated Operation Bunyan Ul Marsoos, striking Indian military targets including airbases in Pathankot and Udhampur, as well as what Pakistani officials described as a missile storage facility for Indian BrahMos cruise missiles. Both sides appear to have employed drones and cruise missiles in these attacks; imagery suggests that Pakistan also used Fateh-1 short-range ballistic missiles. In the early hours of 10 May, reports emerged that Pakistan had convened the National Command Authority, which is responsible for operational decisions regarding its nuclear arsenal. The Pakistani defense minister later denied these reports.

Indian Defense Firm Says It Did Not Resell U.K. Technology to Russia

Jane Bradley

An Indian defense company says that it did not resell sensitive technology to Russia that was supplied by one of the biggest corporate donors to the populist Reform U.K. party.

The New York Times reported in March that, according to 2023 and 2024 shipping records, the British aerospace manufacturer H.R. Smith Group exported equipment to India that had been flagged as critical to Russian weapon systems. That included transmitters, cockpit equipment and antennas.

The Indian company, Hindustan Aeronautics, is the biggest trading partner of the Russian arms agency Rosoboronexport.

Hindustan Aeronautics did not respond to repeated requests for comment, but a lawyer for H.R. Smith recently provided The Times with a statement from Hindustan Aeronautics staying that the British equipment was not sold to Russia. The statement was dated a week after the Times article was published and received coverage in India.

That aligns with the account of H.R. Smith Group, which said that its sales were lawful and that the equipment was used in an Indian search-and-rescue network. The parts “support lifesaving operations” and are “not designed for military use,” said Nick Watson, a lawyer for the company.

India’s missile attack shows that managing an India-Pakistan crisis is easier said than done

Syed Ali Zia Jaffery

A day after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged India and Pakistan to de-escalate tensions following the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, US Vice President JD Vance said the “hope here is that India responds to this terrorist attack in a way that doesn’t lead to a broader regional conflict.” Vance also said he hoped “that Pakistan, to the extent that they are responsible, cooperates with India to make sure that the terrorists sometimes operating in their territory are hunted down and dealt with.”

But on Tuesday, in what it code-named Operation Sindoor, India fired missiles at multiple sites in Pakistan, claiming that those sites were “terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir from where terrorist attacks against India have been planned and directed.” According to a report in The Guardian newspaper, no Pakistani military sites were targeted.

Before the missile attack, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave full operational freedom to the Indian military to avenge the Pahalgam attack, which killed 26 people in the portion of Kashmir controlled by India. In a statement, India’s armed forces claimed they had “demonstrated considerable restraint” in Tuesday’s missile attack, but Pakistan has vowed to give a befitting response to any Indian aggression. After India’s missile attack, Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper cited Pakistani Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry as saying: “Let me say it unequivocally: Pakistan will respond to this at a time and place of its own choosing. This heinous provocation will not go unanswered.”

How India and Pakistan Can Pull Back From the Brink

Ravi Agrawal

India and Pakistan are once again at each other’s throats. Following a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22, New Delhi launched coordinated attacks this week that struck deeper into Pakistani territory than at any point in the last five decades. Islamabad is now threatening to retaliate. An optimistic reading of the situation could be that this has all happened before: The two rivals fought full-scale wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 and have engaged in several major skirmishes since the 1990s, when they declared themselves as nuclear powers. In each case, and especially since enjoying the shield of a nuclear deterrent, the two nations found ways to eventually pull back and accept a stalemate over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

There is a more worrying prospect this time around. The world in 2025 looks very different than it did before: The United States appears disinterested in new foreign wars, major powers are tied up in conflicts on other continents, and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations have seen their credibility erode. As a result, international mediation that was instrumental in years past now seems less meaningful. India and Pakistan have also followed sharply different trajectories since their last serious conflict in 1999. At the turn of the millennium, India’s GDP was about five times that of Pakistan. Today, it is nearly 11 times larger. Greater economic clout has not led to a commensurate military advantage for India, but it has fanned a heady confidence among its citizens, along with a clamor for action. Israel’s overwhelming response to the Oct. 7, 2023, attack led by Hamas has also strengthened New Delhi’s assessment that other powers can’t—or won’t—stop it from exercising its right to defend itself. In Pakistan, meanwhile, the usually quiet army chief, Asim Munir, has become increasingly public-facing, suggesting a military climbdown may be more difficult to accomplish.

A Tale of Four Fighter Jets - Analysis

Rishi Iyengar

A terrorist attack takes place in Indian-administered Kashmir. India blames Pakistan and vows to retaliate. A few days later, India conducts airstrikes in Pakistani territory, the two sides exchange fire, and one side claims it shot down the other’s fighter jets.

That could either be describing events that took place in 2019, or events that took place this week.

Why Gulf States, More Than the U.S., Are Key to Prevent War Between India and Pakistan

Charlie Campbell

The crisis embroiling India and Pakistan continues to spiral. Pakistan’s military claims to have killed 40 to 50 Indian troops along their de facto border in Kashmir and downed 29 Indian drones during Thursday night and Friday morning, in response to India striking multiple locations in Pakistan on Wednesday that it claimed were “terrorist camps.”

The current unrest was sparked by last month’s deadly terrorist attack on tourists in the India-controlled part of the restive region of Kashmir, which left 25 Indians and one Nepali national dead. New Delhi has pinned the bloodshed on Islamabad, which denies complicity and called for an independent investigation. But with both sides blaming the other for every escalation, full blown war appears worryingly close.

On Thursday, Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir stood atop a tank during a military exercise to address his troops. “Let there be no ambiguity,” he said. “Any military misadventure by India will be met with a swift, resolute, and notch-up response.”

For Bharat Karnad, an emeritus professor in national security studies at New Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research, everything rests on Munir, who’s “something of a hot head,” he says. “He’s a Quranic literalist, one of the true believers, who’s spoken about Ghazwa-e-Hind,” referring to a holy war against India mentioned in the Hadith.

Orders for Pahalgam satellite images from US firm peaked two months before attack

Soumya Pillai

Two months before terrorists killed 26 people in Kashmir, a top US-based space tech company saw an unprecedented spike in orders for high-resolution satellite images of Pahalgam and its surrounding areas. Between 2 and 22 February 2025, at least 12 orders—double the usual number—were placed with Maxar Technologies, whose roster of clients includes government and defence agencies across the world. Orders for Pahalgam satellite images started appearing on the portal in June 2024, just months after Maxar acquired a new partner: A Pakistan-based geo-spatial company linked to federal crimes in the US.

The data does not show whether the orders for Pahalgam satellite images were placed by the Pakistani firm, Business Systems International Pvt Ltd (BSI). But defence analysts and experts as well as scientists that ThePrint spoke to said the coincidence cannot be dismissed given the track record of the company’s founder, Obaidullah Syed.

The Pakistani-American businessman was found guilty and sentenced to a year in prison by a US federal court for illegally exporting high-performance computer equipment and software application solutions from America to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) — the agency that designs and tests high explosives and nuclear weapon parts, and develops solid-fuelled ballistic missiles.

Xi shows he wants to be close to Putin - but not too close

Laura Bicker

Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin make it look like they're the best of friends.

Xi took his place at the right-hand side of Putin, the position of a steadfast ally, as their troops marched together on Red Square as part of Moscow's Victory Day parade.

Hours earlier, Xi described the bond between the two countries as "unbreakable" and added that Russia and China should be "friends of steel".

This is Xi's 11th visit to Russia since becoming president in 2013 and the two leaders have met on more than 40 occasions.

Putin has already announced plans to visit China in the autumn and the two leaders have even, in the past, shared a rare public hug.

But there is more to this relationship than meets the eye.

"We see a lot of exchanges between the two men and patriotic displays of togetherness," said Mathieu Boulegue, from the Center for European Policy Analysis.

China’s exploitation of overseas ports and bases

Thomas X. Hammes

Introduction

This paper examines the potential for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to exploit its growing network of overseas ports and bases to challenge control of the seas in a conventional war with the United States. Security concerns with Chinese ownership of overseas ports fall into three main categories. First, China collects vast amounts of intelligence via its port network. Second, it could use that intelligence and its control of key ports and piers to disrupt US shipments during wartime. Finally, China could leverage these ports to pre-position weapons, ammunition, and equipment to resupply its warships and armed merchants or rapidly establish anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) nodes near major maritime choke points. In short, China could exploit this network to challenge the sea control essential to US success in an armed conflict.

This paper does not speculate on why the United States and China might enter a global conflict. In fact, current Chinese writings indicate China does not seek a global confrontation. Rather, Chinese strategic literature reflects a preference for winning without fighting and, if forced to fight, fighting one local enemy at a time after politically isolating that enemy.

As with all future papers, this one starts with assumptions. It then examines China’s current network of overseas ports and its expansion of that network. The rationale behind China’s pursuit of overseas ports is explored through an analysis of Chinese strategic vulnerabilities. This paper considers three potential applications for these bases, including an improbable worst-case scenario, to assess how China may exploit this advantage.

Trump Is Undermining 3 Key US Advantages Over China

Gabriele Manca

In recent decades, China has changed at an extraordinary pace, so quickly that many have struggled to keep up with its transformation. Many people, especially those over 50, often cling to an outdated perception of China. If you ask them what they think of the country, they will likely mention cheap, low-quality products produced by millions of factory workers. In their eyes, China is still the world’s toy workshop, the land of copycat products and low-end manufacturing. That may still be true in part, but it is now only a small fragment of a much larger picture.

China continues to be the factory of the world, as its near-trillion-dollar trade surplus in 2024 attests. But it is also a technological superpower, leading the world in strategic sectors that define both the present and the future: batteries, electric vehicles, green technology, 5G, advanced nuclear reactors, and more. It now produces more active patents and top-cited scientific publications each year than the United States. China indeed remains behind the U.S. when it comes to “zero-to-one” innovation – creating something entirely new from scratch. But it has become extraordinarily effective at advancing innovation, refining and scaling ideas that originate elsewhere. To describe China today merely as a country that copies the West is not just inaccurate; it is dangerously simplistic. China is now a powerhouse in manufacturing, technology, and innovation.

China-US AI Technology Competition: Who’s Winning in Key Inputs?

Sara Hsu

After China revealed its own homegrown large-language model, DeepSeek, in January 2025, the artificial intelligence (AI) competition intensified. Much of the conversation on this new technology has focused on semiconductors or model speeds, but the race is very much dependent on several upstream factors: energy, rare earth elements, and talent. These critical inputs into the AI industry face vastly different structures in the two countries and may determine the pace and scale of AI innovation.

Energy: Powering the AI Revolution

AI models use massive amounts of energy to power their computations. Ensuring a consistent and growing energy supply to power data centers and cool servers is now an essential part of national AI strategies. The United States and China have different energy ecosystems, with alternative methods of pricing, regulating, and sustaining energy for AI endeavors.

Due to increasing investment in electricity generation, the energy requirements of AI data centers have placed a great amount of pressure on local power grids. A notable incident occurred in July 2024, when 60 data centers in Northern Virginia were disconnected from the grid due to a surge protector failure. This incident forced operators to rapidly reduce power generation to prevent widespread outages, and demonstrated the challenges that utilities face in providing data centers with growing amounts of power.

Europe cannot remain on the sidelines in Gaza

Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff

Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff is the former EU ambassador to the Palestinian Territory.

Since Hamas’ brutal Oct. 7 attack on Israel, and the devastating war in Gaza that’s followed, tens of thousands of Palestinians have been killed and much of the Strip now lies in ruin.

EU leaders have issued countless calls to respect international law and pursue a two-state solution — but when it comes to action, the bloc has been largely absent. A “paper tiger” loud in rhetoric but toothless in practice, it wasn’t even invited to ceasefire or hostage negotiations.

And Europe’s failure to step up carries serious geopolitical costs.

The bloc’s marginalization on Gaza is partly self-inflicted, as it settled for being a payer of aid rather than a diplomatic player. It poured billions into assistance for Palestine and offered routine support for a two-state solution, while shying away from putting political pressure on Israel.

Meanwhile, Brussels gave Israel unfettered access to its market without seeking to leverage to push for the end of Israel’s occupation of Palestine and sustainable peace.

Simply put, aid and trade became Europe’s default instead of hard diplomacy — a far cry from the geopolitical role trumpeted in the Lisbon Treaty.

Ukrainian soldier says ground robots are great for attacks because they carry far more explosive power than flying drones

Sinéad Baker

Ukrainian soldiers use ground robots to blow up Russian troops and equipment. These carry a far heavier explosive payload than drones that fly.

Operators control these uncrewed ground vehicles, or UGVs, remotely. The UGVs can travel close to Russian positions, assuming they're not spotted, and detonate. And Ukraine's soldiers can stay safe and far from the action. They are a lot like flying drones, but the systems pack a greater punch because they don't take flight.

Oleksandr Yabchanka, the head of the robotic systems for Ukraine's Da Vinci Wolves Battalion, told Business Insider that Ukraine's soldiers attach bombs and explosives to ground robots, "turning that system into a kamikaze one."

The UGV actions mirror what has been done with aerial drones in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, where the flying drones explode and drop grenades.

"A crucial difference between aerial and on-the-ground unmanned systems is the mass that they can carry," Yabchanka said. He said Ukraine needs to "always be one step, half a step ahead of the enemy in terms of the powers of destruction." That's where these ground drones come into play.

Try and try again! Ukraine’s AI drones defeat Russian electronic warfare in new Kursk offensive

David Axe

Inside Ukraine’s new surprise offensive in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, an unassuming plywood drone is going after another Russian howitzer. Don’t let its simplicity fool you—this German-made HF-1 packs sophisticated AI that finds and strikes targets even when Russian jammers block radio signals.

It’s the third attempt to hit this particular Msta-S self-propelled howitzer’s hatch, with two previous 11-kg, AI-steered drones already lying destroyed beside the 47-ton vehicle.

The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces’ 413th Battalion posted this remarkable footage Tuesday, showing a series of precision strikes on Russian military equipment in Kursk Oblast in western Russia.

One particularly strategic hit by the battalion’s HF-1 drones targeted the hatch of a Msta-S self-propelled howitzer, a potential weak point on the mobile artillery system.

It was a tricky maneuver, as made clear by the remains of two other HF-1s lying beside the howitzer—and visible in the third drone’s forward-facing camera in the moment before that drone struck.

Both Xi and Trump Want the Other to Call Them First - Analysis

Bob Davis

As if U.S.-China relations weren’t complicated enough, the two sides are also squaring off over which side will lose face in their trade battle. In the United States, the Chinese concern about saving face is usually dismissed as pride—but U.S. President Donald Trump has made a career out of insisting that he get the upper hand in relations.

That’s a very Western form of face, according to scholars, who characterize it as the need for “honor” or individual triumph at the expense of someone else.

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