6 May 2022

Gauging the Gap: The Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap – A Strategic Assessment

Nick Childs
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With the end of the Cold War, the waters that form the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, or GIUK Gap, fell into strategic neglect. However, they have come back into focus with the revival of great-power competition and in the context of a resurgent and aggressive Russia and NATO and the West’s attempts to respond. At the same time, significant geopolitical, climatic and technological developments mean that the defence and security challenges that the Gap represents need to be re-evaluated. This paper aims to assess how the GIUK Gap fits into the strategic context now and into the future and what that means in terms of future strategy and capability requirements.

After a long period of post Cold War neglect, the maritime transit route that became famous during the Cold War as the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom, or GIUK, Gap has come very much back into focus in the context of both a resurgent Russia and NATO’s subsequent efforts to respond. Moreover, the fallout from the Ukraine war seems likely to plunge Russian and NATO/Western relations into a new and prolonged deep-freeze. At the same time, significant geostrategic, geo-economic, technological and climatic developments mean that the defence and security challenges that the Gap represents – and the capability requirements that it may generate – need to be re-evaluated.

The Character of War Is Constantly Changing

Captain Gerard Roncolato

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face daunting times, particularly with the return of great power competition. The known is becoming unknown; the predictable, unpredictable. Surprise at every level is likely—technical, tactical, operational, strategic. Organizations and people who can rapidly and effectively adapt are more likely to prevail; those who cannot, will fail. This, perhaps, is why the old warning not to fight the last war should resonate.2

Prevailing against the capable and powerful opponents that are emerging demands the Department of the Navy (DoN) up its game—it must get better at all aspects of war, from political and strategic thinking through plans and procurement to tactics and techniques. Getting better means thinking and doing differently. Business as usual will no longer suffice.

Assessing the Solomon Islands’ new security agreement with China

Euan Graham
China’s new security agreement with the Solomon Islands has sparked controversy and garnered attention far beyond the relatively remote Southwest Pacific. Dr Euan Graham examines the drivers and implications for the major actors in this strategically sensitive location.

In April, China’s foreign ministry confirmed that Beijing had signed a minimum five-year security agreement with the Solomon Islands. The deal, which Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare described as a ‘treaty’ to the Solomon Islands Parliament, has not been made public. But it is thought to be close to a version leaked from within the Solomon Islands government in late March. The implications of the agreement are far-reaching, most importantly for China, the Solomon Islands, Australia and the United States.

Pakistani Writer Akbar Jan Marwat Discusses The Role Of Non-Jihadi Terror Groups In Baluchistan, Says: 'The New Crop Of Baluchi Insurgents Are Politically Radicalized And Are Striving To Convert A Tribal Uprising Into A Full-Fledged Guerrilla War'

On April 26, 2022, a female suicide bomber of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), one of the many non-jihadi terror organizations fighting for the independence of Baluchistan province from Pakistan, carried out an attack killing three Chinese academics inside the Karachi University campus. The BLA, which claimed the April 26 attack, identified the female suicide bomber as Shari Baloch aka Bramsh.

This might be one of the few suicide bombings by a Baluchi secessionist groups, which are secular and democratic in attitude, and certainly the first suicide bombing by a woman fidayee (i.e., martyrdom-seeking) bomber. In Baluchistan, two types of terror groups are active: secular Baluchi rebel groups and jihadi organizations like the Islamic State's (ISIS) Khurasan branch and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (the Movement of Pakistani Taliban, TTP).

Russia Futures: Three Trajectories

Andrew Lohsen

Beginning in 2018, the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS initiated a research project to explore scenarios related to Russia’s future development and to consider the transatlantic implications of each scenario. The project, which was generously funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, was intended to provide policymakers with an understanding of how Russia’s domestic political situation, economic outlook, military activities, and foreign policy might evolve in response to modern-day challenges including climate change, growing competition in the Arctic, and the fraught relationship between China and the collective West.

Based on original research and workshops involving U.S., Norwegian, and European experts, CSIS identified three potential scenarios for Russia’s future development. The first scenario envisioned a path of continuity, in which Russian leaders strove to maintain the status quo. The second scenario foresaw a trend of risk reduction in the Kremlin’s decisionmaking that led to a partial normalization of relations with the West. The third scenario considered a darker future, in which Russian leaders accepted a higher degree of risk to manage mounting problems at home and abroad, leading to sustained confrontation with the West and the further detachment of the Russian government from its people.

Tesla And The Future Of Electric Cars

When it comes to the automotive industry, the American investment bank JPMorgan Chase & Co. is clear about what is happening: “The Future Is Electric.”

The bank suggests, “The road to a fully electric future was paved in 2020 with potential new partnerships between automakers and Electric Vehicle (EV) start-ups, advancements in battery range, and heightened government efforts to reduce CO2 emissions.”

Electric cars, also called electric vehicles (EVs), are no longer just an outlandish concept that interests a few fanatics. Manufacturers and consumers are now starting to take them seriously.

But what kind of an automobile qualifies to be called an EV? What are the advantages and disadvantages of electric cars? Have EVs transformed the automobile industry? And if so, how? Are electric cars green? What is the future of electric cars in a world accustomed to combustion engines?

The Ukraine War and U.S. National Strategy: The Need for a Credible Global Force Posture and Real Plans, Programs, and Budgets

Anthony H. Cordesman

It is one of the many ironies of the Ukraine War that it began at a time when the U.S. was on the edge of committing an act of bipartisan stupidity. If Russia had not invaded Ukraine, the Biden administration would have almost certainly issued a more detailed unclassified version of the Interim National Defense Strategy provided to Congress on March 28, 2022.i

One can only guess at the level of detail the Biden administration might have released regarding the nature and cost of the changes such a strategy would call for in reshaping the size, nature, and location of U.S. forces and the desired changes in strategic partnerships. It seems all too likely, however, that those changes would not have gone all that far beyond the vacuous generalities of the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance that the White House issued in March 2021.ii

What Does the 2022 NDS Fact Sheet Imply for the Forthcoming Cyber Strategy?

Michael P. Fischerkeller 

The Defense Department’s two-page fact sheet summarizing the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) provides notable insights from a cyberspace strategy perspective. Identifying campaigning as one way to advance Department of Defense goals is consistent with the lessons learned by employing the doctrine of persistent engagement for operating in and through cyberspace. Additionally, three of the NDS’s campaigning objectives—to gain advantages against the full range of competitors’ coercive actions, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion and to complicate competitors’ military preparations—could be supported by persistent engagement. Further, although a fourth objective mentioned in the NDS fact sheet—resilience—is not listed as an objective of campaigning, persistent engagement has demonstrated that campaigning is critical to supporting anticipatory resilience in cyberspace, including ongoing efforts such as the use of hunt forward teams to inoculate the U.S. public and private sectors from malicious cyber activity. Overall, such cyber campaigns support integrated deterrence by undermining an opponent’s confidence that they will prevail in crisis or armed conflict. The forthcoming cyber strategy will be nested within the NDS, and the cyber strategy should be expected to support these same objectives. This post elaborates on each from a cyber strategy perspective and offers an additional objective unique to cyberspace—precluding exploitation and/or inhibiting the cumulation of strategic gains in and through cyberspace that can independently influence the international distribution of power.

Why the Chinese military wants thousands of ‘made-to-order’ noncommissioned officers


Here in the good ol’ U.S. of A, the military likes to mold noncommissioned officers — the sergeants and petty officers who keep the armed forces running — in the jaded wisdom and disillusioned bitterness that comes from years of herding junior enlisted service members and officers in order to make things work kind-of-okay most of the time.

But for the past 10 years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has been trying something different: sending high school graduates to school for a few more years before getting them back as newly-minted noncommissioned officers to guide younger service members through the increasingly-technical equipment of its modernizing military.

Multiple Dead After Mysterious Explosion at Russian Ammunition Plant


Amid the country's ongoing military conflict in Ukraine, an ammunition plant near the Ural Mountains in Russia suffered a massive explosion which resulted in fatalities.

The FKP Perm Powder Plant, which produces gunpowder and is located in the city of Perm, reportedly endured an explosion at approximately 8 p.m. local time, according to local authorities. The resulting fire eventually killed two workers and injured others. The incident has so far been pinned on "a product" that "caught fire."

"According to the information received, on 05/01/2022, at about 20:00, a product caught fire at the production site N 12 of the Plastmassa production facility at the Perm Powder Plant FKP," the Russian State Labor Inspectorate for the Perm Territory said in a statement. "As a result of the incident, 3 employees were injured, 1 of them died on the spot, 2 were taken to the hospital. Subsequently, another 1 worker died in the hospital."

Flying Under The Radar: A Missile Accident in South Asia

Matt Korda

With all eyes turned towards Ukraine these past weeks, it was easy to miss what was almost certainly a historical first: a nuclear-armed state accidentally launching a missile at another nuclear-armed state.*

On the evening of March 9th, during what India subsequently called “routine maintenance and inspection,” a missile was accidentally launched into the territory of Pakistan and impacted near the town of Mian Channu, slightly more than 100 kilometers west of the India-Pakistan border.

Because much of the world’s attention has understandably been focused on Eastern Europe, this story is not getting the attention that it deserves. However, it warrants very serious scrutiny––not only due to the bizarre nature of the accident itself, but also because both India’s and Pakistan’s reactions to the incident reveal that crisis stability between South Asia’s two nuclear rivals may be much less stable than previously believed.

Good US-China Strategic Competition

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MILAN – It is now widely accepted that the economic and technological relationship between the United States and China will be characterized by some combination of strategic cooperation and strategic competition. Strategic cooperation is largely welcomed, because addressing shared challenges, from climate change and pandemics to the regulation of cutting-edge technologies, demands the engagement of the world’s two largest economies. But strategic competition tends to be viewed as a worrisome, even threatening, prospect. It need not be.

Anxiety about Sino-American competition, particularly in the technological domain, reflects a belief on both sides that a national-security-based, largely zero-sum approach is inevitable. This assumption steers decision-making in an unconstructive, confrontational direction and increases the likelihood of policy mistakes.

Soft Power After Ukraine


CAMBRIDGE – As Russian missiles pound Ukrainian cities, and as Ukrainians fight to defend their country, some avowed realists might say, “So much for soft power.” But such a response betrays a shallow analysis. Power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes you want. A smart realist understands that you can do this in three ways: by coercion, by payment, or by attraction – in other words, the proverbial “sticks, carrots, and honey.”

In the short run, sticks are more effective than honey, and hard power trumps soft power. If I want to steal your money using hard power, I can threaten to shoot you and take your wallet. It does not matter what you think, and I get your money right away. To take your money using soft power, I would need to persuade you to give me your money. That takes time, and it does not always work. Everything depends on what you think. But if I can attract you, soft power may prove a far less costly way to get your money. In the long term, honey sometimes trumps sticks.

Ukrainian Guerillas: Fighting Russians in Temporarily Occupied Territories

Yuri Lapaiev

On April 22, General Rustam Minnekayev, the acting commander of the Central Military District, announced that one of the goals of the second phase of Russia’s “special military operation in Ukraine” is to gain full control of Donbas and Ukraine’s south. According to him, achieving this objective would “ensure a land corridor to Crimea, control over vital objects of Ukraine’s economy,” and grant Russia access to Transnistria, the separatist region of Moldova occupied by Russian “peacekeeping” forces since 1992 (Interfax, April 22; see EDM, April 28).

The Beginning of a New Era

George Friedman

A week ago, I wrote a piece on the stages of history, pointing out systemic shifts that have taken place for more than 200 years. In the last century, these shifts took place roughly 30-40 years apart with the last occurring in 1991, or about 30 years ago. That year, the Cold War ended, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, Operation Desert Storm began, and the Japanese economic miracle ended, opening the door for China’s rise. The world in 1989 was very different from the one in 1992.

We are now in an era in which shifts occur. Being in an era doesn’t necessarily mean the shift will immediately come; the change between the epoch of world wars and the post-Cold War world took almost 50 years, solidified as it had been by the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. It is uncertain why some eras last longer than others. It might well be simply chance. An alternative to consider is that some eras are based on single, very solid realities, while others are based on multiple and more fragile ones. Thus, the 1945-1991 era was based on the solid foundation of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, while 1991-2022 was based on multiple forces – the global war on terror, the European Union, China emerging, Russia asserting itself, and so on. It was less coherent and therefore more fragile. Our current epoch began with more fragmented shifts, creating a less stable platform.

The War in Ukraine Will Complicate U.S.-China Relations Even More

Ali Wyne

It has not even been three months since Russia invaded Ukraine, and it remains far from clear as to when and how this conflict will end. Nevertheless, a robust discussion is already underway over the potential impact of Moscow’s aggression on U.S. foreign policy toward China as well as on Washington’s broader strategic outlook.

In the short term, it seems likely that the war will undercut U.S. efforts to rebalance its focus to the Asia-Pacific and strategic competition with China—ironically, because Ukrainian forces have performed far better than expected. Given the vast imbalance between Russia’s conventional military capabilities and those of Ukraine, many observers reasonably assumed that Ukraine would surrender quickly in the event of a full-scale Russian invasion. Had it done so, and had Ukraine suffered few military and civilian casualties, it is unclear whether the U.S. would have gotten drawn in significantly, as it would not have had sufficient time to coordinate a response with key allies and partners; nor would it have had to contend with Russia’s escalating brutality in its conduct of the war. ..

Windows XP proves Russia is losing the cyber war against Ukraine, too

Preston Gralla 

When Russia launched its all-out attack against Ukraine in February, the world expected the invaders to roll over the country quickly. That didn’t happen, and Ukraine today, though still under assault, has so far thwarted Russia’s ambitions to conquer it.

Russia has also been fighting a quieter war against Ukraine, a cyber war, deploying what had been considered the most feared state-sponsored hackers in the world. And in the same way that Ukraine has fended off Russia’s military might, it’s been winning the cyber war as well.

China’s Ukraine Conundrum Why the War Necessitates a Balancing Act

Yan Xuetong

Russia’s war in Ukraine has produced a strategic predicament for China. On the one hand, the conflict has disrupted billions of dollars’ worth of Chinese trade, heightened tensions in East Asia, and deepened political polarization within China by dividing people into pro- and anti-Russia camps. On the other, China blames the United States for provoking Russia with its support for NATO expansion and worries that Washington will seek to prolong the conflict in Ukraine in order to bog down Russia. Beijing sees little to gain from joining the international chorus condemning Moscow.

Regardless of what China says or does in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to wage war in Ukraine, Washington is unlikely to soften its strategy of containment toward Beijing. And as China’s largest and most militarily capable neighbor, Russia is not a power that Beijing wishes to antagonize. Chinese policymakers have therefore sought to avoid unnecessarily provoking either rival power—abstaining from votes to condemn Russia in the UN General Assembly and carefully selecting its official statements about the war.

The West’s Economic War Against Russia Is Imperiling the World

David C. Hendrickson

An extraordinary feature of the Ukraine crisis is the way it has imperiled three other “global goods”: efforts to address climate change, energy security, and poverty. Under the impetus of the total economic and financial war against Russia, as the French foreign minister described it, the West is now committing to a set of measures that threaten these other objectives, making them secondary or tertiary before the all-commanding need to do harm to the Russian economy. The global food crisis was precipitated by Russia’s war against Ukraine, as it has disrupted food and fertilizer shipments from the Black Sea, but the total economic war against Russia (TEWAR) looks set to deepen these multiple crises, converting temporary disruptions into near-permanent handicaps.

Energy security and climate change pose a set of quandaries that are very different from traditional geopolitics, and yet for which traditional geopolitics have been of vital importance. Vast interdependencies populate the subject. Energy production is thirsty, often intensely reliant on scarce freshwater. Climate change will make some areas far more susceptible to drought or harsh storms, imperiling food supplies. Then, too, the price of oil and natural gas is closely linked with food prices. Historically, crisis in the one domain has meant crisis in the other.

The Hour of Europe?

Max Bergmann, Pierre Morcos

The reelection of Emmanuel Macron on April 24 has profound implications for the future of Europe. Much of the coverage of the election has understandably focused on the significance of the election for France domestically and the future of French politics. But much less attention has been paid to the impact of Macron’s victory on European security and transatlantic relations.

In 2017, Macron’s election was received with relief in many European capitals. The survival of the European Union was at stake, with concern that a Marine Le Pen victory, coming on the heels of Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory, might prompt a further unravelling of Europe’s union. Macron won on explicitly pro-EU platform, but when he outlined his vision for Europe, he was met with a cold silence from Berlin and has largely been stymied in his ambitions.

Playing at Ethics: Military Ethics Education Playing Cards

Ray Kimball

Playing cards have an extensive association with the U.S. Armed Forces. Purpose-built decks of cards made to alleviate boredom in the U.S. Civil and Spanish-American wars gave way to more ingenious applications in the Second World War and Vietnam.[1] More recently, playing cards have been used as shorthand for the most-wanted members of Saddam Hussein’s regime and to educate troops about cultural preservation.[2] The King’s College London Centre for Military Ethics (KCME) Military Ethics Education Playing Cards Deck, hereafter referenced as “the Deck,” is the latest worthy entry in that genre. The Deck as designed works very well for individual and small group reflections; this article will also propose three adaptations for using the deck in larger groups.

Army Software Factory Touts Early Successes

Stew Magnuson

AUSTIN, Texas — As a defense technology reporter, I have gone on my fair share of factory tours.

I have seen the assembly of Army trucks, helicopters, satellites, rockets, batteries, radios, and even a module that would one day fly in the International Space Station.

But have never been on a tour quite as boring as the Army Software Factory in Austin, Texas.

And I mean no insult and cast no aspersions on my tour guide, Capt. Tyler Morrow, who showed me and a gaggle of techies from the private sector the one-year-old organization’s headquarters on the edge of downtown Austin.

Rajan Menon, War Is Hell (Even for Those Far from the Battlefield)

I can’t help wondering: Did Joe Biden send his secretaries of defense and state to Kyiv recently to show just how totally “into” the war in Ukraine his administration is? So into it, in fact, that it’s hard to express (not in weaponry, perhaps, but in words). Still, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin did make it clear enough that Washington’s objective in sending ever more weapons Kyiv’s way isn’t just to help defend the Ukrainians from a nightmarish aggression — not anymore. There’s a deeper purpose now at work — that being, as Austin put it, to ensure that Russia is eternally “weakened” by this war. In other words, the world is increasingly to be involved in a bad take two of the Cold War of the last century. And by the way, when it comes to actual diplomacy or negotiations, not a word was said in Kyiv, even with the secretary of state there.

Egypt braces for third-stage filling of Nile dam

Ayah Aman

CAIRO — Before the start of the third-stage filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’s (GERD) reservoir and with the start of the planting season in the summer, Cairo is considering all scenarios related to water resources management for this year.

In a meeting with Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Mohamed Abdel Aty on April 18, President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi discussed the water situation in the country and water needs for the agricultural and drinking water projects.

Despite the strict measures adopted to optimize water use in the country, Egypt is facing new challenges imposed by the Russia-Ukraine war this year, namely meeting its local needs in grains amid the increasing local demand for rice and wheat with the population growth — knowing that these crops require large water quantities.

Winning on the battlefield won't bolster Russia strength


After a faltering, downright humiliating, military defeat in Ukraine's north, categorized by burned-out tanks and stalled armored convoys, the Russian army is now executing what it describes as the "second phase" of its war in Ukraine. The objective: to extend its control over the entire Donbas region and perhaps turn Ukraine into a land-locked country without access to the Black Sea.

The United States has rushed billions of dollars in military equipment to help Kyiv stem the Russian advance. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Washington wants to see Russia "weakened" so it can't invade a neighboring power ever again. But whether Russia wins or loses in the Donbas, it will emerge from the war in a weaker geopolitical position than when it came in.

Is Russia’s Demographic Decline Irreversible?

Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco

In today’s global strategic environment, Russia is one of the international system’s major players along with the US and China. Its national power encompasses formidable military, intelligence, and technological capabilities, as well as the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and an assertive diplomatic projection that relies on asymmetric equalizers and force multipliers. Likewise, the Kremlin has also mastered the esoteric art of hybrid warfare. Plus, it contains vast deposits of natural resources, including fossil fuels like oil and natural gas, metallic minerals, uranium, gemstones, fresh water, and timber, amongst others. Moreover, although its ultimate outcome is still unclear at this point, the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows that Moscow is willing to use military might in order to restore its status as a major force to be reckoned with. However, the country’s long-term demographic prospects look rather gloomy, an issue that represents a critical Achilles’ heel. If this phenomenon is not dealt with, Russia’s fate might be sealed in an unfavorable way. Needless to say, a declining population can potentially compromise Russia’s ambitious revisionist plans and perhaps even its own survival as a national state.

The West Should Stay Focused on Geoeconomic Rivalry With China

Peter S. Rashish

As China leveraged its state capitalist model to become a global superpower, it increasingly challenged the market-oriented basis of the liberal economic order founded by the United States and its allies 75 years ago. When this competition between the Chinese and Western economic systems gained steam in the 2010s, the main battlefield of international relations also began to shift from the classical realm of security to the normally “civilian” fields of trade, investment, technology and finance—in other words, from geopolitics to geoeconomics.

How Will Twitter Change?

Kevin Kaiser, Pinar Yildirim

Elon Musk made Twitter an offer that board members simply couldn’t refuse, Wharton experts said.

The billionaire’s bold move to pay roughly $44 billion in cash for the company and take it private immediately raised the stock price — along with eyebrows. Critics are worried that he will undo content moderation policies and wield too much power over the platform, which has 217 million daily active users. Musk has said he wants to unlock Twitter’s “tremendous potential” to advance free speech.

Russia Botched Its Early War Propaganda Campaign, but Now It’s Doubling Down

Dmitry Adamsky

Russia is never as strong as it appears, but neither is it as weak as it seems. Prior to the war, many observers overestimated Russia’s military. Now, another extreme has emerged: underestimating Russian combat effectiveness.

Western euphoria about Ukraine’s success at fending off Russian forces has led leaders to underestimate Russia’s capacity to mobilize manpower and domestic support as well as Moscow’s ability to bolster troops’ morale—one of the essentials for battlefield performance in Russian military thinking.

What would victory actually mean now for Ukraine – and for Europe?

Orysia Lutsevych

For more than two months, Vladimir Putin has been violently trying to erase the modern Ukrainian state from the map of Europe. This means Ukraine needs to win. In fact, victory is imperative if the continent wants to stand the chance of being able to live in peace and work collectively to meet global challenges.

It is clear that Putin has failed to compel Kyiv to capitulate. Russia’s plans to annihilate Ukraine and annex more of its territory have cemented Ukraine’s will to fight and win this war. So we need to ask: what does victory actually look like?

China Wants Its Investments in Afghanistan to Be Safer Than in Pakistan

Raffaello Pantucci and Ajmal Waziri

On April 26, a suicide bomber killed Huang Guiping, the director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi, as well as two Chinese teachers and a Pakistani driver. The attack, claimed by Baloch separatists, highlighted the tensions that China has stirred up with its massive China-Pakistan Economic Corridor investments in Pakistan—a lesson Beijing has learned and is keen not to repeat in Afghanistan. But China will struggle to entirely sidestep these problems, especially because the answer it often reaches for in these situations is economic investment—something that inevitably expands exposure on the ground.

Ukraine’s Online Volunteers Go After Russian Targets

Justin Ling

“Today we’ll attack fiscal data operators,” proclaimed the official Telegram channel of Ukraine’s IT Army on April 20. Attached was a list of websites of Russian and Belarusian financial services companies, complete with critical information about their website configurations.

Within 24 hours, a raft of those websites were knocked offline. “You did a great job,” the Telegram channel reported. Attached was a new list of targets. Within hours they, too, were offline.

Shanghai’s Food Shortages Spur Voluntarism and Cynicism

Tracy Wen Liu

Last month, in an article published by Xinhua News, multiple botanists in Shanghai made an emergency announcement, calling on Shanghai residents not to dig up and consume wild vegetables, tree roots, and bamboo shoots grown in apartment complexes lest they accidentally poison themselves. This was a realistic fear; some residents, desperate for food, had already reportedly fallen sick after consuming wild vegetables growing in the shared areas of their apartment complexes. It was eerily reminiscent of the desperate times of the Great Leap Forward, a period when China saw mass famine from 1959-1961, when the bark was stripped from trees by starving people.

The Dangerous New Anti-Globalization Consensus

Edward Alden

The long-time critics of globalization who warned us that it would end badly are having a told-you-so moment. Porous borders, free trade, and thinly stretched supply chains would make the world more fragile, they cried, leaving countries dangerously vulnerable to disruptions and shocks. It took a protectionist U.S. president, a global pandemic, and a new European war to prove them right.

For decades, the critics were mostly ignored because the benefits of global integration were simply too compelling to those who pulled the levers in government and large corporations. The dissenting voices could only throw a bit of sand in the gears. They forced globalization’s cheerleaders to accept a few minor brakes on unfettered commerce and mobility, such as labor and environmental standards for trade, and tougher border inspections for people and goods.

Ukrainians have shown they can out-think, out-influence and out-fight Russia. So what happens if Putin loses?

Mick Ryan

It has been a fascinating week for those who analyse the war in Ukraine, and western strategy.

First, President Biden sent a request to Congress for $US33 billion ($47 billion) in military, economic and humanitarian aid for Ukraine.

Then, the US Congress approved new Lend Lease legislation, a 21st-century version of the American support that was decisive in helping its allies in winning World War II.

Additionally, US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin described how "we want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can't do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine. They can win if they have the right equipment, and the right support."