Indian Strategic Studies: 05/20/25

20 May 2025

Prospects for India–China relations

Since a violent border clash in June 2020 across their disputed border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), India and China have sought to stabilise their bilateral relationship. It took them over four years to reach a politically enabled agreement on patrolling arrangements, which has inaugurated a tactical thaw on what has nonetheless continued to be an increasingly militarised LAC, and a reactivation of meaningful diplomatic engagement.

However, as the two countries reach 75 years of diplomatic ties, a structural shift in what has nevertheless continued to be an increasingly competitive relationship is unlikely. Aside from their disputed border, Beijing’s political, economic and defence engagement in South Asia and Indian Ocean island states remains a key security concern for New Delhi. Yet, India cannot afford to forfeit its economic ties with China, if it is to maintain its current high level of economic growth.

Diplomatic thawThe India–China border agreement on 21 October 2024 resulted in a meeting, the first since 2019, between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the BRICS summit on 23 October. Their high-level political guidance provided the necessary impetus to finalise their militaries’ disengagement in Ladakh and restore regular, high-level dialogue on border management. A rebuilding of bilateral ties (which had been severed in 2020) followed.

Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi met in November 2024. They agreed to the resumption of a religious pilgrimage in Tibet (scheduled to resume in June 2025), data sharing on trans-border rivers, direct flights between India and China and media exchanges. The two countries’ defence ministers, Rajnath Singh and Admiral Dong Jun, also met in November 2024. In December, the empowered special representatives on the India–China boundary question – Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Wang – also met.

Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit to Beijing in January 2025 preceded another foreign-minister meeting in February and another between diplomats in March. India has stated a need to move relations to a ‘more stable and predictable path’, while Beijing has called for the two countries to be ‘partners rather than rivals’. This diplomatic momentum has so far successfully overcome several lingering issues and other matters of contention.

Pakistan is Strategically Indispensable to Washington

Julian Spencer-Churchill

On April 22, 2025, 26 tourists and civilians were killed in a terror attack in Pahalgam as part of the interminable Kashmir insurgency, which has claimed 40,000 lives since 1987. On May 6, as part of Operation Sindoor, Indian missiles struck suspected base camps for Kashmirri insurgents in Pakistan in the cities of Muzzafarabad, Kotli and Bahawalpur. India has also escalated the armed stand-off to include the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, against which Pakistan responded by threatening the abandonment of the 1972 Simla Agreement. Given the centrality to Pakistan of the Punjab Rivers and the Indus, which pass through India from the Himalayas of China, the National Security Council has warned that an interruption of those waters would be an act of war. Any escalation to nuclear conflict, given that both states are most likely equipped with approximately 170 boosted fission nuclear warheads with maximum yields of 50 kilotons, would set a imitable precedent for nuclear war.

The strategic concern with India is that, of all the great powers, it is closest to consolidating domination over its neighbors in its region. Only the U.S. has ever achieved the status of regional hegemon, which it attained in the 1890s when Great Britain abandoned Canada to its fate. China, separated by the sea, Brazil, disconnected by the Andes, and as a yet non-expansionist Nigeria, all outnumber their regional neighbors in population. According to University of Chicago Professor John J Mearsheimer, in his The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, countries are tempted to start wars to conquer their own continental regions, even if there is a low prospect of success, because the security payoff is tremendous. These were the motives of the Hapsburgs, Louis XIV, Napoleon Bonaparte, Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and now Communist China.

The U.S., which is the only country ever to have achieved continental hegemony, pays very little for the cost of its local defense because of the protection of the Oceans. In what is called a strategy of offshore balancing, Washington is then able to project power to support smaller countries draining the resources of the regional hegemonic candidates on other continents. This thereby increases the cost of any retaliation against the U.S., such as the costly Soviet backing of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada during the Cold War. Pakistan, a growing democracy, has repeatedly demonstrated itself to be a reliable offshore ally of the U.S. during the Cold War and the Global War on Terror. Pakistan-based U-2 aircraft overflew the USSR from bases in Peshawar and coordinated with Israel for the transfer of small arms to the mujahidin in Afghanistan in the 1980s, while India leaned significantly farther than the anti-Western Non-Aligned Movement, to cooperate with Moscow.

US General Details China Military Plans to Defeat US in Taiwan War

Micah McCartney

Aformer top U.S. defense official has warned lawmakers that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is "no longer distant" amid rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Charles Flynn, retired general and former commander of the U.S. Army Pacific, also laid out the steps the People's Liberation Army would need to accomplish such a feat.

Why It Matters

China has vowed to unify with Taiwan, which it considers its territory, though the Chinese Communist Party has never ruled there. Beijing, in recent years, ramped up military activities around Taiwan to punish the island's Beijing-skeptic ruling Democratic Progressive Party.

U.S. officials believe Chinese leader Xi Jinping has instructed the People's Liberation Army to be capable of taking Taiwan by 2027, even if he does not necessarily intend to give the order that year. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others in President Donald Trump's administration have stressed deterring China means making an invasion as costly as possible.

In his Thursday remarks at a House hearing focused on the Chinese Communist Party, retired General Charles Flynn, the former commander of the U.S. Army Pacific, told lawmakers that "the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is no longer distant or theoretical."

Flynn spoke at a hearing of the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. Also testifying were Mark Montgomery, former director of operations at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and Kurt Campbell, deputy secretary of state from 2024 to 2025.

As It Makes a Trade Deal With China, Trump Administration Would Be Wise To Proceed With Caution

Matt Cookson

Early on Monday morning, the Trump administration said it had reached a preliminary agreement with China on a trade deal that would reduce tariffs on both sides. This comes after over a month of uncertainty caused by President Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs. While Wall Street will cheer this news, investors and policymakers should remain wary of any trade agreement made with China.

Back on April 2nd, President Trump announced tariffs on a wide range of countries in what he called ‘Liberation Day.’ For China, these tariffs were combined with tariffs Trump had already put in place in response to China’s role in the production and smuggling of fentanyl. The Chinese didn’t take this lying down, responding with a series of tariff hikes on U.S. goods. Back-and-forth responses between the two nations resulted in tariffs from each country exceeding 100% on imports from the other country.

China is an important trading partner for the U.S.. The total value of trade between the two countries is almost $600 billion. This doesn’t factor in the investments, educational exchanges, and other partnerships between the two countries. By itself, China is responsible for just under 30% of the world’s manufacturing output. Almost double that of the U.S.. Therefore the U.S. has a lot to lose in a trade war with China.

Even excluding the recent trade war, China’s trade relationship with the United States has been fraught in recent decades. Market restrictions, IP theft, unfair trade practices, and fentanyl production are just a few of the issues between the U.S. and China. Despite frequent protests, especially on IP theft and fentanyl, there has been little improvement on the Chinese side.

Even areas where China pledged to do better have seen little actual improvement. In 2015, China agreed that it would not steal any intellectual property. However, in the ten years since this agreement, tech sector experts have seen little long-term improvement. Estimates of the value of IP stolen by Chinese entities range from $180 to $540 billion per year. Economic theft of that magnitude is hardly a sign of a reliable partner.

Future War and Naval Drone Carriers

Mick Ryan

A quick assessment on the implications of South Korea's shift from building a F35 carrier to a platform for the launch and C2 of uncrewed aerial systems. Is this part of an accelerating trend?

This is a short piece, but I wanted to write something on this topic because it is demonstrative of how uncrewed systems are changing how some military institutions are thinking about their inventories of large, exquisite platforms and how uncrewed systems are having an increasing influence over how force is projected in all military theatres, not just eastern Ukraine.

This week, saw two important events regarding the application of uncrewed systems in the maritime environment. First, the Government of Ukraine publicly unveiled its range of Magura uncrewed naval vessels. Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence in the Ministry of Defense unveiled several classes of the maritime sea drones capable of destroying enemy ships and aircraft:

The Magura V5—Black Sea fleet killer.

The Magura V6P—multifunctional platform.

The Magura V7 (missile-carrying), which destroyed a combat jet for the first time in history

The Magura V7 with a mounted machine gun.

Second, and central to the subject of this quick assessment, the government of South Korea announced that the planned light aircraft carrier (CVX) project for the South Korean Navy had been shelved in favour of a new Uncrewed Aerial Systems ship.

The Magura naval drones unveiled in Ukraine this week. Source: @DefenceU

This has implications for how other navies might think about the employment of uncrewed systems, and how offensive capability might be projected from naval vessels. This quick assessment will explore the background of the CVX project, and how this shift in role for the vessel might influence naval operations and the force designs for other navies in Europe and the Pacific. The assessment also poses several questions about these naval drone carriers and their role in future conflicts.

China-US ties: lawmakers call on American college to end role in Duke Kunshan University

Bochen Han

Two Republican lawmakers in the US House of Representatives are asking Duke University to terminate its joint campus with Wuhan University in China over concerns about technology transfers and student “manipulation”.

In a letter to Duke president Vincent Price, which was made public on Thursday, Michigan congressmen John Moolenaar and Tim Walberg said the partnership created a “direct pipeline between US innovation and China’s military-industrial complex” and facilitated the use of Americans as “pawns” for Chinese propaganda.

Trump says he can see himself dealing directly with Xi on US-China trade deal details

In a statement in 2012, then-Duke president Richard Brodhead framed the project as a way to introduce China to “Duke’s signature strengths of liberal arts education” and to help American students become more “aware of a world of which China is a part”.

The campus in Kunshan, Jiangsu province, is home to about 2,000 students. In the spring semester of this year, it played host to some 1,635 undergraduates and 270 graduate students, according to DKU’s website. The school does not confer doctoral degrees.

Students receive a full degree from Duke University, in addition to one from DKU, which is certified by China’s Ministry of Education, and are often offered the opportunity to spend time at Duke’s campus in Durham, North Carolina.

Moolenaar, who chairs the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, and Walberg, who chairs the House Education and Workforce Committee, said DKU specialised in “high-technology fields with direct military applications” and, due to exchange opportunities, many of its students gained access to federally funded US research.

Chinese defence firm strikes arms deal with Nigeria, deepening ties with West Africa

Jevans Nyabiage

Nigeria has struck a major agreement with a leading Chinese defence company to begin local production of military-grade ammunition, deepening the West African nation’s military ties with Beijing.

The deal, signed during Nigerian Minister of State for Defence Bello Matawalle’s visit to China earlier this month, covers the construction of ammunition production lines, maintenance and upgrades of military hardware, servicing of battle tanks and military engineering services.

It also involves technology transfers and training for Nigerian defence personnel.

While Nigeria’s Defence Ministry did not name the Chinese company in its May 6 statement, photos showed officials reviewing equipment from China North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco), a state-owned arms manufacturer.

A high-level Norinco delegation visited Nigeria in March to discuss local arms production through collaboration and technology transfers.

The partnership marks the latest step in Nigeria’s growing military cooperation with China, which began in the mid-2010s when Nigeria turned to Beijing after failing to secure needed defence equipment from the Obama administration during the peak of Boko Haram’s insurgency.

“Satellite Images Don’t Lie”: China Is Quietly Building the Largest Military Complex on Earth, and It’s Already Massive

Avi COHEN

As geopolitical tensions rise across Asia, particularly among major powers, recent satellite images have unveiled a massive military project underway in China. Nestled in secrecy, Beijing is constructing what could become the largest underground military command center ever built. This project not only symbolizes China’s strategic ambitions but also its intent to contend with the United States. The scale and secrecy of this undertaking have both intrigued and alarmed experts worldwide. In this article, we delve into the implications and details surrounding China’s ambitious military expansion.

A Supercharged Pentagon on Beijing’s Doorstep

Since the 1980s, China has invested in specialized teams capable of constructing underground shelters designed to withstand the most powerful bombs. This practice dates back to the Cold War era, when the Soviet Union and Germany proliferated bunkers and underground bases. Today, Beijing is elevating this concept to an unprecedented scale with the construction of the largest military bunker ever attempted. This new development is not just about defense; it is a strategic move that highlights China’s determination to establish itself as a global military power. The underground command center, reminiscent of a supercharged Pentagon, is a testament to China’s long-term military planning and resilience. As this facility takes shape just outside of Beijing, it raises significant questions about regional security dynamics and the balance of power in Asia.

A good, but not great, China trade dea

Urban C. Lehner

The US-China agreement on a 90-day suspension of mutually destructive triple-digit tariffs will allow at least some trade to continue. Photo: DTN files / Chris Clayton

The United States-China agreement to reduce tariffs is undeniably a good thing. People like me who have criticized the Trump tariffs are happy to see it. But while it’s a good thing, it’s not a great thing. And it’s certainly not a triumph for the president.

It’s good because if we’d stuck to the trade-war tariffs – ours at 145% and theirs at 125% – commerce between the countries would have come to pretty much a complete halt.

At the new levels of 30% and 10%, routine commerce – including agricultural trade – will at least be possible, though still in many cases difficult. The US will instead be able to focus on ending its reliance on China for critical products it can’t currently get elsewhere. That should be goal number one.

Some trade between the countries is good, some less so. As Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent put it, the US doesn’t want “generalized decoupling” from China. It wants “strategic decoupling.”

Financial markets seemed pleased that it was the somewhat more pragmatic Bessent speaking for the administration on tariffs this time and not Peter Navarro, the White House aide who was a key figure behind the massive tariffs on China and other countries.

The deal is also a good thing because it raises hopes of further improvements in US-China trade arrangements as negotiations continue. American farmers and ranchers, for example, wouldn’t mind getting China’s tariffs and other barriers to US ag products eliminated altogether.

The perpetual horizon: Armenia, Azerbaijan and prospects for peace

Marie Dumoulin

In a speech on May 9th, Armenia’s prime minister Nikol Pashinyan hinted at the delicate status of the country’s negotiations with Azerbaijan: “Despite all the internal and external provocations […]. There will be peace.” That peace has not seemed so close since the end of the 1980s. But the spectre of a new war also looms as near as ever.

The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency saw Yerevan inject a new urgency into its bilateral discussions with Baku. In March, this led the two governments to agree on the text of a peace treaty. But, while the text incorporates some important concessions from Armenia, it does not even touch on the thorniest issues between the two countries. Baku has also introduced new conditions that mean the agreement is unlikely be signed any time soon.

It appears that Armenia and Azerbaijan are becoming increasingly involved in Middle Eastern dynamics, a development that could make an escalation between them more likely as long as the peace agreement remains unsigned

The world’s no less thorny geopolitical moment creates more risk—for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also for the EU. It appears that the two countries are becoming increasingly involved in Middle Eastern dynamics, a development that could make an escalation between them more likely as long as the agreement remains unsigned. If the EU fails to help prevent such an escalation, the bloc’s own neighbourhood—and a region that is vital for European energy security and connectivity projects—may remain trapped in its cycle of violence; or even become another playground for proxy confrontation between external actors.

So near and yet so far

Trump likely translates into less American support for Armenia. This is due to cuts in US foreign assistance, but also because the Armenian diaspora in the US does not have strong connections with the MAGA movement. Trump has previous business dealings with Azerbaijan, and the expectation in Baku seems to be that its relations with Washington will thrive in a second Trump term. In anticipation of this, Armenia’s government tried to reach a quick agreement with Azerbaijan by accepting two of the latter’s key conditions.

Turkish vs. Israeli Jets Over Syria: The Middle East Has A New Crisis Brewing

Ted Galen Carpenter

Turkey and Israel Collide in Syria: Both Turkey and Israel have been on a short list of Washington’s closest allies for decades.

With Washington’s enthusiastic support, NATO made Turkey a member in 1952. US leaders regarded the country as the essential guardian of the Alliance’s southeastern flank during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The United States and Israel have had a “special relationship” since the latter’s creation in 1948, and their foreign policy objectives have become ever closer over the decades. Washington has given Israel access to many of the most sophisticated weapons in the US arsenal.

Tensions Among Allies

However, tensions between America’s two close allies are rising, especially as they pursue directly conflicting objectives in Syria. In December 2024, a primarily Islamist rebel coalition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) toppled Bashar al-Assad, whose family had ruled Syria for five decades.

Writing in Foreign Affairs, Middle East scholars David Makovsky and Simone Sandmehr note that HTS’s leader, Ahmed al-Shara, has taken charge of Syria, and foreign powers hope to steer his behavior. “Two of the country’s neighbors, Israel and Turkey, have taken advantage of the power vacuum by establishing a presence there—and have already begun to butt heads.” Makovsky and Sandmehr said, “Turkey has emerged as the dominant military power in Syria. Since 2019, HTS has held Idlib in Syria’s northwest, and for years, Ankara indirectly assisted it by operating a buffer zone in northern Syria that protected the group from Assad’s forces. Now Turkey wants even more influence in Syria.”

Unfortunately, Israel also wants more influence in Syria and does not trust that Ankara won’t exploit the power vacuum to support a new wave of Islamic militants under Ankara’s control. Makovsky and Sandmehr conclude that “Israeli leaders viewed Assad’s ouster as a strategic windfall and are racing to take advantage of his removal by establishing buffer zones and informal spheres of influence in southern Syria. Israel is particularly concerned by Turkey’s presence in the country because it fears that Ankara will encourage Syria to harbor anti-Israeli militants.”

Moscow Unwittingly Promoting Rise of Radical Islam in Dagestan by Not Addressing Problems Paul Goble

Moscow is unwittingly contributing to the rise of Islamism in Dagestan by failing to address social and economic problems and by handing over the region to siloviki who view all protest there as Islamist.

The problems in Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus are so numerous and complex that the Russian government does not understand them or have the financial and other resources to address them.

These failures mean the Kremlin is producing exactly what the siloviki appear to think already exists, a powerful and often violent Islamist movement that is rapidly acquiring the ability to challenge both Dagestani authorities and Moscow’s control.

Dagestan is an extremely complicated society that faces many problems—some unique to the region and others completely analogous to problems within other federal subjects of the Russian Federation. Both Moscow and those the Kremlin has appointed to manage the North Caucasus, however, primarily view protests in the region as reflecting the expansion of Islamist ideas (Kavkaz Realii, May 6; Window on Eurasia, May 10). The Russian government not only backs but also frequently rewards siloviki (силовики), Russian security forces, who follow this understanding of the region and report success when they use force to crush protests. This decision reflects how complicated the problems in Dagestan are and how deeply the authorities do not understand them. Moscow, especially amid Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expanded war against Ukraine, lacks the resources and attention span to deal with these issues. By responding with force, however, the Putin regime is producing exactly what it has good reason to fear, a powerful and increasingly violent Islamist movement, which may soon be able to challenge the Kremlin-approved Dagestani authorities and Moscow’s control there (see EDM, June 25, August 6, 2024).

Trump, Iran, and the Power of Seeing Things as They Are

Siamak Naficy

Another round of U.S.–Iran nuclear talks came and went in April 2025, this time in Oman. As usual, pundits dusted off their familiar lines about “progress” and “remaining gaps,” while critics lined up to remind us why no deal with Iran is ever worth signing. These critics tend to sound less like analysts and more like ghostwriters for John Bolton, repeating the same stale argument: that Iran is so steeped in ideological hatred of the West that it simply cannot be trusted. For them, the lesson of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not that diplomacy once worked—it’s that it never could have, and never will.

But this argument doesn’t just oversimplify Iran. It misunderstands diplomacy itself. It also misreads the past.

The 2015 JCPOA was not a hallucination. It was a verifiable, functioning agreement that significantly curtailed Iran’s nuclear activity for years, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) repeatedly affirming Iran’s compliance. The collapse of the deal did not result from Tehran’s duplicity but from Washington’s own unilateral withdrawal in 2018. The U.S. broke the deal—not because Iran violated its terms, but because the first Trump administration decided that no amount of Iranian compliance could offset its continued defiance of American expectations.

This is why U.S. President Trump—if he approaches the problem not as a culture war but as a strategic negotiation—could very well make a deal. In fact, he already did. The 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA wasn’t a rejection of Iran’s behavior as much as it was a repudiation of Obama-era diplomacy. But Trump has always prided himself on the “art of the deal,” and if he chose to engage Iran not as a moral adversary but as a state with interests, constraints, and leverage, there is no reason he couldn’t negotiate a new agreement. The president’s decision to fire National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, due to his coordination with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in pushing to attack Iran ahead of the talks, is surely welcome news for those seeking to avoid further unnecessary conflict.

Iran does not need to become America’s friend—it only needs to see a clear path toward survival and benefit. Trump’s transactional instincts, if freed from ideological rigidity, could serve him well. A realist approach—grounded in pressure, incentives, and verifiable limits—might succeed where moral grandstanding fails.

Re-politicizing the Military: A Case for Civilian Oversight and Accountability

S.L. Nelson

Military and foreign policy professionals often warn against the “politicization of the military.” Yet the phrase has become so reflexive and vague that it obscures the reality: the U.S. military is already an intensely political institution.

In answering Lt. Col. Stuart Scheller’s question—How can the military build a screening system to assess the performance of key leaders?—the answer requires something bold and often unpopular: politicians must assert more influence over military affairs.

They should evaluate military leadership for three key reasons: to uphold the morality of war, to ensure trust in institutional decision-making, and to enforce accountability when performance falters.

Moral Responsibility Is Political Responsibility

In wartime, civilian leaders are not merely strategists or managers but moral actors. Delegating war-making authority does not absolve them of ethical accountability. Even decisions operational in appearance—targeting, casualty thresholds, or force posture—carry profound political and moral weight.

Winston Churchill offers a clear example. In preparation for Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Nazi-occupied France, Churchill demanded that bombing plans limit civilian casualties to under 10,000. When Air Marshal Arthur Tedder forecast 160,000 potential civilian deaths, Churchill objected: “You are piling up an awful load of hatred.” That wasn’t simply an emotional response but a political judgment. Churchill understood that high civilian deaths could damage Britain’s postwar legitimacy and moral authority.

Churchill regularly took responsibility for decisions that blurred the lines between tactics and grand strategy. He considered deploying metal chaff to jam German radar but recognized that the Luftwaffe might adopt the tactic in return, threatening British civilians. The technical details were military in nature, but the consequences were political and human. He assumed the burden, knowing the final accountability lay with elected leadership.

Trust Between Civilians and the Military Is Built on Moral Clarity

From Tariffs to Tech Power: The Pivot the United States Needs Now

Navin Girishankar

For businesses and consumers alike, the joint statement from Washington and Beijing offered signs of a détente in the U.S.-China trade war. Following the weekend’s Geneva talks, both sides have decided to roll back tariffs. By some estimates, average U.S. rates on Chinese goods will fall to about 40 percent, while China’s tariffs on U.S. products will drop to roughly 33 percent. It is tempting to interpret this pullback from the brink—a self-inflicted embargo—as the “total reset” President Trump claimed. But tariffs are still too high, and Groundhog Day–like market rallies should not be confused with strategic success.

If the brinkmanship of the past several weeks is to have any lasting value to the United States, then the Geneva talks were just the beginnings of negotiation over economic security and technology issues that are the heart of the U.S.-China relationship. That will remain the test for the Trump administration’s tariff gambit: Will it prove to be a master class in leverage that delivers “a big beautiful rebalancing”—or an own goal of historic proportions that erodes the United States’ global economic leadership? For now, 90-day reprieves and on-again, off-again import duties underscore the capricious nature of U.S. economic statecraft.

Looking ahead, both sides have promised to put in place a mechanism to prevent misunderstandings in future talks. Should future talks materialize (still an “if”), the Trump administration would do well to condition additional tariff relief on progress on longstanding issues with China such as intellectual property theft, cyber espionage, forced technology transfer, dual use risks, supply chain chokepoints, nontariff barriers to U.S. firms, and currency manipulation. We can expect that China, far from being on the back foot, will press its own demands. Beijing will likely use tariff talks to gain concessions in terms of U.S. export controls, outbound investment restrictions, and the broader scaffolding of U.S. tech dominance—from chip design to AI standards.

By most accounts, China is in a better negotiating position than in 2018. It is able to rely on internal demand, and it has diversified trade relationships, including in Asia—evident in last week’s joint statement with Japan, Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It has also made strides across advanced technologies, including AI, biotech, and quantum, and in critical minerals self-sufficiency.

Putin’s New Hermit Kingdom

Andrei Yakovlev, Vladimir Dubrovskiy, and Yuri Danilo

Since he returned to office in January, U.S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive outreach to Russia has marked a stark shift in U.S. foreign policy. Ending years of isolation of the Kremlin, the Trump administration has offered numerous concessions to Russian President Vladimir Putin, raising hopes among some Western observers that the United States might be able to bring about an end to the war in Ukraine after more than three years of fighting. So far, although Russia has shown an interest in engaging with Trump, there is little indication that it is prepared to wind down

Trump is shaking up US-Israel relations in a way no one has in decades

Joshua Keating

What’s the opposite of a “bear hug”?

That was the phrase often used to describe President Joe Biden’s approach to Israel since the October 7, 2023, attacks: publicly and enthusiastically backing Israel, particularly when it comes to its wider regional conflict with Iran and its proxies, while quietly trying to restrain Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Now President Donald Trump is traveling through the Middle East this week for a multi-country tour and dealmaking bonanza that pointedly does not include a stop in Israel. (Trump has denied the snub, saying his trip is “very good for Israel.”)

The trip is the latest example of how Trump’s approach to the country often seems like a mirror image of his predecessor’s: He has little interest in restraining or pressuring Israel on its war in Gaza, but perhaps even less interest in supporting Israel on wider regional issues or aligning the two countries’ approach to the region.

This is still an administration that is fiercely “pro-Israel” in rhetoric and in its willingness to punish Israel’s critics in America. But in practice, as he conducts his foreign policy, Trump seems remarkably unconcerned about what Israel has to say about it.

“The one message that’s consistent [from Trump] is, ‘I have plans for the region. You’re welcome to be a partner, but if you prefer to be ignored, go ahead,’” said Nimrod Novik, former foreign policy adviser to the late Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres.

This is not the Trump that Israel was expecting

When Trump was reelected last November, the response from the Israeli government was near rapturous. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had an often fraught relationship with Biden’s administration, praised Trump for “history’s greatest comeback” and predicted a “powerful recommitment to the great alliance between Israel and America.”

The Trump Factor in Today’s Middle East

AARON DAVID MILLER and LAUREN MORGANBESSER

WASHINGTON, DC – As Donald Trump parades through the Middle East this week, he will encounter a very different region than the one he experienced during his first term. True, the Israeli-Palestinian problem remains unresolved, as do the challenges emanating from Iran’s much-advanced nuclear program and the instability and dysfunction in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

But this old wine is now packaged in new bottles. Beyond the garish headlines of Trump’s plan to accept a Boeing 747 as a gift from Qatar, new trends are emerging that will redefine the region, posing additional challenges for US policy.

Of all the changes in the Middle East since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, perhaps the most striking is Israel’s emergence as a regional powerhouse. Aided by the administrations of former President Joe Biden and Trump, and enabled by Arab regimes that do little to support Palestinians, Israel devastated Hamas and Hezbollah as military organizations, killing much of their senior leadership. With the support of the United States, Europe, and friendly Arab states, it effectively countered two direct Iranian missile attacks on its territory.

Israel then delivered its own strike, reportedly destroying much of Iran’s ballistic missile production and air defenses. In short, Israel has achieved escalation dominance: the capacity to escalate (or not) as it sees fit, and to deter its adversaries from doing so. Israel has also redefined its concept of border security in Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Syria by acting unilaterally to preempt and prevent threats to its territory.

Converting Israel’s military power into political arrangements, even peace accords, would seem like a reasonable next step. But the right-wing government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu seems uninterested in such options and is unlikely to be induced to change its outlook. Moreover, securing new, lasting agreements also depends on whether there are leaders among the Palestinians and key Arab states ready to take up the challenge, with all the political risks it entails.

Trump's agenda meets broad resistance from American institutions

Eleanor Hawkins

Educational institutions, law firms, broadcasters, nonprofits and corporate shareholders are all currently fighting or rejecting the Trump administration's policies and executive orders.

Why it matters: Widespread pushback against President Trump's agenda is starting to take shape.

Driving the news: Shareholders from major U.S. companies like Apple, Costco, Coca-Cola, Goldman Sachs and, most recently, Berkshire Hathaway have overwhelmingly rejected anti-DEI proposals pushed by conservative activists.While the Trump administration has revoked federal grants and threatened Harvard's tax-exempt status, the university continues to fight back and is suing the administration.

Nonprofits like the Ford Foundation, the Gates Foundation and the Charles Koch Foundation are preparing for a fight, should the administration attempt to pull tax-exempt status, the Wall Street Journal reports.

Meanwhile, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is suing Trump for attempting to fire members of CPB's board.

Law firms Jenner & Block, WilmerHale and Perkins Coie are legally challenging Trump's executive order that targeted them for employing or representing his critics and sought to freeze their security clearances.

Plus, individual executives are starting to speak out.REI's new CEO Mary Beth Laughton recently apologized for the company's January endorsement of Trump's then-nominee for secretary of the interior, Doug Burgum, for example.

By the numbers: A recent survey conducted by Weber Shandwick and KRC Research found that roughly 6 in 10 Americans describe the state of democracy and democratic institutions as "volatile," with 75% saying businesses should take a stand to "protect democracy."

Russia-Ukraine peace talks end after less than 2 hours with deal to swap POWs but no ceasefire

The first direct Russia-Ukraine peace talks since the early weeks of Moscow’s 2022 invasion ended after less than two hours Friday, and while both sides agreed on a large prisoner swap, they clearly remained far apart on key conditions for ending the fighting.Read More

Kyiv residents had mixed opinions on Friday about the first direct Russia-Ukraine peace talks. Both sides agreed on a large prisoner swap after their meeting, but they clearly remained far apart on key conditions for ending the fighting.

European leaders agreed on Friday to press ahead with joint action against Russia over the failure to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said, after consultations with President Donald Trump. Starmer spoke from Albania’s capital, Tirana, where leaders of dozens of European countries were gathered for the European Political Community summit.

Russian and Ukrainian delegations attend talks at the Dolmabache palace, in Istanbul, Turkey, Friday, May 16, 2025. (Ramil Sitdikov, Sputnik Pool Photo via AP)

Russian presidential aide, Vladimir Medinsky, right, and other members of Russian delegation attend talks with Ukrainian delegation at the Dolmabache palace, in Istanbul, Turkey, Ton Friday, May 16, 2025. (Ramil Sitdikov, Sputnik Pool Photo via AP)

In this handout photo released by Turkish Foreign Ministry, from left, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Ukrainian Head of Presidential Office Andriy Yermak arrive for a meeting at Dolmabahce palace in Istanbul, Turkey, Friday, May 16, 2025. (Turkish Foreign Ministry via AP)

Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer, right, and Turkey’s President Recep Erdogan attend a plenary meeting at the beginning of a summit where the leaders of 47 European countries and organizations will discuss security, defense and democratic standards, in Tirana, Albania, Friday, May 16, 2025. (Leon Neal/Pool via AP)

Putin no show is playing Russian roulette with Trump

Over the past two days, diplomats and observers of the war in Ukraine have waited on word whether Russia’s president would follow through with his commitment last week to meet with his Ukrainian counterpart in Turkey.

Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky, keen to keep the Americans onside and set in motion a peace process with Vladimir Putin, flew to Istanbul in anticipation of talks.

Perhaps worse for Putin, he now looks even smaller and more cowardly than he has throughout the war. AP

We have now received what appears to be definitive advice from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that neither Putin nor Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will attend the talks. Instead, a scratch team of low-level Russian bureaucrats will be sent to Turkey.

For Putin, this may be yet another carefully calculated move to show that he controls the levers of this war and – as the person who began this war in 2014 – only he can end it.

He is playing a high-risk game, however. The Russian president has calculated so far that Donald Trump, unwilling to escalate the conflict, will continue to tolerate Putin’s insults and brutal behaviour against Ukraine.

But Putin’s decision might also be seen by Trump and others in his administration as a deliberate insult. It could (if we squint our eyes enough) finally force Trump to take action against the Russians. This might comprise additional sanctions, and potentially, an increase in the amount of US weaponry that Trump permits Ukraine to purchase.

Regardless, Putin is not the master chess player that his propaganda network portrays him as. He has made many strategic errors in this war, and this might be his largest yet.

South African influencers-for-hire target Ukraine’s president in influence campaign, researchers say

Daryna Antoniuk

South African influencers have reportedly been involved in an online influence campaign targeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, researchers have found.

The campaign, which criticized Zelensky’s rejection of a proposed ceasefire by Russia, appears to be part of a larger, coordinated effort linked to an African influence-for-hire network.

A new analysis from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) identified over 40 accounts involved in the traffic manipulation campaign, which garnered 290,000 views. Among these accounts, 29 identified as influencers in their bios on X (formerly Twitter), with four directly linked to Lit, a South African influencer marketplace known for facilitating paid promotions.

The influencers targeted Zelensky over his refusal to accept a three-day ceasefire proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin late last month. The ceasefire was set to coincide with Russia's Victory Day celebrations but was ultimately dismissed by Zelensky, who called for a longer, 30-day ceasefire format in line with U.S. suggestions.

Following Zelensky’s rejection, pro-Russia voices, including bloggers on Telegram and X, launched a wave of criticism. This online attack was amplified by South African influencers who promoted anti-Zelensky hashtags on X.

According to DFRLab, this campaign was not the first of its kind. The influencers had previously engaged in similar efforts, including a March 2025 campaign aimed at disrupting Zelensky’s planned meeting with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa. Hashtags such as #ZelenScam and #StopZelenScammingUS trended in South Africa during this period, portraying Zelensky as corrupt.

On War in 2027: Five Principles to Guide the Army Transformation Initiative

Joshua Suthoff

Sometime in 2027, two US Air Force C-17s are on final approach somewhere in the Pacific’s first island chain. Over the last week, tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan have reached crisis level. Forty-eight hours ago, the US president gave the order to build combat power in the Indo-Pacific theater. The pair of C-17s are carrying key enablers and personnel to build and protect the growing intermediate staging base. However, US intelligence has missed indicators and warnings that Beijing intends to escalate to conflict, and the crews onboard the C-17s are not aware of the screen of small, one-way attack drones loitering near the airfield where they intend to land, just outside its protected ring and directly in the aircrafts’ flight path. The almost undetectable and nonattributable drones detonate in close proximity to the airframes, scattering aircraft debris and cargo—a cargo of personnel and equipment that was exquisite, expensive, and not quickly replaceable. The conflict has begun, Beijing finally turning its years of rhetoric and aggressive posturing vis-à-vis Taiwan into action.

Three weeks into the conflict, an infantry fire team on Taiwan is strongpointed in a destroyed building overwatching an abandoned open-air market that is now the team’s engagement area. Two of the team members are constantly wearing their first-person view goggles searching for an enemy target to strike or call for fire on. A third member lays wounded in the corner, sustained only by the medical expertise within the team because conditions are not right for a medical evacuation. The team leader knows he has to get other enablers in the fight as soon as the enemy appears. Remnants of the team’s company are spread in a defense across a wide frontage. A day ago, the company tried to mass to clear a building to initially establish a defense and paid dearly in casualties even before the commander could initiate the assault. For now, the teams continue to hunt with drones and fires assets all while trying to avoid the swarms of Chinese drones. Most of the core strengths the US Army once relied upon are now weaknesses. Night movements, tactical assembly areas, and causality evacuation operations are all quickly noticed by persistent enemy drones. Warfare has changed.

Dominating Conflict’s Leading Edge: Five Principles for an Assertive Irregular Warfare Doctrine

Brandon Kirch

Over the course of one week in late October, North Korean troops appeared in Ukraine, Israel launched retaliatory air strikes against Iran, and news broke that Russia provided targeting data to the Houthis in support of their effort to disrupt global shipping. These events occurred less than a month after Israel invaded Lebanon, and only two weeks before a US presidential election. More recently, Syria’s Assad Regime collapsed entirely and was replaced by a new government rife with terrorist affiliations. As a tepid ceasefire in Lebanon approaches its expiration date, the time and space between international escalation cycles is decreasing. The Trump administration has taken office amidst a volatile geopolitical environment that will likely demand a majority of their bandwidth for the term’s first 100 days, if not longer. A layered irregular warfare strategy will be essential if the US wishes to avoid further destabilization and reverse the ever-increasing risk of direct involvement in a broader war. Though specifics will depend on the events which unfold during the term, here are five principles that should be applied to develop an irregular warfare (IW) strategy to manage the gray zone’s current challenges.

1) Accept Risk

The cult of de-escalation has demonstrated itself to be unfounded, particularly since the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine and Israel. Likewise, it is not escalatory to match activity an adversary is already conducting. If effective deterrence requires capability and credibility, then concerns about escalation or “triggering World War III,” even when dealing with proxy forces, have so far only served to undermine the “credibility” half of that formula. Ongoing Houthi harassment of global shipping lanes and attacks against Israel, for example, warrant an offensive response targeting leadership and command and control, as opposed to reactive strikes against replaceable weapon systems. As nefarious geopolitical actors move with increasing boldness in the gray zone, the US must be able to counter with even stouter strategic momentum.

The escalation concerns echoing from isolationist wings of both parties are short-sighted and overly cautious excuses to ignore geopolitical reality. The new administration must argue to its populist constituencies that the domestic issues many voters prefer to focus on will be moot if a robust global deterrence posture is not maintained.

The West’s Intellectual Deficit in Modern War

Mick Ryan

Nearly 18 months ago, I explored the key intellectual challenges that had become apparent as the result of technological insertions into the Ukraine War. This includes the impact of drones and the democratisation of battlespace knowledge through digital command and control systems.

In that two-part series, I proposed that the Russo-Ukraine War had evolved into a more static ground because both sides were fighting a 21st century war with 20th century ideas. Most attention was being focussed on generating more munitions, more units, more territorial gains and more people. But I also proposed that even if Ukraine and Russia were to mobilise more people and industry, the trajectory of the war would not change significantly unless there was a mobilization of intellectual capacity to develop new warfighting ideas.

The period since those articles were published has proved this out. The ground war, with the exception of short periods of tactical energy such as the Ukrainian Kursk offensive, remains largely static in nature. Where advances have been made, they are achieved at very large costs in humans and equipment. The air, drone and missile war has more dynamism and is having an impact on the economy and warfighting capacity of both nations. However, this air and missile war is still yet to prove politically or strategically decisive.

More intellectual dynamism and innovation is necessary to develop more effective and survivable offensive military concepts for the modern technological and political environment. This is not just a military concern, however. Being able to threaten the use of offensive operations is central to a viable strategic deterrent. While nuclear weapons remain an important component of deterrents, conventional and cognitive options must also play their part. These two elements are currently a weakness in Western nations.

This article examples looks beyond the challenges facing Ukraine that were examined in the previous articles and looks more broadly at the big problems that all western nations face with modern warfighting concepts. The article proposes the key strategic challenges in contemporary warfare that require clever and affordable solutions.

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