Indian Strategic Studies: 05/17/25

17 May 2025

The Logics of Military Force: Or, How India and Pakistan Fought Each Other and Didn’t Use the Bomb

Max Margulies and Patrick Sullivan

Global catastrophe seems to have been narrowly avoided this past weekend, after India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire following the most tense military confrontations between the two states in decades. While any ceasefire is inherently fragile and vulnerable to accusations of violations, both sides have stepped back from the brink and seem committed to de-escalation. Any outbreak of violence between two nuclear-armed states is particularly fraught, and the world is right to pay attention. Yet, fortunately, no instance of such confrontation has ever resulted in a nuclear exchange. This is explained by the phenomenon that international relations theorists and security scholars term the stability-instability paradox: Because nuclear weapons fundamentally change the strategic logic of conflict, they may prevent major conflict between two nuclear-armed actors while simultaneously increasing the amount of minor conflict.

Beyond the latest episode, this phenomenon explains the continuation and outcome of much of Pakistan and India’s rivalry since Pakistan’s successful nuclear tests in 1998. Indeed, this is not the first time since they have both demonstrated nuclear capabilities that India and Pakistan have fought each other. Only a year after Pakistan first tested a nuclear weapon, India and Pakistan fought the brief Kargil War over Kashmir. There have been several flare-ups since then, the most recent of which was in 2019. Nor is this the only example of two nuclear-armed states using force against each other: The Soviet Union and China fought a brief but bloody border war in 1969, and more recently Indian and Chinese forces skirmished over their Kashmir border in 2020 and 2021.

Crises between nuclear states are never guaranteed to end so peacefully. They still require delicate diplomacy to manage and de-escalate tensions. Yet, through a better understanding of the strategic logic of nuclear and conventional conflict, we can breathe a sigh of relief at this apparent latest validation of the stability-instability paradox.

Are America's Indo-Pacific Friends Flirting with China?

Derek Grossman

This could be the most volatile geopolitical moment in the Indo-Pacific since World War II. Extreme uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration's policies is prompting U.S. allies and partners alike to explore the possibility of relying less on the United States and pivoting more toward China. U.S. President Donald Trump's 90-day pause of the steep tariffs he placed on friend and foe alike is unlikely to have quelled regional concerns. But U.S. policy alone is not enough to produce a shift; Beijing will also have to capitalize on the emerging geopolitical inflection point if it wants to ensure a long-lasting shift toward a China-centric region.

Take Vietnam, the ultimate strategic hedger in the Indo-Pacific. It has been careful to balance relations with China and the United States, both of which it treats as a “comprehensive strategic partner”—the highest level of partnership Hanoi can offer. This month, Vietnam welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping in Hanoi, where both sides pledged to elevate their partnership even higher. This was a deliberate message to the United States from Vietnam, which had just been hit with a 46 percent tariff rate, that the country has other options.

And Xi played the role of spoiler to a tee: Taking a clear swipe at Trump's tariffs, he urged Vietnam to resist “unilateral bullying.” Xi also warned that “there are no winners in trade wars and tariff wars, and protectionism has no way out.” Rather than point out the irony of a Chinese leader lecturing about protectionism, Trump merely responded that China was probably trying to “screw” the United States. Xi went on to Malaysia and Cambodia—facing U.S. tariffs of 24 and 49 percent, respectively—to make a similar argument.

What the next phase of Trump’s trade war with China looks like

Ian Williams

For clues as to where US policy towards Beijing goes next, look beyond Donald Trump’s chaotic and erratic tariffs and focus instead on the small print of the US-UK draft trade deal. It has a clear message: that if you want to do business with Washington, keep China at bay.

The agreement itself doesn’t quite put it that way. It doesn’t need to. Instead, there are broad pledges to cooperate and coordinate on ‘the effective use of investment and security measures, export controls, and ICT [information and communications technology] vendor security’, and ‘to address non-market policies of third countries’ – all tailor-made for China, even if the country is not mentioned by name. It is even more significant because the UK agreement is being touted as a template for those the US is seeking to strike with others.

That explains why Beijing is so rattled, its foreign ministry telling the Financial Times it was a ‘basic principle’ that agreements between countries should not target other nations, and that ‘co-operation between states should not be conducted against or to the detriment of the interests of third parties’. Earlier, before the weekend tariff war truce between China and the US, China’s commerce ministry warned any country striking trade deals at its expense that it ‘will take countermeasures in a resolute and reciprocal manner’.

That is, of course, rank hypocrisy. Beijing routinely strong-arms countries and companies over trade, investment and market access. For instance, when Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a diplomatic presence in Vilnius using its own name, Beijing launched a trade embargo against the Baltic state that also included threatening multinational companies that sourced their components from Lithuania. More recently, Beijing has urged Chinese companies to purge foreign-made goods from their own supply chains.

Beijing’s reaction to the US-UK deal is a measure of its concern that despite the 90-day suspension of crippling tariffs, Washington remains not only intent on shaking up international high-tech supply chains, locking China out from the most sensitive areas, but is seeking to bring allies and trading partners into line via trade deals.

The Risk of War in the Taiwan Strait Is High—and Getting Higher

Bonny Lin, John Culver, and Brian Hart

Tensions in the Taiwan Strait are growing. Even before Taiwan elected William Lai as its president, in January 2024, China voiced strong opposition to him, calling him a “separatist” and an “instigator of war.” In recent months, Beijing has ramped up its broadsides: in mid-March, the spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office labeled Lai a “destroyer of cross-Straits peace” and accused him of pushing Taiwan toward “the perilous brink of war.” Two weeks later, as Beijing launched a large-scale military exercise around Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) circulated cartoon images that portrayed Lai as an insect. One image depicted a pair of chopsticks picking the “parasite” Lai out of a burning Taiwan.

This effort to dehumanize Lai reflects Beijing’s deep anxiety about the trajectory of cross-strait relations, particularly what China views as Lai’s desire to push Taiwan toward independence. Compared with his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, Lai has taken a stronger and more defiant stance in the face of growing Chinese threats to the island, as evident in his rhetoric and new policy measures. This March, Lai characterized Beijing as a “hostile foreign force” and announced a plan to implement 17 wide-ranging strategies to defend the island from Chinese infiltration.

Taipei in Four Days

Bill McAllister

There are at least two pertinent lessons from Ukraine that China can apply to its assumed planning for Taiwan. From the 2022 invasion, it’s obvious that much of the international community does not support a military buildup and drawn-out invasion of an independent country. Speed is of the essence. From the 2014 occupation and conquering of Crimea, there is more than one way to exert military power. Using “little green men” was a stroke of military genius that confused the international community long enough to be effective.

China has the manpower to infiltrate Taiwan with sufficient quantity to disable most means to defend Taiwan. This would be a multi-phase plan to infiltrate 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers, possibly less, into Taiwan as businessmen, tourists, laborers, and ship workers with no uniforms. Using basic small arms, grenades, explosives, and possibly rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), small units can take down critical infrastructure, blockade chokepoints, and tie up island defenses. In a Tet Offensive scale of attack model, small units, mission-focused infantry, and special forces can wreak havoc on communications, transportation, command and control, and island defenses.

The second phase, an air campaign to support the forces on the ground, would quickly be followed by a full invasion. Troops and material flown into airfields, possibly airborne troops, and airstrikes would do what the “little green men” could not. Unlike 2014, this phase will be violent. Once the initial assault takes down the Taipei government, it will be nearly impossible for the international community to come to their aid. China will now consider this as an internal security matter, further negating international options to intercede. The initial commando attacks and shaping operations will do the important work of decapitating the government, while the invasion forces from the mainland will consolidate control of the island.

Beijing is a ‘red line’: Hungary vows it won’t decouple from China if pushed by Trump

Finbarr Bermingham

Decoupling from China is a “red line” in Hungary’s relations with the United States, a deputy minister has said, in rare remarks clarifying Budapest’s thinking on its close ties with both superpowers.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has spent years cementing his position as Europe’s most pro-Trump and pro-China leader. With the US government now suggesting that its allies must choose between the two, many speculate that Budapest could find itself in an awkward position.

“Definitely not. That’s a red line for us, we’re having excellent trade relations with China, and China has become one of the biggest investors in Hungary,” said Levente Magyar, a deputy minister for foreign affairs and trade, when asked in Brussels on Thursday if Hungary was willing to decouple from China, “if that’s what Trump wants”.

China and Hungary hail ‘all-weather’ partnership as Xi Jinping gets red carpet treatment in Budapest

The official pointed to a swathe of Chinese investment in Hungary, with research showing that 44 per cent of capital pumped into Europe in 2023 went into the country, allowing it to overtake Germany, France and Britain as the most popular destination for Chinese funds.

“We are highly over-represented, considering our population and the size of our economy. So Hungary is benefiting from these very intensive Chinese economic and trade relations. We’re not willing to give that up,” Magyar said.

Journalism or Jihad?

Toby Dershowitz and Eitan Fischberger

Al Jazeera’s ethics instructor Khamaiseh led a webinar on bias—despite a history of glorifying Hamas and spreading hate against Jews online.

The Qatar-based Al Jazeera Media Institute recently hosted a webinar for journalists about detecting media bias to coincide with Press Freedom Day. One big problem: Muhammad Khamaiseh, the Al Jazeera instructor who specializes in “journalism ethics”, himself has a record not only of media bias but of hatred and discrimination. That’s quite an ethical dilemma, an area in which he claims to be an expert, and it’s also a dilemma for Al Jazeera, the organization for which he frequently acts as a public standard bearer.

Khamaiseh holds a master’s degree in media and cultural studies, is an editor at the Department of Media Initiatives at the Al Jazeera Media Institute, is a member of the Al Jazeera Journalism Review’s editorial team, and oversees its Research Fellowship Program. But despite his impressive CV, Khamaiseh has used social media to spread hate against Jews instead of using it to gather information for stories.

“Jews have been known for centuries to be cunning thinkers, and currently, the entire global economic system is under their control”, he posted on his X account in August 2018, six months after he started working at Al Jazeera, amplifying a hateful canard against an entire faith population.

Back in July 2014, at the height of an expanded military confrontation between Israel and Hamas, Khamaiseh expressed disturbing support for Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades when he cruelly mocked the suffering of Jews, laughing — yes, actually typing out the sound of laughter — at the idea of them being left orphaned. “The summer schedule of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades… By God they are not slacking off on going after the Jews, not even allowing them to sleep in the morning as they would like. Hahahaha.”

The Israel-Iran Nuclear Rivalry: Can War Be Prevented?

Assaf Zoran

Over the past eighteen months, tensions in the Middle East have escalated dramatically. The launch of hundreds of missiles from Iranian territory toward central Israel and F-35 jets striking near Tehran last year marked some of the most critical moments of the regional confrontation that began on October 7, 2023. Now, Tehran and Jerusalem are on a trajectory that risks further escalation in an already volatile regional conflict. At the center of this tension remains Iran’s nuclear program, seen as an existential threat by Israel and a major regime safeguard in Iran.

The debate is not over whether Iran should be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons but over how. To assess the best path forward and its impact on Iran-Israel relations, three main scenarios should be considered.

The first and most probable is a partial nuclear agreement, which may temporarily curb escalation but risks renewed hostilities without additional leveraging. The second, a comprehensive nuclear resolution, could significantly reduce tensions but remains unlikely due to time constraints and the wide gap between U.S. desires and Iran’s willingness to compromise. The third, an Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear program, becomes increasingly probable in the absence of any agreement over the next months.

Could the strategies employed by global powers during the Cold War provide insights into alternative scenarios for reducing tensions in the Middle East? While détente between Israel and Iran would require fundamental shifts in perception and remains unlikely in the foreseeable future, certain measures can help reduce miscalculations and the sense of immediate threat. In a rapidly evolving Middle East, potential domestic and regional shifts may create better conditions for de-escalation.

At key moments of change, historic opportunities for Israel-Iran relations may arise. Preparing for such developments is crucial, as proactively engaging with them could also, in itself, foster more pragmatic approaches in current bilateral relations.

In the meantime, the primary focus should remain on preventing the threat posed by Iran’s nearing a nuclear weapons capability through both diplomatic and military means. The North Korean case should not set a precedent, and mistakes that led to its nuclearization must not be repeated.

Trump pledges to lift Syria sanctions as he seals $142bn arms deal on Saudi visit

President Donald Trump has said the US has "no stronger partner" than Saudi Arabia during his first major foreign trip - a whirlwind visit of Gulf countries mainly focused on shoring up investment.

Speaking in Riyadh, the US president also pledged to lift all sanctions against Syria, saying it was now time for the country to move forward with "a chance at greatness".

Day one of the tour saw the US and Saudi Arabia announce a $142bn (£107bn) arms deal, as well as other investments that the country's crown prince said could eventually be worth $1tn.

Trump also made Saudi Arabia the first foreign stop during his first term, in 2017. The rest of his trip will include stops in Qatar and the UAE.

Trump's arrival in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday was met with a grand reception, including a lavish lavender-coloured carpet rolled out to greet him. He had even chosen a purple tie to match it.

Riyadh swapped red carpets for lavender in 2021, saying that it was a symbol of the kingdom's desert wildflowers and generosity.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met Trump on the tarmac and provided an honour guard of Arabian horses to accompany his presidential limo.

In his remarks at an investment forum, Trump lauded the US-Saudi relationship as "more powerful than ever before".

"From the moment we started we've seen wealth that has poured - and is pouring - into America," he said.

When Trade Wars Become Shooting Wars

Allison Carnegie

President Donald Trump may have backed off, for now, from the sweeping tariffs he proposed placing on almost every country in the world. But he is still upending global trade. Trump has established baseline ten percent tariffs on most imports. He has made those levies higher for a variety of specific goods, including steel. And he slapped 145 percent tariffs on imports from China, the world’s largest manufacturer, although he has now agreed to cut this rate to 30 percent. The result has been a raft of trade wars between Washington and other governments, Beijing foremost among them.

Trump’s disruptions to the global economy are serious, and they may feel novel. But today’s situation is hardly without precedent. One does not have to look especially far back to see what the president’s tariffs might do to the world. The problems the global economy now faces echo some that existed before the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization and others that existed even before the WTO’s predecessor, the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Until those bodies helped standardize commerce, countries frequently used trade to extract concessions from one another. They created and exploited what economists call “hold-up problems”: when one state or firm makes an investment in another in which profits depend on the continuation of the relationship. For example, one country could build oil infrastructure in another country that the supplier alone can service or operate. Once such deals are concluded, powerful countries can coerce their partners simply by threatening to change the terms of the agreement.

In the near term, countries can benefit from wielding trade as a cudgel. But in the long term, trade wars leave almost everyone worse off. When countries frequently use economic leverage to secure concessions from vulnerable partners, investment and economic growth go down. Political instability, meanwhile, goes up. States that chafe at economic coercion sometimes turn to their militaries in order to fight back. Countries that once cooperated because of commercial ties turn into competitors. Even close allies drift apart. Trump may think his tariff regime will make the United States richer, safer, and stronger. But history suggests it will do just the opposite.

Istanbul 2.0: Know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em

Ian Proud

The biggest achievement of today’s Istanbul talks is that they are even taking place. U.S. engagement will remain vital to getting a peace deal over the line. Russia’s desire for a reset with Washingtonmay keep them on track.

I have a sense of déjà vu as I contemplate these long-overdue peace talks between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul. In April 2022, Ukraine and Russia were close to agreeing a peace treaty, less than two months after war started. However, this came crashing down amid claims that western governments, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom encouraged Ukraine to keep fighting.It’s worth recapping very briefly what was close to having been agreed. By far the best summary of negotiations between both sides was produced by the New York Times in June 2024. Those negotiations ranfor almost two months. The talks started with Ukrainian officials being spirited over the border into Belarus on February 29, 2022 while the fighting raged around Kyiv, and eventually led to the now famous talks in Istanbul in March and April.

Ukraine will enter the Istanbul talks in a weaker position than it held in 2022.

Western support for Ukraine financially and economically is not as sound as it was then. No big ticket economic aid and assistance has been made available since the G7 agreement of a $50 billion package of loans, in June 2024. While European states scratched together new economic aid to Ukraine in April, this cannot make up for the reduction in US support.

In territorial terms, Russia withdrew from Kyiv as a concession to the first Istanbul talks and lost ground in Kharkiv and in Kherson in late 2022. However, Russia has gone on steadily to gain further territory in the Donbas since the end of 2023. So while both sides have scores on the board, Russia now maintains the military upper hand on the battlefield and that seems unlikely to change. These two factors in particular were behind President Trump’s February assertion that Ukraine has no cards to play.

Defending Europe Without the United States: Costs and Consequence

The IISS has conducted an assessment of the financial costs and defence industrial requirements for NATO-Europe to defend against a future Russian threat without the United States. A US departure would create a ‘window of vulnerability’ for Europe. While much can be done to improve readiness and boost Europe’s industrial capacity – and buying abroad may help increase pace – European allies will face difficult trade-offs in certain capability areas. Indeed, looking to directly replace key parts of the US contribution would amount to approximately USD1 trillion.

The IISS has conducted an independent, open-source assessment of the financial costs and defence industrial requirements for NATO-Europe to defend against a future Russian threat without the United States. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, its hybrid war against European states, and demands by the Trump administration for European defence autonomy make it imperative for European decision-makers to consider the military, financial and defence industrial investments needed to reduce dependencies on the US and, in extremis, to prepare for a NATO without any US role.

The objective of the study is to inform European policymakers’ thinking about the military, financial and defence industrial implications of closing key military gaps.

To inform the European defence policy debate, the study assumes that by mid-2025 the war in Ukraine has ended with a ceasefire agreement and that the US government has indicated that it will begin the process of withdrawing from NATO. Declaring its need to prioritise the Indo-Pacific theatre, the US also commences to remove equipment, stocks, supplies and military personnel from Europe. The IISS does not assume this scenario to be inevitable, but it is a helpful construct to clarify policy and capability decisions for European governments today.

General Clark Underscores Land Power's Pivotal Role in Indo-Pacific Security at LANPAC

Sgt. Johanna Pullum

U.S. Army Pacific commanding general, Gen. Ronald P. Clark, delivered a keynote address at the Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC) Symposium, emphasizing the pivotal role of land power in ensuring security and deterring aggression within the Indo-Pacific region. He asserted that land forces, operating in conjunction with naval and air capabilities, are indispensable for joint operations and fostering robust partnerships. Clark highlighted that a strong strategic land power network grounded in trust is critical as is interoperability with allied nations.

Themes and Messages:

Land Power as a Cornerstone: Land power serves as a cornerstone for guaranteeing sovereignty, fortifying borders, and enabling the joint force to attain its objectives.

Synergy Through Joint Operations: The U.S. military achieves success through collaborative joint and combined operations, training alongside allies and partners across all domains.

Strategic Land Power Network as a Foundation: A robust strategic land power network, built upon trust and seamless interoperability, is paramount for effectively responding to crises and deterring potential aggression.

Proactive Campaigning Forward: Strategically applying combat power on key terrain during exercises and rehearsals for potential operations is essential for deterring adversaries and empowering the joint force.

Setting the Stage for Joint Operations: The Army and its strategic land power network play a crucial role in setting the stage for joint operations, facilitating the movement of personnel and equipment, establishing vital supply chains, and maintaining essential infrastructure.

Indo-Pacom Commander Highlights Army's Regional Contribution

Matthew Olay

Yesterday, during the 2025 Land Forces Pacific Symposium and Exposition in Honolulu, the U.S. military's senior leader in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility discussed ways the Army contributes to the joint force's overall mission throughout the region.

Navy Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said "fires" or weapons systems that strike targets are the capability he needs the most.

"The ability to deliver fast, accurate and lethal fires across domains is fundamental," he said.

Paparo referenced China's potential invasion of Taiwan as an example, noting that U.S. maritime and air superiority aren't necessarily needed to prevent an invasion. Rather, the joint force needs the capability to deny China's use of the Taiwan Strait.

"And the Army's fires capability, integrated with the … joint force, is essential to deny that zone by imposing devastating costs [to China]," he added.

Paparo also said that, over the past nine years, the Army has risen to meet a challenge issued by a previous Indo-Pacom commander to forge a capability to "Sink ships, neutralize satellites, shoot down missiles and deny the enemy's command and control."

"The Army responded decisively [to the challenge] with the creation of multidomain task forces," Paparo said.

He added that there are currently MDTFs in the field bringing land-based capability to oppose the enemy's command, control, communications, computers and information systems' surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting capabilities.

Trump’s Pledge to the Middle East: No More ‘Lectures on How to Live’

Vivian Nereim

When President Trump declared from the stage of an opulent ballroom in Saudi Arabia that the United States was done nation-building and intervening, that the world’s superpower would no longer be “giving you lectures on how to live,” his audience erupted in applause.

He was effectively denouncing decades of American policy in the Middle East, playing to grievances long aired in cafes and sitting rooms from Morocco to Oman.

“In the end, the so-called nation builders wrecked far more nations than they built,” Mr. Trump said on Tuesday, during a sweeping address at an investment conference in the Saudi capital of Riyadh. “And the interventionalists were intervening in complex societies that they did not even understand.”

He urged the people of the region to chart “your own destinies in your own way.”

Reactions to his speech spread swiftly on mobile phone screens in a Middle East where the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan — and more recently, U.S. support for Israel as it intensifies its war in Gaza, which is on the brink of starvation — are ingrained in public consciousness and criticized by monarchists and dissidents alike.

Sultan Alamer, a Saudi academic, joked that Mr. Trump’s remarks sounded like they came from Frantz Fanon, a 20th century Marxist thinker who wrote about the dynamics of colonial oppression. Syrians posted celebratory memes when Mr. Trump announced that he would end American sanctions on their war-ravaged country “in order to give them a chance at greatness.”

And in Yemen — another country mired in war and subject to American sanctions — Abdullatif Mohammed implied agreement with Mr. Trump’s notion of sovereignty, even as he expressed frustration with U.S. intervention.

Navigating the Sea of Misinformation: Increasing Resilience to Russian Influence Operations through Military Education

Anne Furman, Michael Posey

Russia seeks to undermine American values and interests using malign influence operations. As an example, the United States military should buttress servicemembers’ resilience through education. By educating through engaging discussions, enhancing digital literacy, and employing well-crafted nudging, the U.S. military can improve the Joint Force’s understanding of how Russia operates across its competition continuum and how to recognize and develop defenses against Russian propaganda, ultimately resulting in a resistant and resilient force.

Lessons from Russian Influence Operations in Romania

Romania’s beauty astonishes visitors, but its history is even more astonishing. Romania transformed from a Warsaw Pact member to a NATO ally and functioning democracy, demonstrating resilience in the face of geopolitical pressures. Sharing a 381-mile border with Ukraine makes this scenic country a vital corridor for Western military aid, particularly since Russia’s 2022 invasion. Romania’s importance to the NATO Alliance continues to grow with the construction of NATO’s largest base, solidifying its role as a key regional player.

In late 2024, Russia sought to exploit vulnerabilities in Romania’s democracy by orchestrating a massive influence operation during its elections. Utilizing platforms like TikTok, Russian operatives activated dormant accounts and deployed bots to manipulate public opinion, successfully skyrocketing the popularity of a pro-Russian candidate, Calin Georgescu. Russian operations to multiply these fabrications included covert funding, misinformation, and violations of Romanian campaign laws. These influence operations affected the Romanian election, which the Romanian government annulled. Nearly successful, this influence campaign demonstrated Russia’s ability to exploit social media, one of its preferred tools for cyber-enabled influence operations. Romania’s decision to expose the operation provides a playbook for other democracies under similar threats.

Social Media as a Force Multiplier in Influence Operations

FROM HYPERSONICS TO ALLIANCES: RUSSIA’S EMERGING THREATS TO U.S. AND NATO SECURITY

Eric Uribe

Russian innovations with short/medium-range hypersonic weapons present the main challenge to the United States.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues into its fourth full year of full-scale war and with the entrance of a new U.S. presidential administration, the security environment for the United States vis-à-vis Russia has changed rapidly. Russian lessons learned, strategic innovations, and battlefield successes and failures have generated new challenges that will threaten U.S. national security in the near term. Within this article, a strategic threat is defined as a factor that denies or mitigates the United States’ ability to employ its current warfighting doctrine, conduct combat operations, or effectively protect its allies. Despite the recent focus on Russian ground operations, in the next 3-5 years, the most prominent Russian strategic threats to the United States will be advancements in hypersonic technology, Russia’s use of its regional and global partnerships to bolster munitions production, and Russia’s leveraging of partnerships to expand its geographic advantage. Also, Russia’s massed offensive maneuver capability will remain a challenge but likely will decrease over the next 2-3 years as the Russians seek to reconstitute their losses.

Emerging Threat #1-Advanced Weapons Development: Hypersonic Missiles

Russian innovations with short/medium-range hypersonic weapons present the main challenge to the United States. These weapons can destabilize the current offense-defense balance that informs the military strategy for both the United States and Russia. The new Russian Khinzal and Zircon hypersonic missiles can defeat U.S. and European air defenses not only through the massing of effects, supported by Russia’s increased production rates, but also due to the weapons ability to maintain its radar defeating plasma layer through the terminal phase when striking static targets. This capability would tilt the offensive advantage in favor of Russia, which could conduct strikes on strategic infrastructure across Europe that hinders the U.S. ability to respond to adversary aggression or come to the aid of NATO allies with resources both inside and outside the theater of operations.

The West’s Intellectual Deficit in Modern War

Mick Ryan

Nearly 18 months ago, I explored the key intellectual challenges that had become apparent as the result of technological insertions into the Ukraine War. This includes the impact of drones and the democratisation of battlespace knowledge through digital command and control systems.

In that two-part series, I proposed that the Russo-Ukraine War had evolved into a more static ground because both sides were fighting a 21st century war with 20th century ideas. Most attention was being focussed on generating more munitions, more units, more territorial gains and more people. But I also proposed that even if Ukraine and Russia were to mobilise more people and industry, the trajectory of the war would not change significantly unless there was a mobilization of intellectual capacity to develop new warfighting ideas.

The period since those articles were published has proved this out. The ground war, with the exception of short periods of tactical energy such as the Ukrainian Kursk offensive, remains largely static in nature. Where advances have been made, they are achieved at very large costs in humans and equipment. The air, drone and missile war has more dynamism and is having an impact on the economy and warfighting capacity of both nations. However, this air and missile war is still yet to prove politically or strategically decisive.

More intellectual dynamism and innovation is necessary to develop more effective and survivable offensive military concepts for the modern technological and political environment. This is not just a military concern, however. Being able to threaten the use of offensive operations is central to a viable strategic deterrent. While nuclear weapons remain an important component of deterrents, conventional and cognitive options must also play their part. These two elements are currently a weakness in Western nations.

How Spying Helped Erode American Trust

James Santel

In 1973, William Colby, then the director of central intelligence, had a statue of the Revolutionary War spy Nathan Hale placed on the grounds of the CIA’s headquarters in Virginia. Hale struck many as an odd choice of icon; after all, he had been captured and executed by the British. One of Colby’s successors, William Casey, grumbled that Hale “fouled up the only mission he was ever given.” Casey left Hale alone, but compensated by commissioning what he considered a more appropriate statue in the lobby—a likeness of William Donovan, nicknamed “Wild Bill,” the man often credited as the father of the CIA.

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Casey wasn’t wrong about Hale’s incompetence. Hale hadn’t bothered to use an alias, and he divulged his assignment to a British officer. Whether or not he actually uttered his famous last words about having only one life to give for his country, it appears that he was an idealist, if not an outright innocent. “He was simply too forthright and trusting to be a good spy,” concludes Jeffrey P. Rogg in his forthcoming book, The Spy and the State, one of two new histories of American intelligence. This is an interesting assessment because of what Rogg declares just a few pages earlier: that the business of intelligence “is inherently ‘un-American,’” a practice ill-suited to a “country that values honesty, transparency, and forthrightness.” A tantalizing inference can be drawn: If Hale had been a worse American, he might have been a better spy.

Navigating the Sea of Misinformation: Increasing Resilience to Russian Influence Operations through Military Education

Anne Furman, Michael Posey

Russia seeks to undermine American values and interests using malign influence operations. As an example, the United States military should buttress servicemembers’ resilience through education. By educating through engaging discussions, enhancing digital literacy, and employing well-crafted nudging, the U.S. military can improve the Joint Force’s understanding of how Russia operates across its competition continuum and how to recognize and develop defenses against Russian propaganda, ultimately resulting in a resistant and resilient force.

Lessons from Russian Influence Operations in Romania

Romania’s beauty astonishes visitors, but its history is even more astonishing. Romania transformed from a Warsaw Pact member to a NATO ally and functioning democracy, demonstrating resilience in the face of geopolitical pressures. Sharing a 381-mile border with Ukraine makes this scenic country a vital corridor for Western military aid, particularly since Russia’s 2022 invasion. Romania’s importance to the NATO Alliance continues to grow with the construction of NATO’s largest base, solidifying its role as a key regional player.

In late 2024, Russia sought to exploit vulnerabilities in Romania’s democracy by orchestrating a massive influence operation during its elections. Utilizing platforms like TikTok, Russian operatives activated dormant accounts and deployed bots to manipulate public opinion, successfully skyrocketing the popularity of a pro-Russian candidate, Calin Georgescu. Russian operations to multiply these fabrications included covert funding, misinformation, and violations of Romanian campaign laws. These influence operations affected the Romanian election, which the Romanian government annulled. Nearly successful, this influence campaign demonstrated Russia’s ability to exploit social media, one of its preferred tools for cyber-enabled influence operations. Romania’s decision to expose the operation provides a playbook for other democracies under similar threats.

Social Media as a Force Multiplier in Influence Operations

FEMA Needs to Change. A New Bill in Congress Shows Promise.

Sarah Labowitz and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz

The Sustainability, Climate, and Geopolitics Program explores how climate change and the responses to it are changing international politics, global governance, and world security. Our work covers topics from the geopolitical implications of decarbonization and environmental breakdown to the challenge of building out clean energy supply chains, alternative protein options, and other challenges of a warming planet.Learn More

Over the past four months, the administration of President Donald Trump has vacillated on what to do with the U.S. federal disaster aid system. Early on, Trump expressed interest in “getting rid” of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), pushing disaster-related costs to states and households. Then the administration shifted to a vision that would end FEMA “as it exists today” while implementing major reforms. Talk then returned to eliminating FEMA, only to settle again on some kind of reform. Meanwhile, the president created a FEMA Review Council, which is now making plans to meet.

Despite its uncertainty about how to proceed, the administration is right that FEMA and the federal disaster aid system more generally need to change. This is not new. The system is too slow and burdensome for state and local governments and households. It overindulges in micromanagement at the expense of speed and flexibility. It doesn’t do enough to incentivize investments in resilience and risk mitigation. But there are many worthy aspects that shouldn’t be thrown out with the bathwater. The right way to approach reform is in consultation with local leaders, with plenty of runway to implement major changes, drawing on lessons of what’s worked well and could work even better with reform.

Congress is now entering the fray with constructive ideas, and in good time: Hurricane season starts in twenty-six days. A bipartisan group of legislators has introduced a draft bill in the House of Representatives that has three key changes that would strengthen the disaster aid system and improve its responsiveness to Americans.

The Technopolar Paradox

Ian Bremmer

In February 2022, as Russian forces advanced on Kyiv, Ukraine’s government faced a critical vulnerability: with its Internet and communication networks under attack, its troops and leaders would soon be in the dark. Elon Musk—the de facto head of Tesla, SpaceX, X (formerly Twitter), xAI, the Boring Company, and Neuralink—stepped in. Within days, SpaceX had deployed thousands of Starlink terminals to Ukraine and activated satellite Internet service at no cost. Having kept the country online, Musk was hailed as a hero.

But the centibillionaire’s personal intervention—and Kyiv’s reliance on it—came with risks. Months later, Ukraine asked SpaceX to extend Starlink’s coverage to Russian-occupied Crimea, to enable a submarine drone strike that Kyiv wanted to carry out against Russian naval assets. Musk refused—worried, he said, that this would cause a major escalation in the war. Even the Pentagon’s entreaties on behalf of Ukraine failed to convince him. An unelected, unaccountable private citizen had unilaterally thwarted a military operation in an active war zone while exposing the fact that governments had remarkably little control over crucial decisions affecting their citizens and national security.

This was “technopolarity” in action: a technology leader not only driving stock market returns but also controlling aspects of civil society, politics, and international affairs that have been traditionally the exclusive preserve of nation-states. Over the past decade, the rise of such individuals and the firms they control has transformed the global order, which had been defined by states since the Peace of Westphalia enshrined them as the building blocks of geopolitics nearly 400 years ago. For most of this time, the structure of that order could be described as unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, depending on how power was distributed among countries. The world, however, has since entered a “technopolar moment,” a term I used in Foreign Affairs in 2021 to describe an emerging order in which “a handful of large technology companies rival [states] for geopolitical influence.” Major tech firms have become powerful geopolitical actors, exercising a form of sovereignty over digital space and, increasingly, the physical world that potentially rivals that of states.

Three technologies that can change the world

Ilan Gur

We have a guest post today from Ilan Gur, the CEO of the UK government’s Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA).

ARIA was set up in 2023 to fund cutting edge research, but there has been relatively little coverage of what it’s actually doing. The one thing that has cut through recently is ARIA’s funding of some small geoengineering experiments. This has been written up by some outlets, in a sensationalist fashion, as a “secret government plan to dim the sun” (you can read about the actual work and safeguards here).

We thought it would be of interest to readers to give Ilan the space to set out some other work ARIA is engaged in, as well as setting out some of the barriers to success.

Prior to ARIA, Ilan founded two deeptech startups and served as a Programme Director at ARPA-E, the US government’s Advanced Research Projects Agency for cutting-edge energy technologies. He is also the founder of Activate.org, a US-based non-profit that supports scientists and engineers in bringing groundbreaking research to market.

Two and a half years ago, I moved from Silicon Valley to the UK to take on the role of leading the government’s newly created Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA).

I joined because of the enormous, inspiring ambition underpinning the project: to unlock breakthroughs in science and technology that can drive a step change in economic growth and social prosperity, for Britain and the world.

Our team has since been working to develop a new model for UK innovation. Drawing inspiration from the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which catalysed the internet, mRNA vaccines, personal computing, and GPS – we are adapting the best parts of a proven model to the strengths and opportunities of Britain.

The Trump Administration May Be About to Repeal the AI Diffusion Rule. Here’s What It Should Do Next.

Alasdair Phillips-Robins and Sam Winter-Levy

The Technology and International Affairs Program develops insights to address the governance challenges and large-scale risks of new technologies. Our experts identify actionable best practices and incentives for industry and government leaders on artificial intelligence, cyber threats, cloud security, countering influence operations, reducing the risk of biotechnologies, and ensuring global digital inclusion.Learn More

One of the final actions of president Joe Biden’s administration was to publish the “AI diffusion rule,” a complex regulation governing the export of advanced computing chips to most countries in the world. President Donald Trump’s administration has signaled that it intends to repeal the rule, which is set to come into force on May 15, and replace it with a simpler framework to regulate the export of AI technology, although the administration has reportedly not reached a final decision.

The existing rule seeks to regulate the sale of the world’s most powerful AI chips and the storage of advanced AI model weights (the parameters that encode a system’s core intelligence) in every country in the world. It does so by splitting the world into three groups: a small set of close U.S. allies to which almost no restrictions apply; a group of arms-embargoed countries, including China and Russia, that were already banned from receiving U.S. chips; and a large middle category where most shipments can proceed but those necessary to build very large computing clusters are subjected to additional scrutiny or, at the largest levels, banned entirely.

The rule’s designers were attempting to balance the need to preserve U.S. control over powerful AI systems against the importance of promoting exports of U.S. AI products and services abroad. Their solution was to try to ensure that the largest computing clusters and the most powerful AI systems remained in the United States and a small group of close allies, while allowing the vast majority of commercial activity to carry on largely unimpeded. At the same time, they created a framework for using AI exports as leverage over geopolitical swing states, establishing incentives for other governments to adopt U.S. technology standards and protections in exchange for U.S. chips. In other words, the rule was a compromise between what one of this article’s authors has elsewhere described as three possible goals of international AI policy: control, promotion, and leverage.

Echoes of influence: Saying farewell to 1st IO

Maj. Ally Raposa

FORT BELVOIR, Va. — The story of the 1st Information Operations Command is a testament to how innovation in warfare often starts quietly – drawn out on butcher boards in briefing rooms and SCIFs (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) – by people who see what others don’t yet recognize.

From the sands of Iraq to the digital battlefields of today, its members helped pioneer Army Information Advantage.

The idea began as an INSCOM (U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command) concept; an intangible form of warfare that could determine a battle’s outcome. From that vision emerged the Army’s only active-duty information operations unit: the 1st Information Operations Command (Land), or 1st IO. Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, the unit spent three decades deploying teams, providing reach-back support, conducting red team cyber threat assessments, and delivering IO training.

Tracing its lineage to the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), activated May 8, 1995, 1st IO was formally established on October 28, 2002.

This story goes beyond organizational charts and force structure realignment. It’s about the people who made it matter and a legacy that informs and empowers the next generation of information warriors.

Thirty years—to the day—after LIWA’s founding, 1st IO Command cased its colors on May 8, 2025. Its legacy set to be carried forward by Army information advantage forces and nascent Theater Information Advantage Detachments (TIADs). 1st IO deployed worldwide, embedded in joint and Army commands, training thousands and enabling commands to achieve an information advantage.

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