Post-Sindoor, A New Reality for India and Pakistan

Yogesh Joshi and Harsh V. Pant

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ve strategy of escalation dominance to impose steep costs on future Pakistan-backed terrorism.

On the night of May 7, India initiated Operation Sindoor, conducting precision strikes against terrorist camps in Pakistan. India was responding to the brutal massacre of twenty-six tourists by terrorists affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba, a UN-designated terrorist organization with sanctuaries in and support from Pakistan. It sparked the most serious escalation of military force between the two South Asian nuclear powers. For the first time in history, two nuclear powers have attacked one another with drones and air strikes as well as cruise and ballistic missiles.

The ceasefire brokered by the United States last week remains fragile, and both sides have claimed victory. Pakistan claims that it has defended its sovereignty against India’s aggression and retaliated effectively, forcing India to sue for peace. The ceasefire agreement has once again drawn international attention to Kashmir, with President Trump offering to mediate a resolution to the longstanding territorial dispute.

New Delhi’s perceptions of gains are different. India believes it has finally avenged not only the recent terror attack but also past attacks. India struck Pakistan “harder, bigger, deeper,” demonstrating military superiority and technological precision. India has pursued escalation, strengthening its position for future crises. No diplomatic concessions have been made; India will neither talk to Pakistan nor countenance third-party mediation efforts. The Indus Water Treaty remains suspended.

The latest crisis has forced South Asia into uncharted territories. For nearly forty years, New Delhi absorbed the costs of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism as the Pakistani military trained, equipped, and funded proxies who carried out attacks across India with little consequence. Pakistan, as well as the world, thought India would fume but practice restraint due to fears of nuclear escalation. Indian behavior did not help either. India threatened military responses but rarely executed them.

CDS Along With Army, Navy And Air Chiefs, Provide Perspective Into Successful Conduct Of Operation Sindoor

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New Delhi, May 14: Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan along with Chief of Army Staff General Upendra Dwivedi, Chief of Navy Staff Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi and Air Chief Marshal AP Singh provided a direct perspective from the Apex Leadership of Indian Armed Forces into the successful conduct of Operation Sindoor on Wednesday.

Insights into Tri-Services synergy achieved during the operation were deliberated upon during this interaction.

“General Anil Chauhan, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), along with General Upendra Dwivedi (COAS), Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi (CNS) and Air Chief Marshal AP Singh (CAS) provide a direct perspective from the Apex Leadership of Indian Armed Forces into the successful conduct of Operation Sindoor. Insights on the TriServices synergy achieved through clearly stated Strategic guidance, and the successful execution of new-age multi-domain operations, with an exceptional degree of Jointness and Integration, deliberated with Veterans and Think Tanks,” Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff wrote.

India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7 as a decisive military response to the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack in which 26 people were killed. Indian Armed Forces targeted terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, leading to the death of over 100 terrorists affiliated with terror outfits like the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen.

After the attack, Pakistan retaliated with cross-border shelling across the Line of Control and Jammu and Kashmir as well as attempted drone attacks along the border regions, following which India launched a coordinated attack and damaged radar infrastructure, communication centres and airfields across 11 airbases in Pakistan.

Modi Has Changed India’s Military Doctrine

Anchal Vohra

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It was widely understood that India would respond militarily to what it called a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack that occurred on April 22 in the town of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, which resulted in the deaths of more than two dozen people. But very few anticipated the far-reaching nature of that response—and the resulting counter response.

By last week, India and Pakistan were flying armed drones above each other’s territories, targeting military installations, and spreading panic about the possibility of a full-scale war or even nuclear weapons use. On Saturday, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a cease-fire “[a]fter a long night of talks.”

Amid India-Pakistan Clashes, China Faces a Difficult Balancing Act

Muhammad Murad

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India and Pakistan are on the brink of another war. The recent deadly terrorist shooting attack targeting tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22 resulted in at least 27 deaths and many injuries, escalating tensions between the long-time rivals, India and Pakistan. That culminated in cross-border strikes by both sides on May 7.

The April 22 attack in Pahalgam, 90 km away from the city of Srinagar, was unusual for targeting civilian tourists on such a scale. Omar Abdullah, the chief minister of India-held Kashmir, said that “the attack was much larger than anything we have seen directed at civilians in recent years.”

The attack was condemned by leaders from the United States, the European Union, China, Pakistan and others. Responding to media queries, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said, “We are concerned at the loss of tourists’ lives in an attack in Anantnag district of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. We extend our condolences to the near ones of the deceased and wish the injured a speedy recovery.”

In response, the Indian government claimed that Pakistan was linked to the attack without providing any concrete evidence, either to the international community or to Pakistan. New Delhi announced a series of punitive measures against Pakistan on April 23. With immediate effect, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in a major escalation. The IWT was signed by India and Pakistan in 1960 under the aegis of the World Bank and had survived three wars between the neighboring countries. New Delhi also announced that it had closed the Attari border and asked Pakistanis present in India to leave the country. Defense personnel at the Pakistani High Commission in India were also ejected, and India said announced staff at the high commission would be reduced.

Pakistan strongly denied any responsibility for the Pahalgam terrorist attack. Instead, Pakistani analysts have suggested that India’s own government was behind the killings. Senior Pakistani journalist Najam Sethi has said that he believes that the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam could be a “false flag operation,” claiming that similar incidents were used to manipulate public perception against Pakistan by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in the past.

Strategic Convergence Between India and the European Union

Christoph P. Mohr

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At this year’s Munich Security Conference, remarks by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance marked a turning point in the evolving geopolitical landscape. His speech confronted a stark reality: the EU-U.S. partnership – once the fulcrum of the global liberal order – has reached its limits. Pax Americana, the era of U.S. dominance and liberal internationalism, is coming to an end. In its place, a new world order is emerging – its contours still uncertain, its implications globally resonant.

In this transitional phase, this interregnum, middle powers such as the EU and India must proceed with strategic prudence. The global stage is no longer monopolized by a single hegemon; it is becoming multipolar, with power redistributed across several centers of gravity. In this context, the deepening convergence between New Delhi and Brussels is more than a diplomatic footnote – it is a sign of things to come. If they can overcome their differences, both geographies stand to benefit significantly from their growing alignment and could jointly rise to new strategic importance.

What did India and Pakistan gain – and lose – in their military standoff?

Abid Hussain

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Islamabad, Pakistan – Four days after a May 10 ceasefire pulled India and Pakistan back from the brink of a full-fledged war following days of rapidly escalating military tensions, a battle of narratives has broken out, with each country claiming “victory” over the other.

The conflict erupted after gunmen killed 26 civilians in Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Kashmir, on April 22. A little-known armed group, The Resistance Front (TRF), initially claimed responsibility, with India accusing Pakistan of backing it. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised retaliation, even though Pakistan denied any role in the attack.

After a series of tit-for-tat diplomatic measures between the neighbours, tensions exploded militarily. Early on the morning of May 7, India fired missiles at what it described as “terrorist” bases not just in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, but also four sites in Pakistan’s Punjab province.

In the following days, both sides launched killer drone strikes at each other’s territory and blamed one another for initiating the attacks.

Tensions peaked on Saturday when India and Pakistan fired missiles at each other’s military bases. India initially targeted three Pakistani airbases, including one in Rawalpindi, the garrison city which is home to the headquarters of the Pakistan Army, before then launching projectiles at other Pakistani bases. Pakistan’s missiles targeted military installations across the country’s frontier with India and Indian-administered Kashmir, striking at least four facilities.

Then, as the world braced for total war between the nuclear-armed neighbours, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire, which he claimed had been mediated by the United States. Pakistan express gratitude to the US, even as India insisted the decision to halt fighting was made solely by the two neighbours without any third-party intervention.

Since the announcement, both countries have held news conferences, presenting “evidence” of their “achievements”. On Monday, senior military officials in India and Pakistan spoke by phone, pledging to uphold the ceasefire in the coming days.

Asia without America, part 1: The cupboards are bare

Han Feizi

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History has multiple equilibria. Seemingly stable arrangements can turn on a dime. “There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen,” Vladimir Lenin wrote in 2017, his last year in exile.

Or, as President Xi Jinping said at the door of the Kremlin after a 2023 meeting with Vladimir Putin, “Right now there are changes – the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years.” Within earshot of the press, President Xi slyly added, “and we are the ones driving these changes together.”

Let us not beat around the bush: We’re talking to you, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The changes that President Xi was referring to are the collapse of America’s alliance system and, along with it, the collapse of the rules-based international order.

Every nation should be prepared. The savviest actors will front-run events. When President Xi said “we are the ones driving these changes,” it was an open invitation to bet on and become part of the “we.”

Fast forward to 2025 and trends have only accelerated. President Trump, in his second term, has gratuitously insulted Europe, strong-armed Panama, threatened to annex Greenland and Canada and launched a chaotic trade war on the world.

This is not 4D chess, people. This is President Trump using whatever is left of American power to kick over the chessboard, hoping the scattered pieces magically rearrange themselves in advantageous positions. It is also sheer madness.

Bullying only leads to self-isolation, Xi says day after US-China tariff truce

Nectar Gan

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Chinese leader Xi Jinping says “bullying” and “hegemonism” will only backfire, in a veiled reference to the United States just a day after a temporary truce was agreed in the trade war between the world’s two largest economies.

Xi chose to deliver this message, which paints China as a global leader and defender of free trade, at a summit of Latin American and Caribbean officials — including the presidents of Brazil, Colombia and Chile — in Beijing on Tuesday. The region has become increasingly caught in the middle of a tussle for influence between the US and China.

“There are no winners in tariff wars or trade wars. Bullying or hegemonism only leads to self-isolation,” Xi said, reiterating a warning he has made throughout the trade showdown with US President Donald Trump.

Great changes unseen in a century are accelerating, which have “made unity and cooperation among nations indispensable,” he added.

Xi’s speech comes a day after the US and China announced they would drastically roll back tariffs on each other’s goods for an initial 90-day period, in a surprise breakthrough that has de-escalated a punishing trade war and buoyed global markets.

Assessing the PLA’s Strengths and Weaknesses for Achieving the PRC’s Goals

Dennis J. Blasko and Rick Gunnell

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Over the past decade, the PLA has significantly increased the capabilities of its services in all domains of war, providing China’s leaders with new military options to defend the country’s national interests. However, based on problems in its combined arms and joint warfighting capabilities, leadership, and political loyalty, senior PLA leaders foresee decades of work before the PLA considers itself a modern, world-class military confident in its ability to conduct advanced, system-of-systems warfare. Despite the numerous improvements in equipment and organization, the PLA perceives itself as trailing the world leaders in many aspects of military technology, racing against time while its opponents are not slowing down. Even though the PLA may be required to fight at any moment, its leaders would prefer to stick to their modernization schedule ending in 2049 and achieve the nation’s goals through efforts short of war.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Evaluating Chinese reports of the PLA’s weaknesses is difficult because they are subjective rather than objective and measurable.

Underestimating PLA capabilities is dangerous, but overestimating the pace and effectiveness of PLA modernization could lead to policies that cause China to increase the speed and scope of its efforts, resulting in an escalatory spiral or arms race.

The PLA’s self-assessments of its capabilities should be compared with both the actions it undertakes and the potential options it refrains from taking.

When interacting publicly with foreigners, Chinese leaders will not display doubts about PLA capabilities to “fight and win.”

Introduction: China’s Military Strategy and Posture in an Increasingly Complex Security Environment

Benjamin Frohman and Jeremy Rausch

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Even though the PRC’s more forceful approach in the Indo-Pacific has yielded only mixed results to date, concern is growing in the United States and capitals around the world about Beijing’s more assertive use of the PLA to achieve its regional and global goals. From the China-India border to the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and the CCP’s sweeping sovereignty claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea, recent years have witnessed increasingly aggressive actions by the PLA to assert control over territory the CCP believes to be vital to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Flashpoints have included a fatal clash on the China-India border in 2020, which saw the PRC’s first use of lethal force against India in nearly half a century; the PLA’s aggressive efforts to prevent the Philippines’ resupply of Second Thomas Shoal, which continued into 2024; and what CIA director William Burns stated publicly to be CCP general secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xi Jinping’s instruction to the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.[1] Meanwhile, China’s security forces continue to expand their presence outside the PRC’s immediate periphery, including into the small island states of the Pacific.

Amid these tensions, the United States must update its understanding of the drivers behind the PRC’s more aggressive military posture, including the CCP’s perception of its security environment and thinking regarding the use of military coercion and force to achieve its goals. This PLA Conference volume provides in-depth analysis of Chinese leaders’ assessments of the challenges and opportunities in their external security environment, the PRC’s military and economic preparations for a future conflict, and the PLA’s evolving posture and capabilities in key regions, including around Taiwan, in the South China Sea, and in Oceania.

Demography’s Great Turn

John Derbyshire

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Demography ought to be one of the more exact human sciences. If I know the number of 25-year-olds in a certain population today, I can predict with good accuracy the number of 35-year-olds in that population 10 years from now. Some slight adjustments will need to be made for immigration, emigration, and early mortality, but the relevant statistics are easy to find.

It is therefore curious that one of the most sensational prediction failures in the sciences occurred in demography. That was, of course, Paul Ehrlich’s telling us in his 1968 book The Population Bomb that a Malthusian catastrophe was at hand and that, as a consequence of overpopulation and climate change, “In the 1970s hundreds of millions of people will starve to death.”

Ehrlich’s demographic pessimism had literary company. John Brunner’s novel Stand on Zanzibar (the title alludes to the idea that the Earth’s entire population could fit on the East African island of Zanzibar, but not for much longer) was published the same year. Harry Harrison’s Make Room! Make Room! had appeared in 1966; it inspired the 1973 movie Soylent Green.

This was all old hat to me. A sci-fi addict since childhood, I had made my first acquaintance with the demographic subgenre via Cyril Kornbluth’s 1951 short story “The Marching Morons.”

Kornbluth gives us a mid-20th-century American real-estate agent thrown into suspended animation by a botched dental procedure in 1988. When accidentally awoken some centuries later, Earth’s population has doubled and has separated by intelligence. There are 5 billion dumb, useless people with an average IQ of 45—the morons of the story’s title—and only a reserve caste of 3 million high-IQ supervisors who labor thanklessly to prevent the chaos brought by the 5 billion. Here is a bit of dialogue from the book:

The U.S. Needs a Bold Strategy to Win the U.S.-China Tech Race

Kelsey Quinn

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China is outpacing the U.S. in critical technologies—preserving American leadership demands urgent, systemic, and strategic reform across innovation, regulation, and global alliances.

The United States is losing the technology race with China. This is not hyperbole but rather a strategic reality demanding immediate action. China’s coordinated state-driven approach is eroding America’s technological edge across artificial intelligence, quantum computing, advanced manufacturing, and supply chain dominance. This erosion represents an existential threat to our economic prosperity, national security, and global influence. Recapturing our lead requires a fundamentally reimagined response.

America’s Technological Challenge Demands Systemic Changes

The United States is ceding ground to China across multiple critical technology fronts simultaneously. China’s dual-circulation strategy and military-civil fusion approaches represent a comprehensive, whole-of-nation approach that is outpacing America’s efforts in advancing the tech sector. While we debate incremental policy tweaks, China is executing a coordinated strategy that systematically targets U.S. vulnerabilities.

The competition with China is not merely about who produces more or marginal performance improvements. It is about whether democratic or authoritarian values will shape the future technological landscape, and thus, the global landscape. As I emphasized in New Lines Institute’s recent compendium “Future-Proofing U.S. Technology,” this rivalry “represents a systemic challenge that cuts across economic, security, and diplomatic domains” and requires a comprehensive strategic response harnessing America’s innovative capacity while protecting critical technologies from exploitation.

Confused about Trump’s tariff policy?

Michael Hiltzik

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Are you confused about Donald Trump’s tariff policy, including why he instigated a global trade war, what its impact will be on the U.S. economy and how hard it will hit your pocketbook?

Join the club. So too are economists, trade experts, political prognosticators and Trump himself. Their bewilderment has only intensified with the White House’s recent announcement of trade “deals” with Britain and China.

Those quote marks are proper, because it’s unclear how much of a bargain Trump has struck with those countries despite his triumphalist rhetoric.

Running a trade deficit is nothing new for the United States. Indeed, it has run a persistent trade deficit since the 1970s—but it also did throughout most of the 19th century.

— Brian Reinbold and Yi Wen, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

On Monday, for instance, Trump declared that he had achieved a “total reset” in trade relations with China. That doesn’t appear to be true, given that the thrust of the announcement was a 90-day pause in the recent round of U.S.-imposed tariffs on Chinese goods and retaliatory Chinese levies on goods imported from the U.S.

Indeed, the announcement appears at least superficially to represent another climb-down by Trump of the stern tariff regime he claimed to be imposing. No one is even sure that the purported cease-fire will survive for the full 90 days. Even if it does, it means 90 days of continued uncertainty about the relations between the two largest economies on the planet.

Don’t Offshore American AI to the Middle East

Alasdair Phillips-Robins

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In 1867, Tsar Alexander II of Russia agreed to sell the territory of Alaska to the United States for a mere $7.2 million—approximately 2 cents per acre. At the time, Secretary of State William Seward, the architect of the deal, was ridiculed for the acquisition; critics called it “Seward’s Folly.” But since geologists struck oil in the region in 1902, Alaska has provided the United States with a strategic resource that helped bankroll its rise over the 20th century.

Alaskan oil production has generated more than $180 billion in revenue for the state—a return orders of magnitude greater than the original purchase price. Meanwhile, Russia’s Alaska sale has gone down as a strategic blunder.

Trump Isn’t Following the Script on Israel

Emma Ashford

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With Jared Kushner to his left, Donald Trump listens to the rabbi Shmuel Rabinovitch during a visit to the Western Wall in Jerusalem’s Old City on May 22, 2017.With Jared Kushner to his left, Donald Trump listens to the rabbi Shmuel Rabinovitch during a visit to the Western Wall in Jerusalem’s Old City on May 22, 2017. Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images

The only thing more certain than the sun rising in the east and setting in the west is that a Republican president will always support Israel—and that Democratic presidents will largely do the same while being blamed for the opposite.

And yet, U.S. President Donald Trump is visiting the Middle East this week, and his trip does not include Israel, despite lobbying from the Netanyahu government for him to do so. He recently negotiated a cease-fire with the Houthis in Yemen, even though their stated intention is to continue striking Israel. He even removed his national security advisor, Mike Waltz, reportedly in part for the sin of coordinating potential strikes on Iranian nuclear sites with Israeli officials without consulting him.

Israel issues major evacuation order for Palestinians sheltering in Gaza City

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Israel has issued one of the most sweeping evacuation orders for civilians in Gaza yet seen in this war.

Large swathes of Gaza City, an area already partially destroyed by bombing, have been declared unsafe, the residents taking shelter there told to leave for their own safety ahead of "intense strikes" by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Among the buildings highlighted by Israel are the Islamic University, Al-Shifa Hospital and three former schools.

While Israel alleges that the buildings are being used by Hamas as "command and control centres", local authorities and aid agencies say there are thousands of civilians sheltering there.

Evacuating these areas would require time, they say, and there could be huge numbers of casualties.

It's an ominous sign of Israel's threat to significantly expand its military campaign in Gaza.

The former Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, has been one of very few senior Israelis so far to speak out against expanding the military campaign in Gaza.

In an interview with the BBC, Olmert said: "Most Israelis are against what is happening, large numbers of the [army's] commanders are against expanding the military operation and want to end the war right now."

Olmert is a frequent and increasingly vocal critic of Israel's current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and his views reflect growing concern about the impact of the 20-month-long war on the country's morale, economy and international standing.

Olmert was also outspoken on the humanitarian impact of the war on the residents of Gaza.

"It's totally intolerable, unacceptable and unforgivable, it needs to be stopped right away," said the former top official, who has been accused by pro-government outlets of "lobbying for Palestinians".

PRC Lessons Learned from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Implications for a Taiwan Conflict

Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise and Tsun-Kai Tsai

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Beijing is carefully studying Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine and drawing lessons that inform its views on future warfare. PRC scholars assess that the risk of a protracted, costly, potentially disastrous great-power conflict has increased. To address this, they urge leaders to (1) improve deterrence capabilities, (2) avoid unnecessary conflict, and (3) prepare alternative means to resolving conflict to include the use of proxy wars and irregular warfare. PRC international security scholars are developing a renewed appreciation for the wide range of nonkinetic options available to sympathetic nations to support a nation resisting aggression, including economic sanctions and rapid provision of arms, material information, and intelligence support. PRC scholars portray the current conflict in Ukraine as deadlocked and treat the use of nuclear weapons as a real possibility. They also predict that many countries will observe the fate of Ukraine and decide to develop their own nuclear weapons programs. Some PRC observers portray U.S. efforts coordinating international support to Ukraine as a guide for predicting U.S. actions in the event of a Taiwan contingency.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The U.S. and the West’s demonstrated capacity to rapidly field an integrated slate of economic sanctions, material aid, weapons, and intelligence support in the face of Russian aggression has the potential to serve as a deterrence multiplier against the PRC.

Uncertainty surrounding continued support to Ukraine may weaken U.S. deterrence in a Taiwan contingency, given that PRC analysts portray U.S. support to Ukraine as a useful proxy for assessing U.S. capacity to sustain persistent support in a protracted conflict.

Follow the Money Trump in the Middle East

Lawrence Freedman

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Rambling it might have been, but Donald Trump’s speech at Riyadh on 13 May, and the themes of his visit to the Gulf states, illuminates his overall approach to foreign policy as well as its application to the current situation in the Middle East.

It is far away from the preoccupations of past presidents, notably George W Bush and his ‘war on terror’ and active promotion of democracy and human rights. It does not see the world in terms of a clash of ideologies and political values so much as a battle for markets and deals. The victories and defeats are to be found in the economic as much as the political sphere.

This philosophy is not particular to Trump but few political leaders have embraced it so enthusiastically. It is also the case that a concatenation of events have given his approach a validity that it might not otherwise have had. The sudden decline of Iran as a regional power, as well as the economic rise of the Gulf states, along with Israel’s inability to extract itself from the cruel logic of its war with Hamas, has shaped the policies he is currently adopting.

In his first term Trump inherited some of the features of the old geopolitical approach, not least because of his advisers, but his impatience with it was evident, especially when it came to the obligations imposed by long-standing alliances. He still can’t quite escape from past commitments and political relationships, including in Europe, however much he’d like to. So his strong geoeconomic view is superimposed on top of a fading geopolitical view.

As his tariffs policy has demonstrated, his geoeconomic view can be simplistic to the point of absurd naiveté. It does not reflect a sophisticated approach to supply chains and financial flows, and can be as crude in identifying threats and misbehaviour in the economic sphere as his predecessors could be in the political sphere, and as clumsy in seeking remedies.

But at its heart is a belief that for states as much as much as individuals, power stems from wealth and this power can be used to do deals which can make you even richer. That is the key metric of success.

Russia’s Plans Are Bigger Than Conflict With the West or Camaraderie With China

Sophia Nina Burna-Asefi

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There is a serious disconnect between Western pundits and the reality on the ground when it comes to understanding the Kremlin’s thinking. The current popular narrative surrounding Russia and its neighbors boils down to the following: Moscow poses a threat to the purported liberal world order; Russia is “destined” to remain on the “sidelines” of global politics; Central Asia is a “battleground” for Russia, China, and the West; the Russian economy is being “crippled”; and finally, Russia is supposedly growing “dependent” on China.

There are two common ideas guiding these beliefs. First, Russia is simultaneously a powerful and influential giant and a weak actor. Second, the actions of Russia’s neighboring countries are subordinate to Moscow’s interests rather than intrinsically derived. But these narratives miss a big point: There are more layers of affect that shape the Kremlin’s thinking and its assessment of the so-called near abroad. The way to understand how Russia works is to try and get inside this longer-term mindset.

Putin’s Growing Interactions Along Its Southern and Eastern Borders Have Deep Roots

Despite the talk of an eventual peace in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin will continue to step up in countries neighboring Russia, and the West needs to be better prepared. Areas to Russia’s south and east are considered particularly important to Putin. Putin’s Look East policy was first introduced in 2012, and predates the two Ukrainian wars. In the same year Russia adopted a critical new law, the 2012 Federal Law, which for the first time set a clear definition of the Northern Sea Route and its geographical scope.

Putin’s emphasis on the south can been seen in the Kremlin’s ongoing ambitions vis-a-vis the North-South corridor project, otherwise known as the Iranian route, a 7,200-kilometer corridor that connects India with Russia via Iran. Like the Northern Sea Route, part of the northeastern passage connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through the Arctic seas, the North-South corridor seeks to provide Russia an alternative to the Suez Canal and a way to sanction proof its supply chains.

Carrier or Coffin

Andrew Latham

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It is a peculiar feature of American defense politics that the most critical capabilities are often developed not in times of clarity, but in moments of institutional confusion and political upheaval. The F/A-XX program—the Navy’s next-generation air dominance platform—is a case in point. It is unfolding amid a fractured political landscape at home and an accelerating airpower race abroad. And it is happening, for better or worse, on Donald Trump’s watch. This fact, more than any technical specification or budgetary detail, will shape its destiny.

The Navy needs the F/A-XX. That much is not in dispute. The carrier air wing as it currently stands is at risk of obsolescence in a world of Chinese hypersonic missiles, expanding anti-access bubbles, and increasingly sophisticated adversary air defenses. The F/A-18 Super Hornet, capable as it is, belongs to an era in which the U.S. Navy could operate with near-impunity within the first and second island chains. That era is over. China is now fielding systems designed explicitly to deny the U.S. military freedom of maneuver in precisely those spaces. And in the absence of a credible next-generation platform with range, stealth, and networked lethality, the carrier will revert to what it was in 1941—large, visible, and vulnerable.

But if the strategic case for F/A-XX is ironclad, the political reality surrounding it is anything but. Trump’s re-election—completed not in a blaze of national unity, but amid ongoing legal challenges and accusations of electoral manipulation—has not produced policy coherence. It has produced something more familiar: disruption, improvisation, and theatrical executive authority. The irony is that this may be exactly what the F/A-XX needs. For all the programmatic discipline and bureaucratic caution that the Obama and Biden administrations attempted to bring to defense procurement, the result was paralysis. Trump, by contrast, may lack a strategic theory, but he does possess a tactical instinct for moving fast and breaking things. And the defense establishment—riven by inertia and allergic to risk—may need that kind of velocity more than it cares to admit.

The survivability of the aircraft carrier

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Against the backdrop of the ongoing Defence Review and naval air power deployed in the Red Sea, the debate about the viability of aircraft carriers continues. In this guest article, Tim Griffiths considers the remarkable ability of these ships to withstand enemy action and serious accidents.

A very rarely talked about strength of the aircraft carrier is its survivability. An ability to absorb damage from enemy action or accident and keep operating or make it to a suitable place for repairs to fight again another day. That’s not to say the aircraft carrier is unsinkable. The Japanese lost three in an afternoon at the Battle of Midway in 1942, and in 2020, after a fire broke out during refit that took four days to put out, the assault ship/light carrier USS Bonhomme Richard was deemed beyond economical repair. But in the 80 years since 1945 not a single aircraft carrier has been lost to enemy action. This period encompasses the Suez crisis, Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, the Gulf War, the Iraq War and the best attempts of the Houthis in the Red Sea.

The political threat

Plots to axe aircraft carriers have been part of the political discourse over the last sixty years. Under Harold Wilson’s Labour government of the mid-1960s it was decided to run down the RN carrier force and cancel plans to build CVA-01, the new large fleet carrier. HMS Victorious was run down quicker than planned, a small fire onboard was used as the excuse. HMS Eagle was laid up and cannibalised for spares to keep her sister the famous HMS Ark Royal, going until 1978. A new type of ship was conceived by the RN to be called the ‘through-deck cruiser’. It was actually an anti-submarine helicopter carrier, but the word ‘carrier’ was not to be used. By the time HMS Invincible entered service with her Sea Harriers and Sea King helicopters, it wasn’t really possible to call her anything other than an aircraft carrier.

The U.S. Should Rely on Performance, Not Explanation, When Evaluating AI

Michael Perry

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To stay competitive, the U.S. should evaluate AI tools like large language models based on performance, not explainability. Trust should be grounded in results, not unrealistic expectations of human-like reasoning.

The United States Must Treat AI as a Strategic Asset in Great Power Competition

As the United States enters a new era of great power competition—particularly with a technologically ambitious China—questions about how and when to trust artificial intelligence systems like large language models (LLMs) are not merely technical. They are strategic. These tools will increasingly shape how the United States allocates resources, prioritizes defense investments, and maintains a credible military posture in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Focusing on Explainability Could Undermine Strategic Adoption of AI

LLMs are not reasoning agents. They are pattern recognizers trained on vast datasets, designed to predict the next word in a sequence. Like a chess grandmaster making a brilliant but intuitive move, LLMs often cannot explain why they generate a specific output. Yet the Department of Defense, through organizations like the Chief Digital and AI Office, has prioritized explainable AI as a requirement for operational use. This well-meaning mandate risks missing the point.

Explainability in LLMs may not be technically achievable—and chasing it could be a strategic distraction. These models don’t “understand” in the human sense. Their outputs are statistical associations, not causal conclusions. Post-hoc explanations, while satisfying, can be misleading and ultimately hinder adoption of tools that could enhance strategic foresight, intelligence analysis, and operational planning.

The real danger lies in overemphasizing explainability at the expense of performance. Many decisions in national security—from target selection to long-range procurement—already involve opaque but proven processes, like wargaming or expert judgment. LLMs, if properly tested, can complement these approaches by processing volumes of information at speeds that human analysts cannot match.

Trump's photo with Syrian President al-Sharaa symbolizes new world order - analysis

SETH J. FRANTZMAN

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US President Donald Trump met the new Syrian leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The photos from this historic moment that surfaced on Wednesday symbolized that a new world order is emerging.

This is a major event in the Middle East.

Syrians celebrated throughout the night between Tuesday and Wednesday due to Trump saying that he would work to end sanctions on Syria.

Many people have commented on the rapid turn of events. Sharaa led his Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham forces into Damascus on December 8, 2024. It has only been five months since then, and Sharaa is already in Saudi Arabia meeting the US president.

When he first rolled into Damascus, he had a $10 million bounty on his head from the US owing to accusations of his involvement in terrorism in the past.

The US was quick to note in December 2024 that it would cancel the bounty. However, it remained to be seen if Washington would move quickly to establish ties.

European countries moved faster, and Sharaa visited France first, before meeting the American president.

The Trump meeting is symbolic on many levels. It brings to a close a chapter of US president George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror. That war began after 9/11 and saw US troops go to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Sharaa went to Iraq to oppose the US occupation there around 2005. He was held at a US-run detention center called Camp Bucca, according to reports.

Executives Are Pouring Money Into AI. So Why Are They Saying It's Not Paying Off

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A recent survey by tech giant IBM came to a conclusion that could send shockwaves through Wall Street and the tech sector writ large. The survey asked whether or not company leaders were reporting that their AI initiatives delivered the expected return on investment.

A shockingly small proportion of the surveyed CEOs reported that the tech was delivering on its promises, with only a quarter of the 2,000 respondents answering in the affirmative, while only 16 percent scaled AI across the entire enterprise.

A mere half of the CEO respondents indicated they were realizing value from generative AI investments, indicating the tech may be falling far short of some sky-high expectations and billions of dollars spent.

Tech leaders have long rung the alarm bells about the dangers of fueling an AI bubble, investing in an unproven tech that's still suffering from widespread hallucinations and a propensity to leak potentially sensitive data. As AI models become more powerful, they're also becoming more prone to hallucinating, not less, highlighting that the industry is heading in the wrong direction.

However, company executives are seemingly unperturbed. A whopping 85 percent of the CEOs IBM surveyed expected their investments in AI efficiency and cost savings to return a positive ROI by 2027.

The general fear of being left behind by missing the boat on AI is still rampant.

"At this point, leaders who aren’t leveraging AI and their own data to move forward are making a conscious business decision not to compete," IBM vice chairman Gary Cohn wrote in the report. "As AI adoption accelerates, creating greater efficiency, and productivity gains, the ultimate pay-off will only come to CEOs with the courage to embrace risk as opportunity."

Can An A-10 Warthog Destroy A Tank?

Luke Diaz

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The first United States Air Force aircraft built specifically for close air support of ground forces was the A-10C Thunderbolt II. All ground targets, anything from tanks to the most specialized armored vehicles, can be annihilated by these straightforward, efficient, and resilient twin-engine attack jets.

The goal of the A-X program was to build upon the Douglas A-1 Skyraider's performance. To fulfill that, the powerful 30 mm GAU-8 Avenger rotary autocannon would become the center of the Thunderbolt II's airframe as the core of its mission. The 30mm GAU-8/A Gatling cannon of the Thunderbolt II can shoot 3,900 rounds per minute to demolish tanks.

The Warthog has a variety of weapons systems, including electronic countermeasures, target penetration aids, as well as a variety of air-to-surface weapons. It was a standout aircraft during the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm). Later, the A-10 served in the Middle East against the Islamic State and in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Iraq War.