Indian Strategic Studies: 06/24/25

24 June 2025

China’s Use of AI and its Negative Impact on the World

M. Dane Waters

China’s rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have significantly reshaped the global landscape, with profound implications for security, economic stability and democratic values. While AI holds immense potential for innovation and efficiency, under China’s authoritarian use of it, AI has become a tool for mass surveillance, censorship,

disinformation, military expansion and economic coercion. This report analyses how China weaponises AI to consolidate power, influence global narratives, how Chinese AI companies must comply with the CCP’s orders, and how this undermines democratic institutions worldwide.

At the domestic level, China has developed the most sophisticated AI-powered surveillance state, utilising facial recognition,

predictive policing, and biometric data-tracking to monitor its citizens and suppress dissent. The Great Firewall – an AI-driven censorship mechanism – controls the flow of information, shaping public perception and reinforcing the authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). AI-enhanced disinformation campaigns manipulate domestic narratives and influence international media, pushing pro-Beijing messaging while suppressing dissenting views.

Beyond its borders, China’s AI strategy extends into military, economic and geopolitical domains. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly developing AI-powered autonomous warfare systems, cyberwarfare capabilities and intelligence analysis tools,

making China a key player in modern conflict dynamics. Meanwhile, China has leveraged AI in the global economy for industrial automation, supply chain control and financial market manipulation, positioning itself as a dominant force in semiconductors, rare earth minerals and digital finance sectors. By integrating AI into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has expanded its digital and economic influence across developing nations, embedding AI-driven infrastructure that ensures long-term dependence on Chinese technology.

Drones, Missiles, and a Battle of Chinese and European Fighter Jets: Lessons on the Future of War from the Indian Subcontinent’s Skies

When Indian and Pakistani jets took to the skies last month, the world witnessed one of the largest and technologically most complex air confrontations in recent history. For four days, both sides unleashed precision strikes, drones, and long-range missiles in an engagement that, while brief, could reshape thinking about modern warfare in the region and beyond.

Although the fighting de-escalated as a ceasefire was brokered amid risks of a nuclear confrontation, the battle—its tactics, technologies, and consequences—offers rich insights for militaries, defense planners, and experts worldwide. With confirmed losses, unverified claims, and evolving doctrine, the air war between India and Pakistan in 2025 underscores that future conflicts may be won or lost far from the battlefield—in the invisible domains of sensors, algorithms, and contested airspace.

The Spark: A Strike and a Race to the Skies

The latest India-Pakistan crisis was triggered on April 22, when twenty-five innocent tourists and a local guide were killed in a terrorist attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir. India blamed Pakistan-based militants for the attack and responded by launching precision airstrikes on May 7 against multiple sites, which New Delhi called terrorist camps, across Pakistani cities and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Pakistan retaliated by scrambling its jets and targeting the Indian fleet.

What followed was not a conventional border skirmish, but a complex, beyond-visual-range (BVR) aerial confrontation involving more than one hundred combat aircraft. Interestingly, neither side penetrated the other’s airspace. The missile exchanges between the adversaries took place at distances of up to one hundred miles. Among the aircraft used in the confrontation were some of the most advanced jets, including 4.5-generation fighters. The Indian Air Force is reported to have deployed, inter alia, French-built Rafale fighters armed with Meteor missiles, while Pakistan scrambled Chinese-made J-10s carrying PL-15 missiles.

While the initial air battle reportedly lasted an hour, the military confrontation between the two countries continued to escalate in the coming days. The second round of violence culminated with the Indian and Pakistani militaries striking each other’s military bases following a carefully calibrated drone war. An uneasy ceasefire came next, averting a nuclear confrontation. Still, the world is examining the momentous developments that unfolded in the South Asian skies as a compelling case study with lessons on modern warfare.

The Belt and Road Trilemma: The Future of China’s Role in International Development Finance

Felix Martin

This working paper analyses the evolution of China’s role in international development finance and explores how that role might develop over the next five years. China's rise as one of the world economy’s leading trading nations over the past 25 years has been extensively analysed. The growth and persistence of unprecedented global financial imbalances—reflecting in part the so-called “China shock” to the world trading system—is also well documented. China’s emergence in more recent years as the single largest bilateral official lender to developing country sovereigns under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has also been the subject of detailed academic and policy research.

This working paper seeks to add value by demonstrating the connections between these three trends, and by analysing how they relate to the recent evolution of international financial flows—and especially private financial flows to developing countries—more broadly.

The working paper concludes that as a result of the reversal of private capital inflows since 2021, China is increasingly confronted by a policy trilemma, according to which it will be forced to choose between (1) scaling back lending under the Belt and Road Initiative; (2) delaying or abandoning its commitment to the internationalization of the Chinese yuan; or (3) making domestic policy adjustments to revive capital inflows.

Precisely because China is now such a dominant player in global trade and finance, whichever choice it makes will imply systemic consequences for the international monetary and financial system. As a result, China’s future role in international development finance will depend significantly on the increasingly contested geopolitical context for global trade and finance generally.

The Life of the Party: Past and Present Constraints on the Future of the Chinese Communist Party

Yvonne Chiu, Isaac B. Kardon, and Jason M. Kelly

The Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace studies disruptive security, governance, and technological risks that threaten peace, growth, and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region, with an enduring focus on China. This compendium of essays on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by some of the world’s leading China scholars advances Carnegie’s long-standing commitment to rigorous, insightful, and policy-relevant research at a moment when a sober and strategic approach to China has never been more essential—or more difficult to define and achieve.

In Xi Jinping’s “new era,” students of Chinese politics face diminishing access to reliable sources. They must contend with biased or absent data, dwindling access to Chinese scholars and officials (and lack of candor when access is possible), and closed doors to archives, conferences, and meetings that, at least for a brief period of relative liberalization, were previously open. The avenues for substantive interactions between Chinese and American scholars that were being institutionalized in universities and think tanks during that “old era” have narrowed dramatically, due to restrictions on both sides.

Studying and analyzing the CCP from the outside is becoming more challenging, even as the importance of China has grown for decisionmakers, industry leaders, foreign policy analysts, and average citizens alike. However, the CCP has always been a challenging target, an organization that embodies the Daoist dictum “those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know” (知者不言，言者不知). That much has not changed. Yet the public demand to understand (and “counter”) China is surging, and many prominent voices on the subject are plainly untroubled by their lack of knowledge. As a result, much of the received wisdom about the CCP circulating in Washington is wrong, obsolete, or just unwise.

Ten challenges facing China’s economy

Depending on how it is measured, China’s economy is now the world’s largest or second largest. It is also the world’s second-most intertwined in terms of trade relationships, after the European Union, and is a major investor and lender in the emerging world. Understanding where China is heading is important for the whole world. This requires an assessment of both China’s strengths – and also the challenges it faces, of which ten can be highlighted.

According to Chinese policymakers, the economic outlook is positive, despite the trade war ignited by President Donald Trump, and China’s growth target has been kept at 5 percent. However, to reach that level in 2024, China needed a massive $1 trillion trade surplus. Chinese trade is now threatened by a more protectionist external environment.

Laxer fiscal policies have seen the official deficit eased from 3 percent to 4 percent of GDP, the largest on record, and a less strict monetary policy. However, no stimulus has been announced – a rather conservative response to the external environment. Meanwhile, China’s inflation target has been cut from 3 percent to 2 percent1, but the reality is that China is already suffering from entrenched deflation, which the government does not seem ready to fight.

This may be because of the need to remain competitive in export markets, even at the cost of a deflationary environment. Export prices fell in 2024 and have continued to fall in 2025. Even consumer prices in China have fallen since February 2025. While pushing prices down to compete is not without risk (Japan’s experience in the 1990s is a good example; García-Herrero and Xu, 2025), President Trump’s tariffs and the ongoing weakness of the dollar do not leave China much space.

China has also confirmed it will continue to step up manufacturing as a growth engine – there is no intention of correcting overcapacity by reducing supply. Because the increase in the fiscal deficit seems directed at supporting the debt restructuring of local governments rather than boosting domestic consumption, and because China’s labour market remains weak and disposable income stagnant, Chinese consumption cannot be expected to jump substantially in 2025. China will thus need to continue to force exports to reduce overcapacity.

Reprogramming the future: The specialized semiconductors reshaping the global supply chain

Celine Lee, Andrew Kidd, and Bruce Schneier

In 2014, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launched a massive investment campaign to develop its domestic semiconductor industry. While significant policy and media attention is focused on PRC efforts to catch up to the United States at the leading edge of semiconductor manufacturing, PRC investments in foundational, or “lagging-edge,” semiconductors are also an important strategic development. In this issue brief, the authors examine PRC investments in field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) as an example of critical, specialized semiconductors that are often manufactured with foundational technology.

FPGAs are specialized semiconductor chips that offer a unique combination of flexibility and performance. They are critical components in guided missile systems like the FGM-148 Javelin, automobiles like the Mustang Mach-E electric SUV, telecommunications systems, and cloud data centers. Today, the United States leads the FPGA industry. US firms hold market-leading positions in FPGA design and design software, while most FPGA manufacturing and assembly, testing, and packaging is conducted by US firms or by close allies such as Taiwan.

However, the PRC has steadily increased its semiconductor investment efforts in recent years to develop manufacturing capabilities for foundational semiconductors overall, and design capabilities for FPGAs in particular. This new PRC capacity will come online in one to three years and, given its substantial scale, it may price US FPGA firms out of the critical segments of the FPGA market. This will create both availability and security risks for the US FPGA supply chain.

Semiconductors are at the heart of US-China tech tensions

In the last decade, US and PRC policy postures toward the semiconductor industry have changed. As the overall US-China relationship shifted from collaboration to competition,1 the US-China semiconductor ecosystem has evolved from a benign mutualistic partnership into a strategic competition. This shift, coupled with rising tensions between the United States and the PRC overall, triggered a broad US response, including prohibiting PRC investments, imposing export controls on critical chips and manufacturing equipment, and an industrial policy that supports domestic chipmakers. Key PRC and US actions are summarized in Figure 1.

Mapping China’s strategy for rare earths dominance

Craig Hart

China has built a commanding monopoly over rare earths, the seventeen metallic elements that are crucial for modern technologies spanning from energy to defense. Through decades of strategic state intervention, China now controls over half of global mining production and 90 percent of separation and refining capacity.

This dominance has been enabled by a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach that includes the Communist Party, the state apparatus, the military complex, industry, and research institutions. These entities work together to implement a broad range of policies that ensure global control, such as price controls, tax policy, environmental regulations, standards setting, foreign policy, defense strategy, industry planning, and research and development. These labyrinthine policy- and market-making processes add layers of complexity to the already opaque inner workings of the Chinese state.

This report by Craig Hart demystifies these interconnected systems by:outlining China’s strategic objectives

identifying the key rare earths stakeholders in government and industry

unraveling the complex web of policies that enable its global market dominance

exploring potential opportunities for the West to develop a counterstrategy to develop its own rare earths supply chains

Rising Lion: Escalation, Objectives, and the Logic of Targeting

Jay Pasquarette

Operation Rising Lion represents a significant moment in the ongoing confrontation between Israel and Iran. The consequences wrought by Iran’s persistent destabilization of the region through proxy groups for years and insistence on advancing their nuclear program – despite repeated warnings from the United States and Israel – are already severe.

Although it is early, there are three elements of Rising Lion to pay close attention to: (1) how escalation progresses and where it may lead, (2) what Israel’s true strategic objectives are given the means it has already committed and the risk it appears willing to assume, and (3) how the logic of targeting can shape an adversary’s decision-making. Each of these dynamics may influence not only the outcome of this conflagration but the possibility for a better peace when the fighting stops.

Escalation Ladders and Thresholds

The fundamental question of how far this conflict could escalate may be a function of degraded Iranian capabilities and limited means available to Tehran. Iran’s ability to respond convincingly and in a way which preserves the legitimacy of the Ayatollahs is likely to be materially constrained. Years of sanctions, the degradation of military infrastructure at the hands of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Mossad, and the weakened state of Tehran’s proxy network has done much to weaken Iranian strategy. However, a cornered Iran with limited options may escalate asymmetrically or worse. Tehran might feel forced to make unpredictable, drastic actions that are unforeseen by Israel and the United States.

This begs the question of off-ramps for both sides – and the degree to which they are already narrowing based on actions already taken. For Israel, an off-ramp could follow decisive operational success – such as the destruction of key Iranian nuclear infrastructure. A decisive military achievement paired with U.S. diplomatic assurances to maintain pressure on Iran through non-kinetic approaches might provide the opportunity to off-ramp and de-escalate the conflict. Alternatively, for Iran, a plausible off-ramp may include symbolic retaliation which seeks to preserve what little credibility Iranian leadership has left followed by a return to the negotiating table with the United States. However, in the absence of meaningful options, Iran’s leadership may perceive that de-escalation means capitulation – which further reinforces the increased risk that Iran may lash out in unpredictable ways.

Is the decline of war a delusion? An exchange between researchers following the publication of Azar Gat’s article on the subject

This special roundtable discussion developed from the publication of my article, ‘Is the Decline of War a Delusion? The Long Peace Phenomenon and the Modernization Peace - The Explanation that Refutes or Subsumes All Others’, in the Journal of Strategic Studies (2024, vol. 47, Nos. 6–7). I emailed the article to an open list comprising all the scholars cited in my article’s references as involved in the discussion on the decline of war and the related democratic peace and capitalist peace theories [see Bibliography to my article, to which a few more names were added]. The list of correspondents reached some 60 names. I invited them to comment and attempt to refute my argument(s).

Quite a few correspondents responded to the call, and the result turned out to be a very fruitful conversation, extending over a couple of months during the last months of 2024. From beginning to end, the entire exchange took place before the full list of correspondents and was distributed further to other lists.

A number of participants suggested that the venture could be developed into a special journal issue. I was in the same view and believed that the direct exchange format we used had great advantages. It produces much greater engagement – and hence, clarification – of the arguments and counterarguments than is usually the case. Happily, the editors of JSS agreed to publish the whole exchange – lightly edited – as a special roundtable discussion.

The subject of the decline of war is crucial in terms of both theory and relevance to the real world and to unfolding events. Additionally, in the process of clarifying it, the discussion touched on a number of other major methodological and practical questions in international relations theory. It is rare to have such a gathering of scholars directly debating a subject. I therefore believe this special issue may be of service to both scholars and students.

As realist theory repeatedly came up in the exchange, I should add that Professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, chief proponents of the realist school in the current debates, were included in the list of correspondents throughout the exchange. Before the entire forum, they were repeatedly invited to respond, yet elected to remain silent.

Peppino DeBiaso, The Rise of a New Axis: Great Power Struggle and the Future of Conflict

The Trump Administration has taken office during a period of perilous transformation that presages a new era in international security. This new era is unlike anything the United States has encountered since perhaps the period leading up to the Second World War. Its most prominent feature is the growing collaboration and coordination among revisionist and belligerent autocratic nations.

They are building more lethal militaries while fueling crises and conflicts across Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. To a large degree, these regimes are aligned in their opposition to the United States and the post-World War II security order established in the wake of American leadership.

China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are pursuing concerted actions to further a common strategic aim, namely, strengthening each countries’ military capabilities as a means, in the near term, to shift the balance of power in their respective regions, while in the longer term,

altering the conditions under which future conflict with the United States and its allies would be waged. If this challenge is to be effectively countered, American political leaders must be clear on the nature of the strategic competition that is underway. While today’s adversaries have varying individual regional interests and goals, they recognize the struggle to forge an alternative order of power can likely be achieved only through an entente that erodes American military preeminence, which is at the core of its freedom of action to deter aggression and prevail in conflict with acceptable risks and costs.

How Israel’s Operation Rising Lion Dismantled Iran from Within: A Case Study in the Art of Deception

On June 13, the Islamic Republic of Iran experienced a strategic collapse that altered the balance of power in the Middle East. Israel eliminated key Iranian military and scientific personnel, degraded the country’s missile infrastructure, and neutralized its early-warning systems. But more consequentially, Israel’s strike—dubbed Operation Rising Lion—shattered the Iranian regime’s confidence in its own security apparatus.

This outcome was the result of years of sustained intelligence preparation, real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) dominance, and deep operational infiltration. Israeli planners achieved full-spectrum disruption by dismantling Iran’s command and control networks, severing high-level communications, and injecting uncertainty into the regime’s decision-making processes.

By the time Tehran could react, the damage was already done. Its upper command was dead, its defensive systems were disabled, and its internal threat assessments were in disarray. Crucially, Israel did not rely on cross-border operations. It had pre-positioned remote-activated strike platforms inside Iran and deployed them with surgical precision.

Israel’s operational concept combined a decapitation strike with cognitive disruption. The psychological warfare element—that the strike had come from Iranian soil—amplified the attack’s kinetic effects, leaving Tehran paralyzed. Unable to determine whether it had been infiltrated or outmaneuvered, the regime’s ability to respond collapsed before it could launch a single countermeasure.

I. Strategic Complacency: How Iran Misread the Coming Storm

The first two warnings came in July 2024 and September 2024. In July, Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh—Hamas’s top political official and a guest of the Islamic Republic—in the heart of Tehran, demonstrating its ability to penetrate Iran’s capital, bypass multiple layers of security, and execute a precision strike without visible attribution. The second warning followed in September, when Israel conducted a sophisticated attack using explosive pagers against Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon, killing dozens and injuring thousands. This showcased its capacity to infiltrate and disrupt enemy networks. These operations sent a strategic message and served as rehearsals for something much larger.

Why Putin Still Fights The Kremlin Will End Its War in Ukraine Only When It Knows That Victory Is Impossible

Nearly five months since U.S. President Donald Trump entered the White House promising to quickly end the war in Ukraine, it is being fought as intensely as before. Russia has not rejected the idea of negotiations, but despite Trump ruling out NATO membership or U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to offer any serious concession to put a deal within reach. At first glance,

it is unclear why this is so. After all, the war is now well into its fourth year, and although Russian forces have recently made advances and regularly attack Ukrainian cities with large numbers of drones and missiles, they are still far from achieving Putin’s core objectives. Russian losses have been accumulating at a staggering pace, with as many as 200,000 casualties since the start of 2025 alone. Meanwhile, Ukrainian units have pulled off some stunning operations,

including the spectacular June 1 attack on Russia’s strategic bomber force far from the border, and they are increasingly able to use long-range drones to hit military assets and oil facilities inside Russia—challenging any assumptions that Kyiv is on its last legs or that Moscow is close to a decisive breakthrough.

Given that Trump had presented Putin what he assumed to be attractive terms for a cease-fire, he could be forgiven for wondering why the Russian president is being so stubborn.

If Putin wanted a way to ease his country out of the war with minimal humiliation, Trump’s offer was as generous as any that a U.S. president is likely to make. A cease-fire would not only allow Russian forces to recuperate after a grueling few years but also potentially get rid of at least some sanctions and provide a chance to normalize relations with the United States.

Imagining the Near-Future of American Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific

Jeremiah "Lumpy" Lumbaca

Malign actors deploy cyberattacks, economic coercion, disinformation, and illicit gray zone tactics to destabilize the modern Indo-Pacific region. Competition in the region is currently not characterized by kinetic engagements—it is a protracted, complex struggle that advances incrementally. Economies, friendly nations, and innocent people pay the price. The primary perpetrators include the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Russia, Iran,

North Korea, and a range of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) – the 4+1 construct of bad actors (while acknowledging that all current US security strategy documents explicitly highlight the CCP as the primary national security threat).

These actors destabilize the international order with hostile intent, prioritizing their interests over others’ sovereignty by subverting, manipulating, and circumventing established laws, rules, and norms to their benefit at the cost of others. To counter this, considering recent Irregular Warfare (IW) developments, this paper outlines a new IW framework designed to undermine and mitigate 4+1 aggression while pushing decentralized, offensive IW to the advantage of America and its partners.

The intent of this framework is to develop an evolving irregular warfare network of actors. It would eventually encompass multiple cells that inflict damage on the CCP as it seeks to dominate maritime chokepoints, Russia as it manipulates media and elections, Iran as it targets Middle Eastern adversaries in the region, North Korea as it evades sanctions and escalates tensions,

and VEOs pursue a range of political objectives through violence or the threat of violence. All of these actors employ some degree of asymmetric tactics.

The Theory of a New Irregular Warfare Approach in the Pacific

How War with Iran Would Undercut US China Strategy

Adam Gallagher

There are many reasons why the Trump administration should refrain from further entangling the United States in Israel’s war on Iran. Iran is a relatively weak country halfway around the world and poses no serious threat to core US interests. If you liked the failed forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, you’d love the quagmire of a war in Iran—a country of 90 million people with a significantly stronger military than those two countries.

But Israel appears intent on drawing the United States into this destabilizing war of choice. Because Israel can’t totally eliminate Iran’s nuclear program alone, it has urged the United States to intervene directly.

A joint US-Israeli war in Iran harms American interests and would threaten American lives while draining resources and diverting strategic attention from pressing priorities. Indeed, one of the most crucial reasons why Washington needs to stay out of the war is that it serves as a distraction from more critical strategic challenges. Chief among those is managing tensions with China.

Since the October 7 attacks, the United States has surged ships, personnel, and other materiel to the region to protect Israel and deter Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” allies. In some cases, these military assets have been repositioned from the Indo-Pacific, where they are stationed in large part to deal with potential Chinese threats.

Before the Trump administration reached a ceasefire with Yemen’s Houthis in May, US commanders expressed concern that the military would have to move long-range precision weapons stockpiles from the Indo-Pacific region to the Middle East. The US military expended massive amounts of munitions to fight a militia that couldn’t even take over one of the poorest countries in the world. What kind of resources would it have to marshal—and from where—to prosecute a war against a state like Iran with serious military capabilities?

Ramifications of the Death of Iran’s (Former) President Ebrahim Raisi

Masoud Kazemzadeh

May 19, 2025, was the first anniversary of the death of Ebrahim Raisi. His death would not have mattered greatly if Raisi were merely the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). This article argues that the death of Ebrahim Raisi, widely believed to be Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s designated successor, has upended Iran’s succession trajectory, which will increase the elite factionalism and internal conflict in the aftermath of Ayatollah Khamenei’s death.

According to a 2023 report by Aman, the Military Intelligence of the Israel Defense Forces, the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was preparing the path for Raisi to succeed him in this position. It adds that other Western intelligence agencies also shared that assessment. The report further states that Khamenei not only orchestrated the 2021 presidential election to pave the path for Raisi to become president but also dismissed IRGC Gen. Ali Shamkhani (who was killed by Israel on June 13, 2025) from his position as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in order to increase President Raisi’s power.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was born in 1939 and is 86 years old. The fundamentalist constitution grants extensive executive, legislative, and judicial powers to the Supreme Leader. According to the fundamentalist constitution, the Assembly of Experts, a body of 88 fundamentalist Shia clerics, chooses the Supreme Leader.

Khamenei had invested at least 10 years in preparing the path for Raisi to assume that position. This includes not only appointing Raisi as the Head of the Judicial Branch but also manipulating the 2021 elections for the presidency and the 2024 elections for the Assembly of Experts. Raisi was the sole candidate allowed to run for the seat from his district for the Assembly of Experts. Raisi’s father-in-law, Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda, is a powerful hardline member of the fundamentalist oligarchy and a powerful member of the Assembly of Experts. Finding another suitable candidate for Supreme Leader will not be easy. Raisi checked all the boxes.

Deterrence: Peace Through Strength Works

Peter Huessy

The United States relies on deterrence to protect our country from all enemies foreign and domestic. The police and border patrol protect our cities and borders by deterring criminals and their associated organized criminal cartels.

The U.S. military, including all five services from the USAF to the Marines and Coast Guard, protects our nation’s interests and sovereignty and our allies overseas through displays of deterrent forces that give pause to our enemies.

However, there are pressures in the U.S. that are deliberately proposing the U.S. stop deterrence both internal to and external to the United States even atop the already serious loss of deterrence to date.

For example, HASC Chairman Mike Rogers explained at a recent hearing on the Mideast and Africa that:

“American deterrence in the Middle East and Africa eroded under the last administration. The disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan emboldened our adversaries. The Biden administration’s appeasement of Iran only made matters worse. After Hamas’ barbaric onslaught, Iran opened a second front—activating the Houthis to strike Israel and disrupt global trade. Since 2023, the Houthis have launched hundreds of attacks on U.S. warships and commercial vessels. Yet, instead of holding the Houthis accountable, the Biden administration pulled them off the terror list.”

Previous administrations said Ukraine was either of no security interest to the United States (2014) or feared (2022) Russian escalation to the nuclear level and therefore reduced weapons provided to Ukraine and failed to develop any strategy to win the war against Putin and Moscow.

Army promises to deliver analysis on sweeping changes in 10 days

Jen Judson

A U.S. Marine with 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division fires a joint light tactical vehicle mounted M240B machine gun while conducting a convoy movement during Spartan Fury 22.1. (Staff Sgt. Olivia G. Knapp/U.S. Marine Corps)

U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll promised Congress today the service would show its homework in 10 days on how it decided to consolidate commands, restructure formations and cancel or restructure a slew of weapons programs.

In a memo to the Army, the service secretary announced in early May that major change was underway and dubbed it the Army Transformation Initiative.

Yet many of the decisions laid out in the document lacked clear analysis behind them, such as a plan to consolidate Army Futures Command and Training and Doctrine Command into one entity and cancel programs just as they were crossing the finish line like the M10 Booker light tank and the Robotic Combat Vehicle

Driscoll tallied the amount of spending planned over the next five years for programs the service will cancel or reorient to roughly $48 billion. The service will reallocate funding into innovative efforts to transform the Army into a highly mobile and lethal force, service leaders are saying.

“I agree the Army must change and modernize how it fights and must take into account significant changes in technology,” Sen. Chris Coons, the highest-ranking Democrat in the Senate Appropriations Committee’s defense subcommittee said in a June 18 hearing.

“But, bluntly, months after you’ve announced the Army Transformation Initiative, this committee hasn’t received detailed or substantive analysis as to why the Army is planning to cancel or reduce 12 programs of record, consolidate or reduce staffing at 21 commands or how the investments you’re proposing will significantly enhance battlefield lethality,” he said.

Is Israel's favorite US general helping to push us into war?

Did the Israelis strike Iran when it did because Michael Kurilla is still commander of U.S. Central Command and a “window” for a prospective joint operation with the U.S. might be closing?

Some are speculating that because Kurilla is expected to retire from the military this summer that the Israelis saw their chance. The Army general, 59, has been widely reported to be on one side of a split in the Pentagon over whether the U.S. should support and even be part of Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.

In April, Israel news outlet Ynet coined him as “The U.S. general Israel doesn’t want to strike Iran without.”

“Israeli defense analysts say the window for a successful attack on Iran’s nuclear program is rapidly closing,” wrote Alon Strimling on April 19. “That window could narrow dramatically once Kurilla steps down, as his successor’s stance remains unclear.”

Kurilla is retiring this summer after a nearly 40-year career that dates back to the first Persian Gulf War. Ynet noted that Kurilla “is seen as one of Israel’s staunchest allies in the American defense establishment,” and his relationship “runs deep” dating back to his time as a young officer in his 20s.

“He’s a hawk of hawks,” noted Curt Mills, executive director of the American Conservative. “(The Israelis) knew they were losing an ally soon. They knew the negotiations (with Iran) were ongoing. The Iranians had signaled that they were close to accepting a deal days before the strike. So all of these things were a factor.

"And then meanwhile, I think there's every piece of evidence that Kurilla would at least start the conflict and pop his cork on it before he leaves.”

at the Cato Institute.

Israel’s Futile Air War

Over the past week, Israel has engaged in a protracted air campaign in Iran to achieve something no other country has ever done before: topple a government and eliminate its major military capability using airpower alone. Israel’s attempt to achieve these highly ambitious goals with an air campaign and sophisticated intelligence networks,

but without the deployment of a ground army, has no modern precedent. The United States never succeeded in achieving such goals just through airstrikes during the massive strategic bombing campaigns of World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War,

the wars in the Balkans, or the Iraq war. Nor did the Soviet Union and Russia in Afghanistan, Chechnya, or Ukraine. And Israel itself has never attempted such a campaign in previous conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, or even in its most recent operation in Gaza.

Israel, the strongest military power in the Middle East, has scored numerous tactical successes using precision airpower and exquisite intelligence since Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023. The Israel Defense Forces have assassinated senior leaders in Iran’s proxy organizations, including much of Hezbollah’s mid- and high-level leadership. In a previous exchange of missile fire in April,

the IDF destroyed a variety of Iran’s air defenses and missile capabilities. And its most recent attacks on Iran have killed senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders, destroyed important regime communication systems, damaged important economic targets, and degraded some of Iran’s nuclear program.

Building a Brain of the Army Through Professional Military Educatio

Next Army is a collaborative series by CSIS Futures Lab and the Modern War Institute launched in honor of the U.S. Army’s 250th birthday and the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI). The commentaries explore how emerging technologies, organizational reforms, and major shifts in the strategic environment will shape the force of 2040 and beyond.

In the future, the U.S. Army will operate as a distributed, data-centric network in which every echelon—from squad to theater armies and corps serving as combined forces land component commands—can tap a continuously refined “brain of the Army.” This agentic AI model will integrate lessons harvested from professional military education (PME) and real-world operations, fusing human insight with machine speed to accelerate the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP),

Troop Leading Procedures (TLP), and functional planning. Commanders will query staffs that combine human military professionals and an ecosystem of AI agents fine-tuned through reinforcement learning from human feedback. The best and brightest across the Army will collectively teach AI agents how to think about land power based on insights captured in classrooms, staff rides, and decision games—turning the classroom and leader development into the structured data needed to train algorithms.

Widely used AI platforms ingest commercial datasets divorced from the realities of land warfare, leaving commanders with generic models that misunderstand terrain, tempo, and tactical nuance. Most foundation models, which are generalists, are trained on more data about the Kardasian family than corps commanders from World War II or evolution of Army doctrine for leading large units.

Advanced Space Technologies Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. National Security

The United States is home to a growing set of companies building advanced space technologies, from lunar landers to satellite servicing systems. These firms are taking on missions once led by government and developing capabilities the government does not yet field. But limited profitability, export restrictions, and free government services may constrain growth unless targeted investments and smart policies help sustain a dynamic,

secure commercial space sector. This report explores the U.S. advanced space technologies industry and highlights challenges and opportunities the state of the industry presents for national security.Download Full Report

The U.S.-government-designed uncrewed Surveyor moon lander program first flew in 1966 and cost $658 million per lander in 2024 dollars.1 The government-designed Apollo missions cost $23 billion per launch when adjusted to 2020 dollars.

Since then, NASA has taken a different approach: in February 2024, the company Intuitive Machines successfully delivered a lander to the surface of the moon, fulfilling an agency contract costing just $118 million.2

Today, U.S. companies find themselves fulfilling roles that were historically the domain of the government—and taking on missions that even the government has yet to embrace. From exploration systems to in-space manufacturing to satellite refueling,

companies are deploying new systems for novel applications at a rapid pace and lower price. We call these companies part of the “advanced space technology” market and include in this category businesses that provide positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness (SSA); exploration; in-space satellite services; and in-space manufacturing.*

Cybersecurity:Network Monitoring Program Needs Further Guidance and Actions

While the program has met two of its goals, it lacks sufficient guidance for managing network security and data protection. The program generally supports government-wide cybersecurity initiatives, but DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency hasn't finalized all plans for how CDM can provide support. For example, the agency hasn't fully updated the program's cloud asset management guidance.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program in 2012 to strengthen the cybersecurity of government networks and systems. Its goals are to: (1) reduce exposure to insecure configurations or known vulnerabilities; (2) improve federal cybersecurity response capabilities; (3) increase visibility into the federal cybersecurity posture; and (4) streamline Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) reporting. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) manages these goals across four capability areas (see figure). The program is meeting two of its four goals and partially meeting the other two, as discussed below.

Figure: Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Capability Areas

CDM has met two goals. First, it is reducing exposure to insecure configurations and known vulnerabilities—22 of 23 agencies reported that the program was helpful in accomplishing this. CDM is also meeting its incident response capability goal.

The program, however, has been less successful in meeting the other two goals.

Although CISA developed dashboards to visualize and provide insight to the federal cybersecurity posture and the associated capability areas noted above, officials from 21 of 23 agencies stated that they had not yet fully implemented network security and data protection capabilities. Several agencies cited a lack of guidance as contributing to the slow implementation.

TikTok: A Tool for Cognitive Warfare?

How does an app designed for short videos become a battleground for influence and manipulation? This report by Head of Red Watch Program,

Zuzana Košková explores TikTok’s role in shaping perceptions, spreading disinformation, and serving as a potential tool for foreign influence.

Is TikTok just entertainment, or is it a strategic weapon in modern hybrid warfare? Should democratic nations regulate TikTok more strictly to safeguard national security?

This report was compiled in cooperation with Adapt Institute as a part of the NATO – Republic of Korea Security Dialogue, which is sponsored

Opportunities in Open Science, Metascience, and Artificial Intelligence

This new report summarizes a March 2025 workshop hosted by CSET and ORCA, with support from NSF. The workshop brought together more than 30 experts to discuss advancing open science and metascience, and brainstorm how artificial intelligence can be a tool in those efforts. Informed by workshop panels and discussions, the report outlines an agenda for near-term, high-priority next steps to benefit researchers, funders, and policymakers.Download Full Report

On March 26, 2025, the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) and the Open Research Community Accelerator (ORCA), with support from the National Science Foundation, hosted a workshop in Washington, DC. We brought together 35 experts, researchers, and funders to explore opportunities and challenges in open science, metascience, and AI. This report summarizes the conversation that took place over two panel sessions, two guided group discussions, and a concluding synthesis session.

This report also aims to fill a gap identified by participants: the need for a clear agenda to inform and guide efforts at the intersection of metascience research, open science monitoring and impact assessment, and AI for research and science. To that end, we highlight priority research questions and feasible opportunities for collaborative work.

We thank the National Science Foundation—and specifically, the Cyberinfrastructure for Public Access and Open Science program (CI PAOS) within the Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure—for the support in planning and hosting this productive workshop.

Impact of Military Artificial Intelligence on Nuclear Escalation Risk

Increasing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into military systems has the potential to influence nuclear escalation even when that integration occurs outside nuclear weapon systems. Non-nuclear applications of military AI may compress decision-making timelines, potentially increasing miscalculation risks during a crisis.

Opaque recommendations from an AI-powered decision-support system can bias a decision maker towards acting, while autonomy in a system with counterforce potential may undermine strategic stability by threatening the integrity of second-strike capabilities. Such uses of AI raise the fundamental question of whether they introduce new risks,

exacerbate existing ones or fundamentally alter the nature of nuclear escalation. Contextual and socio-technical factors that might affect nuclear escalation pathways can help to answer this question. Understanding these dynamics is essential for using current risk-reduction measures or developing new strategies to address nuclear escalation risks posed by military AI.

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