22 June 2025

How the Air India crash investigation is unfolding


That's how long Air India Flight 171 was airborne before it plunged into a densely populated neighbourhood in Ahmedabad in one of India's most baffling aviation disasters in recent memory.

Investigators now face the grim task of sifting through the wreckage and decoding the cockpit voice and flight data recorders of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner to piece together what went catastrophically wrong in the seconds after take-off. Under international rules set by the UN aviation body ICAO, a preliminary investigation report should be released within 30 days, with the final report ideally completed within 12 months.

The London Gatwick-bound aircraft, piloted by Captain Sumeet Sabharwal and co-pilot Clive Kundar, lifted off from the western Indian city of Ahmedabad at 13:39 local time (08:09 GMT) on Thursday, with 242 people and nearly 100 tonnes of fuel on board. Within moments, a mayday call crackled from the cockpit. It would be the last transmission. This was followed by a loss of altitude and a crash engulfed in flames.What could have caused Air India plane to crash in 30 seconds?

Captain Kishore Chinta, a former investigator with India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), calls this "the rarest of the rare" crashes - a controlled flight into terrain just 30 seconds after take-off. "To my knowledge, nothing quite like this has ever happened," he told the BBC.

Did both engines fail due to bird strikes or fuel contamination? Were the flaps improperly extended, reducing lift on a heavily loaded jet in extreme heat? Was there a maintenance error during engine servicing? Or did an inadvertent crew action cut off fuel to both engines?

How Vulnerable Is India to Chinese Economic Coercion?

Sushant Singh

While India-China tensions began to thaw last year, the bilateral relationship has mostly been on the decline in recent years. In response, New Delhi has taken two distinct approaches to its relations with Beijing — a more confrontational security stance on the one hand and a cooperative economic posture on the other. The 2020 clashes between India and China on the disputed border, 

which resulted in the first deaths on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in decades, and the subsequent deterioration in diplomatic ties, only further highlighted this divergence over the past five years. After the clash, the Indian government heightened anti-China rhetoric, banned Chinese apps and argued that a “normal” India-China relationship required peace on the border. Yet trade with China continued to reach record highs.

The two countries have taken steps toward normalized ties after an October 2024 border agreement, 

but the experience of the preceding four years has showcased the depth and scope of India’s economic vulnerability to China. China is India’s top trading partner — with bilateral trade significantly skewed in China’s favor — and New Delhi relies on Beijing for imports in industries critical for India’s growth including electronics, solar power and pharmaceuticals. China’s recent restrictions on high-tech manufacturing to prevent Chinese companies from moving manufacturing away from Beijing has already demonstrated how disruptive restrictions could be for Indian industries.

The May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis, sparked by a terrorist attack in Kashmir, saw intense military exchanges and highlighted China’s overt support for Pakistan — including military assistance. This deepened India’s concerns about a “two-front” threat, reinforcing its view of China as a direct, interconnected security challenge.


Mapping India-Pakistan military power

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Linus Cohen

India strives to render Pakistan strategically irrelevant to better focus its attention on China. But neither Pakistan nor China has an interest in allowing that to happen.

It’s an ongoing saga of which we saw the most recent instalment some weeks ago, following late-April terrorist attacks at Pahalgam in Indian Kashmir. As an indicator of the broader military balance on the subcontinent, the recent confrontation suggests that even though India’s eye is on China for the long term, Pakistan is still a problem it cannot ignore.

A new policy brief by ASPI, released today, outlines the quantitative military balance between India and Pakistan.

By the numbers, the India-Pakistan military balance is fairly favourable to India. In every year since 1956, India has outspent Pakistan on defence (in real terms) by a factor of at least 4.5—even by a factor of 10 in the most recent budget. India’s armed forces field more personnel than Pakistan’s across the board, most prominently the land forces, which field 1.2 million active-duty soldiers against Pakistan’s 560,000.

While India’s army is very large, its equipment is dated. Its fleet of almost 4,000 main battle tanks, largely devoted to the western front against Pakistan, is composed mainly of Russian T-72s and T-90s. These are decades-old and demand costly ongoing modernisation. India’s armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, of various models in the Soviet BMP series, are likewise mainly of Cold War vintage. And he vast majority of India’s artillery is towed rather than self-propelled, though it’s complemented with a few hundred mobile multiple rocket launchers.

While India dwarfs it in some metrics, Pakistan is a considerable military power. However, its half-million-strong army has similar equipment issues. It fields a melange of 2,500 main battle tanks, largely Chinese in origin (bought wholesale or co-developed), that are in various phases of indigenous-led modernisation. The Al-Zarrar—the most common in Pakistan’s fleet, with about 500 in the inventory—is a heavily-upgraded Chinese Type 59, itself derivative of a Soviet design from the mid-1950s.

India breaks with China, Russia on Israel-Iran war

Andrew Korybko

India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MEA) clarified over the weekend that India “did not participate in the discussions” on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) statement earlier that day condemning Israel for its latest strikes on Iran.

The absence of any clause in the group’s statement indicating that India disagreed with them initially suggested consensus (including with rival Pakistan), but after the MEA’s clarification, it now suggests that India was kept out of the loop. This could have political ramifications if that’s indeed what happened.

The SCO was founded to peacefully resolve border issues between China and the former Soviet Republics after the USSR’s dissolution and then united them all in their opposition to the shared threats of terrorism, separatism and extremism.

The group has since taken on economic and other connectivity functions after expanding to include India and Pakistan in 2015, with these additional interests increasingly taking center stage since those two accuse each other of fomenting the aforesaid threats. Iran joined the SCO in 2023.

Article 16 of the SCO Charter clearly states that “The SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without vote and their decisions shall be considered adopted if no member State has raised objections during its consideration (consensus)… Any member State may state its opinion on particular aspects and/or concrete issues of the decisions taken which shall not be an obstacle to taking the decision as a whole. This opinion shall be placed on record.”

Accordingly, given the absence of any clause in the SCO’s statement indicating that India disagreed with what was written, it therefore compellingly appears that it was kept out of the loop.

China is bringing gray-zone warfare to space


PRAGUE—China describes its space activity—including the deployment of highly maneuverable satellites, satellites equipped with robotic arms, and moon missions—as nonmilitary. But officials from the United States and Taiwan, as well as independent space experts, worry that China is “rehearsing” how to use satellites as space weapons in the opening days of an invasion.

They also fear China is positioning itself to press other nations into accepting whatever space activities Beijing defines as “normal.”

Speaking at the 8th annual Space Security Conference here this week, Holmes Liao, a senior adviser to the Taiwan Space Agency, said China’s recent space activities are “not just logical demonstrations, but could be, maybe, rehearsals for future space design operations.”

Those activities include the use of several satellites to perform complex maneuvers—what Gen. Michael Guetlein, vice chief the U.S. Space Force, described in March as “dogfighting” in space, a term Liao echoed on Monday. Liao also recounted a January 2024 incident in which China launched a rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan province: “Because of the trajectory,” he said, “Taiwanese radar picked up the launch as an incoming missile.”

That incident reflects an increasingly common Chinese tactic: using military exercises, launches or air patrols to trigger alarms in Taiwan. Last week, at the GLOBSEC security forum—also in Prague—Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister, Chen Ming-chi, said China’s “gray zone” operations are designed to strain Taiwan’s readiness and response capacity—sometimes by literally exhausting radar operators or pilots. The term refers to coercive actions that fall below the threshold of armed conflict.

Wargame Shows How CCAs Could Take On China

Parth Satam

CCAs would support the U.S. Air Force’s 4th and 5th gen fighters by harassing and creating targeting dilemmas for PLA forces, shaping their decisions in favor of U.S. forces.

The most concrete vision of the employment of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the western Pacific emerged during a 2024 Tabletop Exercise (TTX) led by the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies (MIAS), which saw the participation of three teams of the U.S. Air Force, its Air Mobility Command (AMC) and industry.
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While laying out how the AI-enabled “recoverable” and “expendable” CCAs will complement the service’s diminishing fleet of Generation 4, 4.5 and 5 aircraft to confront China’s massive fleet, the study also focused on the logistics of operating CCAs while forward-basing them in the First Island Chain.

CCAs are now envisioned to add the required mass, present “targeting dilemmas;” “complicate China’s counter air operations” focusing on its Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), Surface Action Groups, KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft; “disrupt” and “impose crippling costs on its forces;” “distributed” CCA posture on the ground complicating China’s ability “to find, fix and track” the aircraft as they generate “decisive combat power” inside its A2/AD umbrella, all with aim of helping U.S. forces “drive the timing and tempo of a conflict.”

While this was the conceptual and theoretical end of the doctrine, the logistical side of CCA operations aimed at analyzing their refueling, maintenance, rearming processes, boiling down to how the CCAs are even designed. Subsequently, in a podcast hosted by MIAS’s Director of Future Concepts and Capability Assessments Mark Gunziger with representatives from Kratos, Anduril and General Atomics, the industry representatives called for rapid and immediate fielding of the CCAs, at least the Increment 1 variants, to allow units to begin experimenting and figuring out how to use them

China’s aircraft carriers send message in the open Pacific for the first time – and bigger and more powerful ships are comin

Brad Lendon, 

In early June, the Navy's aircraft carrier formation conducted training in the Western Pacific. The picture shows the Shandong aircraft carrier launching carrier-based fighter jets. Zhang Huiquan/People's Liberation Army Navy
Seoul, South KoreaCNN —

For the past month Chinese aircraft carrier strike groups have been operating further from home shores and in greater strength than ever before, testing state-of-the-art technology and sending a message they are a force to be reckoned with, analysts and officials say.

Since early May, a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) flotilla led by the carrier Shandong has conducted exercises north of the Philippines; its newest carrier, the soon-to-be-commissioned Fujian, has been on sea trials in disputed waters west of the Korean Peninsula; and its oldest carrier, the Liaoning has led exercises in the Pacific waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

During the drills the Fujian for the first time conducted aircraft take-off and landing operations at sea using its advanced electromagnetic catapult system (EMALS), regional defense officials said.

That’s a significant development. Only one other carrier in the world has that system – the US Navy’s newest carrier, the USS Gerald R Ford.

Last Monday, the Japanese Defense Ministry said the Shandong and its support ships had been exercising in the waters southeast of the island of Miyako in southern Okinawa prefecture, putting two Chinese carrier strike groups in the open Pacific for the first time.

At the center of that box of exercises is Taiwan, the democratically ruled island which China’s Communist Party claims, despite never having controlled it.


Don’t Give Up on Diplomacy With Iran

Ali Vaez

On June 13, Israel initiated a series of airstrikes and covert operations against Iranian nuclear sites and military officials. Dubbed Operation Rising Lion, this sophisticated and multilayered campaign followed days of speculation about an impending assault. So far, the attacks have damaged Iran’s Natanz and Isfahan nuclear facilities and killed a number of Iranian scientists. They have also claimed the lives of scores of civilians and injured dozens more, razed apartment buildings, and blown up parts of the country’s energy infrastructure. Israelis, meanwhile, have found themselves rushing to shelters as their own cities come under attack.

Right now, there is no indication that the fighting will stop. Both Iran and Israel have signaled that they are willing to keep striking each other. Israel’s defense minister even promised that “Tehran will burn” if the attacks don’t end. The United States, meanwhile, has done little to stop the bloodshed. Instead, U.S. President Donald Trump has sent mixed signals about whether he wants the fighting to cease. His administration has positioned military assets in the area, and according to multiple news reports, U.S. forces are helping Israel shoot down Iranian drones and missiles.

Despite his equivocations, however, Trump has said he still wants to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, and Tehran has left the door open to talks—provided that Israel lets up. The U.S. administration, then, may still have space to forge an agreement.

If Trump wants to avoid a U.S. war with Iran, he should seize it. So far, Israel has inflicted significant but not total damage on Iran’s nuclear program. Even if the fighting drags on, it is unlikely to succeed at wiping out all of it. Elements of Iran’s nuclear program are deeply buried underground, including at the Fordow enrichment site, and the country’s leadership may now have more of an incentive than ever to build the ultimate deterrent. That means if the fighting stops without a deal, Tehran could well make a run for a nuclear weapon that only heavy bunker-busting American bombs can seriously delay, at least in the near term. Even then, to truly assure that the threat has been curtailed, the United States would need either a presence on the ground or sustained rounds of military strikes carried out with exhaustive knowledge of Iran’s nuclear operations.

Is Israel Really Making Itself Any Safer?

Ivan Eland

Israel’s direct attacks on Iran shows again that it is willing to conduct multiple wars at once on its perceived adversaries. Recently, it has also been at war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and it is still currently at war with Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen.

This is not to mention repeated strikes on the old military stockpiles of the deposed Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. Yet, before a country goes to war, no matter what the original provocation, it should have a clear idea of the objectives that the war is intended to fulfill. This strategic thinking appears to be lacking in Israel’s conduct.

In general, throughout Israel’s history, it has achieved considerable tactical military success—at times even brilliance—but without strategic competence. This conclusion should probably be unsurprising, given that since the early 1970s, it has been a client state of the United States, whose national security policy exhibits the same qualities and deficiencies.

Also, both countries have overinvested in technologically and operationally superior militaries at the expense of other tools of statecraft—diplomacy, economic engagement, cultural expansion, and, above all else, strategic vision. And as the old clichรฉ goes, if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

It is also no shock that after a dramatically successful attack by an adversary, both countries responded with flailing incoherence. President George W Bush responded to Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks by declaring a “global war on terrorism” (GWOT). This helped build the case (along with suspect intelligence) to invade a country that had nothing to do with the 9/11 strikes—Iraq. Such an inchoate policy fueled more terrorism, worldwide condemnation of America, and two failed military interventions.

Similarly, even after President Joe Biden warned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to repeat the disastrous escalatory mistakes of the American GWOT, his government has proceeded to conduct a multiple-front war on Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran.



Iran’s Four Possible Responses to Israel — and Their Risks

Hal Brands

Israel’s attack on Iran opens the next phase of the Great Middle Eastern War that began on Oct. 7, 2023. Over the past 20 months, that war has played out on fronts across the region and has drawn in actors from around the globe.

There is much we don’t yet know about what has happened, let alone what will happen. But it is clear that Iran has suffered significant damage to its leadership, its military and industrial capabilities, and perhaps its nuclear program. The endgame of this conflict and the future of the region will be profoundly shaped by how a wounded Iran responds.

There are four basic possibilities. Their consequences range from a bigger, bloodier Middle Eastern mess to a potentially surprising diplomatic denouement: a far stronger nuclear deal than President Donald Trump could have gotten just a few days ago.

First, Iran could go nasty but narrow, striking back against Israel but avoiding US bases or other regional targets. Drone, missile or terrorist attacks against Israel (some of which are already underway) would offer a measure of vengeance. But this strategy would seek to avoid triggering a larger, riskier conflict with Washington.

The problem is that America is already involved in this conflict: Trump has pledged to help Israel defend itself. A narrow response could thus look pathetic if Tehran’s remaining weapons can’t penetrate Israel’s multi-layered (and multi-nation) air and missile defense. And even if Iran draws blood, Israel will just keep coming, as these opening strikes were the beginning of a larger military campaign.

If Iran needs to make a bigger statement, it could go big and broad. In addition to hitting Israel, it could strike US personnel, facilities and partners from Iraq to the Persian Gulf. It could also activate its proxies — the Houthis, Iraqi Shia militias, and what remains of Hezbollah — in a bid to set the region on fire.


Nuclear arms race to intensify amid control crisis, says SIPRI


Global nuclear weapon stockpiles are expanding and being modernised, indicating the onset of a “dangerous” arms race coinciding with a decline in arms control measures, says the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

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In the 56th edition of the ‘SIPRI Yearbook 2025’, the think tank said that the nine nuclear-armed nations namely, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the UK and the US had persisted in upgrading their nuclear capabilities in 2024.

Some of these nations also deployed new weapon systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads in the year.

The estimated global inventory of nuclear warheads stood at 12,241 in January 2025. Of these, about 9,614 were considered active military stockpiles ready for potential use, which is an increase from the previous year by approximately 29 warheads.

An estimated 3,912 of these warheads were deployed with operational missile and aircraft systems, mirroring the numbers from January 2024. The rest were stored centrally.

The yearbook notes that close to 2,100 of the deployed warheads were on high alert status on ballistic missiles, which are predominantly owned by Russia or the US. A smaller number of high-alert warheads are believed to be maintained by France, the UK, and potentially China.


The 3 Big Lessons for US Air Power from Israel’s War on Iran

Rebecca Grant

U.S. Air Force Maj. Melanie “Mach” Kluesner, the pilot for the F-35A Demonstration Team, performs aerial maneuvers in a USAF F-35A Lightning II during the practice day before the airshow at Jacksonville Naval Air Station, Florida, on 18 October, 2024. The practice day ensures that the team is able to safely and properly display the power, agility, and lethality of America's 5th generation fighter jet. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Nicholas Rupiper)

Key Points – The ongoing “Operation Rising Lion,” where Israel’s largely US-made air force is systematically dismantling Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, offers three critical lessons for the United States.

-First, it proves the enduring value of investing in first-rate, manned airpower (fighters and bombers) capable of precision strikes to dismantle sophisticated air defenses. Second, it provides invaluable real-world tactical lessons for US pilots on how to engage modern threats like drone swarms.

-Finally, it serves as a stark warning that the US must urgently improve its own missile defenses, particularly for forward bases, to counter the types of mass missile barrages Iran has launched against Israel.
Why Manned Fighters & Bombers Still Rule the Skies: Lessons from Iran

President Donald J. Trump has put out the call for U.S. airpower.

For all the talk of drones and AI, the crisis with Iran proved yet again that manned fighters and bombers are America’s number one option for global containment.

Airpower set the conditions for Operation Rising Lion. The Israeli air force was able to target Iran as a result of meticulous work to take out Russian-built air defenses.

Why Isn’t Russia Defending Iran?

Hanna Notte

Iranian and Russian flags are pictured before a news conference at the Vahdat Hall in downtown Tehran, Iran, on June 10, 2025.© Morteza Nikoubazl / NurPhoto / Getty

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Iran is suffering blow after blow, and Russia, its most powerful supporter, is apparently not prepared to do much of anything about it.

Not long ago, backing the West’s least-favorite power in the Middle East had its uses. In prosecuting his war of attrition in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has made confrontation with the West the organizing principle of his foreign policy. In that context, edging closer to Iran and its partners in the “Axis of Resistance” made sense.

Tehran was also an important supplier: It delivered Shahed drones for Russian use in Ukraine at a moment when these were particularly crucial to Moscow’s war-fighting capacity. Then came the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, followed by Israel’s brutal war in Gaza. Leaning into pro-Palestinian and anti-Western sentiment allowed Russia to score points with global public opinion.

But dynamics that initially seemed to benefit Russia quickly became a strategic headache. First, Israel devastated Iran’s partners Hamas and Hezbollah; then, in April and October 2024, Iran attacked Israel directly with strikes that yielded only minimal damage, suggesting that Iran’s missile capabilities were not all that formidable. Israel retaliated, impairing Iran’s missile production and air defenses, including its Russian-made S-300 missile systems. Suddenly, Iran looked weak, and Russia had a choice: It could shore up its Middle Eastern ally, or it could cut its losses in a troubled region.
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Can Trump Manage an Unbelievably Small War?


When John Kerry was secretary of state under Barack Obama, he was widely mocked for saying a proposed military strike on Syria would be “unbelievably small.”

Few on either side of the 2013 Syria debate found those assurances believable. There was limited appetite at the time for even an unbelievably small war in the region, given recent experience with the bigger ones.

Can Israel fight such a war against Iran, with the U.S. role never growing beyond unbelievably small at the most? That is what President Donald Trump appears to be betting, based on the early promising results of the Israeli military strikes.

It’s certainly true that military interventions do not have to grow into full-blown occupations and nation-building projects. Trump’s first-term military campaign against ISIS was largely successful without metastasizing into Iraq War 2.0.

Afghanistan could have been conducted in a way more like the anti-ISIS blitz than the ill-fated 20-year war to transform that barren wasteland into something approximating a normal country that the Afghan conflict ultimately became.

From Grenada to the Persian Gulf War, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush governed as if they learned some lessons from the Vietnam debacle even though they both supported that war at the time, and neither of them condemned it in retrospect (though there were at least arguably negative downstream effects from the first Iraq war that contributed to the second, far less successful one). The U.S. and its allies were also able to win the Cold War despite the failures in Vietnam.

If a more limited intervention is possible here, it will be because Trump is differently motivated than past interventionists. I was among those worried his strike against Iranian military officer Qasem Soleimani would lead to war. It did not at least in part because Trump quit while he was ahead rather than use Iran’s retaliation, which some described as “calibrated” at the time, as a pretext to keep going.

How Iran Lost Tehran’s Hard-Liners Squandered Decades of Strategic Capital and Undermined Deterrence


On June 12, Israel unleashed a series of strikes that damaged Iranian nuclear facilities and missile sites, destroyed gas depots, and, critically, killed scores of top regime officials. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains alive. But his most important deputies—including Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of the armed forces, and Hossein Salami, the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—are dead.

A few years ago, the sudden, near-simultaneous killing of Bagheri, Salami, and a host of other senior leaders would have been unthinkable. Over three decades, the hard-liners who control Iran’s regime had built up what seemed like a formidable system of deterrence. They stockpiled ballistic missiles. They developed and advanced a nuclear enrichment program. Most important, they established a network of foreign proxies that could routinely harass Israeli and U.S. forces.

But Iran’s hard-liners overplayed their hand. After Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, the regime’s leaders opted for a campaign of maximum aggression. Rather than letting Hamas and Israel fight it out, they unleashed their proxies at Israeli targets. Israel, in turn, was compelled to expand its offensive beyond Gaza. It succeeded in severely degrading Hezbollah, the most powerful of Tehran’s proxy groups, and eviscerating Iranian positions in Syria—indirectly contributing to the collapse of the Assad regime. Iran responded to this aggression by unleashing the two largest ballistic missile attacks ever launched against Israel. But Israel, backed by the U.S. military and other partners, repelled those attacks and incurred little damage. It then struck back.

With that, the foundation of Iran’s deterrence strategy crumbled. Its ruling regime became more vulnerable and exposed than at any point since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. And Israel, which has dreamed of striking Iran for decades, had an opportunity it decided it could not pass up.

US critical networks are prime targets for cyberattacks. They’re preparing for Iran to strike.

Maggie Miller

The organizations representing critical networks that keep the lights on, the water running and transportation systems humming across the U.S. are bracing for a possible surge of Iranian cyberattacks.

Virtually every critical infrastructure sector is on high alert amid a deepening conflict between Iran and Israel, though no major new cyber threat activity has been publicly reported so far.

As these groups proactively step up their defenses, it’s unclear whether Washington is coordinating with them on security efforts — a change from prior moments of geopolitical unrest, when federal agencies have played a key role in sounding the alarm.

“Iranian cyber activity has not been as extensive outside of the Middle East but could shift in light of the military actions,” said John Hultquist, chief analyst for Google Threat Intelligence Group.

As the conflict evolves — and particularly if the U.S. decides to strike Iran directly — “targets in the United States could be reprioritized for action by Iran’s cyber threat capability,” he said.

During previous periods of heightened geopolitical tension, U.S. agencies, including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, stepped up to warn the operators of vital U.S. networks about emerging threats. Ahead of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, CISA launched its “Shields Up” program to raise awareness about potential risks to U.S. companies emanating from the impending war.

The Israel-Iran Conflict: Q&A with RAND Experts


Last week's Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program and military assets and Iran's responding missile strikes represent a significant escalation in the long-standing tensions between the two nations. While covert operations and proxy conflicts have defined much of their rivalry in recent years, this overt military strike signals a dramatic shift in the nature of their confrontation. The attack raises urgent questions about the motivations behind Israel's actions, Iranian retaliation, and the broader implications for regional and global stability.

To explore these issues, RAND experts provide insights into the strategic, diplomatic, and economic dimensions of this unfolding crisis. From the risks of further escalation to the impact on U.S. foreign policy and global energy markets, their analysis sheds light on the complexities of this pivotal moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

This violence marks a dramatic departure from the long-simmering Iran-Israel shadow war. Why is it happening now?

Heather Williams Israel is trying to take advantage of its successes against Hezbollah and Hamas and the fall of Assad in Syria to deal a serious blow to Iran. More than simply setting back Iran's nuclear program, Israel appears committed to punitive damage that causes permanent harm to the Islamic Regime's military capabilities and political resolve.

Raphael S. Cohen Simply put, Israel believed it was almost out of time to stop an Iranian bomb and that the time was right for a preventative strike. In a post–October 7th world, Israel believes that an Iranian bomb poses an existential risk to Israeli security. Thanks to war in Gaza and Lebanon, Israel has dealt significant blows to Iran's proxy network, particularly Hezbollah. Moreover, back in October, Israel had already taken out some of Iran's air defense.

The Israel-Iran Conflict: Q&A with RAND Experts


Last week's Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program and military assets and Iran's responding missile strikes represent a significant escalation in the long-standing tensions between the two nations. While covert operations and proxy conflicts have defined much of their rivalry in recent years, this overt military strike signals a dramatic shift in the nature of their confrontation. The attack raises urgent questions about the motivations behind Israel's actions, Iranian retaliation, and the broader implications for regional and global stability.

To explore these issues, RAND experts provide insights into the strategic, diplomatic, and economic dimensions of this unfolding crisis. From the risks of further escalation to the impact on U.S. foreign policy and global energy markets, their analysis sheds light on the complexities of this pivotal moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

This violence marks a dramatic departure from the long-simmering Iran-Israel shadow war. Why is it happening now?

Heather Williams Israel is trying to take advantage of its successes against Hezbollah and Hamas and the fall of Assad in Syria to deal a serious blow to Iran. More than simply setting back Iran's nuclear program, Israel appears committed to punitive damage that causes permanent harm to the Islamic Regime's military capabilities and political resolve.

Raphael S. Cohen Simply put, Israel believed it was almost out of time to stop an Iranian bomb and that the time was right for a preventative strike. In a post–October 7th world, Israel believes that an Iranian bomb poses an existential risk to Israeli security. Thanks to war in Gaza and Lebanon, Israel has dealt significant blows to Iran's proxy network, particularly Hezbollah. Moreover, back in October, Israel had already taken out some of Iran's air defense.

Spike Missiles That Destroyed Air Defenses From Inside Iran Were Remotely Operated


As Israel’s Operation Rising Lion campaign enters its fifth day, Iranian officials claim they’ve uncovered new evidence of how Mossad operatives carried out attacks from inside the country using missiles and drones, at least some of which helped suppress Iranian air defenses. This is the latest in long-standing Israeli operations using weapons smuggled inside Iran, a senior IDF official told us. You can catch up with the latest installment of our coverage of the Israeli attack and the Iranian response dubbed Operation True Promise III, here.

In new images published on Iranian media, authorities there showcased what they say are remnants of Rafael Spike precision-guided missile systems left behind after being used in the initial phase of Israel’s ongoing campaign to neuter Iran’s nuclear and long-range weapons capabilities. At least some of those systems were operated remotely, according to Iranian officials, representing another leap forward in Israel’s ability to use systems set up in Iran to attack from afar.

“Iranian intelligence forces have discovered customized Spike missile launchers…designed to suppress Iran’s air defenses, equipped with internet-based automation and remote control systems,” the official Iranian Press TV news outlet reported on Telegram on Monday. “They were operated by terrorist Mossad agents.”

The images released by Iran on Monday seem to verify what we previously wrote about the mission in which Mossad operatives worked to move “special weapons on a large scale, deploy them throughout Iran, and launch them towards the attack targets in a precise and effective manner.” They show an array of hardware scattered across a dirt area. These include launchers, a number of radio and computer hardware components, and a small EO/IR turret on a turret mount. These systems appear to have allowed operatives to fire and guide the weapons without being present at the site.

Intense Israeli strikes hit Tehran after Trump demands ‘unconditional surrender’

JOSEPH KRAUSS, JON GAMBRELL, NATALIE MELZER AND MELANIE LIDMAN

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Intense Israeli airstrikes targeted Iran’s capital early Wednesday a day after U.S. President Donald Trump demanded “unconditional surrender.”

As the U.S. sent warplanes to the Middle East, Trump made a series of statements about the conflict, including warning Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that the U.S. knows where he is hiding but that there were no plans to kill him “at least not for now.”

His statements fueled confusion about the U.S.'s role in the conflict as Tehran residents flee their homes on the sixth day of Israel’s air campaign aimed at Iran’s military and nuclear program.

Israel asserts its sweeping assault is necessary to prevent Iran from getting any closer to building an atomic weapon. The strikes have killed at least 224 people in Iran.

Iran has retaliated by launching some 400 missiles and hundreds of drones at Israel. So far, 24 people have been killed in Israel.

The conflict erupted as Israel continues to fight in the Gaza Strip, where there have been near-daily shootings since last week near hubs where desperate Palestinians are being directed to collect food.
Israel hammers Tehran

A major explosion could be heard around 5 a.m. in Tehran Wednesday morning, following other explosions that boomed earlier in the predawn darkness.

Authorities in Iran offered no acknowledgement of the attacks, which has become increasingly common as the Israeli airstrike campaign has intensified since they began on Friday.

At least one strike appeared to target Tehran’s eastern neighborhood of Hakimiyeh, where the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard has an academy.

Washington War Games: How the U.S. Prepared for an Iran Strik

Jay Solomon

On a humid evening in late April, a group of Trump officials, U.S. intelligence analysts, and Iranian dissidents met for dinner in Washington to game out a potential military assault on Iran. Strong evidence that Israel was preparing to strike was already reverberating through intelligence channels in the city. And questions about whether Donald Trump would join in were also being asked around the dining table at an exclusive, tree-shrouded apartment building near Woodley Park.

The sequencing of any Israeli or American operation was the primary focus for the mealtime discussion, which included gourmet Indian food, French wine, 

and Italian gelato, according to attendees. The targeting timeline mapped out during the dinner was remarkably similar to what the Israel Defense Forces have pursued so far in their five-day onslaught. 

This has included Israel’s early attacks on Iran’s military chain of command; the flattening of key military and intelligence command centers; and the steady degradation of the country’s nuclear program, including the assassinations of more than a dozen scientists.



Putin Isn’t Actually Enjoying This Trump is turning out to be a liability for the Kremlin.

Andrew Ryvkin

Within weeks of Donald Trump’s second inauguration, pundits began saying that his return to office opened new doors for Vladimir Putin, offering Moscow opportunities it hadn’t seen in years. The deference the new administration afforded the Kremlin appeared to be rivaled only by its hostility toward its own national-security establishment.

Trump entered negotiations to end the war in Ukraine by presenting Putin with a bouquet of inexplicable concessions. Washington ruled out NATO membership for Ukraine—then proposed that it might recognize the illegally occupied Crimean peninsula as Russian (in a reversal of long-standing U.S. policy), allow Russia to retain most of the territory it had seized since 2022, and lift sanctions. The U.S. even sided against its European allies when they presented a resolution at the United Nations condemning Moscow—and then it drafted a peace proposal that omitted any criticism of Russia.

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You’d think Putin would be delighted by all of this. Instead, he’s been thrown on his heels. Trump’s efforts at rapprochement have left Russia’s propaganda apparatus, foreign policy, and economic stability in worse shape than they were before January 20.

Whatever the intent, Washington has robbed the Kremlin of its north star: opposition to the United States. After years of routinely threatening to drown the Eastern Seaboard, Moscow can no longer afford the luxury of calling America its enemy

No. 1. Thanks to Trump, the Kremlin now has to portray Washington as a rational negotiating partner—even as American-made missiles continue to rain down on Russian troops. The title of Russia’s civilizational enemy has been reassigned to the European Union. The Russian propaganda machine has some flexibility, but being locked in an existential struggle with the Netherlands is far less flattering to the imperial mindset than going up against the world’s leading superpower.

Explainer: How Xi’s ‘New National System’ Centralizes Innovation to Counter Tech Containment


Since 2019, the Party has promoted the construction of a “new national system”—a centrally directed, institutionalized framework for mobilizing state and market resources to achieve breakthroughs in core technologies vital to national power and security.

Beijing sees this system as already delivering results by tightly integrating planning, technical expertise, and real-world application to overcome complex strategic challenges.

Under this model, the central government coordinates top-level missions through Party-led ministries, directing state-owned enterprises, elite research universities, national laboratories, military-affiliated institutes, and emerging tech champions to execute targeted objectives.

These efforts are reinforced by “social resources”—a category that includes private firms, local governments, policy banks, and even venture capital platforms—brought into alignment through political incentives and institutional design.

The system’s performance will shape not only the PRC’s technological trajectory, but also the evolving global balance of innovation and industrial power.

The so-called “new national system” (ๆ–ฐๅž‹ไธพๅ›ฝไฝ“ๅˆถ) is the Party’s own term for a governance model that mobilizes state and market resources to achieve breakthroughs in core technologies essential to national power and security. First formally articulated under Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, it is not a new label for central planning but an evolving mechanism of Party-led strategic coordination in the context of a socialist market economy. Though frequently invoked in the PRC’s policy discourse, the concept remains poorly understood abroad. In Beijing’s own telling, the new national system is a modernization of the old Mao-era approach of concentrating national resources to “accomplish big things” (ๆˆๅคงไบ‹) with a reengineered structure that links government leadership with enterprise initiative, market incentives, and innovation networks..

Authors Are Posting TikToks to Protest AI Use in Writing—and to Prove They Aren’t Doing It

Culture

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Victoria Aveyard’s eyes avoid the camera when she slams her large white binder on the table, weighed down with a 1,000-page draft of her latest work in progress. The stack is heavy, made clear by her audible sigh as she splits the thick manuscript in half. Fueled with Cherry Lime Poppi and a bowl of grapes, she purposefully jots notes on the pages with every quick camera cut. Aveyard, the New York Times bestselling young adult fantasy author of the Red Queen series, doesn't say a single word in the video, but her captions on the screen speak volumes. “Using GenAI to write a book doesn’t make you a writer, it makes you a thief,” reads one.

“Don’t use generative-AI to make tropey, regurgitated romantasy sludge that you can then launder through the self-publishing industry in order to backdoor your way into a traditional publishing deal,” Aveyard tells her over 460,000 followers on TikTok in another video posted on May 27. “Authors talk.” Both TikToks garnered over 350,000 views.

Criticism and warnings of Gen-AI authors snagging coveted deals are flooding both Threads and TikTok, with writers and readers sometimes flinging around accusations when they suspect someone is using AI as part of their creative process. Now, Aveyard and other prolific authors are not only calling out people who use AI to write, they’re also posting livestreams and time-lapses of their writing processes to defend themselves against such complaints.

“The r/WritingWithAI subreddit has over 40,000 subscribers and growing. It’s a very depressing thought, to know we may very soon be the minority,” Aveyard tells WIRED. “I don’t think my voice will move the needle much or convince anyone already using generative AI to stop, but I needed to voice my anger with the circumstances.”

JUST IN: Army Has Little to Show for its Efforts to Boost Air and Missile Defense, GAO Finds

Tabitha Reeves

The Army has little to show for its recent efforts to upgrade its air and missile defense systems despite putting them on the development fast track and spending billions of dollars in funding, the Government Accountability Office reported June 17.

"The Army chose accelerated acquisition pathways and flexible agreement types to develop and field systems to address required capabilities — and submitted increased funding requests through the budget process to support them — but has not yet fielded most of the air and missile defense modernization efforts," said the report, "Army Modernization: Air and Missile Defense Efforts Would Benefit from Modern Practices."

“The Army is spending billions of dollars to modernize its systems to address identified capability needs,” the report said. “Yet, even with the use of accelerated acquisition approaches and increases in funding, the Army, outside of [Counter-small Unmanned Aerial Systems], has fielded limited capabilities,” the report added.

The Army has renewed its focus on updating its air and missile defense systems in recent years to keep pace with potential adversaries such as China and Russia. The Ukraine war has also seen inventive and increased use of drones as flying munitions although the service's efforts began before the beginning of that conflict, GAO noted.

In 2021, the Army requested roughly $8.8 billion for these air and missile systems for the fiscal years 2021 through 2025. By 2025, the Army had requested about $11.8 billion for the systems — a $3 billion increase, which was due to “the inclusion of systems that did not appear in the fiscal year 2021 budget request, … as well as changes in funding needed,” said the report.

Since it began to focus on modernization in air and missile defense, the Army “has identified seven air and missile efforts to develop and acquire needed capabilities and increased its requests in the President's Budget to support them” since 2021, said the report.