Why Choosing The Dalai Lama Is Not Just A Spiritual Matter – Analysis

Lobsang Gelek

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The Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, said on Wednesday that he will have a successor chosen by a nonprofit he started— not by the Chinese government. Beijing sounded a different note: foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said China had the right to approve the Dalai Lama’s successor. Beijing’s bottom line: whatever spiritual force guides this sacred process must adhere to the strictures of the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP.

If that sounds unholy, that may be the point. China has very practical reasons why it wants a say in who is the next Dalai Lama, given the enormous popularity of the current one and his ability to maintain cohesion among Tibetans across the globe in their fight for greater autonomy for Tibet.

The current Dalai Lama has become an enormously popular figure. Winner of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize, his international renown has helped maintain a unity among Tibetans in and outside Tibet, despite efforts to negate his influence by the CCP.

Last year, the China Tibetan Buddhist Academy — a Chinese government-supported institution — held a seminar to promote its views on the matter. The seminar re-emphasized the CCP’s policies on reincarnation that must align the system with Xi Jinping thought and party policies.

According to Beijing’s official media, the seminar attendees were Tibetan Buddhism representatives and experts from Tibetan populated areas, including the Tibet Autonomous Region and the provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu.

But that quickly triggered a rebuttal from the Tibetan government-in-exile, the institution the current Dalai Lama helped set up in 1959.

“While China recognizes only the Tibet Autonomous Region as the only ‘Tibet,’ they still recruited attendees from other Tibetan populated areas for important issues,” Sikyong Penpa Tsering, the president of the current government, said in response to the seminar.

Anatomy of an Insurgency: Balochistan’s Crisis and Pakistan’s Failures

Yunas Samad

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Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, comprising 44 percent of the country’s territory, yet it has a relatively small population of approximately 14.8 million. Of this population, only 5.9 million are ethnic Baloch, with Pashtuns forming the other significant demographic group.

The province has been engulfed in an insurgency since 2006, but the conflict has recently undergone a dramatic transformation. What began as a tribal resistance movement has evolved into a formidable insurgency with separatist ambitions, complemented by a broader peaceful political movement. Recent escalations demonstrate both the insurgents’ growing operational capabilities and the Pakistani state’s persistent reliance on heavy-handed military responses that continue to alienate Baloch society.

Federal Overreach: The Catalyst for Modern Insurgency

The roots of contemporary unrest, according to Baloch nationalists, trace back to Pakistan’s founding when in 1948 the State of Kalat was forcibly incorporated into the federation despite local resistance. However, the current insurgency was catalyzed by then-President General Pervez Musharraf’s unilateral decision to construct Gwadar Port, bypassing constitutional structures including the National Assembly, 

Council of Common Interest, and the Balochistan Provincial government. This decision came despite ongoing negotiations through a Senate Committee led by Senator Mushahid Hussain, then the secretary general of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Q), that had nearly achieved consensus.

Akbar Bugti – a veteran political leader and Tumandar of the Bugti tribe who had served as chief minister, governor, and federal minister of state – had opposed the Gwadar project due to concerns about demographic changes from nationwide migration and the lack of guarantees that locals would benefit from development. Musharraf’s handling of political disagreements with Baloch leaders was marked by intimidation, and when security forces initiated operations against protests surrounding the port’s construction, Bugti and his supporters retreated to the mountains where military forces killed him in August 2006.

The US Aimed At Iran But Might Have Hit Central Asia – Analysis

James Durso

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The U.S. and Israeli attacks last month on Iran to “obliterate” its nuclear program may have hit another target: Central Asia’s interests in accesses the large Iranian market and use Iran’s transport links to trade with the wider world.

Iran’s “Look East” policy was launched by then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 to improve relations with Russia, China, and India to counter Western pressure over Iran’s nuclear program and improve the economy. It was continued by Ahmadinejad’s successors and now includes Central Asia, a region with which Iran has had numerous recent engagements.

On May 15, 2025, a free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan) came into force.

In June 2023, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met Iran’s then-President Ebrahim Raisi and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The 2023 meeting netted cooperation pacts in agriculture, energy, customs affairs, sports, science, technology and innovation, cultural exchanges, health care, Chabahar port, the environment, industry, and tourism.

The June 2023 meetings followed a March 2023 visit by Uzbekistan’s foreign minister, who met Iran’s minister of foreign affairs and minister of industry, mines, and trade. Afterward, the parties announced efforts to increase trade turnover, and to foster business links and people-to-people ties. The ministerial meetings built on the September 2022 visit by Raisi to Uzbekistan that produced 17 agreements in areas such as energy, transport, and agriculture, and discussed how to increase trade.

In September 2022, Raisi had declared that improving relations with Central Asia was “one of the first priorities of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Issues Facing Young Cadres In China – Analysis

Zhao Zhijiang

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In the context of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a cadre refers to a party member who holds a position of authority or responsibility within the party-state system. This includes individuals in leadership or administrative positions across government, state-owned enterprises, and other public institutions.

The quality of China’s younger generation of cadre workforce is a crucial factor influencing the nation’s future development. As a vital component of the power structure, they wield significant authority, impacting resource allocation, shaping policy decisions, and potentially playing a decisive role in China’s overall economic and social progression.

Through numerous field investigations and consultations with relevant individuals, researchers at ANBOUND have identified a multitude of challenges within the current cohort of young cadres.

Examples of the issues observed include errors in addressing senior leaders, widespread typographical and grammatical mistakes in official government documents, a lack of familiarity with administrative and business etiquette, among others.

While many of these young cadres possess impressive academic credentials, including degrees in fields such as economics and finance, with some even holding doctoral qualifications, such credentials do not necessarily reflect the realities of the professional world. In practice, many of these individuals are ill-equipped to handle the complexities of real-world challenges, especially when compared to experienced career officials. Despite their theoretical knowledge, they often lack the practical experience necessary to navigate complex situations. Furthermore, some high-achieving cadres tend to focus on technical concepts, but when faced with substantial problems, they quickly find themselves out of their depth.

Additionally, in terms of interpersonal interactions, certain young cadres exhibit a sense of inflated authority, using their position and academic credentials to create hierarchical distinctions in relationships that should be based on equality, often displaying a sense of superiority in their dealings with others.

Balancing Acts: Deterrence and Reassurance in U.S.-China Strategy

Michael Beckley, et al.

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This month, we’re zeroing in on a core tension in U.S. strategy toward China: how to strike the right balance between deterrence and reassurance. As Washington strengthens military postures, deepens coalitions, and hardens supply chains, it also faces the challenge of managing escalation risks and preventing unintended conflict. The dual imperatives of signaling resolve while maintaining bilateral stability have become central to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

The contributors to this roundtable examine whether Washington has emphasized one pillar—deterrence—at the expense of the other. Nikolas Gvosdev argues that global overstretch has undermined U.S. credibility in Asia, as Beijing and regional partners question Washington’s ability to prioritize the Indo-Pacific in a crisis. Takuya Matsuda emphasizes the importance of assurance and diplomatic clarity to avoid miscalculation, especially across the Taiwan Strait.

Aaron Glasserman and Josh Freedman point to China’s economic challenges as a strategic opportunity for the United States to use economic statecraft and restraint to lower the risk of confrontation. Terry Cooke explores the semiconductor battle as a case of inconsistent policy signaling. Carlos Salazar proposes a strategy of “restraint and resolve,” combining diplomatic flexibility with long-term investments in American hard power. Collectively, these essays underscore that deterrence without reassurance risks hardening the very tensions the United States seeks to manage.

Credibility in the Crossfire—Nikolas Gvosdev

Does U.S. resolve to confront other competitors in other regions of the world impact Beijing’s deterrence calculus? Proponents of robust action to defend Ukraine or remain engaged in the Middle East argue against the “Asia Firsters” in the administration that upholding U.S. credibility elsewhere is necessary for deterring China and reassuring U.S. partners in the Pacific.

Can America Stop China’s Port Expansion?

Matthew Phelan

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China’s expanding global port control threatens US security, economic influence, and free trade. Washington must counter Beijing’s reach with development financing, diplomatic pressure, and allied coordination before it’s too late.

Seemingly innocuous shipping containers, filled with death.

That has been the headline twice in a month, as both Ukraine and Israel utilized shipping containers to smuggle into enemy nations drone components and even entire drones capable of delivering devastating precision strikes on strategic military assets. These capabilities are not limited to the small and feisty: China is also developing these capabilities, which is particularly concerning given Beijing’s global reach.

China Is Building an Empire of International Ports

One need only glance at China’s expanding control of international ports, and its recent panic at the possibility of losing some of this control through the now-stalled CK Hutchison port deal, to appreciate the growing risk that China will quietly deliver these payloads across the world.

Ports are critical nodes in the international economic system, facilitating global maritime shipping that had an estimated value of over $2 trillion in 2023 alone. They are also increasingly coming under Chinese control.

China’s presence in international ports, defined as having a controlling stake in a port directly or through a subsidiary, owning or operating a port terminal, or handling construction in a manner that appears to grant effective operational control, has grown substantially over the past 25 years. Before 2000, China was represented in 16 ports. Today, 93 ports have a Chinese presence, a number expected to breach 100 in the coming years.

Because even nominally private Chinese companies operate at the pleasure of the Chinese Communist Party, it is easy for the Party to explicitly, yet covertly, exploit the strategic value and influence that ports can provide.

China and Pakistan Mull a Beijing-led Alternative to SAARC

Sudha Ramachandran

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The China-India tussle for influence in South Asia can be expected to intensify should Pakistan and China’s plans for setting up a new regional organization materialize.

According to a report in the Pakistani English daily, Express Tribune, the proposed regional grouping “could potentially replace the now-defunct South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).” According to “diplomatic sources familiar with the development,” the discussions between Pakistan and China are reportedly “at an advanced stage.”

South Asia is among the least integrated regions in the world; intra-regional trade accounts for barely 5-7 percent of its total international trade. South Asian countries struggle with common problems like poverty, climate change and human trafficking that could be better tackled through cooperation.

In 1985, seven South Asian countries — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka — came together to found SAARC; Afghanistan joined as the eighth member in 2007. Among its objectives were economic and regional integration to enhance the quality of life of its people.

However, SAARC’s performance over the past four decades has been below par. Decisions are made by consensus, and the India-Pakistan rivalry paralyzed its functioning.

Pakistan would “indirectly target” India at summits, and “try to get the other members to gang up against Delhi,” a retired Sri Lankan foreign secretary told The Diplomat in 2019. As for India, “it refused to move beyond its concerns over terrorism linked to Pakistan, which was a bilateral issue.”

Caught in the crossfire, SAARC stagnated.

Then in 2016, India drove the final nail in SAARC’s coffin when it boycotted the summit that Islamabad was to host. India’s boycott came in response to a terror attack on an Indian army camp in Kashmir in September 2016, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan-based militants. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka followed suit and withdrew from the summit. It was cancelled, and no SAARC summits have been held since.

Europe’s Dangerous Gap in China Expertise

Stefan Messingschlager

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When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, many in the West still hoped that deepening economic ties would eventually nudge China toward liberalization. Over a decade later, that optimism is gone. China has become more authoritarian domestically, increasingly assertive internationally, and notably more difficult to predict. In 2018, 

U.S. analysts Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner famously declared in Foreign Affairs that the decades-long strategy of engagement with China had failed. Their blunt assessment catalyzed a strategic rethink in Washington – one that gave China specialists a seat at the strategic policy table.

Europe, by contrast, has struggled to make the same adjustment. While its leaders increasingly view China as a “systemic rival,” most European capitals still treat China expertise as a background resource, not a strategic asset. The result is a dangerous “China expertise gap” that undermines Europe’s coherence, credibility, and capacity to respond decisively to Beijing’s global assertiveness. Closing this gap is now a strategic imperative.

The U.S. Model: Institutionalizing Expertise as Infrastructure

The United States demonstrates vividly how institutionalizing China expertise can significantly strengthen national strategy. Leading think tanks – including the Council on Foreign Relations, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, and the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis – act as talent pipelines, where analysts routinely rotate into government roles. Under the Biden administration, this integration deepened further. In late 2022, the State Department launched “China House,” a dedicated coordination hub bringing together experts across regional and functional bureaus to sharpen China policy.

A Wartime Diary From Tehran

Alireza Iranmehr

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Translated by Salar Abdoh

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched air strikes on nuclear and military sites in Iran. Over the 12 days that followed, the Israeli campaign expanded to include energy and other infrastructure; Iran retaliated with drone and missile strikes inside Israel; and the United States entered the conflict with strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22. Alireza Iranmehr is a novelist and an essayist who lives in the north of Iran but returned to Tehran to witness and document the bombardment. He sent the following series of short dispatches to his translator throughout the conflict.

June 16, 8:30 p.m.

The enormous roundabout at Azadi Square was full of cars, yet still felt somehow deserted. Then it dawned on me: Humans—they were mostly missing. Where normally tens of thousands of pedestrians thronged, now there were only a scattered few. Even many of the cars sat empty.

Azadi Square is commonly the first place one sees upon arriving in Tehran and the last upon departure; several major expressways pass through it, and it is not far from Mehrabad Airport, which serves domestic flights. The airport reportedly had been bombarded a couple of days before, but I could not discern any sign of destruction from where I stood—just the smell of burned plastic cutting through the usual city smog.

Earlier that day, in Bandar Anzali, on the Caspian shore, I had been lucky to find a cab driver willing to bring me all the way to Tehran. The driver told me that he’d made the opposite trip with three young women in the middle of the night—and charged them 25 times the going rate. “You can see what’s going on,” he said. “There’s no gas. All the cars are stuck on the road. This is a five-hour trip, and it took us 15 hours.”

Israel’s War on Iran Backfire

Sina Toossi

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Twelve days of war between Israel and Iran left a trail of devastation across both countries. Yet the clearest takeaway is this: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bold gamble failed. Despite launching one of the most audacious military campaigns in Israel’s history, the war was short, punishing, and ultimately fell far short of its declared aims.

It began with a meticulously planned Israeli offensive. Years of intelligence work culminated in a wave of covert operations—drones assembled inside Iran, sleeper cells detonating bombs, and targeted assassinations of top military figures and scientists. These were followed by conventional airstrikes on military bases and nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow. But Israel’s targets extended well beyond strategic infrastructure. Residential neighborhoods, prisons, media offices, and police stations were also hit, pointing to a broader strategy aimed at sowing chaos and igniting internal unrest.

Doha’s Quantum Threat

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Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani attends the opening session of the Qatar Economic Forum 2025 in Doha, Qatar, on May 20, 2025

Noushad Thekkayil/NurPhoto via AP

A Qatari business conglomerate has announced a joint venture with Quantinuum, an American-based world leader in quantum computing, to accelerate the use of quantum technologies in the war-torn Middle East.

 Part of a package of American-Qatari economic commitments totaling $1.2 trillion, the deal has prompted fears that dangerous cyber warfare technologies could end up in the hands of America’s adversaries,

 according to a referral the Middle East Forum (MEF), a Philadelphia-based think tank, recently submitted to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).

With the potential to break modern encryption methods at alarming speeds, quantum computing is expected to revolutionize cybersecurity and information sciences. That could pose significant threats to national security by compromising access to critical infrastructure,

 financial institutions, and national intelligence. Industry analysts warn that quantum computing demands the same rigorous oversight and safeguards as nuclear technology or biological weapons

The Influence of Ukraine’s Drone War on the Middle East

David Kirichenko

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Ukraine’s drone innovations are reshaping warfare, influencing Middle Eastern conflicts and prompting global shifts in defense strategy, as nations recognize low-cost unmanned systems can disable billion-dollar assets with devastating effect.

Ukraine’s recent strike on four Russian airfields was among the most audacious of the war, inflicting an estimated $7 billion in damage. While Donald Trump claims Ukraine holds no leverage, Kyiv proved otherwise.

However, it was also a warning to defense officials around the world that warfare has evolved rapidly.

Ukrainian Drones Decimated the Russian Military

In a covert 18-month operation named Spiderweb, Ukraine’s security service (SBU) remotely used 117 low-cost First-Person-View (FPV) drones, smuggled into Russia inside cargo trucks, to disable over 40 long-range bomber aircraft central to Russia’s campaign of strikes on Ukrainian cities. The operation delivered not only a tactical blow but a psychological one, showing that even Russia’s most protected assets are vulnerable.

With limited air defenses and slow Western resupply, Kyiv struck at the source. Russia, for all its bluster, may find its threats harder to carry out when its bombers no longer make it off the ground. What was once considered one of Russia’s greatest strengths, its vast territory, is increasingly proving to be one of its most significant liabilities.

Following the operation, which damaged multiple Russian bomber bases, Moscow was forced to relocate its Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers to the Far East, including Anadyr and Yelizovo, pushing round-trip missile strike missions against Ukraine to nearly 23 hours.

The New York Times wrote, “A defense official in a NATO country in Europe said Ukraine’s strikes have already led to discussions as to whether allies needed to reassess their vulnerabilities.” The attack also ignited discussions about the vulnerability of American ports to similar attacks from Chinese cargo ships.

The Military-Industrial Complex Is Riding High

William D. Hartung

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While Donald Trump and crew have been altering so much and changing our world in so many ways — if you doubt that, wave a Mexican flag and say goodbye to democracy — there’s one place where they remain stuck fast in the past. Yes, once upon a time, when it came to what’s still called the “defense” budget (though it should undoubtedly be called either the “offense” or “offensive” budget), there weren’t all those high-tech producers of wildly futuristic weaponry like Peter Thiel, the co-founder of Palantir Technologies, aka “the AI arms dealer of the 21st century.” You know, the fellow who invented… oops, sorry, first employed and then invested an estimated $15 million in promoting J.D. Vance to senator and then vice-president.

And yes, President Trump has recently made history after a fashion by sending in the Marines and calling up the California National Guard to put down protests in Los Angeles — no matter that California Governor Gavin Newsom didn’t want either of them; no matter that it changes American history (for the worse) and brings us ever closer to the end of democracy in this country; no matter that the president of the United States essentially called for the arrest of the governor of California, suggesting border “czar” Tom Holman could do so. (“I would do it if I were Tom. I think it’s great.”) No matter, no matter, none at all.

Yes, everything right now seems so eerily new that it’s hard sometimes to imagine what’s so eerily old and still goes on and on. And yet, today, TomDispatch regular William Hartung, most recently co-author of the upcoming book The Trillion Dollar War Machine: How Runaway Military Spending Drives America into Foreign Wars and Bankrupts Us at Home, explores just how the American taxpayer continues to feed the lions of the American military machine in a fashion that only grows ever more expensive as the years pass by. It’s quite a (grim) tale of what even Donald Trump can’t change and, as Hartung makes clear today, it only grows worse, year after Trumpian year. Tom

Israel-Iran war has exposed Russia’s vulnerability

Azriel Bermant

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The war between Israel and Iran has brought only short-term gains for Russia. Looking to the longer term, we see much bigger negatives.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky complained that the war had resulted in a sharp rise in oil prices, benefitting Russia. It also diverted world attention from the war in Ukraine, giving Russia more freedom to launch attacks against the country. Indeed, Russia continues to make gains in Ukraine and is producing four times as much ammunition as NATO is. It is easy to see why some in Russia had welcomed the prospect of a regional war in the Middle East.

Yet this is deceptive. Israel’s ability to attack Iran’s nuclear and missile facilities showed Iran’s vulnerabilities. This is important as Russia and Iran signed an agreement for strategic cooperation in January 2025 and the two countries’ anti-Western positions are very similar.

The overall assessment of Arkady Mil-Man, a former Israeli ambassador to Russia, is that longer-term damage to Russia’s interests outweigh any short-term gains it has accrued from Israel’s war with Iran. Russia needs Iran as a spoiler that threatens the West, but now the battered Iranian regime is in no position to help, Mil-Man told me in an interview.

Furthermore, Moscow has relied heavily on Iran’s supply of Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 drones. Although Russia has set up domestic Shahed production, it probably still wants Iranian supply. Debris recently found in Ukraine suggests that Russia is continuing to benefit from new Iranian technology which is used in its drones. And in 2024 Iran supplied Russia with short-range ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine. Again, Russia presumably has been looking forward to getting more.

The strategic cooperation agreement did not oblige the Russians to come to the defence of Iran, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has made this clear. Yet even if it wanted to do so, Russia is incapable of supporting Iran militarily because it needs ammunition for its own war.

Russia Could Now Win the War Against Ukraine

Alexander Motyl

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-This “China-first” view, championed by officials like Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, dangerously underestimates the immediate threat posed by a declining but destabilizing Russia. As argued by Michael Carpenter in Foreign Affairs, a Ukrainian victory is still possible with decisive Western aid.

Russian T-90M Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

-By pausing support, the US not only risks a Russian victory but also signals a lack of resolve that could embolden China to act against Taiwan.

America’s Giant Ukraine Mistake

The Trump administration may have just committed a profoundly self-destructive, perhaps even reckless, foreign policy mistake.

According to Politico, “The Pentagon has halted shipments of some air defense missiles and other precision munitions to Ukraine due to worries that U.S. weapons stockpiles have fallen too low.”

The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Elbridge Colby, reviewed the Pentagon’s munitions stockpiles and concluded that its arsenal of critical weaponry was getting thin.

“This decision was made to put America’s interests first following a review of our nation’s military support and assistance to other countries across the globe,” a White House spokeswoman said. “The strength of the United States Armed Forces remains unquestioned — just ask Iran.”

Why Now?

Iran Strike Was a Triumph That Showed American Weakness

Hal Brands

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It’s useful to be reminded, occasionally, that there’s only one superpower. Operation Midnight Hammer, the globe-spanning strike against Iran’s nuclear program, was a demonstration of power projection that America’s rivals can only envy. Unfortunately, the operation is also testament to how badly US military power is being strained, and how unserious the nation’s debate on defense strategy has become.

That debate has featured, in recent years, two warring camps. In the first are those who warn that the threat of war with China is rising and that interventions elsewhere make it harder to prepare for that fight. In the second are those who argue that the US has vital stakes outside the western Pacific and that a global power can’t simply quit crucial regions such as the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Oddly, recent events show that both groups have a point.

President Donald Trump may style himself a peacemaker. But in just five months, he managed to fight two Middle Eastern wars. In the spring, he ordered a vicious bombing campaign to halt Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Last month, the US supported, and ultimately joined, Israel’s war against Iran.

Those decisions caused controversy within a Make America Great Again movement that is often skeptical of Middle Eastern interventions. Yet the attacks nonetheless occurred because the US does have important interests there — preventing an Iranian bomb, beating back grievous challenges to global trade — and no other country can vindicate them when they are challenged.

Trump thus joins that long, bipartisan line of presidents who tried and failed to deprioritize the Middle East. This probably isn’t the last time he’ll send forces surging there. If Iran quickly reconstitutes its nuclear program, the next crisis could be just weeks or months away. But if it’s foolish to think that the Middle East will leave the US alone, it’s also foolish to think that American interventions there come cheap.

Kyivstar Cyber Attack: A Deep Dive Into Cyber Warfare in Ukraine

Evans Mugari

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In 2022, amidst the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict, one of the largest cyber attacks fell upon Kyivstar, the largest telecommunications provider in Ukraine, leaving millions without mobile and internet services. This attack underlined the vulnerability of national infrastructure but also served as a chilling reminder of how cyber warfare can be leveraged in geopolitical disputes. Kyivstar provides services to some 24 million subscribers; its disruption would thus constitute a critical blow to civilian communications and those military operations dependent on secure and reliable networks.

Threats Identified

Scale of Impact: The result of the cyber attack in Kyivstar was widely disruptive, with no services on voice calls, SMS and internet connectivity for hours that affected daily life and emergency responses. For example, public transportation in Kyiv, dependent upon mobile connectivity to pay tickets and schedule current time en masse, had been cast into chaos. Hospitals were cut off from important services that used mobile phone networks for their communications. This incident has shown how cyber attacks can bring a nation to its knees—from disrupting economic activities to affecting national security.

Attack Methodology: Cybersecurity experts believe the attack on Kyivstar is the work of an APT group, possibly sponsored by Russian state actors, due to their advanced cyber capabilities. The attack likely consisted of phishing, malware deployment and exploitation of network software vulnerabilities. A similar trick was used in the 2017 NotPetya attack, where Russian hackers targeted accounting software used by Ukrainian businesses with devastating global consequences. The Kyivstar breach could have been initiated with stolen employee credentials or zero-day exploits, which would showcase the careful planning and execution so typical of state-sponsored cyber operations.

How Rare Earths Became China’s Top Trade Weapon

Christina Lu, 

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Months of fraught U.S.-China trade talks have laid bare just how reliant the United States is on China for rare earths, the powerful raw materials that underpin technology from fighter jets to wind turbines.

Washington and Beijing have been locked in a bitter trade war since U.S. President Donald Trump announced sweeping tariffs on much of the world in April, at one point driving up tariffs on China to a staggering 145 percent. China struck back by singling out one of Washington’s key vulnerabilities: rare earths.

Trump Is Breaking American Intelligence

David V. Gioe and Michael V. Hayden

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“Speak plainly!” Russian President Vladimir Putin snapped at his foreign intelligence chief, Sergei Naryshkin, at a televised security council meeting on the eve of his shambolic full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Naryshkin was visibly nervous. Once he had finally stammered out his support for recognizing the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states—the words Putin was waiting for—he was abruptly told to sit down, like an unprepared pupil flubbing an oral exam. Naryshkin’s apparent ambivalence about embracing Putin’s pretext for the war was likely due to the lack of solid intelligence that Putin’s “special military operation” would return Kyiv to Moscow’s imperial orbit. But rather than air any misgivings, Naryshkin chose compliance and conformity. The intelligence may have been hazy, but the risks of contradicting Putin were clear.

Putin’s unwavering belief that Ukraine would swiftly capitulate represents the greatest intelligence failure of his quarter-century tenure in power. He was furious when his invasion did not unfold as he envisioned, casting blame on and even arresting some senior security officials. But Putin had laid his own trap. Like many authoritarians, he had fostered conditions in which subordinates told him only what he wanted to hear. Intelligence, in its best form, encourages political leaders to ask the right questions, challenge their assumptions, and consider what might go wrong. Although intelligence officers have a professional responsibility to adapt to the interests, foreign policy priorities, and preferred briefing style of the leaders they serve, sometimes the highest form of service an intelligence agency can provide is to disabuse its political masters of a strongly held but false idea.

The future of air combat: How long will the US military still need pilots?

Morgan Phillips 

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As sixth-generation fighter programs ramp up, military insiders are divided over whether future warplanes need pilots at all.

The Pentagon is pouring billions into next-generation aircraft, pushing the boundaries of stealth and speed. But as America eyes a future of air dominance, one question looms large: Should Americans still be risking their lives in the cockpit?

Autonomous drones backed by AI are progressing faster than many expected, and that has some defense leaders rethinking the role of the pilot.

Some are of the mindset that the F-35 should be the last manned aircraft. Many pilots, however, do not agree.

The RQ-4 Global Hawk is the military's largest autonomous vehicle currently in operation, mostly for surveillance and reconnaissance missions. (David Mareuil/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

"It’s highly controversial," one former senior defense official told Fox News Digital. "There's a whole cohort of people who think we should not be thinking about building a manned fighter for the last half of this century."

"Inside the Air Force, there are hard-line air dominance people. They're on cloud nine this week, after what the B-2s did in Iran… but in my mind, I say, why would we put men in that loop? Why wouldn't we fly those things in 2050 unmanned, completely?"

Not just drones, but massed swarms of them. Defences can’t cope

Timothy Millar

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A new and sophisticated phase of aerial warfare has emerged from the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East over the past month, defined by the systematic use of massed drone saturation attacks. This evolving doctrine, refined by Russia and Iran, uses quantity and simultaneity to overwhelm even the most advanced air-defence systems.

The core of the tactic lies not in the technological superiority of any single weapon but in the brutal economic and operational logic of drone-based attrition. By doing so, it forces reassessment of how modern militaries can protect their airspace, infrastructure and military assets.

The war in Ukraine has been the main laboratory for the development of these tactics. Early in the conflict, Russia launched small waves of Iranian-designed Shahed 136 strike drones, small propeller-driven aeroplanes that can carry their warheads at least 1,300 kilometres. As the conflict has progressed, Russia’s tactics have grown in scale and complexity. The trend reached a new high during nights of the past month, when Russia repeatedly launched massive assaults with 300 or even 400 propeller-driven strike drones alongside conventional jet and rocket-propelled missiles.

While Ukrainian forces remarkably neutralised hundreds of the incoming drones, at times roughly 20 percent have managed to get through. On the night of 16 and 17 June, 30 targets in Kyiv were hit. The defences could not handle the full volume of munitions flying in.

Russia’s barrages were not an anomaly but the result of a highly effective and ongoing industrial scaling strategy. A production facility in Russia’s Alabuga special economic zone, set up with Iranian assistance, is intended to make thousands of Shahed drones a year. With more of the munitions pouring out of factory gates, Russia can mass ever larger groups of them in single strikes.

Two Wars, One Axis: How the Israel–Iran Conflict Echoes in Ukraine

Igor Desyatnikov

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As Israel escalated its campaign against Iran’s nuclear and proxy networks, the shockwaves are felt far beyond the Middle East. Thousands of kilometers away, Iranian-supplied Shahed drones continue to strike Ukrainian cities—a grim reminder that these two seemingly distinct conflicts are tightly interwoven. The wars may differ in their origins and immediate objectives, but they are bound by a strategic partnership between two revisionist powers: Iran and Russia.

Both regimes share a vision of overturning the Western-led liberal order, albeit in different theaters. Iran seeks to dominate the Middle East by empowering a constellation of proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis—and displacing US and Israeli influence. Russia,

 for its part, aims to reconfigure the European security architecture and reestablish itself as the center of a multipolar world order carved into spheres of influence. Though their ambitions diverge in geography and scope, their alliance is one of mutual benefit — militarily, diplomatically, and symbolically.

Last month’s violence offers a potent example of that convergence. Iranian Shahed drones have targeted civilians in Israel, just as identical models have rained down on Ukrainian neighborhoods. Tehran has exported thousands of these drones to Moscow, helping sustain Russia’s war effort even as its domestic military production falters. These are not coincidental parallels—they are evidence of an integrated effort to weaken Western allies across regions through asymmetrical warfare.

The parallels are not just strategic — they are visual. Around the world, newspapers and television screens are filled with images of ruined apartment blocks in both Kyiv and Tel Aviv, often side by side. Civilians in both cities have been targeted by the same model of drone wielded by two authoritarian regimes acting in concert. The symbolism is hard to ignore: the same weapon, the same tactic, and the same message of defiance against the liberal democratic order.

The future of air combat: How long will the US military still need pilots?

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As sixth-generation fighter programs ramp up, military insiders are divided over whether future warplanes need pilots at all.

The Pentagon is pouring billions into next-generation aircraft, pushing the boundaries of stealth and speed. But as America eyes a future of air dominance, one question looms large: Should Americans still be risking their lives in the cockpit?

Autonomous drones backed by AI are progressing faster than many expected, and that has some defense leaders rethinking the role of the pilot.

Some are of the mindset that the F-35 should be the last manned aircraft. Many pilots, however, do not agree.

The RQ-4 Global Hawk is the military's largest autonomous vehicle currently in operation, mostly for surveillance and reconnaissance missions. (David Mareuil/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

"It’s highly controversial," one former senior defense official told Fox News Digital. "There's a whole cohort of people who think we should not be thinking about building a manned fighter for the last half of this century."

"Inside the Air Force, there are hard-line air dominance people. They're on cloud nine this week, after what the B-2s did in Iran… but in my mind, I say, why would we put men in that loop? Why wouldn't we fly those things in 2050 unmanned, completely?"

Air Force pilots flew B-2 bombers on a 36-hour round trip to strike three Iranian nuclear facilities last weekend. Trump said the strikes left Iran's nuclear sites "obliterated like nobody’s ever seen before." He praised the "brave" pilots who crewed the planes as "the best shots in the world."

Tolstoy’s Complaint: Mission Command in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

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What will become of battlefield command in the years ahead? This question is at the heart of the US Army’s once-in-a-generation reforms now underway. In search of answers, the Army looks to Ukraine. Events there suggest at least two truths. One is that decentralized command, which the US Army calls mission command and claims as its mode, will endure as a virtue. A second is that future commanders will use artificial intelligence to inform every decision—where to go, whom to kill, and whom to save. The recently announced Army Transformation Initiative indicates the Army intends to act on both.

But from these lessons there arises a different dilemma: How can an army at once preserve a culture of decentralized command and integrate artificial intelligence into its every task? Put another way, if at all echelons commanders rely on artificial intelligence to inform decisions, 

do they not risk just another form of centralization, not at the top, but within an imperfect model? To understand this dilemma and to eventually resolve it, the US Army would do well to look once again to the Ukrainian corner of the map, though this time as a glance backward two centuries, so that it might learn from a young redleg in Crimea named Leo Tolstoy.

What Tolstoy Saw

Before he became a literary titan, Leo Tolstoy was a twenty-something artillery officer. In 1854 he found himself in besieged port of Sevastopol, then under relentless French and British shelling, party to the climax of the Crimean War. When not tending to his battery on the city’s perilous Fourth Bastion, Tolstoy wrote dispatches about life under fire for his preferred journal in Saint Petersburg, The Contemporary. These dispatches, 

read across literate Russia for their candor and craft, made Tolstoy famous. They have since been compiled as The Sebastopol Sketches and are considered by many to be the first modern war reportage. Their success confirmed for Tolstoy that to write was his life’s calling, and when the Crimean War ended, he left military service so that he might do so full-time.