Indian Strategic Studies: 07/06/25

6 July 2025

Ex-Army General warns: 'Most drones deployed in Op Sindoor were assembled in India, core systems aren't Indian'

Saurabh Sharma

India has demonstrated drone warfare capabilities during Operation Sindoor, but the underlying technology still heavily relies on foreign systems, according to M Indrabalan, former Major General and Military Tech Advisor at Chennai-based drone startup Amber Wings. He also said that the majority of drones deployed during the operation were assembled and not fully indigenised, with critical electronic components sourced from abroad.

"Majority of the drones that we have deployed recently were assembled drones. They were manufactured, but I'm sure there are companies catching up. In terms of the deep technology, we are still dependent on electronic systems which are not entirely indigenised," Indrabalan said while speaking at CNN-News18 Defence Townhall.

Operation Sindoor marked India's first experience with drone warfare, during which the Indian Air Force targeted Pakistani airbases in Noor Khan and Rahimyar Khan in response to the terror attack in Pahalgam. The mission involved loitering munitions - also known as kamikaze drones - capable of hovering over target areas before striking enemy radar and missile sites with high precision.

Indrabalan said the operation exposed critical gaps in India's drone technology stack. "The drone has its aerodynamics, its airframe, its propellers - but the main point of the drone is its brain: the autopilot or control system, the navigation system, the telemetry. Now these are the things - we have realised during Op Sindoor - need extreme focus. In terms of our ability to match world-level technologies, or even what China uses, we are way, way behind. A lot of catching up to do."

He warned that reliance on foreign navigation and transmission systems makes Indian drones vulnerable to spoofing, jamming, and cyber attacks. "While a drone can have a navigation system - RTK-based or GPS - if that system is not supported by our own infrastructure, the drone can get spoofed. If you depend on GPS, that's the American system - owned by the American Air Force - you know how vulnerable you are. If you're going to depend on Chinese BeiDou, you know how vulnerable you are."

The Staying Power of India’s Hindu Right

Hartosh Singh Bal

When India’s 2024 general election results were announced a year ago, they surprised almost everyone. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party—which was expected to win its third straight parliamentary majority—took less than 240 of the country’s 545 seats. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had promised his supporters a supermajority in parliament; instead, he was forced into a coalition with other parties. It is the first time Modi has ever had to depend on politicians from outside the BJP to prop up his government.

The election results were, naturally, celebrated by India’s opposition. They were also celebrated by millions of

Afghanistan: Surging Returns From Iran Overwhelm Fragile Support Systems, UN Agencies Warn

UN News

More than 700,000 Afghan migrants have returned from Iran so far this year, including 256,000 in June alone, the UN International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported on Monday, warning of immense pressures on Afghanistan’s overstretched support systems.

Ninety-nine per cent of the returnees were undocumented, and 70 per cent were forcibly returned, with a steep rise in families being deported – a shift from earlier months, when most returnees were single young men, according to the UN agency.

The rise follows a March decision by the Iranian Government requiring all undocumented Afghans to leave the country.

Conditions deteriorated further after the recent 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel, which caused the daily refugees crossings to skyrocket from about 5,000 to nearly 30,000, according to Arafat Jamal, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) representative in Afghanistan.

“They are coming in buses and sometimes five buses arrive at one time with families and others and the people are let out of the bus and they are simply bewildered, disoriented, and tired and hungry as well,” he told UN News, describing the scene at a border crossing.

“This has been exacerbated by the war, but I must say it has been part of an underlying trend that we have seen of returns from Iran, some of which are voluntary, but a large portion were also deportations.”

Strain on aid efforts

Afghanistan, already grappling with economic collapse and chronic humanitarian crisis, is unprepared to absorb such large-scale returns.

The 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan calls for $2.42 billion in funding, but only 22.2 per cent has been secured to date.

“The scale of returns is deeply alarming and demands a stronger and more immediate international response,” said IOM Director General Amy Pope, “Afghanistan cannot manage this alone.”

The New Great Game: Sino-American strategic competition in Pakistan

The intensification of great power competition in the 21st century has transformed Pakistan from a peripheral actor into a central prize in the strategic rivalry between the United States and China. This "New Great Game" represents a contemporary iteration of classical geopolitical competition, wherein major powers vie for influence over strategically located middle powers.

Pakistan's unique positionâ€”as the sole Muslim nuclear power, a gateway to Central Asia, and a critical node in China's Belt and Road Initiativeâ€”has made it an indispensable asset for both Beijing and Washington in their broader competition for global influence.

Pakistan's strategic value derives not merely from its geographical location, but from its ability to serve multiple functions simultaneously: as China's corridor to the Arabian Sea, America's security lever in South Asia, and a potential source of critical minerals essential to modern warfare and technology. The recent Chinese loan rollover of $3.4 billion and President Trump's hosting of Pakistan's Army Chief at the White House exemplify the heightened attention both superpowers are directing towards Islamabad.

China's strategic approach: The CPEC paradigm

China's engagement with Pakistan represents a long-term strategic investment designed to address fundamental vulnerabilities in Beijing's global position. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2013 with over $62 billion in committed investments, serves as the flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia. However, CPEC's significance extends far beyond infrastructure development.

The development of Gwadar Port, situated at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, constitutes China's most significant strategic asset in the region. This deep-water port provides Beijing with direct access to energy-rich West Asia whilst circumventing the vulnerable Malacca Strait, through which approximately 80% of China's oil imports currently transit. The recent $3.4 billion loan rolloverâ€”comprising $2.1 billion in reserve deposits and $1.3 billion in refinancingâ€”demonstrates China's commitment to maintaining this strategic relationship regardless of Pakistan's economic difficulties.

China's approach to Pakistan can be characterised as "strategic patience"â€”providing unconditional financial support whilst gradually building institutional dependencies. Unlike Western donors, Chinese assistance comes without governance conditionalities or human rights requirements, making it particularly attractive to Pakistan's military establishment. This approach has enabled China to secure not only commercial advantages but also potential military positioning in the Indian Ocean region.

American recalibration: The Trump doctrine

The Trump administration's approach to Pakistan marked a significant departure from previous American policies, which had oscillated between engagement and estrangement based on Pakistan's cooperation in counterterrorism operations. The June 2025 White House lunch hosted by President Trump for Pakistan's Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, symbolised a new American strategy focused on direct engagement with Pakistan's military leadership rather than its civilian government.

This approach reflects a pragmatic acknowledgement of Pakistan's power structures and an attempt to counterbalance Chinese influence through military-to-military cooperation. The approval of a $397 million upgrade package for Pakistan's F-16 fighter aircraft, concurrent with discussions of F-35 sales to India, demonstrates America's willingness to compartmentalise its South Asian relationships rather than viewing them through a zero-sum lens.

The American strategy appears designed to prevent Pakistan's complete drift into China's sphere of influence whilst maintaining flexibility in broader South Asian policy. By engaging directly with Pakistan's military leadership, Washington seeks to preserve intelligence cooperation, maintain access to Central Asian operations, and ensure continued Pakistani cooperation in regional security matters.

The Importance of US Leadership in Open-Source AI Development

Joseph F. Dunford, Francis F. Townsend, and Michael J. Morell

The United States is in a race it cannot afford to lose. China is rapidly gaining ground in artificial intelligence (AI), utilizing open-source models to disseminate powerful, low-cost AI systems rooted in authoritarian values globally. These models aren’t just competing – they’re starting to win, and if left unchecked, they could become the foundation of the world’s digital infrastructure. To protect our national security, economic future, and democratic ideals, the United States must ensure that it leads in both open- and closed-source AI development.

China’s Open-Source AI Models Are Surpassing US Benchmarks

China’s AI gains aren’t just hypothetical. Its open-source models now rival or outperform top US systems. Alibaba’s Qwen 2.5 has beaten leading American models on key benchmarks, while DeepSeek’s open-source R1 made headlines earlier this year and is expected to be followed soon by an even more advanced R2 model. These breakthroughs are no accident: they’re part of China’s national strategy to become a global tech leader and spread censorship-driven AI across the globe. As the US Intelligence Community 2025 Threat Assessment warns, China aims to dominate AI by 2030, with its tech sector projected to drive nearly a quarter of its economy by 2026.

The US Must Strengthen Both Closed and Open-Source AI to Compete Globally

To counter the adoption of models like DeepSeek across the world, the United States must offer accessible alternatives that are powerful, low-cost, and – critically – underpinned by American values.

Many of the best-known US large language models – such as Anthropic’s Claude, OpenAI’s ChatGPT, and Google’s Gemini – were developed as closed models, meaning their underlying technology remains proprietary. The benefits of these models include control of how the technology is used and deployed. Closed models also protect confidential intellectual property (IP), algorithms, and data from theft or misuse, including from foreign adversaries.

US Military Issues Update on China's Rocket Force Threat

Micah McCartney

The Chinese Rocket Force's increasingly capable missile fleet is a growing threat to U.S. bases and security partners in the Asia-Pacific, top Pentagon officials told lawmakers.

Newsweek reached out to the Chinese Foreign Ministry via email for comment outside of office hours.

Why It Matters

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is responsible for China's missile and nuclear arsenal and is a key component of Beijing's efforts to surpass Washington as the region's leading military power.

In some areas, the Rocket Force's capabilities have already surpassed those of the United States, such as with its so-called "carrier killer" hypersonic missiles. While these weapons remain untested in combat, they could potentially keep American forces at bay in a wartime scenario.

What To Know

"The PLA's Rocket Force (PLARF) is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its strategic deterrence capabilities," read a written testimony by U.S. Air Force and Space Force leadership prepared for a Senate Appropriations Committee budget hearing.

China's missile arsenal is estimated to include 400 ground-launched cruise missiles capable of reaching anywhere within the so-called First Island Chain, a stretch of islands from Japan to Indonesia that Washington considers crucial for containing China's navy in the event of a conflict, such as one over Beijing-claimed Taiwan.

A DF-17 missile on display during a military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on October 1, 2019. Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images

China is also believed to field 1,300 intermediate-range ballistic missiles that can strike targets even further afield, threatening the Second Island Chain, which includes U.S. military bases in Guam.

Decoding Xi’s China: The Return of Pekingology

Stefan Messingschlager

When former Chinese President Hu Jintao was abruptly escorted off the stage at the Communist Party Congress in October 2022, global speculation erupted. Was the elderly Hu genuinely unwell, or was President Xi Jinping publicly asserting dominance? Some months later, Foreign Minister Qin Gang mysteriously vanished, triggering intense speculation until his quiet replacement. These episodes illuminate a troubling paradox: despite unprecedented access to information, the inner workings of China’s political elite remain strikingly opaque. Under Xi’s increasingly secretive rule, Western analysts have thus revived the Cold War-era discipline of “Pekingology” – the meticulous decoding of subtle signals from Beijing’s corridors of power.

Reading the tea leaves

During the Cold War era, Western Pekingology was essential for deciphering China’s carefully guarded politics. Without direct sources, experts parsed cryptic statements published in the People’s Daily, analysed official photographs, and scrutinised seating arrangements at major events to detect shifts within the Communist Party’s inner circles. At times, this meticulous approach yielded prescient insights – famously predicting the Sino-Soviet split and internal power struggles during the Cultural Revolution. With Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and cautious political opening during the 1970s and 80s, the necessity of interpretive guesswork gradually diminished.

Xi’s fortress of secrecy

Under Xi Jinping, however, despite an unprecedented abundance of public information, the opacity surrounding China’s highest political leadership has intensified sharply. Since assuming power in 2012, Xi has systematically dismantled the incremental openness that characterised preceding decades, consolidating power and tightening control over information channels. Independent voices have been silenced, prominent journalists expelled, and civil society increasingly constrained. A stringent anti-espionage law introduced in 2023 places even routine exchanges with foreigners under suspicion, transforming China’s political core into a virtual fortress of secrecy.

‘Command Innovation’ Model Builds Momentum: Engineering Capital for Strategic Rivalry

Matthew Johnson

Xi Jinping has elevated Command Innovation to the core logic of the People’s Republic of China’s economy—superseding traditional growth drivers by fusing “self-reliant” strategic-industrial planning with direct financial control. This engineered system gives Beijing new leverage over how capital is deployed and who controls innovation, but its success depends on whether these channels can deliver real breakthroughs without succumbing to misallocation or political drag.

A phased strategy since 2018 has steadily rewired the PRC’s capital system, starting with crisis-induced self-reliance goals and then consolidating fragmented tools into a unified framework targeting strategic tech sectors. Each stage has pushed the Party closer to treating capital not just as a market input but as an instrument of national power, aligned with its broader geopolitical ambitions.

In 2025, this model has shifted from design to rapid consolidation and deployment: top-level directives from Xi and Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang have activated new funding mechanisms, re-lending tools, national venture funds, and innovation-focused bond pilots. All of it operates according to explicit political metrics and with direct Party oversight.

Implementation is now accelerating at the meso level: scoring systems for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), risk-sharing guarantees, revamped capital market rules, and digital supply chain plans are embedding “command innovation” deep into everyday financial practice. Foreign capital flows are being brought under the same umbrella of Party-defined priorities and meso-level controls.

UN Report Highlights Urgent Financing Solutions To Achieve The SDGs In Asia And The Pacific

Eurasia Review

A new report from the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) offers over 40 innovative and actionable strategies for countries in the region to close the development financing gap. This comes as financial and geopolitical pressures across the region threaten to further derail progress on poverty reduction, climate action and economic recovery.

Developing countries globally now face an annual shortfall of between US$2.5 trillion and US$4 trillion to meet the Sustainable Development Goals. Without major improvements in the way development is financed, many countries in the region risk falling further behind.

The sixth edition of ESCAP’s Financing for Development report points to longstanding weaknesses in public finance and private investment systems. Many governments in the region continue to face difficulties in raising domestic revenues at the scale needed. Tax structures remain inefficient, and opportunities to tap into wealth and real estate are often underused. At the same time, capital markets are underdeveloped, and private financing rarely reaches high-impact sectors such as clean energy, healthcare or affordable housing.

“Nowhere is this challenge – and opportunity – more urgent than in Asia and the Pacific,” underscored Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ESCAP. She added, “This is our chance to build a more resilient, equitable and sustainable economy for all. We aim to foster solutions that are regionally grounded, technically sound and financially viable. Unless Asia and the Pacific can lead boldly, the global transition will fall short of expectations.”

Public debt distress has also become a growing concern. The report calls for more responsible borrowing, better transparency in how public funds are used, and stronger coordination among creditors to ensure fair and effective debt resolution.

The report further recommends closer alignment between sustainable finance and development goals. It also notes that when countries plan investments that support both environmental and economic outcomes, they are more likely to deliver results that benefit people and the planet.

Call Him Daddy: Assessing America’s Strike On Iran

Sir Niall Ferguson H.R. McMaster John H. Cochrane Bill Whalen

US forces launched bomb and missile strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, followed soon by an Iran-Israel ceasefire and the beginning of what could be a diplomatic realignment across the Middle East.

The Good Fellows regulars, Hoover Senior Fellows Niall Ferguson, John Cochrane, and former White House National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster discuss the collateral impact of the Trump administration’s move against the Iranian regime. The fallout includes: a possible expansion of Abraham Accords participants (as the Gulf States help Iran pursue a more peaceful nuclear program); NATO members willing to invest more in military readiness; the media’s second-guessing the effectiveness and wisdom of the B2 sorties; plus what message Trump’s use of military might—as opposed to revolving-door diplomacy—sends to the world’s various mischief-making capitals (Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang).

Why the United States Acted Now Against Iran

Kari A. Bingen and Clayton Swope

Looking at the strategic chessboard, it’s clear why the president seized this moment to strike at Iran’s nuclear program. There may never have been a better time. Iran was closer than ever before to having the ability to manufacture an atomic bomb. In the run-up to Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran walked away from the negotiating table, signaling it was not interested in diplomacy. And, finally, Iran was suddenly weak, its air defenses in shambles. It is too early to know the long-term ramifications of the U.S. decision to join Israel’s attack on Iran, but the short-term impacts are clear. Iran’s nuclear program has been set back, and the prestige and influence of the axis of resistance have ebbed. Operation Midnight Hammer is also a reminder of U.S. resolve and military power—and the consequences for those who underestimate either.

For years, Tehran has been constructing clandestine nuclear facilities in deeper, more expansive underground tunnel complexes. In May 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency assessed that Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium had increased by 50 percent since its last report three months prior, citing the rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium of “serious concern,” and placing Iran within short reach of a breakout capability. In testimony this month before Congress, the commander of the U.S. Central Command wrote that Iran possessed enough enriched uranium—well past the enrichment level required for peaceful, civilian purposes—for 10 nuclear weapons and could produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb within a week. Although Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei probably had not decided to build a nuclear weapon, pressure was likely increasing on him to do so, particularly after the start of Israeli strikes on June 12.

Iran-linked hackers threaten to release Trump aides' emails

Raphael Satter

Hackers say they might try to sell emails from Trump aides

Group leaked documents from Republican president's campaign last year

US has said group known as Robert works for Iran's Revolutionary Guards

WASHINGTON, June 30 (Reuters) - Iran-linked hackers have threatened to disclose more emails stolen from U.S. President Donald Trump's circle, after distributing a prior batch to the media ahead of the 2024 U.S. election.

In online chats with Reuters on Sunday and Monday, the hackers, who go by the pseudonym Robert, said they had roughly 100 gigabytes of emails from the accounts of White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles, Trump lawyer Lindsey Halligan, Trump adviser Roger Stone and porn star-turned-Trump antagonist Stormy Daniels.

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Robert raised the possibility of selling the material but otherwise did not provide details of their plans. The hackers did not describe the content of the emails.

U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi described the intrusion as "an unconscionable cyber-attack."

The White House and the FBI responded with a statement from FBI Director Kash Patel, who said: "Anyone associated with any kind of breach of national security will be fully investigated and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law."

"This so-called cyber 'attack' is nothing more than digital propaganda, and the targets are no coincidence. This is a calculated smear campaign meant to damage President Trump and discredit honorable public servants who serve our country with distinction," cyberdefense agency CISA said in a post on X.

Israel Is Growing More Dependent on a Less Sympathetic United States

Leon Hadar

It has become a worn trope among anti-Semitic political commentators that the United States regularly sends its soldiers to “die for Israel.” Yet while Israel has relied on generous US military assistance throughout the years, providing access to the most advanced and cutting-edge weaponry and technologies,

no American soldier has directly fought on its behalf since its founding in 1948. During his initial tenure as Prime Minister in the 1970s, Yitzhak Rabin was the first Israeli leader to explicitly lay out a policy of never asking the United States for combat forces—an approach that all subsequent Prime Ministers have maintained.

The United States and Israel have held joint military exercises, cooperated closely on missile defense, jointly developed and tested new weapons systems, shared intelligence, and consulted on strategy. However, Israel has never requested American boots on the ground, beyond advisers and auxiliary units. Instead, the United States has provided extensive military aid to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), justified by the argument that the IDF functions as an unsinkable American “aircraft carrier” in the Middle East—a substitute for a permanent military deployment like those in Germany, South Korea, Japan, or Qatar.

When Israel has come under assault, Americans have sometimes aided in its defense—as during the missile exchanges in 2024, when US Air Force pilots helped to shoot down Iranian rockets targeting Israeli cities and military bases.

Earlier in June, however, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went a step further: breaking the longstanding taboo that Rabin established, he requested not only defensive support from the United States, but for American pilots and planes to bomb Iran’s nuclear uranium sites. “For the first time, Israel is asking America to fight alongside it, or for it,” as Israel’s Haaretz editor Aluf Benn put it. In Benn’s view,

the mission in question was too big for the IDF alone—and represented an “unprecedented peak” in Israel’s dependence on the United States.

America’s Relationship with Myanmar Is Deeply Flawed

Robert S. Burrell, and Chris Mason

The conflict in Myanmar is the world’s longest ongoing civil war. The former British colony gained its independence in January 1948 and has been in a state of civil war almost continuously ever since. The British colonial policy of classifying and institutionalizing ethnolinguistic differences as part of the imperial schema of colonial rule is partly to blame. “Divide and rule” served imperial interests by subverting any sense of a larger national identity. Even with this approach, Great Britain fought three major wars in Burma and innumerable police actions before the invasion by the Imperial Japanese Army in 1939.

But colonial policy is only partly to blame. Going back more than a millennium, there has never been a sense of a broader national identity within the borders of what is now Myanmar. The government of Myanmar itself codified the classification of 135 ethnic groups in 2014.

Does Myanmar Have a Unifying Identity?

The efforts by the British, Japanese, and now the global world order to maintain the fiction of Myanmar have come at an enormous human cost. Just between May 2021 and December 2024, at least 76,000 people were killed, and this is almost certainly an undercount. The United Nations Refugee Agency now reports 3,443,592 displaced persons from Myanmar. Most of these have fled west, and the tidal wave of refugees is destabilizing Bangladesh and India. The second-order effect of this human catastrophe is the reification of tribal boundaries.

War creates hatreds, and no one alive in Myanmar today remembers a time when all the country’s many tribal groups lived together in peaceful coexistence. Social trust is the essential foundation of any multiethnic society, and it is fair to say that nowhere on earth is there less of it than in Myanmar today.

Indeed, Myanmar lacks the social capital necessary for peace and is farther away from being a nation today than at any point in its history.

Operation Midnight Hammer: Were Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Damaged? – OpEd

Binoy Kampmark

The aftermath of Operation Midnight Hammer, a strike by the US Air Force on three nuclear facilities in Iran authorised by President Donald Trump on June 22, was raucous and triumphant. But that depended on what company you were keeping.

The mission involved the bombing of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, and the uranium-conversion facility in Isfahan. The Israeli Air Force had already attacked the last two facilities, sparing Fordow for the singular weaponry available for the USAF.

The Fordow site was of particular interest, located some eighty to a hundred metres underground and cocooned by protective concrete. For its purported destruction, B-2 Spirit stealth bombers were used to drop GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator “bunker buster” bombs. All in all, approximately 75 precision guided weapons were used in the operation, along with 125 aircraft and a guided missile submarine.

Trump was never going to be anything other than optimistic about the result. “Monumental Damage was done to all Nuclear sites in Iran, as shown by satellite images,” he blustered. “Obliteration is an accurate term!”

At the Pentagon press conference following the attack, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth bubbled with enthusiasm. “The order we received from our commander in chief was focused, it was powerful, and it was clear. We devastated the Iranian nuclear program.” The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen.

Dan Caine was confident that the facilities had been subjected to severe punishment. “Initial battle damage assessments indicate that all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction.” Adding to Caine’s remarks, Hegseth stated that, “The battle damage assessment is ongoing, but our initial assessment, as the Chairman said, is that all of our precision munitions struck where we wanted them to strike and had the desired effect.”

The Guardian view on Donald Trump’s China deal: rare earths pave the green road to militarisation

It’s an irony that the minerals needed to save the planet may help destroy it. Rare earth elements, the mineral backbones of wind turbines and electric vehicles, are now the prize in a geopolitical arms race. The trade agreement between Washington and Beijing restores rare earth shipments from China to the US, which had been suspended in retaliation against Donald Trump’s tariffs. Behind the bluster, there has been a realisation in Washington that these are critical inputs for the US. They are needed not just by American icons such as Ford and Boeing but for its fighter jets, missile guidance systems and satellite communications.

This understanding suggests that Washington will scale back some of its countermeasures once Beijing resumes delivery of rare earths. The paradox is that to reduce its dependence on China, the US must depend on Beijing a little longer.

This is not yet decoupling; it’s deferment. That, however, may not last. Mr Trump has signed an executive order to boost production of critical minerals, which encourages the faster granting of permits for mining and processing projects. He eyes Ukraine and Greenland’s subterranean riches to break dependence on China.

The west became so reliant on a single geopolitical rival for such materials – materials it once extracted and refined domestically before shuttering operations – due to cost and environmental concerns. China, for its part, has come to dominate global rare earth processing. It has used that market power before – notably against Japan in 2010. It’s hard not to think that it was strategic complacency that led to the west relying so heavily on China for key minerals.

This month’s Nato summit has seen the west push to reindustrialise via rearming itself. This is also reawakening long-dormant extractive ambitions in the global north. Canada, flush with critical mineral deposits, says its planned mining resurgence will be a new foundation for alliance solidarity. This month the EU called for strategic reserves of rare earths “to prevent supply chain disruptions and economic blackmail from China” – highlighting their importance not just for electric vehicles but for defence and aerospace industries. “Resilience” means digging deeper at home and controlling extraction abroad.

Israel Hybrid Warfare in Gaza: Regular Goals, Combined Means

David Bastardo Martínez

Ever since the escalation following the October 7 attacks in 2023, as well as the subsequent wars that followed, Israel has changed its paradigm in Gaza toward a hybrid model remarkably similar to that of Iran. Although far from the strategic complexity and efficiency of the “Axis of Resistance,” which is managed by the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Israeli model of infiltration and build-up of paramilitary groups has escalated in similar ways.

Although paramilitary groups are not new to Gaza, this hybrid warfare approach by Israel shows that it is willing to explore and apply new unconventional means to exploit the enclave’s geopolitical vulnerabilities to its advantage. Since early 2025, news reports across different channels pinpoint the rise of a splinter group headed by a former Daesh commander, Yasser Abu Shabab,

christened by its leader as “Popular Forces.” The group’s motivation is to confront Hamas, an organization that has controlled Gaza since 2007 and one that, earlier this year, was met with Palestinian protesters calling for an end to the war.

Hybrid Warfare and the Middle East

A research paper from the Journal of Strategic Security defines hybrid warfare as “a strategy used by states and non-state actors that seeks to maximize the effectiveness of force by combining regular and irregular tactics, as well as various military and non-military instruments.” The concept, originally attributed to Frank Hoffman, describes a specific type of conflict present in contemporary international relations.

Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and in particular since the ascent of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to power, the Islamic Republic’s geo-strategic understanding of the Middle East and Israel in particular has been based on this approach. Through the “Axis of Resistance” belt of paramilitary Shiite or Shiite-affiliated militias, Iran has sought to encircle Israel and render it geopolitically unstable.

This effort, however, co-exists with gray zone strategies applied by Iran’s other rivals in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia. The emergence of Daesh and other Salaphist groups suggests an effort to contain Iran’s Pan-Shiism through similar tactics.

Putin Tossing Generals Exposes Fractures in Presidential Control Over Russian Military

Leonid Sokolov

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s appointment of Colonel General Andrey Mordvichev as Commander in Chief of Russia’s Ground Forces highlights tensions in the Kremlin’s political-military leadership while sidelining critics of notorious Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov.

The concurrent sentencing of popular Major General Ivan Popov and lesser-known cases involving Generals Gennady Anashkin and Mikhail Teplinsky reveal growing internal Russian military fractures and underscore Putin’s tight yet strained control over the country’s military leadership.

Mordvichev’s success and the overall stability of Russia’s military command hierarchy will hinge on how well he balances loyalty to Putin with the operational demands and frustrations of field commanders.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent appointment of Colonel General Andrey Mordvichev as Commander-in-Chief of Russia’s Ground Forces highlights the Kremlin’s intentions and tensions within the political-military leadership. Pro-Kremlin Russian media and Russian military bloggers label Mordvichev, aged 49, as a younger-generation “breakthrough general” (Argumenty i Fakty; Interfax, May 22). Even some Western analysts tend to agree that Mordvichev’s elevation signals preparations for significant offensives (Radio Svoboda, May 16). Beneath this surface-level narrative, however, Mordvichev’s appointment indicates a deeper struggle for Putin’s presidential control over the Russian military.

Russia’s FSB Increasingly Playing Ever More Roles Similar to Soviet Union’s KGB

Paul Goble

As Russian President Vladimir Putin has moved to reimpose totalitarianism on Russia, the Federal Security Service (FSB) increasingly mirrors its Soviet predecessors, including rebuilding a network of camps some are calling “Gulag 2.0,” among other ways.

The quiet revival of these other functions is likely to be even more important in terms of their impact on Russian society at home and how Moscow behaves abroad.

This restored behemoth, given the FSB’s ideological flexibility and technical sophistication, may thus prove more dangerous than the KGB from which Putin himself sprung and cast a dark shadow on Russia’s future long after he leaves the scene.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has moved to reimpose totalitarianism on Russia. The Federal Security Service (FSB) is increasingly playing the roles its Soviet predecessors did in the suppression of Russian society. Last week, Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan, two of the most distinguished investigators of the Russian security services, published an article gaining traction in Russian independent media in which they argued that “Russia’s FSB is working to build a new Gulag” (CEPA, June 23; Agentura.ru, June 24; The Moscow Times, June 25). Because many associate the Gulag more closely with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin than any other institution, their warning is attracting attention in Russia and abroad, far more than the series of steps the FSB has already taken, which have put in place much of the rest of Stalin’s system. These other moves are already having a significant impact on Russian society at home and Moscow’s behavior abroad. Perhaps even more seriously, however, this restored security behemoth, given the FSB’s ideological flexibility and technical sophistication, shows every sign of being even more dangerous than the Soviet security agencies from which Putin himself sprung, both now and in the future.

In their report, Soldatov and Borogan note that the Duma is set to pass three bills this month that will effectively revive the Gulag. One will allow the FSB to set up its own pretrial detention centers, something Moscow promised in the 1990s never to allow. A second directive instructs the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) to schedule “special carriages” that can be attached to regular trains to transport prisoners to the camps. A third gives the FSB “the power to investigate and punish in-house those who cause trouble within detention facilities”(CEPA, June 23; Agentura.ru, June 24; The Moscow Times, June 25). These steps, most of which formalize and extend powers that the FSB had previously arrogated to itself behind the scenes, are making the Russian security service again a law unto itself, with its own agenda that it presses its nominal master in the Kremlin to follow.

‘Don’t Bankrupt America’: Musk Vows to Campaign Against Republicans Who Support Trump’s Debt-Raising Megabill

Chad de Guzman

President Donald Trump has made clear that any Republican member of Congress who opposes his sprawling tax-and-spending package dubbed the “One Big Beautiful Bill” will face his wrath. He launched a campaign to primary Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky and suggested he would do the same against Sen. Thom Tillis of North Carolina, before Tillis announced that he wouldn’t seek reelection.

Now, however, another powerful political kingmaker has vowed to challenge any Republican who supports the bill.

“Every member of Congress who campaigned on reducing government spending and then immediately voted for the biggest debt increase in history should hang their head in shame!” tech billionaire and former close ally of Trump Elon Musk posted on X. “And they will lose their primary next year if it is the last thing I do on this Earth.”

Musk spent more than $250 million to help elect Trump in 2024 but said in May that he had “done enough” and was going to do “a lot less in the future.” He added at the time, however, “if I see a reason to do political spending in the future, I will do it.”

Musk posted his warning, among many posts on the topic, on Monday night as Senators continued to vote on a series of amendments to the megabill, which estimates say will add trillions to the national deficit and lead to cuts to Medicaid.

Trump Ends the Folly of De-escalation

H.R. McMaster

In my first year at West Point, I was part of a cordon of cheering cadets who lined Thayer Road to welcome back to American soil 52 people who had been held hostage by the Iranian regime for 444 days. We saluted as six green-and-white Army buses took them through the scenic campus on the way to a three-day respite with their families at the Hotel Thayer. The hostage crisis was just the beginning of what would become a four-decades-long “twilight war” that the Islamic Republic of Iran has waged against the United States, Israel, and its Arab neighbors. The U.S. response, across seven different administrations, has suffered from a failure to consider adequately how historical memory, emotion, and ideology drive and constrain the theocratic dictatorship in Tehran.

The exception has been President Donald Trump, who from 2017 to 2021 implemented a strategy of maximum pressure on Iran and in January 2020 decided to kill the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani, and his Iraqi militia puppet, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in Baghdad. Trump recognized that the Iranian regime cannot be conciliated and that efforts to de-escalate confrontations with Iran had allowed it to escalate on its own terms with impunity. Early in his second term, Trump has reversed the self-defeating policies of the Biden administration, restored maximum pressure on Iran, and, most notably, ordered U.S. strikes on three facilities related to its nuclear program.

The wisdom of Trump’s approach—forcing Iran to choose between continued isolation and ending its hostility to Israel, the United States, and its Arab neighbors—became apparent to many only after President Joe Biden resurrected a hapless effort to appease Iran that started during the Obama administration. President Biden, in an attempt to restore the flawed Iran nuclear deal from which Trump withdrew in 2018, relaxed enforcement of the Trump administration’s economic sanctions—and as cash flow to Tehran increased, so did Iranian leaders’ confidence that they could use their terrorist proxies to get away with murder. With few exceptions, Iranian proxy attacks against U.S. facilities and personnel went unanswered.

Ukraine Can Still Win

Michael Carpenter

When U.S. President Donald Trump took office in January 2025, many in Washington expected a rapid settlement to the war in Ukraine. On the campaign trail, Trump had boasted he could end the conflict in 24 hours. Although few analysts believed that specific promise, many speculated about the possible terms and timeline of an impending deal. The investment bank JPMorgan Chase, for example, claimed an agreement could be reached by June.

Yet as the weeks pass and diplomacy stagnates, it is becoming clear that no such resolution is imminent. As Ukraine’s former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba noted in Foreign Affairs in late May, neither Russia nor Ukraine “has much of an incentive to stop the fighting.” Ukraine refuses to surrender its sovereignty; Russia will not accept anything less than Ukrainian capitulation.

This conclusion, however, does not mean all is lost. Russia is much weaker economically than many analysts realize, and hard-hitting sanctions and export controls can still cripple its war economy. Ukraine is fighting smartly and could turn the tide on the battlefield with more high-end drones, air defense systems, long-range missiles, and munitions. With a change of strategy, Ukraine can still win the war in the near term—if both Europe and the United States decide to give it the assistance it needs.

THE DOSE MAKES THE POISON

Much of the premature optimism about a settlement earlier this year sprang from the prevailing belief that Ukraine was losing and would soon be forced to negotiate out of desperation. Trump stoked this narrative by asserting that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had “no cards” left to play. U.S. Vice President JD Vance took it a step further, declaring that Ukraine—and its foreign backers—never had any “pathway to victory.” Citing Russia’s superiority in manpower and weapons, Vance argued that if the United States kept up its security assistance, it would only postpone Ukraine’s inevitable defeat.

Israel: Now the Dominant Military Power in the Middle East?

Seth Frantzman

Key Points and Summary – Following the successful degradation of Iran’s nuclear program and military leadership by recent Israeli and US strikes, Israel is emerging as the dominant military power in the Middle East.

-With its primary existential threat from Tehran neutralized and Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas severely weakened, Israel now sits in a position of unprecedented regional strength. However, this new hegemony presents its own challenges.

-Israel must now navigate a complex diplomatic landscape and guard against the pitfalls that have historically plagued dominant powers, including the risk of becoming overextended in conflicts or inflexible in future peace negotiations.

Israel: A Regional Hegemon with Iran Defeated?

In the wake of Israel’s surprise attack on Iran on June 13, it has become clear that Israel’s military is now among the strongest in the Middle East. For many years, Iran was able to expand its role in the region, funding and arming proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and also the Palestinian territories. Now, Iran’s nuclear program has suffered setbacks, and the country’s air defenses and ballistic missile program appear to be in tatters. These events put a larger spotlight on Israel as a potential regional hegemonic power.

Israel’s rise to power in the Middle East comes after many years of confronting threats. Israel’s success has come due to its close partnership with the United States. For instance, the Trump administration ordered the bombing of several nuclear sites in Iran after Israel had shown that Iran could be bombed for a week and a half without Israel suffering any military losses. Iran fired hundreds of ballistic missiles at Israel, killing 28 people and wounding thousands. However, Iran’s military was shown to be inept at repelling the attacks delivered by Israel’s F-35s, F-15s, and other aircraft.

Trump’s Diplomatic Model

George Friedman

U.S. President Donald Trump has developed a clear model for exercising diplomacy. He begins by making demands of other nations, then calls for negotiations. If the negotiations do not take place or fail to produce some kind of accommodation, he takes punitive action. All the while, he alternatively issues threats meant to intensify the process or encourages action by praising his antagonist.

This model was on full display during the recent episode with Iran. Trump demanded that Iran abandon its nuclear weapons program, threatening consequences if it failed to do so. He then engaged in indirect negotiations with Iran, noting publicly that the negotiations showed promise. At a certain point, he set a date for the negotiations’ completion, and when that date passed, he took dramatic military action.

A similar process is underway with regard to NATO. He began by saying NATO was not living up to its military obligations and that this failure shifted the primary burden to the United States. He made clear that this situation could not continue, implying that the U.S. could withdraw from the alliance if Europe didn’t pay its way in the future. Extensive negotiations took place, punctuated by periodic warnings from Trump. At last week’s NATO meeting, European countries agreed to increase their defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product. Trump praised his negotiating partners and made it clear that the U.S. remained committed to NATO.

In both cases, there was a radical demand followed by a period of negotiation and signals of willingness to take drastic action if talks failed, or to reconcile if talks succeeded. In Iran, this process resulted in airstrikes. With NATO, it resulted in accommodation.

Bits, Bytes, and Neutrons: Why Computing and Nuclear Energy Go Together

Andrew Smith

Supercomputing and artificial intelligence (AI) are rapidly reshaping daily life—from mapping efficient driving routes and coordinating real-time supply chains to powering e-commerce, streaming movies, and finishing schoolwork. But this digital surge is straining America’s weakening power grid—and threatening our air quality in the process. Data centers are only as clean as the electricity powering them, and carbon-free nuclear energy is uniquely equipped to deliver the dispatchable, around-the-clock power they demand.

Demand is Growing

Today, computing already consumes as much electricity in commercial buildings as refrigeration. By 2035, it will surpass lighting in all US offices, stores, warehouses, and hospitals. According to the US Department of Energy, by 2040, it will use more electricity than air conditioning, and by 2050, computing will be the single largest source of commercial power demand. Meeting that load will require massive amounts of new, reliable capacity.

For years, big tech companies signed contracts for wind and solar “farms”—but increasingly, they are seeking generation that is available when needed. They know that when intermittent renewables fall short, firm and dispatchable power—like nuclear—keeps the lights on. After all, no one should wait on favorable weather conditions to verify a credit card at a gas pump or complete a transaction at the supermarket.

Struggles of Natural Gas

Natural gas is nuclear energy’s chief competitor for supplying dispatchable power. But gas-fired electricity is often in short supply during winter peaks when home heating takes priority or pipelines freeze. Coal-fired plants require constant train deliveries—and are vulnerable to weather, labor strikes, and accidents. These just-in-time, interruptible fuels carry another cost: air pollution.

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