Indian Strategic Studies: 07/09/25

9 July 2025

Mapping India-Pakistan military power

Security competition between India and Pakistan, rooted in the territorial dispute over Kashmir, has persisted since the partition of British India in 1947. Since the 1990s, Pakistan’s support for insurgent and terrorist groups in Indian-administered Kashmir has posed a persistent challenge to Indian security. While both countries have maintained nuclear arsenals since the late 1980s, the threat of escalation has historically constrained India’s responses. However, India’s posture has shifted in recent years, with a growing willingness to conduct overt cross-border strikes and covert operations targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan.

This evolution has been marked by key incidents, including the 2016 Uri attack and India’s surgical strikes, the 2019 Pulwama bombing and Balakot air strike, and the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, which triggered a series of retaliatory strikes by both sides. India’s targeting of major Pakistani air bases in 2025 marked a significant escalation, raising concerns about strategic stability. China’s role further complicates the regional picture. As Pakistan’s close ally and India’s primary military rival, China’s growing involvement—through arms transfers and strategic coordination—has led Indian planners to seriously consider the possibility of a two-front war.

This ASPI brief provides a overview of the current military balance between India and Pakistan, with a focus on quantitative comparisons of defence spending, conventional military capabilities, and strategic assets. India has consistently maintained a superior conventional military force, particularly in terms of major equipment categories, shaping the strategic calculus on both sides.

Afghanistan review could lead to change in promotions for NCOs, officers

Jeff Schogol

The Pentagon’s ongoing review into the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan could prompt the Defense Department to “reform the way that we evaluate and promote young noncommissioned officers and young officers,” Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell told reporters recently.

“If you think back to my time in Afghanistan as a young commander, giving battle update briefs as a captain to my battalion commander, if I were constantly saying that my area of operations was a disaster, it didn’t have the ammo or troops that I needed to accomplish the mission, the likelihood of me getting promoted was probably not great,” Parnell said Wednesday Pentagon news conference. “So, how do we set the conditions in the [Defense] Department to create a sense of honesty where our officers are reporting what they believe to be accuracy — they’re concerned about maybe their area of operations; they’re concerned about the truth and, maybe, less about their careers.”

Parnell added that his comments were not meant as an indictment of officers who served in Afghanistan. “It’s just the way that our system is constructed,” he said.

In January 2020, John Sopko, then serving as special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, told lawmakers that the U.S. government had “created an incentive to almost require people to lie” about progress in Afghanistan.

“I’m not going to name names, but I think everybody has that incentive to give happy talk — to show success,” Sopko told Task & Purpose at the time. “Maybe it’s human nature to do that. I mean most of the lying is lying to ourselves. We want to show success.”

More than a year later, the Taliban captured Kabul on Aug. 15, 2021, marking the start of a chaotic evacuation of American citizens and Afghans who had worked for the U.S. government. Over two weeks, U.S. troops rescued more than 124,000 people.

Thirteen service members and about 170 Afghans were killed in an Aug. 26, 2021, suicide bomb attack at Abbey Gate outside Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul.

Russia Won’t Sit Out a US-China Asia-Pacic War

Garrett Campbell

Contrary to the popular assessments of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Chinese and Russian national interests primarily converge in the Asia Pacific and Arctic, not in Europe and Ukraine. For the last two decades, the United States has not paid adequate attention to this convergence at our peril. Overall assessments by the US national security community, think-tanks, and academia of the strategic partnership have almost universally fallen short and downplayed the Russia-China convergence.[1] This is a mistake. While establishing its sphere of influence over Europe will remain Russia’s priority, Russia could go to war to support China in the event of a US-China conflict in the Asia Pacific.

It is true that China has done much to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. While it has avoided direct involvement, it remains Russia’s primary enabler. Albeit China does not want to undermine its own economic interests in Europe. Russia’s position in the Asia Pacific is significantly different than that of China in Europe; thus, there is less risk in how it pursues its strategic interests, and that may be fundamentally preparing Russia to elevate the Sino-Russian entente to a military alliance in the Asia Pacific. President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s elites bet their legacy not only on the forceful realignment of the international system, but on the country’s future economic prosperity anchored in the Sino-Russian relationship, including the collaborative development and use of the Arctic and Russia’s Northern Sea Route. As such, Putin has implemented a series of Russian maritime doctrine and Arctic policy changes, undertaken force structure and alignment changes involving a geographic reprioritization, and empowered Russian elites to participate in supporting the Sino-Russian strategic partnership involving these mutually important regions. These actions convey the importance Putin places on the pursuit of Russian national interests and suggest he may be slowly preparing Russia to support its most important treaty partner in the event of a US-China conflict in the region.

Russia’s Pacific Pivot

It is well known that in November of 2011, the Obama administration announced the US Pivot to Asia. But fewer noted that just over a year later, in June 2013, speaking at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Putin essentially did the same. He announced a Russian pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. This announcement was perhaps later eclipsed by Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea, initiation of conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas, and its intervention in Syria’s Civil War in 2015. And given Russia’s history in announcing foreign policy declarations whereby its aspirations have resoundingly exceeded its actual abilities, it was easy to dismiss Putin’s Pacific pivot as mere rhetoric.

Countering Chinese lawfare in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific region benefits from an established set of rules and norms which can govern interactions between countries in the region and manage tensions between them. International law ought to constrain governments, particularly those of powerful nations, for the common good. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), however, is weaponising law to advance its expansionist geopolitical interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Chinese lawfare is being waged in the South China Sea, East China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait on a routine basis. Beijing’s approach is systematic, and looks to reap rewards as the rules of the region are rewritten. Without fighting, the PRC is attempting to take the territory of its neighbours and upend the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

This Policy Paper, written by Deniz Güzel, Associate Fellow at the Council on Geostrategy, outlines this challenge. It calls for the United Kingdom (UK) to adopt a systematic and sophisticated whole-of-government lawfare strategy able to monitor, anticipate and manage lawfare by the PRC and other hostile actors. These malign actions, it is argued, should be countered with the institutionalisation of legal resilience and vigilance, and the instrumental use of law to safeguard British interests, uphold international norms and prevent the reshaping of the legal and physical landscape.

This study from the Council on Geostrategy’s Indo-Pacific Programme will advance the understanding of Chinese activity in the Indo-Pacific region, and will be of interest to policymakers in Whitehall and key stakeholders alike.

Optimal Deterrence How the United States Can Preserve Peace and Prevent a Nuclear Arms Race with China and Russia

James M. Acton

The United States faces growing dangers of nuclear escalation, a new arms race, and proliferation. These risks stem, in part, from its strategy of using its nuclear forces to target opponents’ nuclear forces. Such “counterforce” targeting is justified primarily as a way to limit the damage the United States would suffer in a nuclear war. However, adversaries’ nuclear forces are too difficult to destroy for this strategy to yield meaningful benefits, while its risks are high.

A new arms race. China is building up its nuclear forces. Russia may do so too. To meet counterforce targeting requirements, potentially against both adversaries simultaneously, the United States will need a larger nuclear force. Such a build-up, however, would motivate China and Russia to further increase their force requirements, thus stimulating an expensive, tension-generating, and futile three-way arms race in which the United States is poorly positioned to compete given the limitations of its defense industrial base.

Escalation. Counterforce targeting increases the likelihood that, in a conflict, an adversary could escalate the conflict because it feared its nuclear forces were vulnerable. It could, for example, engage in limited nuclear use or take actions, such as dispersing its nuclear forces, that risked catalyzing further escalation.

Proliferation. U.S. allies fear being abandoned by the United States, and some have begun to openly contemplate acquiring nuclear weapons. However, if Washington decides to rebuild its alliances, it may try to “assure” allies by augmenting its nuclear capabilities in a way that risks accelerating a new arms race.

As part of an improved strategy of “optimal deterrence,” the United States shouldcease, and declare it has ceased, the targeting of adversaries’ nuclear forces, command control systems, and leadership, and instead focus exclusively on conventional military forces and war supporting industry, which it already targets;

weigh the pros and cons, in war planning, of not conducting conventional or nuclear operations that could convince an adversary that the United States was planning to attack its nuclear forces; and continue critical ongoing nuclear modernization programs.

Book Review | China’s Second Continent

by Kyle J. Wolfley

China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa. Howard W. French. New York: Penguin Random House, 2015. ISBN 9780307946652. pp. 1, 304. $18.00.

Looking back ten years from its publication, China’s Second Continent is a prescient tale and subtle warning about China’s expansion beyond the Pacific. Even in 2014, author Howard W. French noticed how the rising power was already pulling Africa away from the West’s orbit “while few in that part of the world were paying attention.” To be sure, awareness grew as it was hard to ignore what some are labelling a new scramble for Africa. Yet even a decade ago, French was onto something, and his work did not get the attention it deserved in defense circles. Policymakers and practitioners should have a closer look and grapple with the question as to how—and to what consequence—increased Chinese presence in Africa affects U.S. foreign policy and strategy.

China’s Second Continent is an intimate account of Chinese settlement in Africa told through the eyes of immigrants and the local Africans it affects. As a journalist with familial ties to the continent, French travels through West and Southern Africa to interview local Africans, Chinese entrepreneurs, immigrant families, and government officials. While scholars usually explain China’s expansion as the product of its centuries-old strategic culture or simply the tragic way that great powers behave, French’s on-the-ground perspective paints a holistic portrait that belies these simple theories.

French mentions that at a broader level, it’s a story about the rise of the East and decline of the West, and the international competition for soft power (or “influence” if the former term is no longer popular today). The tools of influence differ: China builds physical infrastructure like stadiums, hospitals, railways, and bridges, while the West invests in less tangible advances in health and education. China and the West also part ways on the expectations of the African partner receiving assistance: Chinese officials seem unconcerned with partners’ levels of corruption or adherence to liberal values, while the West generally demands it. Surprisingly, China’s soft power doesn’t appear to be undermined by the consistent racism, paternalism, or sense of a “Chinese burden” that French records in nearly every interaction with Chinese migrants. This gives the reader the impression that large, concrete symbols of generosity may be more effective to increase one’s influence than invisible investments like training and vaccines.

China is building an entire empire on data

CHINA’S 1.1BN internet users churn out more data than anyone else on Earth. So does the country’s vast network of facial-recognition cameras. As autonomous cars speed down roads and flying ones criss-cross the skies, the quality and value of the information flowing from emerging technologies will soar. Yet the volume of data is not the only thing setting China apart. The government is also embedding data management into the economy and national security. That has implications for China, and holds lessons for democracies.

Deterring China's Use of Force in the Space Domain

Kevin Pollpeter Elizabeth Barrettand

This report examines the evolving deterrence dynamics between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the space domain. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence helped maintain the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it remains a cornerstone of US defense policy today. However, for reasons both geopolitical and technological, the ability of any country to deter another from attacking its space assets is being called into question.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is acquiring and developing a range of counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and co-orbital satellites, as well as the space surveillance capabilities that enable their use. The use of these weapons against the US space architecture could threaten US military superiority by undermining the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that enable the US military to operate in the Indo-Pacific and project power globally.

APPLYING DETERRENCE TO THE SPACE DOMAIN

We define space deterrence as one country dissuading another country from interfering with systems that operate in space or support the operation of space systems from the ground. Numerous variables can complicate the success of deterrence in the space domain. Deterrence dynamics may be influenced by whether attacks are reversible or irreversible, terrestrial or space-based, kinetic or non-kinetic, and lethal or non-lethal.

The effectiveness of space deterrence could be shaped by the type of weapon. Nuclear weapons, kinetic weapons, and non-kinetic weapons, such as electronic countermeasures, directed energy weapons, and cyber weapons, could all be used against space assets. Space deterrence could also include preventing attacks against launch sites and other facilities using conventional munitions, such as bombs and missiles.

Partnership Short of Alliance: Military Cooperation Between Russia and China

András Rácz and Alina Hrytsenko

Executive Summary:Before 2014, military cooperation between Russia and China was characterized by pragmatic, practical considerations: Russia contributed to the modernization of China’s armed forces by selling various types of weaponry, while Beijing was a lucrative market for Russia’s military-industrial complex.

Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia has lost access both to Ukraine’s defense industry and to its Western military-industrial partners. This has left Russia with China as the sole remaining major source of much-needed imported military technology and components. In exchange, China has received access to advanced Russian missile, air defense, and electronic warfare technology. Deepening cooperation has also been demonstrated by the growing frequency of joint military exercises. As of early 2025, Beijing was a crucial, irreplaceable enabler of Russia’s sustained war efforts against Ukraine.

Meanwhile, despite declarations about a “no-limits” partnership, the cooperation is indeed limited. While Russia and China share a strong anti-US stance, Beijing is unwilling to limit its own strategic autonomy and freedom of maneuver by making any commitment to Russia that would lead to an open conflict with the West or the introduction of sanctions.

A prime example of the limits of Sino-Russian relations is Beijing’s refusal to officially recognize any Russian territorial gains since 2014. Limited trust is also reflected in the joint Russian-Sino military exercises, as these maneuvers are more about demonstrating the will of cooperation to the outside world than improving interoperability between Russian and Chinese armed forces.

Due to these limitations, while military cooperation along shared interests will continue, it is extremely unlikely that it will develop into any functioning, institutionalized alliance.

Going Steady: China and Russia’s Economic Ties are Deeper than Washington Thinks

Natalia Chabarovskaya

Executive SummaryTrade cooperation between China and Russia has grown in tandem with anti-Russian sanctions and tensions with the West. A common border, economic compatibility, shared geopolitical perspectives and joint opposition to the US have encouraged bilateral relations.

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine Russia has been increasingly isolated economically, mainly due to Western sanctions, forcing it to rely heavily on China.

The two countries have orchestrated unprecedented levels of coordination through trade in energy resources, electronics, chemicals, and transportation components.

The relationship is unbalanced because Moscow is more dependent on Beijing than Beijing is on Moscow. A “reverse Nixon” strategy by the West — building relations with Russia to wean it off China — is unlikely to succeed because the economic ties are so important to both countries.

Russia is becoming increasingly interconnected with China throughthe use of the Chinese Yuan. A significant sharing of national currencies between the two powers is reflective of their economic ties, and the use of services like China’s UnionPay cards has helped embed the Yuan in Russia’s economy.

While Moscow and Beijing have deepened collaboration, Chinese investors have reduced engagement in Russia due to the risk of Western sanctions. Investment patterns show that while Russia and China are valuable to each other, their economic relationship is not fully unified.

Introduction

The China-Russia partnership has strengthened since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with their economic cooperation expanding steadily at a time of massive Western sanctions against Moscow. Unlike Russia’s deteriorating relationships elsewhere, its strategic alignment with Beijing remains close, and is built on more than a decade of deliberate economic and geopolitical rapprochement. The two countries’ synergy stems from naturally complementary economic systems, shared geoeconomic goals, and mistrust toward the West.

Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint

The Strait of Hormuz, located between Oman and Iran, connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The strait is deep enough and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, and it is one of the world's most important oil chokepoints. Large volumes of oil flow through the strait, and very few alternative options exist to move oil out of the strait if it is closed. In 2024, oil flow through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption. In the first quarter of 2025, total oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz remained relatively flat compared with 2024.

Although we have not seen maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz blocked following recent tensions in the region, the price of Brent crude oil (a global benchmark) increased from $69 per barrel (b) on June 12 to $74/b on June 13. This piece highlights the importance of the strait to global oil supplies.

Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes that are critical to global energy security. The inability of oil to transit a major chokepoint, even temporarily, can create substantial supply delays and raise shipping costs, potentially increasing world energy prices. Although most chokepoints can be circumvented by using other routes—often adding significantly to transit time—some chokepoints have no practical alternatives. Most volumes that transit the strait have no alternative means of exiting the region, although there are some pipeline alternatives that can avoid the Strait of Hormuz.

Between 2022 and 2024, volumes of crude oil and condensate transiting the Strait of Hormuz declined by 1.6 million b/d, which were only partially offset by a 0.5-million b/d increase in petroleum product cargoes. The decline in oil transit through the strait partially reflects the OPEC+ decision to voluntarily cut crude oil production several times starting in November 2022, which lowered exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, disruptions in 2024 to oil flows around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea, led Saudi Arabia’s national oil company Aramco to shift seaborne crude oil flows from the Strait of Hormuz, instead sending it over land through its East-West pipeline to ports on the Red Sea. Also, more refining capacity in the Persian Gulf states increased regional demand for crude oil and shifted some flows to local markets within the Persian Gulf.

Beyond The Bombs: Who Really Won The 12-Day War Between Israel And Iran? – OpEd

Kit Klarenberg

On June 13, 2025, Tel Aviv launched what many international observers and Iranian officials have described as an unprovoked military strike on Iran. Israeli jets bombed military and nuclear sites, while Mossad-run sleeper cells carried out sabotage missions against air and missile defense systems from within Iran, and drones smuggled into Tehran were launched against local missile launch bases.

Dozens—perhaps more—of nuclear scientists and top military commanders were murdered with surgical precision, often in the presence of innocent family members, who were themselves frequently killed. A climate of chaos and uncertainty seemed to engulf everything.

These early results so exhilarated Israeli officials that they talked a big game on where their operation would lead, making several incendiary claims along the way. They boasted of operating in Iranian airspace without hindrance, invited the U.S. to get formally involved with the “elimination” of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program, and anonymously briefed the media that “a multi-faceted misinformation campaign”—in which Donald Trump was an “active participant”—had been conducted “to convince Iran that a strike on its nuclear facilities was not imminent.”

Internationally-wanted war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu forecast on June 15 that Israel’s war on Iran “could certainly” produce regime change, as the government was “very weak,” and that “80% of the people would throw these theological thugs out.”

A hard-hitting response to Netanyahu’s premonitions and Tel Aviv’s military strike quickly arrived from Tehran in the form of a wave of missile attacks. Wreaking unprecedented damage on Tel Aviv and Haifa. The impact on Israeli military installations is difficult to assess due to its strict policy of internal censorship.

America needs an honest reckoning over its spy agencies

David Simonds

The question of how far America has set back Iran’s nuclear programme clearly matters. That can be far less certain of any of the answers America is coming up with. While the strikes on Iran showed the supremacy of American air power, they also may have revealed a weakness in its national security. According to Donald Trump, the country’s spy agencies failed before the assault in a critical mission, assessing the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. Mr Trump’s claim should heighten doubts now about intelligence reports and White House statements regarding the effectiveness of the air assault. Should anyone trust the conclusions? Which ones? Is the president getting it wrong himself?

Preventing the next war: A European plan for Ukraine

Camille Grand, Jana Kobzova, Nicu Popescu

Whether or not there is a ceasefire in Ukraine this year, Europeans, together with the Ukrainians, should begin—now—to draw up a “beyond the horizon” plan for Ukraine in readiness for a ceasefire or a peace deal.

Even if fighting stops, there is no doubt Russia will continue to undermine Ukraine, with knock-on impacts throughout Europe. The risk of a future Russian-Ukrainian war will remain substantial for years, possibly decades.

Protecting Ukraine’s security and enhancing its defence, European integration and domestic stability are in the interests of both Europeans and Ukrainians. Europe is safer with a sovereign and prosperous Ukraine than if the country is controlled or endlessly destabilised by Russia.

The EU and European states must plan ahead to assure Ukraine’s internal security, and help its democracy to flourish, Ukrainians to return home and the economy to bounce back.

Without such a plan, Ukraine will endlessly preoccupy Europe’s politics and economics. But with such a plan, Europeans can help transform it into an anchor of stability.

A tale of two scenarios

It is 2030. Ukrainians’ valiant resistance failed to expel Russia fully from their territory. Instead, they have carved out the next-best outcome: the front line is mostly stable, despite the absence of NATO membership (as was the case for West Germany) or any final peace agreement (as is still the case for South Korea). But this situation allows the rest of the country to rebuild, recover and prosper.

Strategic Narratives to Counter Global Threats

Jerry E. Landrum, Chase Metcalf, and Michael M. Posey

ABSTRACT: This article argues that the current National Security Strategy lacks the necessary coherence and fidelity to mobilize collective action against the emerging Russia-China axis. It merges multiple theoretical concepts to assert that the “rules-based order” theme is insufficient for mobilizing public support. This article uses textual analysis of the strategy compared with publicly available polling to determine levels of popular resonance and finds that the “rules-based order emphasis” does not resonate. This study’s conclusions will assist practitioners as they develop an updated National Security Strategy with the advent of the new presidential administration.

Keywords: strategic narrative, mobilization, Russia, China, public opinion

In the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), President Joe Biden stressed that the world is at an “inflection point.” This term, adapted from mathematics, is “a point on a curve at which the sign of the curvature (concavity) changes.” Thus, US strategic leaders believe, as expressed in the document, that the international order may curve toward democracy or in the opposite direction toward autocracy. Furthermore, the document asserts that the United States has an “enduring role” in defending the current “rules-based order,” which is “free, open, prosperous, and secure” but challenged by China and Russia. The strategy identifies support for the UN charter, human rights, the environment, and territorial integrity as key aspects of this rules-based order. Unfortunately, the international rules-based order narrative does not resonate with the American public.1

We argue that the strategy establishes narrative themes legitimizing collective action. For example, the commitment of public resources for national security objectives. To be sure, few Americans read the strategy to form their opinions on foreign policy prioritization. Nonetheless, the lexicon of the document manifests in public pronouncements from senior leaders about America’s national security threats. For example, then–Secretary of State Antony Blinken asserted in a May 2022 speech at George Washington University that China was “the most serious long-term challenge to the international order.” This speech effectively communicated the March 2021 Interim National Security Strategy’s emphasis on the rules-based international order concept. As our analysis demonstrates, the rules-based order concept of the interim strategy was carried forward and amplified in the October 2022 NSS. Thus, in a February 2023 interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic posted on the Department of State website, then–Secretary Blinken argued for “a rules-based order, an order that functions on the premise of international law.” Similarly, in a 2024 speech at Georgetown University, retired General Mark Milley stressed that China threatened the “so-called rules-based international order,” which are the rules that “have kept great power peace.”2

Quantity Has a Quality All of Its Own

Elena Grossfeld

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian intelligence operations have shifted toward a mass-scale approach, focusing on sabotage, intelligence collection, and influence efforts. This transformation is driven by Russia’s expanding operational demands, even as it is constrained by mass expulsions of intelligence officers and the urgency to ramp up operations. In response, Russian intelligence has prioritized quantity over quality, relying on multiple cheap, inefficient, and nonprofessional resources. Sheer numbers compensate for inefficiency, and anonymity provides an added layer of plausible deniability.

A key driver of this shift has been the Kremlin’s efforts to undermine Western support for Ukraine, which disrupted Russia’s plans for a quick victory. Russian intelligence—Russia’s primary strategic tool since the Soviet era—was tasked with imposing costs on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), shaping public opinion, disrupting arms shipments, and gathering intelligence. However, with diminished capabilities and a decline in professionalism, Russian intelligence has moved away from precision-driven, professionalized operations to a mass-scale, decentralized model that mirrors broader trends in Russian military strategy. This change aligns with Russian military and strategic thinking, in which material shortages are compensated by sheer numbers and a disregard for casualties. This transformation has significant implications for intelligence efficacy, resource management, and global security.

The shift from quality to quantity

Historically, Soviet intelligence operations during the era of the KGB (the Russian Committee for State Security) were marked by precision and the use of highly trained operatives. These operations focused on high-value targeted objectives such as the infiltration of foreign governments, high-profile assassinations, and covert activities. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian intelligence largely maintained this approach throughout the post–Cold War period. Although subtle changes might have begun to emerge during Russia’s initial operations in Ukraine in 2014, the dramatic shift became unmistakable during the full-scale invasion in 2022. In recent years, Russia’s intelligence operations have increasingly prioritized quantity over precision, mirroring a broader trend in its military strategy, particularly the “meat grinder” tactics that favor overwhelming force over precision. The shift also reflects a high-performance systems design approach in which multiple low-cost, off-the-shelf components replace expensive, custom-built solutions to achieve strategic goals.

Surge in sabotage, intelligence collection, and influence operations

Quad: The Next Phase

Lisa Curtis, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, Keerthi Martyn and Thomas Corel

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners, which are charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition.

The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. However, the administration also has indicated that it wants to streamline the work of the Quad and whittle down its dozens of different working groups to focus on a handful of priorities. With the need to deliver tangible results, the administration is interested in maintaining fewer—yet more active—working groups that produce substantial outputs.1

While the Quad has made notable progress since it was revived nearly eight years ago, there is opportunity to expand and deepen its work to fulfill its promise of promoting a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. To achieve its goals moving forward, the Quad should:

Expand the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative via use of regional information fusion centers, particularly in the western Indian Ocean. The 2022 IPMDA initiative has been largely successful in providing a maritime common operating picture to track illegal activities, but coverage in the western Indian Ocean has remained sparse.2 The Quad should investigate expanding information-sharing agreements with the Seychelles’ Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Center for Safety and Security at Sea and the Madagascar Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center to develop a better picture of the entire Indian Ocean.3

Jamestown Foundation

China Brief, June 21, 2025, v. 25, no. 12

Authorities Renew Reform and Opening Amid Economic Pressures

Xi Jinping’s Central Position in Official Media Starts to Erode

Drills and Experts Suggest Beijing Favors Blockade on Longer Timeline

Scandal Exposes Technocracy, Nepotism, and Control Among PRC Elite

China Spares No Expense for Latin America and Caribbean Ties

‘New National System’: Party-Directed Innovation Aligns Firms, Universities, and the State

‘New National System’ Signals Next Phase of State-Led Tech Mobilization

New Legislation Could Increase Security Presence in Hong Kong

Fungus Smuggling Case Highlights Agricultural Espionage in the United States

Xinjiang Security Expo Reflects the Limits of U.S. Sanctions

Terrorism Monitor, June 25, 2025, v. 23, no. 2 Brief: ISWAP Raids in Northeastern Nigeria Upset Regional Status Quo

Brief: How Hamas’s Degradation Opened Space for Protests

Malhama and Albanian Tactical Groups Train New Syrian Army and Special Forces

Rising Islamist and Anti-Hindu Sentiment in Bangladesh in Wake of Pahalgam Attack

Militant Monks Fuel Government Terror in Myanmar

The pros and cons for Putin of a big push at Ukraine’s Sumy front

Andrew Korybko

Donald Trump, when asked about reports that Russia is gearing up for a large-scale offensive in Ukraine’s Sumy Region, told the media earlier in the week: “We’ll see what happens. I’m watching it very closely.”

This follows the Wall Street Journal’s report alleging that Russia has assembled 50,000 troops in preparation for that. A Russian security source denied such plans in comments to TASS, however, and instead described the aforesaid claims as part of a GUR disinfo campaign to fearmonger about Russia.

TASS’s source, while also claiming that Ukraine also does indeed have quite a few border fortifications there unlike what the WSJ wrote, also put forth the hypothesis that GUR wants to discredit the Defense Ministry in general and Commander-in-Chief Alexander Syrsky in particular.

Whatever the truth may be, what’s known for sure is that the Sumy region falls within the “buffer zone” that Putin spoke about carving out in late May, the strategy of which was analyzed here at the time.

The larger context concerns the realization that “The Russian-Ukrainian Talks Are At An Impasse That Only The US Or Brute Force Can Break.” Absent any serious efforts by Trump to coerce Zelensky into the concessions that Putin demands for peace, Russia might thus continue resorting to brute force to ensure its security interests, especially given the window of opportunity that reportedly just opened up. This is connected to Politico’s recent report about the Pentagon halting some promised munitions to Ukraine.

According to Politico’s sources, this includes “missiles for Patriot air defense systems, precision artillery rounds, Hellfire and other missiles that Ukraine launches from its F-16 fighters and drones.”

A Russia-NATO War Would Look Nothing Like Ukraine

Fabian Hoffmann

Russia planned its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as a decisive, three-day campaign that would take its troops into Kyiv and quickly topple the Ukrainian government. More than three years later, that scenario remains a Russian pipedream. Suffering horrific casualties and losses of equipment, Russian forces are bogged down along a static front line hundreds of miles from Kyiv. While Russia has made incremental tactical gains over the past year, there is absolutely no sign of a military breakthrough anytime soon.

Farther west, European NATO states are scrambling to rearm. Several NATO defense chiefs warn that the alliance must be ready to confront a Russian attack on one or more of the bloc’s members within three to seven years. More starkly, Danish officials have warned that Russia could launch some sort of attack within six months of the war in Ukraine slowing or ending.

Israel’s War on Iran Backfire

Sina Toossi

Twelve days of war between Israel and Iran left a trail of devastation across both countries. Yet the clearest takeaway is this: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bold gamble failed. Despite launching one of the most audacious military campaigns in Israel’s history, the war was short, punishing, and ultimately fell far short of its declared aims.

It began with a meticulously planned Israeli offensive. Years of intelligence work culminated in a wave of covert operations—drones assembled inside Iran, sleeper cells detonating bombs, and targeted assassinations of top military figures and scientists. These were followed by conventional airstrikes on military bases and nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow. But Israel’s targets extended well beyond strategic infrastructure. Residential neighborhoods, prisons, media offices, and police stations were also hit, pointing to a broader strategy aimed at sowing chaos and igniting internal unrest.

Honchoing AI in the Air Force If AI Is Important, the People Are Indispensable

Nolan Sweeney

The U.S. Air Force is attempting to adopt artificial intelligence, but efforts have struggled to gain institutional traction. This report draws on lessons from past military innovations and current AI challenges to offer practical, people-centric recommendations. By embedding engineers, empowering leaders, and retaining talent, the Air Force can take charge of (honcho) AI adoption to achieve a military advantage.

Popular visions of military artificial intelligence (AI) might evoke an all-seeing superintelligence directing autonomous drone swarms—while servicemembers sit far from danger and decision-making alike. This AI hype does not yet comport with reality. More importantly, it distracts from the real opportunity facing the U.S. Air Force (USAF): integrating AI in ways that improve mission effectiveness now.

The USAF can best harness AI by diffusing the technology across the institution to offload onerous, low-complexity tasks from humans to machines. This requires:Embedding AI engineers in operational and support units to rapidly identify, develop, and iterate applications.

Empowering a senior trilingual AI leader—fluent in technology, operations, and acquisition—with a six-to-ten-year tenure to guide and scale innovation.

Retaining critical talent, including the operators, engineers, and leaders needed to build and sustain effective capabilities.

While diffusion drives AI innovation’s breadth and speed, leadership and expertise ensure that its depth and direction align with USAF goals. This places primacy on USAF personnel taking charge of (honchoing) AI adoption while maintaining their central role in executing the mission. Doing so will result in a practical, better-sensing, better-knowing, and better-executing force that balances time, cognitive workload, and risk to better achieve a military advantage.

AI on the Edge of Space

Christopher Huynh

The accelerating commercialization of satellites and launch technologies means space is now more congested, contested, and operationally limited than ever. This drives an imperative to leverage emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence to observe, orient, protect, and if needed, for defense. This report surveys the technology landscape to understand how AI can be applied to space domain awareness and orbital warfare.

The U.S. Space Force faces growing threats from near-peer adversaries capable of targeting U.S. satellites, underscoring the need for enhanced space control capabilities. This paper examines how artificial intelligence can augment space domain awareness (SDA) and orbital warfare functions to help avoid operational surprise in orbit. Integrating AI, both on ground systems and onboard satellites, is essential to accelerating decision-making, enhancing satellite survivability, and maintaining domain knowledge in an increasingly contested environment.

This analysis reviews emerging AI applications upon two space mission areas and proposes additional areas for research. For the SDA mission area, it highlights the power of neural networks and explainable AI tools, such as Local Interpretable Model- Agnostic Explanations (LIME), to accelerate space object detection and improve sensor tasking efficiency. For the orbital warfare mission area, it explores how onboard AI agents can be applied to autonomously manage engagements through rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs), optimize other satellite subsystems, and enable responsive payload tasking—within the constraints of satellite power and compute limitations. These findings are informed by recently published technical papers and defense policy documents.

The paper concludes with recommendations for responsible AI adoption into the above mission areas. These include the immediate adoption of some more mature SDA models, and procuring upgradeable satellite systems with sufficient onboard compute. This paper also recommends key policy considerations, such as defining boundaries for on-orbit autonomy, and establishing rigorous test and evaluation protocols to ensure transparent and auditable AI. In aggregate, implementing all or some of these efforts could significantly increase satellite survivability, and create opportunities to gain an algorithmically informed advantage to secure space superiority.

The Misleading Panic over Misinformation and Why Government Solutions Won’t Work

David Inserra

Misinformation is persistently mentioned as one of the major threats in the world today. It was Dictionary.com’s word of the year in 2018, and in 2024 the World Economic Forum’s annual Global Risks Report found misinformation powered by artificial intelligence (AI) to be the most severe threat facing the world over the next two years—greater than even active wars or threats of war, climate and weather events, or economic volatility. Thousands of books and research papers are published every year discussing the challenge of misinformation. In a 2023 Pew Research Center poll, 55 percent of Americans felt that the federal government “should take steps to restrict false information online, even if it limits freedom of information,” an increase of 16 percentage points in just five years.1 The discussion around misinformation is truly ubiquitous.

And the concerns about misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation (MDM) extend to nearly every domain of human knowledge.2 Is misinformation regarding climate change stopping proper policies? To what degree is misinformation or disinformation responsible for ethnic and racial conflict? How did MDM affect the health and well-being of individuals during the COVID-19 pandemic? What role is disinformation having in debates over foreign policy decisions? Is MDM undermining elections and democracy itself? How does the average person know what is true and false in their daily life?

It is notable that the perceived crisis posed by misinformation first spiked after the June 2016 Brexit referendum and the November 2016 election of Donald Trump, times during which many people would challenge the conventional wisdom. The use of the term “misinformation” in English-language books tripled from 2015 to 2022 after seeing slow, gradual increases and decreases over the past two centuries.3 Academic articles on misinformation spiked in the past fifteen years, with one study finding around 100 articles published per year on three major databases prior to 2011 but around 4,000 articles in 2021 alone.4 A similar review found that prior to 2017, there were only 73 academic articles available on Google Scholar with “fake news” in the title; from 2017 to 2019, there were 2,210.5 Google searches for “misinformation” would spike and remain high starting in February 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic spread across the world.6

Cognitive Defense: 2024 Homeland Defense Symposium

George M. Schwartz

The US Army War College hosted the inaugural annual Homeland Defense Symposium from February 6 to 8, 2024, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference, entitled “Reestablishing the Sanctuary,” featured plenary presentations on defending critical infrastructure, contested deployment, and cognitive defense by experts from military, academic, and government organizations.

As highlighted in the conference theme, attendees recognized the homeland does not provide the sanctuary it once did, and our society is already under attack. Using disinformation and social media means, our adversaries are engaged in cognitive warfare in the homeland, seeking to shape the attitudes and behaviors of citizens by negatively influencing and disrupting their cognitive processes, thus weakening our society’s political will and degrading national resilience.

Using contemporary examples to show how disinformation and malinformation undermine trust in government institutions, the authors of these conference papers provide insights and offer solutions for the cognitive defense of the homeland. These papers from the first Homeland Defense Symposium inform policymakers and practitioners on what to expect as we compete internationally and how to prepare for a possible large-scale conflict.

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