Indian Strategic Studies: 07/13/25

13 July 2025

The Path to a US-India Trade Deal Lies Through Economic Security

Ishaan Thakker

Negotiations for a U.S.-India trade deal have been progressing at breakneck pace, as officials rush to reach an agreement before President Donald Trump’s July 9 tariff deadline. India being near the front of the line is surprising, given that the two countries have consistently imposed high trade barriers and haven’t signed a deal despite years of discussions.

But Delhi is ready to negotiate because it sees an even bigger geoeconomic play: undercut China’s status as a leading manufacturing hub and destination for investment by securing key supply chains and investing in advanced technologies. To seal the deal, Washington and Delhi should put economic security issues at the heart of the agreement.

Getting to yes will require overcoming a long history of nos. In 2019, the U.S. removed India from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, and India imposed retaliatory tariffs on 28 U.S. goods in response to earlier Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum. While mutual tech and defense cooperation increased during the Biden administration, and India joined the non-trade pillars of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, there was little progress in improving market access apart from the removal of previous tariffs and resolution of WTO disputes.

Despite Trump’s recent optimism, ongoing negotiations for a first tranche deal are facing several hurdles, largely due to U.S. demands for lower trade barriers for steel and agricultural products. The task of lowering tariffs and non-tariff barriers for agriculture is especially politically costly for the Indian government,

given that 46 percent of the workforce is involved in agriculture. While still willing to negotiate, Indian officials have signaled their preference for a good deal that puts national interest first rather than just a deal, which may defer discussions on tariffs for key industries and constituencies to a future round of negotiations.

What Pete Hegseth Doesn’t Understand About Soldiers

Mike Nelson

In the summer of 2014, I was leading a company of Green Berets—from the 5th Special Forces Group—in Afghanistan’s Kunduz province. President Barack Obama had recently promised an end of combat operations in the country, and the Taliban understood the tactical implications of his statement, believing that the drawdown of coalition forces meant they could now operate with impunity. They further believed that during the holy month of Ramadan,

our Afghan partners, too tired from fasting during the day, would not conduct large-scale operations against them. My company, along with commandos from Afghanistan’s 5th Special Operations Kandak, decided to surprise them.

Over the course of a week, we would assault Taliban strongholds, striking enemy forces when and where they believed they were most secure.

During one of these operations, in Dasht-e-Archi district, a combined American and Afghan team had just stepped off the helicopters when Taliban machine-gun crews opened fire. Our soldiers responded without hesitation,

killing several enemy fighters and capturing a Taliban machine gunner. At that moment, the team leader radioed me. He was suddenly confronting a scenario that every Green Beret officer prepares for during the Special Forces Qualification Course: His foreign counterpart was about to commit a war crime.

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The machine gunner was severely wounded and, in the dark colloquialism of our profession, circling the drain. An Afghan lieutenant argued that the fighter didn’t deserve mercy; his commandos should finish him off. The impulse was understandable in the lieutenant’s heightened post-combat state; the proposal was also illegal and morally reprehensible.

Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan Expedite Work on Joint Railway Project

Recent meetings between officials from Tashkent, Kabul, and Islamabad have given fresh impetus to the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (UAP) railway project, with Pakistan leading the way in coordinating final steps before construction.

The railway will provide a direct connection from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean and South Asia while enhancing the three countries’ positions in both north-south and east-west trade.

The lack of a standardized rail gauge for transnational connections, combined with ongoing security concerns, could further delay the project. Islamabad and Kabul, however, have made significant progress in reconciling their border security issues.

On June 3, Pakistan’s Federal Minister for Railways, Muhammad Hanif Abbasi, and Uzbekistan’s Ambassador to Pakistan, Ali Shir Takhtae,

reiterated their resolve to complete the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (UAP) railway project during a meeting in Islamabad (Radio Pakistan, June 3). They also devised a joint strategy for beginning the railway’s construction in the near future. Abbasi declared, “Upon completion of this project, Pakistan will gain the shortest and most efficient route to Central Asia, which will not only increase trade volumes but also place the region’s economy on a more solid footing” (Dunya News, June 3).

The West Can’t Survive the Sanctions It Needs to Deter China

Brett Erickson

In the modern context, sanctions are supposed to act as a line of defense, measures designed to dissuade adversaries before a conflict even begins. But for sanctions to carry weight, they must be seen as viable: not just in concept, but in execution.

At present, that foundation is unstable. While Western leaders continue to invoke unity and strength, the tools meant to apply real economic pressure are disjointed and prone to breakdown under strain. The mechanisms required to turn intent into credible action, coordinated enforcement, reliable escalation pathways, and the stamina to withstand domestic fallout, are either missing altogether or proving insufficient where they exist.

The recent response to Russia illustrates this point. Sanctions were rolled out quickly, but their impact has been diluted by inconsistent implementation, a patchwork of legal frameworks, and the absence of long-term political consensus. Instead of a sustained front, we’ve seen a series of measures that lack follow-through and coherence. Recent reporting by the New York Times highlighted a lack of new U.S. sanctions on Russia under the second Donald Trump administration.

What was meant to project strength has instead revealed systemic vulnerability: goods still move through loopholes, enforcement lags, and even allied governments backpedal when domestic costs begin to rise.

China, in watching all this unfold, is learning exactly where the West’s thresholds lie, and what the United States and its partners are willing to tolerate in practice. The New York Times found that more than 130 companies in mainland China and Hong Kong “are advertising immediate sales of restricted computer chips to Russia.” None of the companies found making such advertisements is under sanctions, illustrating the weakness of the existing sanctions regime.

Connecting the Globe After “Globalization”

Kaush Arha, and James Jay Carafano

Globalization—characterized by chasing the lowest costs of production, including in rival countries’ territory—is at an end. Yet, this does not signal a cessation or slowdown of global commerce and trade. On the contrary, global engagement and interconnectedness are still the bedrock of peace and prosperity. In large measure, the future global economic and security architecture will be shaped by diverse, resilient, and trusted connectivity between the Indo-Pacific and Mediterranean-Atlantic (Med-Atlantic) regions.

Shinzo Abe, the late Japanese prime minister, articulated a vision for a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” that is not beholden to any coercive sphere of influence. One of the virtues of the “free and open” notion is its adaptability to different regional characteristics. Most populations aspire to live in free and open societies,

achieving prosperity through free and open markets. Some nations and regions may interpret the concept of “free and open” as a positive and normative state of being. Others may interpret it primarily as the absence of coercion from malign actors.

Trusted connectivity across digital or physical infrastructures is built on two pillars. It calls for the implementation of the best industry standards and, more importantly, governance by laws and institutions that accord with and are accountable to individual dignity and freedom. Countries like China, Russia,

Iran, and North Korea fall substantially short on the second tenet. Nations adhering to both tenets of trusted connectivity will increasingly devise procedures and rules to prioritize trusted commercial and security engagements among like-minded nations.

No, The Chinese Will Not Invade Taiwan

For years, and with increasing intensity, we have been told that the Chinese government is not only resolved to conquer the island of Taiwan by force, but, thanks to its well advertised build-up of military might, has the means to do so. “The threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years,” Admiral Phil Davidson,

the retiring head of the Indo-Pacific command told congress in 2021. The prediction that China would be ready to invade by 2027 has since become official dogma in Washington, spawning untold billions of dollars in defense spending pegged to this threat. Despite constant invocations of China’s expanding navy,

including amphibious capabilities, the Pentagon has studiously avoided telling us exactly how China could manage to move a necessarily enormous force across the stormy seas of the Taiwan strait and subdue the well-armed island.

Fortunately, we now have a clear-eyed examination of the reality behind the much ballyhooed threat. Marine veteran Dan Grazier is Director of the National Security Reform Program at the Stimson Center in Washington D.C. As well as serving tours in Iraq and Afghanistan,

he was specifically trained in amphibious warfare. Grazier has taken the trouble to explore the practical difficulties facing anyone seeking to invade Taiwan. I spoke with him recently to discuss his conclusions, which he and Stimson colleague McKenna Rawlins have now laid out in a report due to bepublished this week.

Connecting the Globe After “Globalization”

Kaush Arha, and James Jay Carafano

Globalization—characterized by chasing the lowest costs of production, including in rival countries’ territory—is at an end. Yet, this does not signal a cessation or slowdown of global commerce and trade. On the contrary, global engagement and interconnectedness are still the bedrock of peace and prosperity. In large measure, the future global economic and security architecture will be shaped by diverse, resilient, and trusted connectivity between the Indo-Pacific and Mediterranean-Atlantic (Med-Atlantic) regions.

Shinzo Abe, the late Japanese prime minister, articulated a vision for a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” that is not beholden to any coercive sphere of influence. One of the virtues of the “free and open” notion is its adaptability to different regional characteristics. Most populations aspire to live in free and open societies, achieving prosperity through free and open markets. Some nations and regions may interpret the concept of “free and open” as a positive and normative state of being. Others may interpret it primarily as the absence of coercion from malign actors.

Trusted connectivity across digital or physical infrastructures is built on two pillars. It calls for the implementation of the best industry standards and, more importantly, governance by laws and institutions that accord with and are accountable to individual dignity and freedom. Countries like China, Russia, Iran,

and North Korea fall substantially short on the second tenet. Nations adhering to both tenets of trusted connectivity will increasingly devise procedures and rules to prioritize trusted commercial and security engagements among like-minded nations.

The West Can’t Survive the Sanctions It Needs to Deter China

Brett Erickson

In the modern context, sanctions are supposed to act as a line of defense, measures designed to dissuade adversaries before a conflict even begins. But for sanctions to carry weight, they must be seen as viable: not just in concept, but in execution.

At present, that foundation is unstable. While Western leaders continue to invoke unity and strength, the tools meant to apply real economic pressure are disjointed and prone to breakdown under strain. The mechanisms required to turn intent into credible action, coordinated enforcement, reliable escalation pathways, and the stamina to withstand domestic fallout, are either missing altogether or proving insufficient where they exist.

The recent response to Russia illustrates this point. Sanctions were rolled out quickly, but their impact has been diluted by inconsistent implementation, a patchwork of legal frameworks, and the absence of long-term political consensus. Instead of a sustained front, we’ve seen a series of measures that lack follow-through and coherence. Recent reporting by the New York Times highlighted a lack of new U.S. sanctions on Russia under the second Donald Trump administration.

What was meant to project strength has instead revealed systemic vulnerability: goods still move through loopholes, enforcement lags, and even allied governments backpedal when domestic costs begin to rise.

China, in watching all this unfold, is learning exactly where the West’s thresholds lie, and what the United States and its partners are willing to tolerate in practice. The New York Times found that more than 130 companies in mainland China and Hong Kong “are advertising immediate sales of restricted computer chips to Russia.” None of the companies found making such advertisements is under sanctions, illustrating the weakness of the existing sanctions regime.

The Element of Surprise: Space and Cyber Warfare in U.S.-China Rivalry

Dean Cheng

The 2024 revelations over China’s effort to implant malware in critical U.S. infrastructure by the Volt Typhoon hacking group — as well as the Salt Typhoon group’s successful breaching of at least nine major U.S. telecoms — have renewed concern over Beijing’s constant, ongoing efforts to hack Western companies,

governments and non-governmental organizations. Unlike past incidents, like those involving Chinese military unit 61398, which were largely about cyber espionage, the Volt Typhoon group was actively implanting malware designed to disrupt critical infrastructure such as water and power systems.

As the Volt Typhoon group is believed to be a state actor (as opposed to a criminal group or “hacktivists”), its actions highlight that the Chinese government is not just gathering information but instead threatening to sabotage the ability of economies and states to function.

Just as the Ukraine-Russia war is demonstrating that drone warfare has moved from the tactical to the strategic, China’s hacking activities showcase how cyber intrusions are increasingly strategic in effect. This is especially true when considering their potential impact on space systems.

Strategic Surprise in the Information Age

Military history demonstrates that the ability to achieve surprise can be decisive; a smaller force exploiting surprise can often defeat a larger one. At its most basic, surprise allows one to concentrate forces at the time and place of one’s choosing. Further, organizational, doctrinal and technological surprise can exploit changes that an adversary cannot compensate or prepare for.

Thailand-Cambodia Border Dispute: Faultlines of Nationalism

Niranjan Jose

Cambodia and Thailand are Buddhist-majority neighboring kingdoms that share rich histories and cultures. The Franco-Siamese treaties of 1904 and 1907 initially established their land boundaries, which span over 817 km. Although they share similarities,

bilateral tensions have frequently emerged, notably in relation to claims to cultural heritage and religious sites. Disputes regarding border demarcation and territory have been among the most sensitive issues, frequently inciting ultranationalist sentiments.

Thailand maintains 17 official border crossings with Cambodia, which encompass seven provinces along their shared frontier. Tensions have been rising between the Thai and Cambodian militaries over the past few months,

which risks a kinetic confrontation over the Ta Moan Thom Temple, which both sides claim. Any increase in tensions could potentially impact the intra-ASEAN solidarity as well, which is already facing challenges stemming from the Myanmar civil war.

In February, a brief altercation broke out between Thai forces after Cambodian personnel and their family members entered an ancient temple along the border and sang the Cambodian national anthem. This was documented on video and subsequently went viral on social media. On February 18,

the Royal Thai Army sent an official complaint letter to the commander of Military Region 4 in Cambodia, describing the event as “inappropriate behavior.” In response to visits from Cambodian nationalists, Thai nationalist organizations began implementing unofficial ceremonies which included singing the Thai national anthem. Both Thai and Cambodian soldiers entered the temple, leading to standoffs.

Why a Ceasefire in Gaza Won’t End Israel’s Nightmare

Seth Frantzman

Key Points and Summary – Even as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump in Washington on July 7 to discuss a potential 60-day ceasefire in Gaza, the complex, multi-front war Israel faces continues to rage.

-On the same day as the meeting, five Israeli soldiers were killed in a Hamas ambush in northern Gaza, a region the IDF has repeatedly cleared.

-The following day, Iran-backed Houthi rebels sank a cargo ship in the Red Sea, and Israel carried out strikes against a Hezbollah operative in Lebanon and an IRGC-backed group in Syria, underscoring the immense difficulty of achieving lasting peace.

As Israel and US Talk Peace, Hamas and Houthis Escalate Attacks

Israel’s war in Gaza has grinded on for more than 20 months. There are still around fifty hostages in Gaza. Israel believes approximately twenty of them are still alive. Israel still wants to defeat Hamas.

However, the Trump administration has indicated it would like to see a sixty-day ceasefire and a possible end to the war. Can Israel end the war while also achieving its objectives? Getting the hostages back is one goal. However, it’s unclear if Hamas will ever return all the people it kidnapped on October 7, 2023.

Oval Office Meeting

Israel’s Prime Minister flew to Washington to meet with US President Donald Trump on July 7. This was an important meeting. It is also the third meeting the two leaders have had since Trump came to office in January. Netanyahu met the American leader in January and again in April.

What Trump’s order on ‘unleashing American drone dominance’ means for the U.S. military

Brandi Vincent

Sgt. Lucero Martinez, an unmanned aircraft systems operator, assigned to Detachment 1, Delta Company, 545th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, helps launch an unmanned aircraft system during a UAS exercise on June 12, 2025 at Camp Gruber Training Center, Oklahoma. The exercise, hosted by the 45th IBCT and featured numerous UAS and counter-UAS systems, focused on preparing infantry Soldiers to react to UAS threats. (Oklahoma National Guard photo by Spc. Cambrie Cannon)

While the Trump administration’s recently-issued executive order on “Unleashing American Drone Dominance” places a sharp focus on civilian use of unmanned aircraft, the new policy also includes multiple provisions that could have implications for Pentagon and military personnel.

“The Department of Defense must be able to procure, integrate, and train using low-cost, high-performing drones manufactured in the United States,” President Donald Trump wrote in the directive.

This new EO comes at a time when autonomous systems are increasingly proving to be game-changing on contemporary battlefields. Yet despite major investments, all of America’s military services are confronting serious challenges in adopting and deploying different-sized and affordable drones for widespread use.

DefenseScoop asked former defense officials and national security experts to share their analyses regarding the order, in separate conversations following its release last month.

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The Balkans Model & Conditions for Peace in Ukraine

Mariya Heletiy

Following the 2024 US presidential elections, President Donald Trump prioritized peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia as a key foreign policy objective. The peace talks that followed led Putin to declare a brief “Easter truce” that he summarily broke, echoing Russia’s repeated violations of the 2019 ceasefire agreement and highlighting its broader challenge to Europe and the post–World War II international order.

These recent ceasefire violations underscore a critical lesson: in today’s conflicts, where the lines between conventional and irregular warfare are blurred, durable peace cannot be achieved through formal negotiations and traditional diplomacy alone. The Russia-Ukraine war is not just a conventional military conflict, but a struggle playing out across diplomatic, informational, economic, humanitarian and military dimensions.

As with all irregular wars, legitimacy and perception are at the center of the struggle. Russia seeks not only territorial gains but also to delegitimize Ukraine’s sovereignty and erode Western unity. Accordingly,

securing peace in Ukraine demands more than conventional negotiations. Instead, it requires a comprehensive irregular warfare strategy attuned to the conflict’s complex dynamics, much like the successful approaches used in the Balkans in the 1990s which integrated military deterrence, legal accountability, information dominance, civil resilience, and international governance mechanisms.

The West Can’t Survive the Sanctions It Needs to Deter China

Brett Erickson

In the modern context, sanctions are supposed to act as a line of defense, measures designed to dissuade adversaries before a conflict even begins. But for sanctions to carry weight, they must be seen as viable: not just in concept, but in execution.

At present, that foundation is unstable. While Western leaders continue to invoke unity and strength, the tools meant to apply real economic pressure are disjointed and prone to breakdown under strain. The mechanisms required to turn intent into credible action, coordinated enforcement, reliable escalation pathways, and the stamina to withstand domestic fallout, are either missing altogether or proving insufficient where they exist.

The recent response to Russia illustrates this point. Sanctions were rolled out quickly, but their impact has been diluted by inconsistent implementation, a patchwork of legal frameworks, and the absence of long-term political consensus. Instead of a sustained front, we’ve seen a series of measures that lack follow-through and coherence. Recent reporting by the New York Times highlighted a lack of new U.S. sanctions on Russia under the second Donald Trump administration.

What was meant to project strength has instead revealed systemic vulnerability: goods still move through loopholes, enforcement lags, and even allied governments backpedal when domestic costs begin to rise.

The US Navy Always Has Aircraft Carriers in the Middle East. Should it?

Peter Suciu

Following the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas in southern Israel, the US Navy has rotated several of its nuclear-powered supercarriers to the Middle East. The warships have sought to deter further escalation from Iran and its regional proxies, while the Pentagon carried out a bombing campaign against the Tehran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen.

Hamas and Hezbollah have each been significantly weakened in their de facto wars with Israel, while the United States reached a fragile ceasefire with the Houthis in early May. It appears that Washington has achieved its objectives in the Middle East,

which raises fresh questions regarding whether the US Navy should maintain any carriers in the region. Yet, as of last week, both the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) were operating in the Red Sea, while the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) is expected to reach the eastern Mediterranean in the coming weeks.

Continued US carrier buildup in the region is unnecessary, argued Dov S. Zakheim, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In an op-ed for The Hill, Zakheim warned that such a carrier buildup risks drawing the United States into another conflict in the Middle East, when efforts should be directed towards “the Western Pacific to confront the increasingly potent and sophisticated Chinese threat.”

Zakheim further noted that history is repeating itself, with policies similar to those of the early 1990s, when the United States failed to “disentangle itself” from the region.

The Iran Cyber Threat Is Real

Terry Thompson

U.S. intelligence agencies are on high alert after CNN reported that Iran is actively preparing cyberattacks aimed at critical government and military infrastructure. But the real threat may already be inside the wire — not from foreign hackers at a keyboard, but from mobile phones unknowingly or deliberately carried into the nation’s most sensitive facilities. The devices we carry every day are now among our greatest national security vulnerabilities.

Despite years of post-9/11 investments in hardened infrastructure, the federal government has been remiss in investing in a sensor network to keep pace with the risks of wireless technology now embedded in daily life.

When the first iPhone was introduced in 2007, it ushered in a new era of hyper-connected mobility. Since then, innovation has continued to explode, bringing countless benefits but also exposing serious vulnerabilities.

However, our most secure government facilities are wide open to wireless threats.

Today, up to 90% of secure government facilities rely on little more than the honor system and self-reporting to keep unauthorized wireless devices — mobile phones, smartwatches, rogue transmitters — out of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), Special Access Program Facilities (SAPFs), and other high-security zones. In an age of Pegasus spyware and remote malware, this should be interpreted as national security malpractice.

The modern smartphone is a traitor’s dream — portable, powerful, and everywhere. It records audio and video, transmits data instantaneously via WiFi, Bluetooth, and cellular networks, and it connects to everything — from commercial clouds to encrypted chat apps. And yet, these devices are routinely brought into facilities housing classified intelligence data, most often undetected and without consequence post-exfiltration.

Global Security Review

American military strikes against Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities on June 22 present a tableau of military-operational excellence that surprised Iran and much of the international community. The joint operation featured the most extensive use of the B2 Spirit bombers in any single operation. Seven bombers attacked Iranian targets at Fordow and Natanz with highly accurate GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bombs.

An American submarine also fired thirty Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) against surface infrastructure targets at Isfahan. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine described it, the entire operation was a complex timed maneuver requiring exact synchronization across multiple platforms in a narrow piece of airspace.

American deception tactics contributed to surprise as neither Iraqi fighters nor their surface-to-air missile defenses attempted to interdict the American bombers and their supporting fighter aircraft, all of which returned safely.

According to General Caine, Operation Midnight Hammer involved more than 125 aircraft, including the seven B2 stealth bombers, numerous fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and dozens of refueling tankers. Some 75 precision-guided munitions were used in Midnight Hammer, including fourteen GBU-57 MOPs, which were used for the first time in combat.

The operational excellence of Midnight Hammer doubtless constituted a setback to Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs, although exactly how much of a setback remains to be determined. Battle damage assessment is dependent on overhead photography unless and until further information is obtained from intelligence sources near or at the affected sites.

Building a Warrior Ethos

R.D. Hooker, Jr.

The new administration has made much of the need to “build a warrior ethos” in the U.S. military, a worthy goal if pursued rationally and thoughtfully. A good place to start is with the U.S. Army, which in every war suffers the highest casualties and, in the end, takes and holds the ground that usually determines victory. In today’s Army, how do we encourage and incentivize our warrior leaders?

The answer is surprising. One might think that those who lead in the combat arms – that is, officers in the infantry, armor, artillery, special forces, aviation and combat engineer branches – might deserve special recognition in the form of promotions and awards. After all, they incur the highest risk, the most casualties, the most discomfort and the toughest challenges. When not fighting our wars,

they spend weeks and months in the field each year conducting dangerous and exhausting training, in all weathers. Life in a combat unit is demanding, with long hours, high stress and hard physical work. Superb physical conditioning and real resilience is a must, given the extreme rigors and demands of leading combat soldiers in peace and war. Unquestionably, the Nation asks more of them than of others.

Why then are all branches and career fields promoted at the same rate? Army promotion statistics show clearly that combat arms officers are given no real preference over others. For example, a recent promotion board selected 48.8 % for promotion to colonel for the Operations category (infantry, armor, field artillery, air defense artillery, aviation, corps of engineers, military police, chemical, special forces, civil affairs,

and psychological operations); 46.8% for the Operations Support category (military intelligence, signal corps, strategic intelligence, space operations, public affairs, foreign area officer, operations research and system analysis, force management,

The Trump-Bibi Bond

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet Donald Trump today at the White House for their fourth meeting in a year. Last July, Netanyahu traveled to Palm Beach, Florida, to meet with candidate Trump at his Mar-a-Lago mansion. During their last official meeting at the White House on April 7,

the president seemed to throw a curveball at Bibi when he announced that the administration would engage in direct talks with Iran over its nuclear program. Both the left-wing media and the Tucker Carlson-led faction of the right erupted with glee at the thought of the Israeli prime minister getting publicly spanked. As it turned out, the meeting was camouflage for Trump and Netanyahu’s joint plans to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program through military action—part of the most successful high-level deception operation since the Allied landing at Normandy.

This time, there’s little doubt about the strength of the relationship between the two world leaders, who will discuss plans for a cease-fire in Gaza and no doubt celebrate the historic victory they won together by destroying the bulk of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. “Bibi and I just went through HELL together,”

Trump posted on Truth Social on June 25. “Bibi could not have been better, sharper, or stronger in his LOVE for the incredible Holy Land.” The American president added, “Perhaps there is no one that I know who could have worked in better harmony with the President of the United States, ME, than Bibi Netanyahu.”

Certainly, the relationship between the two men, each of whom prides himself on being at war with his country’s elites, has gone through some rocky patches. Still, it is nonetheless the most consequential relationship between world leaders since Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher teamed up to end the Cold War—and perhaps even since Winston Churchill enlisted Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s aid in defeating Nazi Germany. It’s easy to say that the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship was far more significant to the world at large than Trump’s partnership with Bibi to bomb Fordow.

But we’ll never know the extent to which the Islamic Republic threatened to destabilize the world order, since the United States and Israel destroyed the terror regime’s nuclear weapons program before it tested our peace—a peace that has been kept by two resolute leaders.

North Korea’s Second Chance?

Since coming to office in January, U.S. President Donald Trump has waded into several geopolitical crises, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Israel’s wars in Gaza and Iran. Thus far, however,

he has said comparatively little about the growing strength of the Kim regime in North Korea, leading some analysts to suggest the administration is neglecting one of the most critical security issues in Asia.

But Trump has not forgotten about North Korea. Although his administration has been preoccupied with other immediate priorities, there are multiple indications that reviving talks with Pyongyang remains high on the president’

The Islamic Republic’s New Lease on Life

Israel’s June 13 assault on Iran, designed to decapitate Tehran’s military and nuclear program, is one of the worst setbacks the Islamic Republic has ever experienced. In less than two weeks, the Israel Defense Forces managed to assassinate dozens of senior Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists.

The IDF destroyed many of Iran’s air defense systems and damaged its nuclear facilities. Israel bombed Iran’s energy infrastructure, military bases, and various missile production sites. The strikes were precise, indicating that Israeli intelligence had penetrated the highest levels of Iran’s armed forces and government. And toward the end of the attacks, the United States joined in. As a result, the Iranian military is weaker now than it was just a month earlier.

But instead of collapsing under the shock, the Islamic Republic appears to have gained a new lease on life. The strikes caused a rally-around-the-flag effect as Iranians condemned them and celebrated the government’s response. The Iranian regime mourned its lost officials but swiftly replaced them. The operations thus made the Iranian nation more cohesive and strengthened the hand of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iranian society is unlikely to become more rigidly Islamist in response to the strikes. To maintain internal stability, the government might even tolerate more social freedoms. But the regime will probably become more repressive, arresting anyone it sees as a traitor. And critically, Iranians may be more willing to accept the state as it is. The country could now have a new social contract, one that prioritizes national security above everything else.

Iran’s national security strategy, however, remains broadly unchanged. The Islamic Republic may be weaker in some ways, but its leaders are proud of having withstood the Israeli and American assaults. They see the substantial damage they inflicted on Israel’s cities as a major achievement. And they continue to believe that demonstrating resolve in the face of aggression is the only way to deter their opponents.

Iranian leaders will thus set out to rebuild the country’s network of proxies: the so-called axis of resistance. They will trust diplomacy even less than before. Instead, they will lay the groundwork for a long war of attrition with Israel—and a potential nuclear breakout.

The Limits of the New Anti-Western Axis | Opinion

Ilan Berman

Last month's conflict between Israel and Iran has only just concluded, but its results are already being felt throughout the Middle East—and beyond.

As a result of Israel's military offensive, Iran's nuclear program has been set back substantially. And, following months of strategic drift in Gaza, the Jewish state's decisive campaign against the Islamic Republic has helped it rebuild regional deterrence. The United States, meanwhile, has finally demonstrated that it is committed to preventing Iran from going nuclear by any means necessary. The region is taking notice; for instance, prospects for an expansion of the Abraham Accords are now the brightest they have been in years.

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran on Nov. 23, 2015. ALEXEI DRUZHININ/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images

But the conflict that's already being billed by the White House as the "12-day war" is also notable for what didn't happen. Despite the dire predictions of many, Israel's campaign against Iran's nuclear program (and America's assistance to it) didn't lead either Russia or the People's Republic of China (PRC) to wade into the fray in defense of the Islamic Republic, generating a wider war.

To be sure, both Moscow and Beijing offered up the proper platitudes. Russian President Vladimir Putin decried Israel's bombing campaign, and his Foreign Ministry issued a formal statement condemning it. Officials in Beijing did much the same, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi mounting a spirited defense of Iran's "sovereignty" in the face of Israel's "illegal" bombings.

Beyond that, however, neither Beijing nor Moscow did anything of substance. Russia did not provide Iran with key battlefield technology, such as air defense components, that could have been used to blunt the effectiveness of Israel's air campaign. Similarly, China did not roll out its prodigious electronic warfare capabilities to better protect Tehran, despite the sprawling quarter century, $400 billion strategic pact codified between the two countries back in 2021.

Horses for Courses: Where Quantum Computing Is, and Isn’t, the Answer

Stephan Robin

Despite the impressive and undeniable strides quantum computing has made in recent years, it’s important to remain cautious about sweeping claims regarding its transformative potential. To avoid future disillusionment as the technology matures and ensure that public focus and investment is best utilised, more effort is needed to bridge the gap between perceptions and technical realities.

Quantum and classical computers should be compared based on the kinds of problems they can solve, not on the machines themselves: quantum computing is not a better or faster version of classical computing,

but a different paradigm of computation altogether. Comparing their inherent speed is like asking whether a paintbrush is faster than a camera. The comparison has value only in relation to their relative capability in doing certain tasks. For many problems, such as climate change modelling, a classical computer will probably provide better solutions for the foreseeable future, even if a working and practically useful quantum computer were available.

Much of the public focus is on scaling quantum computers, often measured by the number of logical quantum bits (qubits) of prototype machines. But scale isn’t everything. An algorithm is needed to do useful calculations with the qubits.

Researchers have identified around 74 quantum algorithms, with Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms being the most widely recognised. The discovery of new algorithms may expand the scope of problems that quantum computers can solve, but these breakthroughs shouldn’t be taken for granted.

Credit where credit is due: Hegseth made the right call about women in combat

Micah Ables

From the value of allies to the importance of keeping secret communications secret, I have disagreed with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on many things. We’ve had different backgrounds, experiences and incentives that have shaped our very different perspectives.

It’s no secret that I strongly opposed his earlier stance and comments against allowing women in combat arms. But I have to give credit where credit is due: His recent order that the military adopt a sex-neutral fitness standard for combat arms branches is not just reasonable — it’s the right policy.

The March 30 order directed all military branches to end separate fitness standards for men and women in combat arms occupation. Gender-normed standards have been left in place for non-combat roles.

The directive requires the services to submit their change plans by the end of May, and implement them by the end of the fiscal year. Already, the Army has announced its plan to implement sex-neutral fitness standards for 21 combat arms jobs beginning in June.

In a previous lifetime, I was the commander of one of the Army’s first sex-integrated infantry companies. Back then, amid a wave of bad-faith arguments in the press, I wrote an op-ed describing my experience. In it, I tried to have an honest conversation about the ground truth and what it actually meant to have women in the infantry.

I was frustrated that everyone was yelling past each other. One side screamed that women were biologically unfit, citing hormones, physiology and unit cohesion. The other side insisted that women had to be integrated, largely because not doing so hurt women’s promotion potential and failed to meet diversity goals.

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