Between Tigers and Tradition: The Complex Reality of Village Relocation in India

Arpit Sharma

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Village relocation from the core areas of India’s tiger reserves has been a persistent issue in conservation efforts. Amid recent field work to the core zone of a tiger reserve, I was able to interact directly with both forest officials and the residents living inside the protected forest area. Although official accounts stress the importance of maintaining uninterrupted habitats for tigers, the realities on the ground present a much different and far more intricate narrative.

India boasts 58 notified tiger reserves, with around 600 villages (nearly 64,800 families) still residing within core tiger habitats as of 2024. Since the launch of Project Tiger in 1973, several families have been relocated, but the process is far from complete. The National Tiger Conservation Authority (NTCA) and conservationists argue that tigers, being solitary and territorial animals, require “inviolate spaces” for survival and scientific guidelines recommend a minimum area of 800-1,200 sq km to maintain a viable tiger population of 80-100 tigers. To achieve that goal, the relocation of villages is seen as essential.

There are two main options to facilitate relocation: either a monetary compensation package consisting of 1.5 million Indian rupees (around $17,500) per family, with each adult counted as a family unit; or alternatively, a rehabilitation package consisting of agricultural land with additional benefits. The process is officially voluntary in nature and designed to be beneficial for both wildlife and people.

However, implementation is fraught with challenges such as the use of outdated surveys for compensation calculations. For example, compensation is sometimes determined based on family structures from over a decade ago, ignoring demographic changes such as children reaching adulthood. There is also a sense of a communication gap between people and the authorities, due to which the full range of benefits and entitlements are not transparently disclosed leading to mistrust and resistance. Additionally, there are bureaucratic hurdles and limited resources.

Myanmar’s junta is losing its grip on power

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A Myanmar military jet continued to fly sorties just over our hidden frontline hospital. Every time it screamed low over the tree line, the entire clinic would crouch down and pray that this wouldn’t be the strike that hit us. These hospitals are prime targets; the military has no qualms about bombing groups of wounded fighters and civilians alike.

I was on the frontlines in Karenni State, at the township of Bawlakhe, where the resistance was launching a large, multi-pronged offensive to seize one of the most strategically important towns in the region. The two main medics running the emergency ward were a husband and wife in their early 30s, former hospital workers who quit after the 2021 coup and joined the rebellion. They’ve seen four years of relentless war. The military deliberately murders its own people.

I’ve seen firsthand the destruction the regime’s airstrikes cause. While the world looks away as conflict breaks out in the Middle East, at least 6,231 civilians have been killed in Myanmar, including 1,144 women and 709 children, according to figures published in January that were compiled by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) and the United Nations. By late June, AP News reported that the number had climbed even higher, with more than 6,600 civilians killed in the aftermath of the coup. These numbers reflect a systematic campaign of violence, targeting not only resistance forces, but ordinary people caught in the crossfire.

China Wants Ukraine to Bleed

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It takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze three feet deep. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly pointed out that there is no simple solution to complex issues. Although there are still major differences in the positions of the parties involved, it is better to talk than to fight.

The statement above, taken from a release promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs this week, is full of Chinese bureaucratic doublespeak. The quirky metaphor up front, and Xi’s support for Putin by playing for time that is inherent in this statement, are indicative of China’s clear preference for a long war in Ukraine.

Back in July last year, I published an article that I called “How China Benefits from a Russian Long War in Ukraine.” It proposed that China’s strategic interests were best served by a long war in Ukraine. This article provides a significantly updated version of that analysis, acknowledging key political and military events of the past year as well as the confirmation of China’s stance on the war during the week by a senior Chinese official.

This week, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, confirmed this hypothesis during a meeting with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. As reported in the South China Morning Post, the exchange was described as follows:

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the European Union’s top diplomat on Wednesday that Beijing cannot afford a Russian loss in Ukraine because it fears the United States would then shift its whole focus to Beijing, according to several people familiar with the exchange.

The Chinese Foreign Minister has essentially said the quiet thing out loud.

Despite Chinese protestations that they are not a party to the war (they are actually Russia’s most important war enabler) and that it seeks peace talks, Wang Yi has confirmed the strategic lens through which China actually views the war. Their calculus is this: China benefits from prolonging the war in Ukraine.

A pivot to China—not Asia

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels, Edward Brady, and Theresa Luetkefend

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In the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the first Donald Trump administration and that of the Joe Biden administration, great-power competition played a central role. However, both administrations considered China and Russia—and therefore the Indo-Pacific and Europe—as twin focal points of risk and strategic interest. The current Trump administration is shifting gears. Rather than balancing China and Russia, the Department of Defense (DoD) will now organize around China as the principal threat and competitor.

This prioritization is welcome. After all, defense planners have long criticized that trying to manage too many threats to the United States without a corresponding increase in defense budget makes it difficult to address any of them effectively. The problem is not whether the United States should engage globally—it must—but whether considering too many issues means that none of them are effectively prioritized.

But how can the Trump administration—through its upcoming NDS—successfully position China as the primary threat, while rebalancing its engagement in other regions in a measured and responsible way? The answer lies in updating the US military’s force structure and rebalancing its force posture. Moreover, to deter China in the Indo-Pacific, the US military should focus on long-range fires, the ability to move forces, the protection of critical defense infrastructure, and additional basing options.

Book Review | China’s Second Continent

Kyle J. Wolfley

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Looking back ten years from its publication, China’s Second Continent is a prescient tale and subtle warning about China’s expansion beyond the Pacific. Even in 2014, author Howard W. French noticed how the rising power was already pulling Africa away from the West’s orbit “while few in that part of the world were paying attention.” To be sure, awareness grew as it was hard to ignore what some are labelling a new scramble for Africa. Yet even a decade ago, French was onto something, and his work did not get the attention it deserved in defense circles. Policymakers and practitioners should have a closer look and grapple with the question as to how—and to what consequence—increased Chinese presence in Africa affects U.S. foreign policy and strategy.

China’s Second Continent is an intimate account of Chinese settlement in Africa told through the eyes of immigrants and the local Africans it affects. As a journalist with familial ties to the continent, French travels through West and Southern Africa to interview local Africans, Chinese entrepreneurs, immigrant families, and government officials. While scholars usually explain China’s expansion as the product of its centuries-old strategic culture or simply the tragic way that great powers behave, French’s on-the-ground perspective paints a holistic portrait that belies these simple theories.

French mentions that at a broader level, it’s a story about the rise of the East and decline of the West, and the international competition for soft power (or “influence” if the former term is no longer popular today). The tools of influence differ: China builds physical infrastructure like stadiums, hospitals, railways, and bridges, while the West invests in less tangible advances in health and education. 

China and the West also part ways on the expectations of the African partner receiving assistance: Chinese officials seem unconcerned with partners’ levels of corruption or adherence to liberal values, while the West generally demands it. Surprisingly, China’s soft power doesn’t appear to be undermined by the consistent racism, paternalism, or sense of a “Chinese burden” that French records in nearly every interaction with Chinese migrants. This gives the reader the impression that large, concrete symbols of generosity may be more effective to increase one’s influence than invisible investments like training and vaccines.

How Taiwan Must Prepare To Face Chinese Drone Saturation

Gaurav Sen

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Taiwan urgently needs to overhaul its air defence strategy to prevent the rising threat of low-cost drone saturation attacks from China.

This demands three major reforms: expanding air-defence capability with low-cost weapons; improving survivability with hardening and greater mobility; and strengthening early warning, logistics and resilience through enhanced cooperation with partners.

China’s inventory of drones, encompassing both reconnaissance and strike types, has increased significantly in recent years. Systems such as the CH-4, WZ and the extensively distributed ASN series provide multirole capabilities at various altitudes, ranges and speeds.

The most notable aspect of this threat is the deployment of expendable, low-cost drones that could significantly alter the dynamics of the cross-strait conflict. Taiwan’s principal interceptor missiles, such as the Sky Bow and the US-supplied Patriot PAC-3, cost many times as much per round as the drones.

This easily exploited disparity could prove fatal for Taiwan. Drone swarms each costing several million dollars might deplete Taiwan’s interceptor inventories.

Conflict between India and Pakistan in May and the Israel-Iran crisis in June have demonstrated that conventional air defences, intended to intercept fast, high-value aircraft and missiles, are more susceptible to mass, low-cost drone assaults. Pakistan executed a coordinated operation by sending 300 to 500 drones into Indian airspace. Although most were knocked down inexpensively by anti-aircraft guns, some got through, compelling India to fire many costly interceptors. Concurrently, Pakistan said it had intercepted several Indian drones. Some were used against Pakistani radars.

Hand and Glove: How Authoritarian Cyber Operations Leverage Non-state Capabilities

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Authoritarian states are increasingly leveraging non-state cyber capabilities to expand their operational reach, thereby challenging conventional distinctions between state and non-state activity. This practice complicates attribution and presents obstacles for coordinated international responses. Moreover, as cyber threats become more complex and entangled, effective countermeasures necessitate enhanced information sharing, trusted partnerships and the development of response tools that function independently of political attribution.

Historically, Western assessments of cyber threats have concentrated on state adver­saries. More than 600 state-backed groups are tracked globally. Yet, for more than a decade, Western analyses and discussions of cyber threat concerns have focused mainly on four states: China, Iran, Russia and North Korea. Based on open-source report­ing evaluated by the European Repository of Cyber Incidents (EuRepoC), these coun­tries account for more than 70 per cent of the state-backed threats that Europe and its partners have faced since 2000.

The focus on a subset of states is due to high activity levels and national security implications related to intellectual property protection, state secrets and the resilience of critical services. However, state-nexus operations account for just 29 per cent of the operations recorded by EuRepoC. That figure highlights concerns about a “fetishi­sa­tion” of state-sponsored groups (advanced persistent threats or APTs), whereby the prac­tice among criminal groups and hack­tivists of pursuing similar targets for the pur­pose of extortion or disruption is over­looked.

Israel-Iran ceasefire: the shortcomings of the “peace through strength” approach

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President Trump’s cease-fire announcement on June 23 failed to resolve the underlying issues that sparked the conflict. The ceasefire includes a series of pitfalls, mainly the vagueness around its terms and the uncertainty about the status of Iran’s nuclear program after the strikes. 

In this context, not only Tehran’s calculations are unpredictable, but the Israeli government could easily get back to its desire to enforce a chaotic regime change in Iran or impose a continued military domination, both bearing prospects for further destabilization.

A cease-fire versus a political agreement

The cease-fire announced by President Trump on his X account on June 23 is full of pitfalls. Two key elements make its fate particularly precarious.

First of all, despite the declarations of the U.S. administration, a lot of uncertainties remain over the effective impact of the Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and therefore over how long the timeframe has been extended – if at all – before Tehran is able to obtain a bomb. Where is the stockpile of uranium enriched to the 60-percent level located? What are the capacities deployed at the new secret facility that Iran announced having built right before the war? What is left from the Natanz centrifuge manufacturing facilities?

All in all, one can affirm that the military strikes have not solved the Iranian nuclear issue, certainly not for the long term.

Under these circumstances, the risk of a prolonged lack of visibility on the current nuclear developments in Iran is a worrying prospect. As its military deterrence has been severely degraded, Iran might decide, in order to gain political leverage, to suspend its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and be tempted to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Iran’s Parliament approved a fast-track bill on suspending cooperation with the IAEA, illustrating the harde-ning of its positions.

Design, Destroy, Dominate. The Mass Drone Warfare as a Potential Military Revolution

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The widespread use of drones observed in Ukraine—both in terms of the scale of the fleets deployed and their omnipresence in the operations of both belligerents—appears to meet the conditions of a genuine military revolution.

Dronization cannot be reduced to a mere technical innovation or a specific category of devices. It stands as a transformative principle, comparable to motorization and mechanization in the past century. It manifests in the evolution of drones into expendable and adaptive tools, the emergence of a “participatory war”, and in the conduct of operations, which is shifting toward “multi-fire, multi-domain” combat.

For the European force model, the Ukrainian example should prompt the establishment of the digital, industrial, and human ecosystem needed to support dronization: building a unified information and decision-support system, fostering a “drone culture” within the armed forces, and, in the short term, focusing on the “high-end” segment of dronization—namely, long-range strike capabilities.

Now entering its third year, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has become the theater of a massive drone-driven transformation of military operations. This phenomenon is unprecedented, both in quantitative terms—with several million drones now produced and destroyed each year—and in its influence on the dynamics of operations and the structure of forces. For context, the most drone-intensive conflict prior to 2022 was the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, where drones were responsible for around 45% of all losses in armored vehicles, artillery, and air defense systems. In Ukraine, by 2025, drones are estimated to account for 60 to 70% of all losses across all categories.

Russia Won’t Sit Out a US-China Asia-Pacific War

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Contrary to the popular assessments of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Chinese and Russian national interests primarily converge in the Asia Pacific and Arctic, not in Europe and Ukraine. For the last two decades,

the United States has not paid adequate attention to this convergence at our peril. Overall assessments by the US national security community, think-tanks, and academia of the strategic partnership have almost universally fallen short and downplayed the Russia-China convergence.[1] This is a mistake. While establishing its sphere of influence over Europe will remain Russia’s priority, Russia could go to war to support China in the event of a US-China conflict in the Asia Pacific.

It is true that China has done much to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. While it has avoided direct involvement, it remains Russia’s primary enabler. Albeit China does not want to undermine its own economic interests in Europe. Russia’s position in the Asia Pacific is significantly different than that of China in Europe; thus, 

there is less risk in how it pursues its strategic interests, and that may be fundamentally preparing Russia to elevate the Sino-Russian entente to a military alliance in the Asia Pacific. President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s elites bet their legacy not only on the forceful realignment of the international system, but on the country’s future economic prosperity anchored in the Sino-Russian relationship, including the collaborative development and use of the Arctic and Russia’s Northern Sea Route. As such, Putin has implemented a series of Russian maritime doctrine and Arctic policy changes,

 undertaken force structure and alignment changes involving a geographic reprioritization, and empowered Russian elites to participate in supporting the Sino-Russian strategic partnership involving these mutually important regions. These actions convey the importance Putin places on the pursuit of Russian national interests and suggest he may be slowly preparing Russia to support its most important treaty partner in the event of a US-China conflict in the region.

Russia’s Pacific Pivot

Iran can still build nuclear weapons without further enrichment. Only diplomacy will stop it

Edwin Lyman 

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Since the successive Israeli and US air strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites in June, much of the fevered and highly politicized public debate has focused on whether the attacks have “obliterated” Tehran’s capability to build nuclear weapons or only set it back a few months or years. But one critical point continues to be largely and inexplicably overlooked: Iran’s stockpile of over 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU)—enriched to 60 percent uranium 235—is weapon usable.

This means that Iran’s HEU—which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in June as being unaccounted for following Israel’s initial air strikes and which may have been moved to secure locations before the attacks—could be used directly to make bombs without requiring further enrichment.

If Iran still has access to some of its HEU stockpile, then direct use of that material may suddenly appear to its leaders as the most attractive and fastest pathway to a bomb, especially if its ability to enrich uranium has indeed been significantly degraded. There may be other chokepoints along the road to weaponization, but access to bomb material would not be one of them.

Right now, whether Iran’s HEU stockpile survived the attacks is a major conundrum for Israel and the Trump administration. There is no plausible military option for destroying or seizing it without being able to pinpoint its location—which by now could be anywhere in Iran, and possibly spread over several sites. The most effective way for the international community to gain full confidence that the HEU has not been diverted for weapons use is therefore through a diplomatic agreement in which Israel and the United States would forswear further attacks, and Iran would provide the IAEA with all the information and access it needs to fully account for the fate of the stockpile and quickly reestablish an enduring verification regime.

The Big Five - 6 July edition

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First, my apologies for not putting out a Big Five for the last couple of weeks. I was on a plane quite a bit, and then getting over some jet lag while also getting back to work at home on two major reports as well as putting the finishing touches on my PhD (more on that topic at some point in the future).

In this edition of The Big Five, I explore issues concerning the war in Ukraine from the past week, as well as news from the Pacific region. As always, I have included my top five national security and war reads.

Ukraine

Trump’s Futile Phone Call. This week, President Trump held another phone call with the Russian president.

Speaking with reporters afterwards about his phone call with Putin, Trump stated that "I'm very disappointed with the conversation I had today with President Putin because I don't think he's there. I didn't make any progress with him today at all."

Trump also spoke to the Ukrainian president after his call with Putin. Zelenskyy described how he and Trump "spoke about opportunities in air defense and agreed that we will work together to strengthen protection of our skies" and that they had "agreed to a meeting between our teams."

Europe's Missile Gap: How Russia Outcompetes Europe in the Conventional Missile Domain

Fabian Hoffmann

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Europe’s position in the missile domain is becoming increasingly precarious. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Russian missile production has surged.

Rather than closing the missile gap, Europe — by relying on a missile defense-centric strategy — is falling further behind. In this post, I detail Russian missile production numbers and compare them to European and U.S. output of missile defense interceptors.

To keep this post manageable, I’ll focus on ballistic missile production and ballistic missile defense. A future post may address cruise missiles and drones.

Thanks for reading Missile Matters — with Fabian Hoffmann! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

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Russian conventional ballistic missile production

Russia currently produces two types of conventional ballistic missiles relevant to NATO-Russia conventional warfighting scenarios:

9M723 short-range ballistic missiles, ground-launched via the Iskander-M system, and

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal medium-range ballistic missiles, air-launched from bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft.

According to the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (HUR), Russia currently produces a combined total of 840 to 1,020 ground-launched 9M723 and air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal short- to medium-range ballistic missiles annually.

This marks a rather substantial increase compared to the previous estimates shared by the HUR in December 2024. Production of the 9M723 short-range ballistic missile, for instance, appears to have risen by approximately 15 to 40 percent.

A US defense strategy to win the next conflict

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

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The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) is set to reshape US military strategy in an era of evolving global threats—from the rise of China as a primary competitor to emerging challenges in homeland security. At the same time, it must correct the shortcomings of previous strategies, including the failure to clearly balance defense and power projection, as well as an overly narrow focus on nuclear missile and terrorist threats.

To sharpen its approach to national defense, the second Trump administration should center the forthcoming NDS around five critical priorities: defending the homeland, deterring strategic attacks on the United States through a resilient and modernized deterrent posture, recognizing China as the primary competitor globally, modernizing US forces for combined arms operations in the age of AI and autonomy, and securing US military dominance in space.

Together, these five priorities form a comprehensive framework to protect the lives of US citizens, interests, and values in an increasingly contested world. In this sense, the next NDS is more than a policy document—it is an opportunity. A bold strategic vision must be met with the necessary resources and capabilities to back it up. By embracing these priorities with clarity and commitment, the NDS can deliver a defense strategy that meets today’s threats and secures the United States’ future.

Putin’s Narrative Power

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In a recent piece published on the Foreign Affairs website I considered Russia’s war in Ukraine as a textbook example of the problem of forever wars (about which I had previously written in the same journal, republished here).

How do countries cope when wars meant to be short and decisive turn out to be protracted and inconclusive? In such situations strategy needs to rethought to bring military means and political objectives into a new alignment – more appropriate means and more realistic objectives. The more a war drags on the harder this becomes for added to the original objectives comes an additional one, the need to avoid the humiliation of defeat.

This additional factor helps explain why Vladimir Putin persists with a war that he is not winning and cannot win. Limited territorial acquisitions do not mean that Putin is winning. Victory depends on achieving his political objectives and here he is not even close.

Putin has made no secret of his objectives. They were first set out as the full-scale invasion was launched in February 2022. Then he focused on the ‘denazification’ and ‘demilitarisation’ of Ukraine, along with constitutional changes to protect Russian speakers. In September 2022 he added to these the claimed annexation of four oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kerson, and Zaporizhzhia) in addition to Crimea, taken in 2014.

Ukraine: Masters of the digital battlefield

Peter Caddick–Adams

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This article is taken from the July 2025 issue of The Critic. To get the full magazine why not subscribe? Right now we’re offering five issues for just £25.

The greatest defence failures of history often originate from a lack of imagination. From the collapse of the walls of Jericho, as chronicled in the Book of Joshua; to the wooden horse left by the gates of Troy; to the monk-slaying expedition of the Vikings who raided Lindisfarne on 8 June 793, the inability to anticipate catastrophe has led to Armageddon.

At some stage in the past, instead of picking up a stone or club, Ug’s stone-age neighbour tied a sharpened flint to a pole and stabbed him to death. Generations later, Nog, armed with his spear, was impaled by a finely crafted arrow shot from afar.

The unknown genius who blended saltpetre, charcoal and sulphur into black powder to develop the first “fire-spurting bamboo lances” used by Chinese warriors in the 9th and 10th centuries, gifted 21-year-old Sultan Mehmed II the perfect futuristic weapon with which to pound the walls of Constantinople for 55 days, leading to its capture on 29 May 1453.

The fall of Constantine’s city and of the Byzantine Empire not only marked the end of the 1,500-year Roman Empire but is regarded as the end of the medieval and beginning of the early modern period. It was also a turning point in military history, with the most impregnable of stone fortifications overcome by gunpowder in an excellent example of the blue-sky thinking of one side and the lack of vision by their opponents.

Such asymmetry has continued ever since, notably via the battlefield use of chlorine gas in 1915 and Japanese swoop on Pearl Harbor of 1941, to the 11 September 2001 and 7 October 2023 attacks of our own times.

Amid Stalled Talks, Russia Has Massively Increased Air Attacks On Ukraine – Analysis

RFE RL

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(RFE/RL) — As several months of US-led diplomacy have failed to broker a cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine, the Kremlin has used the time to massively ramp up aerial attacks on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities.

Russia almost doubled its monthly totals of missiles and drones fired at Ukraine between December 2024 and May 2025, according to figures compiled by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, or ACLED.

The numbers increased every month going from 1,269 in December to 2,436 in May.

The US-based ACLED recorded 2,110 strikes between June 1 and June 27, but this does not include air strikes last weekend which Kyiv said were the largest of the war so far.

Official figures provided by the Ukrainian Air Force put the numbers even higher. It said Russia fired a record 5,438 drones in June.

A 16-Fold Increase In Drone Attacks

This is a roughly 25 percent increase compared with May 2024, and a 16-fold increase compared with June 2024. The figures also show missile attacks almost doubling in the same period.

Russia’s ongoing aerial assault has caused hundreds of deaths every month, including many civilian casualties.

One of the factors behind the increasing scale of attacks is that Russia has steeply increased drone production. The Ukrainian government estimates that Russia is now able to manufacture some 5,000 drones per month.

This includes modernized versions of Iranian Shahed drones which are better at evading Ukrainian defenses.

Quest For Strategic Autonomy? Europe Grapples With The US–China Rivalry – Analysis

Elcano Royal Institute

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The intensifying rivalry between the US and China has reshaped Europe’s strategic calculations. Building on the 2020 European Think Tank Network on China (ETNC) report, which assessed Europe’s positioning in this context, this edition re-examines the geopolitical landscape in light of the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine and Donald Trump’s return to the White House. This report features 22 national chapters and one dedicated to the EU, analysing the evolution of Europe’s relations with Washington and Beijing, the range of approaches to dealing the US-China rivalry and how these are expected to evolve.

The 2025 ETNC report underscores how these developments have compelled Europe to reevaluate its strategic positioning. This new geopolitical context has broadened the debate on strategic autonomy across most countries surveyed. Although the pace and ambition of this shift differ, support for strategic autonomy is growing in most of these countries. At the heart of this discussion is the shared understanding that Europe must reduce its reliance on external powers in key areas such as security, economy and technology.

On the security front, defence cooperation with the US has deepened across most of the countries featured in this report, particularly in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, the return of Donald Trump casts a shadow over this momentum, reviving concerns about the long-term prospects of transatlantic ties. At the same time, there is growing unease in European capitals about China’s impact on European security –fuelled in part by the perception that Beijing has enabled Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine–. Together, these developments are transforming the debate on European strategic autonomy into a more urgent and concrete policy agenda.

Why the Dalai Lama Continues to be a Counselor to Us All

Pico Iyer

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No sooner had a tsunami, in March 2011, swept 18,500 souls to their deaths in Japan than the Dalai Lama, in his home in northern India, expressed his determination to make a “pilgrimage” to offer what he could to the devastated area. Before the year was out, I was accompanying him to Ishinomaki, a fishing village almost entirely leveled by the disaster. I’d met him first as a teenager and had already been speaking regularly with him for 37 years, as well as published a book on his work and his vision.

The minute his car came to a halt amidst the debris, the Tibetan leader strode out and offered blessings to the hundreds lined up along the road, together with words of encouragement. He held heads against his heart, trying to soothe tears. Then, in a nearby temple that had somehow survived the cataclysm, he recalled his own sudden flight from Tibet in 1959. No life is without loss, he observed—but renewal is an hourly possibility.

That morning is a tiny reminder of how, as he prepares to mark his 90th birthday on July 6th, the 14th Dalai Lama has come to symbolize a sort of planetary doctor of the mind, making house-calls on every continent. Regularly noting that “my religion is kindness” and frequently reiterating that if scientific findings contradict Buddhist teachings, science must trump Buddhism, he’s become the rare spiritual teacher who can speak across every border in our ever more divided world.

In an age when moral leadership can be hard to find, he’s become a voice of ecumenical wisdom and compassion to whom millions from every tradition can turn, for both solace and guidance.

Parameters, Summer 2025 no. 55, no. 2

The Next National Defense Strategy: Mission-Based Force Planning

China’s Role in a Future Korean War

Strategic Narratives to Counter Global Threats

A More Perfect Peace: Can the Russia-Ukraine War End Justly?

What the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Tells Us about Educational Resilience

The Enduring Lessons of Vietnam: Implications for US Strategy and Policy

Restoring the Primacy of Army Mobilization Planning: Lessons from the Interwar Period (1919–41)

Misogyny and Violent Extremism: Can Big Tech Fix the Glitch?

Gazbiah Sans

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Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) is preventable, yet remains pervasive. Unfortunately, SGBV encountered in real life has migrated online as Technology-Facilitated Gender Based Violence (TFGBV). While expressed differently, both forms are rooted in extreme misogyny and reinforce each other, with digital technology exacerbating both online and offline violence. TFGBV mirrors and accelerates SGBV by violently weaponising digital technology and creating enabling conditions for violent extremism to thrive.

Moreover, TFGBV has become a precursor for recruitment and is linked to (youth) radicalisation, leading to incidents of real-world abuse and violent extremism. This ebb and flow between online and offline violence perpetrated against women, girls and LGBTQI+ individuals, coupled with digital technology, demands urgent action from tech platforms. Approaching SGBV and TFGBV as separate acts, rather than an intertwined phenomenon, neglects the dual nature of the problem. Addressing TFGBV also means tackling SGBV and violent extremism simultaneously. This Insight examines these dynamics and offers recommendations to prevent TFGBV, SGBV, and violent extremism – enabling a safe(r) digital environment.

How Digital Technology Can Fuel TFGBV, SGBV and Violent Extremism

TFGBV is rampant on mainstream social media platforms, and global and regional estimates of TFGBV rates remain high. For example, a survey conducted across 45 countries by the Economist Intelligence Unit highlights 38% of women “report[ing] personal experiences with online violence.” Furthermore, 85% of women “reported witnessing online violence against other women (including from outside their networks).” The harms of TFGBV are underestimated and the prevalence of TFGBV is under-scrutinised, particularly in the context of misogynistic behaviours, violent extremism and terrorism. This is further compounded by a lack of standardised definition for TFGBV, a narrow understanding of harms associated and linked to SGBV and terrorism, inadequate policy responses, and limited knowledge and understanding about TFGBV.

The Algebra of Irregular Warfare: A Planning Methodology for Transregional Operations

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How do special operations forces (SOF) plan operations against threats delineated in the National Security Strategy that transcend the geographic and legal boundaries imposed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Unified Command Plan? The Department of Defense (DoD) requires, but does not have, an entity that connects,

integrates, and globally synchronizes irregular warfare across combatant commands and the interagency. The solution to fulfilling that requirement is to create an entity that can integrate and leverage all the instruments of national power, domestically within the U.S. and through international allies and partners throughout all phases of the conflict continuum.

In November 2021, the commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) established a transregional irregular warfare task force to address gaps and seams being exploited by adversaries of the United States. Since its inception, this task force has garnered perspectives on planning and coordinating globally integrated irregular warfare. Since 2021, it has been assessed by the irregular warfare task force planners that conventional planning tools U.S. leaders use are rigid and not optimal in some problem sets. The DoD emphasizes traditional planning over the ingenuity, critical thinking, and flexibility required to compete in the irregular warfare space.

 Novel solutions, integration of agencies outside of the military, leveraging multinational partners, and non-traditional planning methods employed in new ways are critical in preparing and synchronizing transregional irregular warfare effects.

Task force planners have observed the joint planning process and military decision-making process as stand-alone methods which are suboptimal to address the complexities of transregional irregular warfare. The planning methodologies do not account for the complexity of spatial, temporal,

 and human variables when they are overlaid by threat streams that cross multiple combatant commands. In the same vein that T.E. Lawrence observed elements in his surrounding that were constants in his planning considerations, the authors suggest the following algebraic equation as a start point to conceptualize known variables that can be rapidly iterated on in a complex environment

The Right Division for the Fight: Force Design and Force Structure Lessons from the Cold War

Max J. Meinert 

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The US Army is undergoing a significant transformation. The Army of 2030 is conceptualized as a force optimized for new challenges and characterized by new capabilities. The multidomain operations operational concept shifts the service away from the contingency operations of Iraq and Afghanistan and toward large-scale combat operations. But an even more fundamental change, spanning and interacting with the full range of transformation—from technological to operational—is one of force design and structure. The Army is moving from the brigade-centric model adopted for the post-9/11 wars to a division-centric one. But what should those divisions actually look like?

While today’s operational environment presents different challenges, the Army has made similar adjustments before. During the Cold War, Army structure and design reflected a pendulum of national security policies and priorities. The Army oscillated between heavy, nuclear-capable forces to defeat Soviet armor in the Fulda Gap and light, rapidly deployable forces for contingencies along the periphery. As we shape the Army of tomorrow, it is important to reflect on the lessons of history.

Force design refers to the composition of a particular unit. Force structure refers to the number and type of units in the Army. The two have an interdependent relationship. Both are critically important to success on the battlefield and are constrained by budget and available manpower. For example, during World War II the Army designed smaller divisions so it could field the large force structure of eighty-nine divisions. Since then, an array of complex factors, both external and internal, combined to require the Army to adapt. A successful force design assigns commanders at echelon sufficient combat power to flexibly task organize within their span of control to conduct combined arms maneuver and defeat an adversary in combat.

Above the Battlefield: The Threat of UAVs in the Hands of VNAs

Matilde Gamba

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In 21st-century warfare, the loudest weapon may not be a missile, but rather the soft hum of a drone overhead. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly called drones, have radically transformed the modern battlefield. Originally developed as tools for reconnaissance and training exercises, 

UAVs have evolved into complex and sophisticated systems capable of executing high-precision strikes, conducting round-the-clock surveillance, and gathering critical intelligence, all while minimising the risk to human operators. Driven by rapid advances in robotics and precision weaponry, these remote-controlled technologies have become integral to the operational strategies of advanced militaries worldwide, fundamentally altering the very nature of traditional combat.

Yet, what was once the exclusive domain of state actors has become alarmingly accessible to Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs). Over the past decade, paramilitary groups, violent extremist organisations (VEOs), and terrorist factions have increasingly exploited commercially available drones to conduct attacks, disseminate propaganda, 

and surveil adversaries. From improvised explosive devices dropped from hobbyist quadcopters to swarm tactics and AI-assisted targeting, UAVs are now at the heart of asymmetric warfare. The low cost and global availability of consumer and “off-the-shelf” drones have enabled non-state actor groups such as ISIS, Hamas, and the Houthis to wield aerial capabilities that rival state forces in tactical surprise and psychological impact.