Chiara Cervasio and Nicholas J. Wheeler
The world breathed a sigh of relief following the news that effective mediation efforts led by the Trump administration had facilitated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. Recurring crises, especially in the wake of terrorist attacks, are a defining feature of India-Pakistan relations. However, the recent Pahalgam crisis has witnessed – for the first time between two nuclear armed states – the use of missiles and drones targeted at key air bases. Both sides have operated on the assumption that this level of military conflict can be maintained without triggering deliberate or inadvertent nuclear escalation. Yet, once again, third party intervention – especially from the United States – was necessary to manage escalation and find a diplomatic off-ramp.
A critical question then remains: how stable is a nuclear dyad in which each successive bilateral crisis sees heightened kinetic military activities, with both sides continuing to rely on third-party intervention to prevent full-scale conflict?
Pahalgam may well mark the consolidation of a playbook for crisis management between India and Pakistan that began to emerge in 2016, with India’s “surgical strikes” against suspected Pakistani terrorist training camps across the Line of Control (LoC), and was fully established with the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis. Earlier crises – the 1999 Kargil conflict, which remained confined to the mountainous region of Kashmir and where Indian airpower was not used across the LoC; the 2001-2002 standoff, which was resolved without the use of force; and the 2008 Mumbai crisis, where India exercised military restraint – exhibited a consistent pattern of caution, in which neither side pushed the other into a choice between a humiliating defeat or nuclear escalation.
No comments:
Post a Comment