Julian Spencer-Churchill
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vague threats of nuclear weapons use to counter Western material support to Ukraine, is widely seen to give Moscow a terrifying negotiating advantage. However, on closer examination, the Russian attempt to use its nuclear arsenal to deter foreign involvement, is demonstrably weak for three reasons. First, the U.S. is able to respond proportionately, and thereby deter escalation, at every important threshold. Second, a continuance from one threshold to another never concedes escalation dominance to Moscow, meaning that any action taken by Russia will produce an unavoidable and costly retaliation. Third, as indicated by a recent hemorrhaging of Putin’s coterie of oligarchs, the uncertainty of the firmness of the Russian public’s support, or at least deference, to Moscow, may be accentuated by the threat of nuclear escalation. These limitations are demonstrable in the four following scenarios.
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