Indian Strategic Studies

19 March 2026

Opinion‘Two sessions’ signals China-US tech contest is entering a new era

Denis Simon

With the conclusion of China’s annual parliamentary “two sessions” meetings, emerging policy priorities suggest its relationship with the United States is entering a new technological era.

This year’s government work report set an economic growth target of 4.5 to 5 per cent and announced increased fiscal support for science and technology, including a 10 per cent funding rise for research and development and over 16 per cent for basic research. More than routine budget adjustments, these figures signal China’s determination to anchor its next development phase in scientific capability, technological innovation and advanced manufacturing.

The China-US relationship is likely to be defined by intensified competition in key strategic industries, with a smaller but still meaningful space for cooperation in global science and innovation.

Strategic Snapshot: U.S.–PRC Tech Competition

Under General Secretary Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made technology competition the focus of its long-term struggle against the West. The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) has codified the fusion of national planning, security strategy, and technological control under Xi’s direct command. The plan, whose early chapters are dedicated to building a modern industrial system, accelerating tech self-reliance and cultivating new productive forces, and deepening informatization and intelligentization, highlights a range of priority high-tech sectors. These include artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, biotechnology, connected devices and the Internet of Things (IoT), robotics, and open-source technologies, among others. The Party believes that seizing the “commanding heights” in these areas is critical to ensuring long-term dominance (Xinhua, March 5).

Xi has directed the Party-state system to advance a whole-of-nation approach to promoting strategic sectors. This is seen in the mechanisms embedded in the Party’s seven national development strategies, of which the military–civil fusion development strategy the most important, coordinating the system to diffuse innovation throughout the pillars of the Party’s power. It also involves boosting competitiveness through securing supply chains, promoting innovation, and ensuring that critical technologies remain in reliable hands. “Reverse constrainment,” or the selective weaponization of trade, has emerged as one tactic to adapt to the competitive international environment; but the Party deploys a variety of other tools in pursuit of supply chain sovereignty, technological dominance, and ultimately victory in international technological competition.

IDF 9900 intel official: We destroyed Iran's base for attacking satellites to keep space supremacy

YONAH JEREMY BOBCH

In an extremely rare public statement, an IDF Unit 9900 intelligence official said on Monday that Israel has destroyed an Iranian base which was focused on building technologies to shoot down Israeli satellites and other adversaries' satellites.

According to the officer from the IDF's clandestine satellite intelligence division, the goal of the attack was to maintain Israel's supremacy in space, especially regarding satellite surveillance. "We are leading many efforts to preserve the IDF's freedom of action in the arena of space, and to harm the capabilities of Iran to act and to build such forces," said the Unit 9900 official.

Who wants what from the Iran war?

Frank Gardner

President Donald Trump's war aims have been somewhat opaque, appearing to vacillate between a simple curtailment of Iran's nuclear programme, to capitulation to all US and Israeli demands, to the total collapse of the Islamic Republic regime. So far, Iran has neither capitulated nor collapsed. But its military has been severely weakened by 16 days of relentless precision bombing.

Indirect talks between the US and Iran in Geneva in February, mediated by Oman, were making progress on the nuclear file. The Omanis say Iran was prepared to make major concessions that offered significant reassurance Tehran was not pursuing a nuclear weapon. What Iran was not prepared to discuss was curtailing or cancelling its ballistic missile programme nor its support for proxy groups around the region, like the Houthis in Yemen or Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The Chokepoint We Missed: Sulfur, Hormuz, and the Threats to Military Readiness

Morgan Bazilian, Macdonald Amoah and Jahara Matisek

The cascading effects of disrupted maritime chokepoints are no longer the subject of simulations; they are an active crisis. As the US-Israeli military operation against Iran and Tehran’s regional military response continue, missile attacks, drone swarms, airstrikes, and maritime threats complicate commercial shipping across the region. The ongoing disruption in the Strait of Hormuz affects about 20 percent of global petroleum and 20 percent of liquid natural gas transits. It is also the subject of decades of wargaming for just this occurrence. But a lesser-known chemical also is being halted: 41 percent of global sulfur is exported.

While the United States produces significant sulfur domestically, the near-total disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for approximately 50 percent of global seaborne sulfur trade flows, has compounded an already tight market. US sulfur prices have increased 165 percent year-over-year to over $650 per metric ton; and now the price has surged by 25 percent just since the Iran war began. This makes domestic procurement fiercely competitive, while also threatening the import of specific ultra-high-purity grades required for advanced manufacturing. It is squeezing one of the most consequential inputs to modern industrial power.

The Gulf states’ offensive options against Iran

Dr Hasan Alhasan

Despite previously pledging neutrality and trying to avoid war, the Gulf states are bearing the brunt of Iran’s retaliation against American and Israeli aggression. Iran has fired at least 1,946 missiles and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) against the United Arab Emirates alone, far surpassing the number of projectiles fired against Israel. In addition to targeting American military bases and facilities in the region, Iran is striking a wide range of civilian targets in the Gulf states, including hotels, airports, ports, and oil and gas facilities, imposing a growing human and economic toll on its neighbours.

Emirati diplomatic adviser Dr Anwar Gargash has stated that the Arab Gulf states can ‘no longer sit idle and absorb [Iranian] attacks against their facilities’, while Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Dr Majed al-Ansari has said that Iran’s attacks ‘cannot go unanswered’ and a ‘price must be paid’. The United States has been coaxing and sometimes pressuring the Gulf states to join the war, largely to signal broader regional support for the US–Israeli campaign. US President Donald Trump has claimed, without evidence, that the Gulf states are ‘aggressively fighting’ and ‘insist on being involved’, although they have repeatedly denied this. Trump ally US Senator Lindsey Graham has warned that ‘consequences will follow’ if the states fail to ‘get more involved’ in the war.

How Iraq Is the New Frontline of the Iran War

Seth J. Frantzman

Iran is seeking to inflame Iraq and drag it into an ever-widening conflict in the Middle East. In the wake of US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran on February 28, there have been numerous attacks in Iraq by Iran and Iranian-backed militias. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani on March 9 and “condemned terrorist attacks by Iran and Iran-aligned terrorist militia groups in Iraq, including in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.”

In the wake of the call, the attacks have increased. Kurdish media outlet Rudaw estimates that there have been more than 270 drone and missile attacks on the autonomous Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq. These attacks have targeted US forces as well as other members of the anti-ISIS Coalition. In addition, they have targeted bases of Kurdish Iranian opposition groups. Italy said on March 12 that it believes an attack on its forces in Iraq was deliberate.

Signifying Absolutely Nothing

Fintan O’Toole

In Donald Trump’s war on Iran, everything is meta except the bombs. At the point of impact, where buildings shatter and flesh is shredded, the war inhabits the material world of awful human consequences. But up to that point, as it exists in Trump’s mind, it seems to be a crazy historical pageant in which disconnected scenes from past American imperial misadventures are randomly reenacted.

It is apt that Trump’s declaration of war was disembodied: a prerecorded video message announcing a major combat operation that had yet to begin. Time in that video is completely distorted; events that are about to happen are referred to in the past tense. Throughout it gives the feeling of being in a time warp: Trump cited as a casus belli “the marine barracks bombing in Beirut that killed 241 American military personnel” in 1983. The forty-three-year gap between provocation and retaliation is a void between cause and effect into which all temporal logic vanishes.

How America’s War on Iran Backfired

Nate Swanson

Seventeen years ago, while serving as an Iran desk officer in the U.S. State Department, I asked a more veteran colleague about the latest inflammatory statement by Mahmood Ahmadinejad, then the Iranian president. My colleague responded: “Stop paying attention to Ahmadinejad. Only focus on Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He makes the important decisions.” He added: “But don’t worry. Change is coming. Khamenei”—who was then 69 and widely believed to have cancer—“could die at any moment.”

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Khamenei did not die. Not until two weeks ago, when U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

How History Keeps the U.S. and Iran on a Collision Course

James Durso

The United States and Iran are fighting not just because of their differences, but also because of their similarities. Both countries see themselves as exceptional civilizations shaped by religion and sustained by a sense of victimhood. Each believes it has been repeatedly wronged by the other and is therefore acting defensively. This mutual narrative has become one of the most powerful forces shaping U.S.–Iran relations.

Both nations interpret the relationship through different historical starting points. Because their memories of the conflict begin at different moments, each country tells a story in which it is primarily the victim and the other the aggressor.

Cascade of A.I. Fakes About War With Iran Causes Chaos Online

Stuart A. Thompson and Alexander Cardia

A torrent of fake videos and images generated by artificial intelligence have overrun social networks during the first weeks of the war in Iran. The videos — showing huge explosions that never happened, decimated city streets that were never attacked or troops protesting the war who do not exist — have added a chaotic and confusing layer to the conflict online.

The New York Times identified over 110 unique A.I.-generated images and videos from the past two weeks about the war in the Middle East. The fakes covered every aspect of the fighting: They falsely depicted screaming Israelis cowering as explosions ripped through Tel Aviv, Iranians mourning their dead and American military vessels bombarded with missiles and torpedoes.

Strategy for a new nuclear age

Michael Albertson, Paul Amato, Henry "Trey" Obering, Ankit Panda, Kingston Reif, Amy Woolf

For much of the post–Cold War era, nuclear strategy receded from daily headlines. That era is over now. In the last several years alone, Russia routinely threatened nuclear use to limit Western support to Ukraine and tested new delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons. China rapidly and opaquely expanded its nuclear arsenal, built new missile silos, diversified its delivery systems, and may have conducted a low-yield nuclear explosive test in June 2020. The reliability, survivability, and accuracy of North Korea’s nuclear-capable missiles incrementally improved. In May 2025, during the most serious military crisis between India and Pakistan in decades, Pakistan’s prime minister called a meeting of the National Command Authority, the body that oversees Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The following month, and again beginning in February 2026, the United States and Israel conducted military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites with the aim of destroying Iran’s nuclear program.

Taken together, these developments force the United States to confront the most complex strategic environment since the advent of nuclear weapons—one defined by simultaneous nuclear challenges across geographies and domains. The February 2026 expiration of the New START Treaty further complicated the landscape by removing the last remaining constraints on US and Russian strategic forces, which raises urgent questions about force sizing, modernization timelines, and the future of arms control. US policymakers must now grapple with whether existing nuclear posture remains sufficient, as well as how best to balance deterrence requirements with fiscal realities and alliance commitments.

Trump, Iran, and Israel: The Wars Behind the War

Cédric Debernard

Since October 7, 2023, Israel has been living under a logic that its Western observers struggle to fully grasp: that of a state which knows, with clinical precision, that several of its neighbors and their backers are organized around a single objective, its disappearance. This is not paranoia. It is written on the walls, literally. In the north, Hezbollah — armed, financed and directed by Tehran — spent two decades building an arsenal of over 150,000 rockets pointed south. To the northeast, in Tehran, a countdown clock installed in 2020 displays the date by which the Islamic Republic has promised Israel will cease to exist. To the southwest, in Gaza, Hamas carried out the deadliest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. And further south still, from Yemen, Houthi missiles reach Tel Aviv. The geography of threat is total.

How should a state respond to this? That question — deceptively simple — is where international relations theory stops being abstract and becomes existential. Two schools of thought have long shaped the debate: liberalism and realism. In most capitals, they are competing frameworks. In Israel, they are competing survival strategies. And the gap between them has never been wider.

More US Marines and warships being moved to Middle East, reports say

James Chater

More US Marines and warships are being deployed to the Middle East, two officials confirmed to CBS News, the BBC's US partner. The officials said the reinforcements were to come from an amphibious ready group and its Marine expeditionary unit, with one official adding that the group would be led by the Japan-based USS Tripoli, an amphibious assault ship.

The unit headed by the USS Tripoli typically consists of around 5,000 sailors and Marines distributed across several warships. The development comes as President Donald Trump said US forces had "totally obliterated" Iranian military infrastructure on Kharg Island in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for global oil shipping.

Iran’s Hormuz blockade is its most powerful card against Trump and Israel. It won’t back down easily

Jack Watling

The US and Israeli decision to attack Iran has sent economic shockwaves around the world. About 20% of global oil supplies have been effectively blocked from transiting the strait of Hormuz since Iran began attacking ships, resulting in a huge jump in oil prices. Militarily, while the United States has the firepower to significantly reduce Iran’s capacity to strike ships in the strait, it is unlikely to be able to eliminate the threat entirely.

Reopening the strait, therefore, is not only a question of military capabilities but of diplomacy, and to negotiate it is necessary to understand what each party to the conflict is trying to achieve.

For the Iranian government, the purpose of its arsenal of ballistic missiles was to deter any direct aggression, allowing the country to subvert its adversaries through violent proxies without incurring retaliation. That deterrent has failed. The idea that Iran can be attacked whenever its actions displease its opponents is clearly unacceptable, and so the Iranian government wishes to re-establish deterrence by imposing such a cost on the global economy that further attacks are not contemplated. The mechanism for doing this is the closure of the strait of Hormuz.

Europe’s hollow Iran war outrage

Leon Hadar

Watching European capitals scramble to calibrate their response to the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, one is reminded of a recurring scene in a very bad play — one that has run, with minor variations, since Suez. Europe blusters. Europe convenes. Europe issues a communique. And then Europe does nothing.

The pattern is so familiar by now that it barely warrants analysis. And yet the current crisis deserves closer scrutiny, not because Europe has surprised observers, but because the depth of its strategic irrelevance has been so thoroughly exposed — and so thoroughly obscured by the fog of its own rhetoric. Let us be clear about what has happened. Washington, in close coordination with Jerusalem, undertook a major military operation against Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure.

The US-Israeli strategy against Iran is working. Here is why

Muhanad Seloom

Two weeks into Operation Epic Fury, the dominant narrative has settled into a comfortable groove: The United States and Israel stumbled into a war without a plan. Iran is retaliating across the region. Oil prices are surging, and the world is facing another Middle Eastern quagmire. US senators have called it a blunder. Cable news has tallied the crises. Commentators have warned of a long war.

The chorus is loud and, in some respects, understandable. War is ugly, and this one has imposed real costs on millions of people across the Middle East, including the city I live in. But this narrative is wrong. Not because the costs are imaginary, but because the critics are measuring the wrong things. They are cataloguing the price of the campaign while ignoring the strategic ledger.

Washington’s War in Iran Will Encourage Nuclear Proliferation

Alex Madajian

The recent US-Israeli attacks against Iran have proven something to the world: Either you get the bomb, or you bow before someone who has the bomb. That wouldn’t be so grim if the stakes weren’t so high. But the issue with nuclear bombs is it only takes one to go off before apocalyptic concerns rear their head. To small and great powers alike, the current war in Iran proves the only guarantee of deterring a nuclear-armed adversary in this era is if you actually have a nuclear weapon of your own.

Oceans of ink have been spilled over who should or should not get a nuclear weapon, but given the recent events, several countries are doing more than just talking about becoming nuclear powers. Poland, Finland, Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia are a few of the countries which reportedly are eyeing getting their own nuclear deterrent. Undoubtedly others are secretly scrambling to see if they can acquire nuclear capabilities themselves.

‘Bit of treachery’: US attack on IRIS Dena undermines Indian security ties

The distress call came in to Sri Lanka’s maritime rescue coordination centre just after 5am. The ship in trouble, they determined, was well within Sri Lanka’s obligation for rescue, being just over 19 nautical miles off the coast of the southern city of Galle.

The navy swiftly mobilised and, by 6am, the first search and rescue boat was on its way, another soon close behind. It was hard to see through the thick morning mist but officers onboard kept their eyes peeled for a ship in the distance. Instead they found a spooling slick of oil on the sea’s surface. Dozens of survivors held on to life rafts and bodies bobbed in the waves, but the vessel was nowhere to be seen. IRIS Dena, an Iranian warship on its way to a friendly port call in Sri Lanka, already sat on the bottom of the Indian Ocean.

Surge in US gas prices deepens political peril for Trump over Iran

Anthony Zurcher

In the third week of the joint US-Israeli war against Iran, Donald Trump faces decisions that could define the rest of his presidency. But if the American commander-in-chief is grappling with a war of choice that seems in danger of spiralling in ways he can't control, those concerns are not playing out in public.

In more than an hour of public remarks at the White House on Monday, he discussed his thinking on the state of the war effort - and also on Kennedy Center renovations, White House ballroom construction plans, this year's World Cup tournament, the health of a Republican congressman and a host of other unrelated topics. It was classic Trump, as unscripted and wide-ranging as ever. This past weekend, he played golf at his Florida resort. And on his Truth Social website, he devoted nearly as much time to railing about the Supreme Court as he did to discussing the Iran War.

Trump’s Cyber Strategy Falls Short on China, Iran, and the Threats That Matter Most

Matthew Ferren

The White House’s recently released cyber strategy is strikingly short, with just four pages of substance—roughly one-seventh the length of the Biden administration’s 2023 strategy. National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross has described it as a high-level statement of intent, with action items to come. But the brevity also reflects a fraying cyber apparatus that is, at best, still finding its footing and, at worst, suffering from institutional neglect.

This strategy arrives at a precarious moment. The United States faces longstanding and intensifying cyber threats—from Chinese espionage and pre-positioning on critical infrastructure to ransomware campaigns that disrupt essential services—that demand sustained attention and investment. The president’s war of choice with Iran adds new urgency. Tehran-linked groups are already threatening cyberattacks on U.S. networks, and the White House’s ability to coordinate national cyber defenses will face an immediate test.

Cheap drones transform global battlefield

Zachary Basu

Cheap, mass-produced drones have permanently changed the face of warfare.Without them, Russia's overwhelming manpower and firepower advantage would grind Ukraine into dust.

Without them, the Houthis are a ragtag militia in Yemen — not a force that brought global shipping to its knees.

Why it matters: Size no longer guarantees victory. Any nation, any proxy, any rebel group with access to cash and commercial components can now bleed a superpower slowly, expensively and without a clean answer. Driving the news: Iran's Shahed drone — said to cost between $20,000 and $50,000 — has been the regime's great equalizer, forcing the U.S. and its allies to respond in some cases with interceptor missiles costing millions of dollars each.

The AI Antagonist

Brian Miller

There is a moment in almost every AI adoption effort where the room gives itself away. A leader asks, “What platform should we buy?” Someone answers with a vendor name. Another person says, “We need an enterprise foundation.” A slide appears with the phrase “AI transformation.” Heads nod. A contract strategy starts to form.

Near the end of the meeting, someone asks the question that should have been first: “What problems are we actually trying to solve?” By then, the decision energy has moved. The capability is already being acquired. The use cases will be figured out later.

This is not a villainous plot. It is a reflex, the capabilities-first acquisition reflex. It is the single biggest obstacle to AI adoption in defense, and why top-down urgency doesn’t reliably translate into bottom-up adoption. The timing matters. Secretary Hegseth recently told the Department of War to become AI-first, push capabilities into operators’ hands in days, and measure success by usage and mission impact, not PowerPoint. That kind of demand signal raises the pressure, but it doesn’t remove the capabilities-first reflex that turns pressure into misguided procurement.

18 March 2026

What Does Pakistan Want in Afghanistan?

Zalmai Nishat, and Chris Blackburn

While global attention has focused on the escalating US and Israeli strikes against Iran since February 28, a parallel and largely overlooked confrontation has been unfolding between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The deterioration of relations between Islamabad and Kabul raises an important question: What is Pakistan’s long-term strategy toward Taliban-ruled Afghanistan? Afghanistan has endured overlapping political, economic, and humanitarian crises since the Taliban seized power in August 2021, and Pakistan’s choices will heavily influence whether the country remains trapped in instability or moves toward a more sustainable political settlement.

When the Taliban entered Kabul on August 15, 2021, Pakistan’s political and military establishment openly welcomed their return. The following day, then-Prime Minister Imran Khan declared that the Taliban had broken the “shackles of slavery,” framing their victory as both a geopolitical and cultural rejection of Western influence. “Breaking the shackles of the mind is more difficult,” he added while speaking at the launch of Pakistan’s “Single National Curriculum.” The remarks reflected a broader ideological narrative portraying Western cultural influence as a form of intellectual domination over Muslim societies.

Iran’s Tactical Blunder

Neville Teller

Justifiable though the February 28 US-Israeli pre-emptive strike on Iran may have been on moral, humanitarian, strategic and political grounds, it was arguably not so strong in terms of international law. France has criticized it as illegal, while Spain has explicitly declared it a breach of that law.

Which international law is the action presumed to violate?

The UN Charter, binding on all member states, is generally regarded as the central component of international law. Article 2(4) bars a state from using force “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of another state, but elsewhere, the charter specifies two accepted routes to its legal application: Security Council authorization, and self-defense. The US-Israel strike did not receive Security Council authorization, and self-defense under Article 51 is permitted only “if an armed attack occurs.”

Israel’s Second War: The Fight Against Iran’s Proxy, Hezbollah

Ray Furlong

As the US-Israeli war with Iran continues, a second front against Hezbollah has led to the displacement of some 800,000 people fleeing deadly Israeli air strikes in Lebanon, while a succession of rocket and drone attacks has rained down on Israel. Hezbollah, regarded as a terrorist organization by both Israel and the United States, is Iran’s strongest remaining proxy on Israel’s borders. It attacked Israel on March 2, after Israel began air strikes on Iran on February 28.

The response by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has been massive — and the conflict with Hezbollah is an integral part of Israel’s wider war against Iran itself. “The campaign against Iran was meant to deal with our very existence in the region, and Hezbollah is part of that,” Sarit Zehavi, head of Alma, a think tank based in northern Israel, told RFE/RL on March 13. “We are under constant attacks 24/7 here.”

Trump Says US ‘Totally Obliterated’ Military Sites On Iran’s Kharg Island, Vows Navy Escorts ‘Will Happen Soon’ In Strait

US President Donald Trump said American forces have “totally obliterated” military sites on Iran’s strategic Kharg Island in “one of the most powerful bombing raids” in Middle East history and he said the US Navy would soon begin escorting vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.

“Moments ago, at my direction, the United States Central Command executed one of the most powerful bombing raids in the History of the Middle East, and totally obliterated every MILITARY target in Iran’s crown jewel, Kharg Island,” Trump wrote on social media. “Our Weapons are the most powerful and sophisticated that the World has ever known but, for reasons of decency, I have chosen NOT to wipe out the Oil Infrastructure on the Island,” he added.

Kharg Island And The Limits Of Military Pressure On Iran

Dr. Sofey Saidi

In moments of geopolitical crisis, policymakers often search for a decisive pressure point that could alter the strategic balance. In the current confrontation with Iran, some strategists in Washington have begun discussing one such possibility: Kharg Island, the terminal through which most of Iran’s oil exports pass. The idea reflects a broader strategic question now emerging in policy debates: what is the real viability of military or economic pressure in shaping Iran’s political future?

Recent reports and policy discussions in Washington have raised the possibility that Kharg Island could become a focal point in any strategy designed to pressure the Iranian regime economically without expanding into a broader regional war.

Gulf War III is a Warning About the Effects of a ‘Taiwan Straits War I’

Dr Philip Shetler-Jones

The economic shock from what Niall Fergusson calls ‘Gulf War III’ is largely being transmitted through the medium of the global shipping industry. The proportion of the world’s fossil fuel sourced from the Persian Gulf is only part of the reason this war risks triggering a global recession. A less examined reason is the critical importance of major Asian economies (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) to global commerce, combined with their vulnerability to the breakdown in the international shipping network that carries their fuel but also the parts and products to assembly and markets. It is important to understand this fragility and consider ways to mitigate it in order to prepare for a similar crisis that could spread out from a possible conflict over Taiwan.

The economies of China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan account for over a quarter of nominal global GDP, and much more than that if measured in terms of purchasing power parity. All of them rely on maritime trade for a large portion of their energy supply and the transportation of industrial inputs and products. Their economies are linked to each other and those of nations across the region and the world by a dense and complicated supply chain network. If something happens to cause that network to break down or shipping to stop, the effect on the global economy would be comparable to what is taking place as a consequence of Gulf War III.

How the Iran War Puts Central Asia Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Eldar Mamedov

The drones that struck Azerbaijan on March 5 did more than wound four people. They shattered the illusion that Central Asia could sit out the Iran War—and exposed the limits of American influence in a region Washington thought it was winning. When allegedly Iranian UAVs hit Azerbaijan’s Nakhchevan exclave—targeting the international airport terminal, narrowly missing a nearby school—Baku’s response was swift and furious. President Ilham Aliyev called it a “terrorist act,” and vowed retaliation. Iran categorically denied it launched the strike, blaming Israel for an alleged “false flag” operation instead.

But the reaction in Central Asia was far more telling. And for American and Israeli strategists who had celebrated Kazakhstan’s entry into the Abraham Accords just months earlier, it carried an uncomfortable message. They had hoped that Kazakhstan would join in a new alliance of “moderate Muslim states” stretching from the Gulf to the Caspian, aligned with Israel and hostile to Iran. The reality has proved to be more complicated, however.

Four Strategic Patterns Now Visible in the Iran War

Robert A. Pape

Wars rarely unfold the way leaders expect.

They begin with plans for quick victories, decisive strikes, and controlled escalation. But once the shooting starts, wars develop their own momentum. Political pressures rise, adversaries adapt, and the logic of escalation begins to shape events in ways few decision-makers initially anticipate.

The early phase of the Iran war is already displaying several recurring strategic patterns that have appeared repeatedly across modern conflicts. These patterns do not predict every event. But they help explain why wars that begin with expectations of rapid success often expand into much larger and more dangerous confrontations.

Pentagon-Anthropic Dispute Over Autonomous Weapon Systems

Kelley M. Sayler

On February 27, 2026, President Donald J. Trump directed federal agencies to “IMMEDIATELY CEASE all use of [American AI company] Anthropic’s technology.” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (who is now using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order (EO) 14347 dated September 5, 2025) subsequently directed the Department of Defense (DOD, now using “Department of War” as a secondary designation under EO 14347) to designate Anthropic a supply-chain risk to national security; barred defense contractors, suppliers, and partners from working with Anthropic; and described an up-to-six-month period of transition away from Anthropic products.

This designation follows a reportedly months-long dispute between DOD and Anthropic over DOD use of Anthropic products, including the company’s generative AI model, Claude. On March 9, Anthropic filed a civil complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit regarding these directives. Some lawmakers have called for a resolution to the disagreement and for Congress to act to set rules for the department’s use of AI and/or autonomous weapon systems.

Ukraine’s Expertise In Countering Iranian-Designed Shahed Drones Attracting Growing International Demand

Can Kasapoğlu

The operational tempo moderated slightly across the battlespace last week, with Ukrainian reporting and open-source indicators suggesting that Ukraine and Russia waged roughly 100 to 150 combat engagements per day, down from the 200-plus daily engagements that characterized the previous several weeks. This reduction likely signals a temporary ease in the fighting rather than a structural shift in either side’s campaign.

Several sectors remained principal flashpoints. Kupiansk, Lyman, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Huliaipole, Pokrovsk, and Orikhiv continued to be the focus of most ground combat and probing attacks. These areas form the operational spine of the war’s eastern and southeastern fronts and will likely remain decisive terrain in the coming weeks. Kyiv suffered tactical-level losses in the Huliaipole sector—where Russia has deployed marine infantry and combat formations from the 68th Army Corps—and in Udachne.

Europe Chides US For Lifting Russian Oil Sanctions

EurActiv

(EurActiv) — uropean leaders have launched a rare rebuke of the United States’ decision to lift sanctions on Russian oil exports amid the ongoing war in the Middle East that has created havoc in global oil and gas markets. “We believe that easing sanctions now, for whatever reason, is the wrong thing to do,” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on a visit to Norway on Friday.

Overnight, Washington moved to unleash around one day’s worth of global oil demand by lifting sanctions on seaborne Russian oil. The US has also given a waiver to Indian refiners to purchase sanctioned Russian oil since the Iran war began. This comes as the EU is attempting to convince its member countries, Hungary and Slovakia, to sign up to a 20th round of sanctions on Russia.

US Army officers say battlefield leaders facing new drone threats have another problem to deal with — it's information overload

Kelsey Baker

New information flows on modern battlefields can be overwhelming for commanders.

Army leaders warn of "cognitive overload" for commanders on the ground facing new and traditional threats. The battlefield is changing dramatically amid new drone and EW threats.

Amid an explosion in new kinds of battlefield tech, from all kinds of drones to the systems and sensors being built to defeat them, commanders at all levels are grappling with the growing challenge of information overload. As the Army absorbs lessons from Ukraine, "we're seeing a cognitive overload on the ground for commanders who have to fight both the ground fight and the air fight," said Maj. Andrew Kang, the fire support officer for the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, during a media roundtable last week.

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