Indian Strategic Studies

18 April 2026

India’s Iran War Trap

Arjun Singh

China, for instance, has condemned the United States and Israel’s actions. Russia, meanwhile, is providing intelligence and logistical support to Iran. Nations of the Global South have rushed to condemn Israel, while US allies such as the United Kingdom are reluctantly drawn into fighting. One regional power, Pakistan, is mediating the conflict to ensure safe transit through the Strait of Hormuz and prevent the outbreak of further hostilities.

Against this backdrop, India—a rising power and leader of the Global South—has been noticeably mute. As of writing, the Indian position on the war has been advocating a ceasefire between the belligerents and calling for dialogue, without expressing any other views. This position is controversial for India, both at home and abroad.

Lebanon seeks peace, but Hezbollah needs to be convinced first

Hugo Bachega

With Lebanon, again, engulfed by war, I remember a meeting I had with President Joseph Aoun at the Baabda Palace, a modernist building at the top of a hill overlooking Beirut last August.

Aoun, a former army chief, took office after a devastating war between Israel and Hezbollah, a Lebanese militia and political party that is backed by Iran. At that point, Hezbollah had been weakened and was isolated at home and Aoun had vowed to disarm it. The seemingly intractable issue over Hezbollah's weapons has long divided Lebanon, but Aoun appeared to believe he could solve it. "I was born an optimist," he told me.

U.S. Intelligence Shows China Taking a More Active Role in Iran War

Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt and Julian E. Barnes

American intelligence agencies have obtained information that China in recent weeks may have sent a shipment of shoulder-fired missiles to Iran for its conflict with the United States and Israel, according to U.S. officials. The officials said that the intelligence is not definitive that the shipment has been sent, and that there is no evidence that the Chinese missiles have yet been used against American or Israeli forces during the conflict.

But even a debate in Beijing over sending missiles to Iran suggests the degree that China sees itself as having a stake in the conflict. Intelligence agencies have assessed that China is secretly taking an active stance in the war, allowing some companies to ship chemicals, fuel and components that can be used in military production to Iran for the war.

Ron Paul: Blockading The Blockade? – OpEd

Ron Paul

President Trump was presented with a great opportunity on Saturday to take the off-ramp from his war on Iran. After threatening Iran that “a whole civilization will die tonight,” Trump managed to get a two week pause in the war with the intervention of the Pakistani government. A window opened to end this illegal war. Vice President Vance traveled to Pakistan to negotiate with a high-level Iranian delegation and from press reporting progress was made on many issues.

Unfortunately, after a month and a half of war, where tens of billions of dollars have been spent, every US base in the region is either damaged or destroyed, and dozens of military aircraft have been lost, President Trump did not take the off-ramp. He hit the accelerator. After 21 hours of negotiations, the talks blew up, reportedly because the US side again insisted that Iran turn over its enriched uranium, destroy its nuclear facilities, and never enrich uranium again. This may be the “maximalist” approach favored by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but there is no reason for the US to make such demands.

Has Saudi Arabia Acquired A Nuclear Option Via Pakistan? – OpEd

Murray Hunter

Saudi Arabia Now Going Alone In The Gulf Conflict

The September 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Saudia Arabia and Pakistan has sparked some speculation about a possible “nuclear umbrella,” where Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent could implicitly cover Saudi Arabia in cases of aggression.

A joint statement made by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the signing SMDA said that any aggression against one as aggression against both, although nuclear weapons were not specifically mentioned. A senior Saudi official was report to have told Reuters that the agreement “encompasses all military means”. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif stated in a September 18, 2025 in a GeoTV interview that Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities “will be made available” to Saudi Arabia according to the agreement, in response to a question about extending nuclear deterrence. He described it as part of joint defense against aggression.

What Does the Iran War Mean for Global Energy Markets?

Joseph Majkut

The sudden eruption of war in the Mideast Gulf has created dramatic new risks for global energy security. Iranian attacks have damaged oil and gas facilities in the Gulf region, and threats against shipping though the Strait of Hormuz have brought maritime traffic to a near standstill, halting oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports. As the crisis continues, announcements of closing production fields and LNG export facilities are beginning to mount. On Friday, March 6, international Brent oil prices surpassed $92 per barrel, up 28 percent since last Friday’s market close. Prolonged disruptions to shipping and/or significant damage to export facilities could cause lasting and larger price increases.

This week, President Donald Trump announced several measures to reduce potential energy price shocks. He said that the United States would guarantee shipping through the strait using both naval escorts and insurance products backed by the U.S. International

Why and how is US blockading Iranian ports in Strait of Hormuz?

Jake Lapham

The US has started a naval blockade of maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. US forces say they will intercept or turn back vessels travelling to or from Iran's coast. Washington says ships coming or going from elsewhere will be allowed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway off Iran's coast that Tehran effectively closed in response to US-Israeli strikes.

The US will rely on its fleet of naval vessels to control access to Iranian ports, and in turn restrict Tehran's ability to profit from oil exports in an attempt to put pressure on the country. It comes after negotiators from both sides failed to reach a deal to end the war, which began on 28 February but is currently under a two-week ceasefire.

A conflict of attrition: Iran’s bet on asymmetric warfare

Spenser A. Warren

Around midnight on March 30, crewmembers on the bridge of the oil tanker Al Salmi were rocked by a large explosion. Hours later, fires still raged on the ship’s deck. The explosion was caused by an Iranian drone strike. The Al Salmi is not an adversary warship; its crew are not enemy combatants—it is a civilian vessel owned by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.

Like others on civilian oil tankers, this attack was intended to disrupt energy supplies and threaten regional security. In short, it’s part of Iran’s asymmetric warfare effort—which includes the use of several types of disruptive technologies—over the course of its ongoing conflict with the United States and Israel.

The Fragile U.S.-Iran Ceasefire: Issues to Watch

Daniel Byman

After over a month of fighting, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire. The ceasefire is fragile, and many of the key factors that will determine its durability are unclear. Below are six issues to watch as negotiations play out.

Ceasefire or a Settlement?

For now, the United States, Israel, and Iran have agreed to a ceasefire and only a ceasefire. Numerous contentious issues remain unresolved, ranging from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs to Tehran’s support for proxies and repression of protesters at home. Tehran, for its part, seeks an end to U.S. sanctions, the right to enrich uranium, an end to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, and other demands, as well as guarantees that attacks on Iran will not resume. The war itself has also generated new demands: Iran seeks compensation for the devastation caused by U.S. and Israeli bombing and is claiming that it will demand payment for tankers seeking to transit the Strait of Hormuz. The two sides are far apart, and both seek to convince audiences at home that they have won—something that will further complicate negotiations.

The War Against Iran

Emile Hokayem

The war that started on 28 February 2026 pitting the United States and Israel against Iran is many things, including a reflection of the decades-long failure of global diplomacy adequately to restrain the Islamic Republic; the logical culmination of the predictable chain of events started on 7 October 2023; a manifestation of the inability of the Middle Eastern security system to constrain and integrate revisionist powers; and evidence of a crumbling international order.

Above all, it is the clash of Iran’s ideological and strategic delusions, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s unhinged obsession with security and US President Donald Trump’s opportunistic, high-risk improvisation. This quintessential war of choice is the fifth major shock to the region since 1979, following the Iranian Revolution, the Iran–Iraq War, the first Gulf War and the US invasion of Iraq. It began to reverberate regionally and globally within hours. Within a day, it became clear that it would have a long tail, throwing the Middle East into a new era of conflict and transformation.

Dueling Hormuz blockades push world to the brink

RN Prasher

US President Donald Trump’s announcement that the US Navy would impose a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, announced after failed face-to-face talks in Islamabad, signals a perilous new phase of the Iran war, one that threatens to prolong the oil shock’s impact on the global economy and entrench US forces in a long-term conflict.

Trump’s move, labeled as “illegal” by some, aims to challenge Iran’s equally legally dubious sovereign claim to what until recently had been a de facto free international waterway, through which an estimated 20% of the world’s oil and liquified natural gas shipments flow. Iran has recently mined the strait, raising concerns that it may not be able to locate all the mines. The US Central Command says its forces have begun mine-clearing operations, a move Iran has said violates the ceasefire.

Disarmed And Betrayed, Then Reborn: Ukraine’s Drone War Revolution – Analysis

Oleg Chupryna

Since independence in 1991 Ukraine lived under illusion that it could be protected by international law, its neutral status and binding international agreements. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited a substantial nuclear arsenal, including 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, over 500 cruise missiles, and 34 strategic bombers, amounting to approximately 1,700 nuclear warheads. This positioned Ukraine as the third-largest nuclear power globally, after the United States and Russia. Nevertheless, by 1996 Ukraine had fully relinquished its nuclear capabilities, motivated by confidence in the security assurances provided under the Budapest Memorandum.

Under this framework, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom—subsequently joined by France and China—committed to respecting Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, while refraining from the use of force or economic coercion. Consequently, Ukraine significantly reduced its conventional military capacity, including its inventories of tanks, artillery, and military aviation, alongside a substantial downsizing of its armed forces personnel.

Iran’s Next Move Decides Everything: Every Iranian Port Will Be Closed by the U.S. Navy.

Kris Osborn

Therefore, U.S. naval firepower will now ensure that no maritime traffic enters or leaves Iranian ports on the Arabian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman. Following the President’s announcement of the blockade, U.S. Central Command issued a statement explaining that “all vessels of all nations” will be blocked from entering Iranian ports, but that there will be “freedom of Navigation for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz to and from non-Iranian ports.”

The question this raises is clear: the Iranian reaction will drive the U.S. Navy’s next steps.

Should Iran fire ballistic missiles at U.S. or commercial ships allowed to pass through the blockade, serious military conflict could resume quickly.

War and the Principles of the Negotiation Process

George Friedman

All wars end. Sometimes, the end is reached when one side achieves its goals, which can range from a limited victory to the conquest of the enemy nation. When neither nation is able to reach its goals, the war ends in negotiations. The evolution and outcome of those negotiations depend on two things. The first is resources: Which nation is most able to continue the war? The second is popular support: whether an agreement can be reached that is acceptable to the public. The leaders on both sides must know what they need to achieve in order to survive, a question that at times competes with the national interest.

Each side must consider the willingness of its citizens to fight on or to demand an end to the war. This is not unlike the world of business, where the interests of shareholders and the management can at times diverge.

Why Go to the Moon?

As NASA prepares for Artemis II—the first crewed mission to orbit the Moon in more than 50 years—the United States is entering a new phase of human space exploration. The return to the Moon is not simply a reprise of Apollo, but part of a broader effort to advance scientific discovery, strengthen international partnerships, and compete in an increasingly contested space domain.

This CSIS Aerospace Security Project commentary series brings together experts from government, industry, and the policy community to answer a fundamental question: Why is the United States going to the Moon? Contributors examine the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers behind renewed lunar exploration, as well as what success will require in the years ahead.

Orbán era swept away by Péter Magyar's Hungary election landslide

Paul Kirby

Viktor Orbán's 16 years in power is over and a system condemned as an "electoral autocracy" lies in tatters, defeated by a 45-year-old former party insider who convinced a majority of Hungarians to bring it to an end. "We did it," Péter Magyar told a crowd of cheering supporters beside the River Danube, overlooking Budapest's magnificent parliament on the other side. "Together we overthrew the Hungarian regime."

Preliminary election results, based on more than 98% of counted votes, put his Tisza party on course for an extraordinary 138 seats, with Orbán's Fidesz on 55 and the far-right Our Homeland on six. The landslide will not only allow Magyar to overturn Orbán's increasingly unpopular domestic policies, but reset Hungary's global relationships.

Will Trump nuke Iran?

Pervez Hoodbhoy

No one—not even Donald Trump—knows the end game as the six-week old US-Israeli war on Iran enters a temporary ceasefire. Just look at the head-spinning time-line:

Sunday, April 5 (infrastructure destruction-I): “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open the fucking strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell — JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah.”

Monday, April 6: (infrastructure destruction-II): “Their infrastructure could be taken out in one night. I’m telling you, no bridges, no power plants. I’m considering blowing everything up and taking over the oil.”

Cognitive Warfare and the Changing Character of Engagement: A Neurostrategic Perspective

Dr. James Giordano

The contemporary battlespace is undergoing a profound transformation in its fundamental logic. As highlighted by Bill Gertz in a recent The Washington Times article reporting on Pentagon initiatives toward cognitive warfare, the United States (US) is actively exploring capabilities designed to “subdue the enemy without fighting”, emphasizing non-kinetic means that directly target human cognition as both the terrain and objective of conflict. This is not simply an evolution in tactics or the use of emergent technology.

Rather, cognitive warfare represents a decisive shift in engagement that leverages information to inform, deceive, and thereby influence the underlying neural processes that are involved in thought, emotion, and behavior (viz- functions that when taken together can be considered constitute the “mind”). In this sense, the battlespace now extends into the neurobiological substrates of the human brain~mind to affect the psychosocial dynamics of targeted individuals and collectives.

Historical Examples of Modern Warfighting Terms

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kristopher Carroll

Clear definitions are crucial for enabling a shared understanding as we adapt to modern times. This article argues that simply rebranding old military concepts with new terminology, without critically examining and learning from history, risks creating the illusion of innovation and leads us to repeat past mistakes. Without grounding our terminology in historical understanding, we risk repeating failures and overlooking successes from prior conflicts. It also presents examples of conventional forces - special operations forces integration, interoperability, and interdependence (CF-SOF I3) employed in the 20th and 21st centuries. The key argument is that effective adaptation to contemporary challenges requires both doctrinal clarity and historical insight.

Recent decades have seen major shifts in U.S. military focus and terminology. From 2001 to 2021, efforts centered on nation-building, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Now, as great power competition (GPC) has risen in prominence, China and Russia challenge the U.S. across political, military, economic, and informational domains. New doctrinal terms such as large-scale combat operations (LSCO), multi-domain operations (MDO), and joint forceable entry operations (JFEO) are prevalent. Conventional forces (CF), special operations forces (SOF), and multinational partners are collaborating for GPC. Many of these concepts have historical counterparts, reinforcing the need to learn from the past as we adapt to current challenges.

The U.S. Fired 18 Months of Patriot Missile Production in 4 Days. The Arsenal Is Empty. Nobody Planned for This

Reuben Johnson

The United States and Iran have agreed to a two-week ceasefire. Looking at how that ceasefire came to be helps judge how accurately the Trump administration has been describing the situation on the ground. But success can be measured even better by examining what has transpired in the aftermath of the announcement.

On April 8, as multiple news outlets reported, U.S. President Donald Trump began to threaten Iran with “annihilation” if the regime failed to bend to his will. However, he soon proclaimed that the Islamic Republic’s leadership had presented him with a “workable” plan that convinced him to agree to a 14-day ceasefire that could end the war.

Strategic Impatience and the Undoing of American Soft Power

Vivian S. Walker

There is a growing argument—implicit in policy, explicit in practice—that soft power has outlived its usefulness as an instrument of American statecraft. Defined as the ability to shape preferred outcomes through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion, soft power appears increasingly out of step with a foreign policy that prizes disruption and aggressive domination.

The first months of the current administration offer a stark illustration.

In rapid succession, the administration moved to dismantle key elements of U.S. soft power: eviscerating foreign assistance programs, restricting international student visas, constraining educational and cultural exchanges, shuttering international broadcasting, and curtailing interagency efforts to counter disinformation. These are not marginal adjustments. They represent a systematic contraction of the United States’ capacity to make a credible and compelling case for its policies and behaviors in the global information space.

Why America is still winningIt is building a new Suez in the stars

Pippa Malmgren

Over the last century, global power was defined entirely by the geography of transit. The map of energy and geopolitical power was flat, two-dimensional, and dictated by wherever molecules of oil, gas, or petroleum by-products could be scraped out of the Earth and squeezed through narrow physical passageways such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz. Those who controlled those chokepoints — as Iran does the Strait — have wielded outsize power.

The British and the Europeans, having held back from joining the American attack on Iran, have been enjoying a sense of collective moral superiority over President Donald Trump. This leaves them unable to see that the United States is executing a geopolitical checkmate that will define the 21st century. The checkmate is that America is now quietly building a new Suez. This new Suez isn’t a trench dug in the sand; it is a pipeline of electrons and light connecting America to the stars.

Ukraine will have the most important defense industrial base in the free world, former CIA chief predicts

Jason Ma

In an interview with World at Stake earlier this week, he called Ukraine the “arsenal of democracy,” a term first used to describe the U.S. during World War II as it sustained allies with weapons and supplies. “Ukraine in the future, I think, will be the most important military industrial complex in the free world,” Petraeus said. “It is producing cutting-edge unmanned systems, not just in the air, but on the ground and at sea.”

Ukraine’s integration of hardware and software is also extraordinary, he noted, adding the pace of innovation is constant. Software updates come in less than a week, and hardware changes come every few weeks. In fact, Ukraine has recently developed new, more advanced drones with longer ranges that have evaded air defenses, allowing them to attack vital oil facilities deep inside Russian territory. That has devastated Russia’s ability to export oil, preventing the Kremlin from capitalizing on the spike in crude prices since the U.S. and Israel launched their war on Iran.

Neurotechnology and the Transformation of War’s Human Domain

Second, it is important to underline implications for the cognitive domain. Unlike traditional digital tools, neurotechnologies can access deeply sensitive information, including cognitive and emotional states, generating what the report identifies as highly valuable and vulnerable “neurodata.” This creates new challenges around privacy, surveillance, data ownership, and bias, while also raising fundamental human rights concerns related to mental autonomy, freedom of thought, and personal dignity.

As a result, these technologies could reshape warfare by shifting focus toward cognition itself, enabling (and aggravating) what we call cognitive warfare. However, these developments introduce substantial risks. They complicate legal accountability, blur the line between human intent and machine action, and create new vulnerabilities such as the possibility of neural system exploitation or “brain hacking.” At the same time, unequal access to enhancement technologies could drive new forms of strategic imbalance and escalation.

Generative AI as a weapon of war in Iran

Valerie Wirtschafter

On February 28, 2026, a joint U.S.-Israeli military campaign struck Iranian nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and leadership targets in what was officially dubbed Operation Epic Fury. Social media quickly flooded with false footage of the conflict, including massive explosions in Tel Aviv, successful Iranian missile strikes on U.S. warships, and satellite imagery purporting to show damage to American military bases in the Gulf.

Some of this footage was recycled from unrelated conflicts, including in Ukraine, and even from video games. Yet some of it was entirely fabricated and created with now ubiquitous generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools that can produce even more realistic content at scale. Several observers of the space emphasized the unprecedented volume of AI-generated content and its increasing sophistication.

17 April 2026

Quantum Power Parity: The Next Front in U.S.–China Strategic Competition

Toghrul Iskandarov

Quantum power parity is a strategic situation in which rival great powers, in this case the United States and China, have amassed quantum capabilities to the point that neither side can grant the other a decisive technological edge without either attaining a lasting advantage. In contrast to nuclear parity, which is kept at bay by transparent warhead counts, mutually assured destruction doctrine, and formal arms-control treaties like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the New START treaty, quantum parity is opaque and hidden by design, capabilities are a dual purpose, proliferate in civilian and commercial markets, and are not readily verifiable. This structural deviation has immediate implications for crisis stability.

When decision-makers cannot predictably evaluate the quantum posture of an adversary, it is reasonable to expect that the tight decision-making timelines and information asymmetries eroded by quantum sensing and computing would amplify the risk of miscalculation, preemptive action, and the attenuation of the gravity with which nuclear parity was historically maintained. The thesis of this article, thus, is that quantum power parity is a less stabilizing equilibrium than nuclear power parity, and that the comprehension of this gap is indispensable to the adoption of sound policy.

China’s Gwadar Gamble: Reshaping Sea–Land Connectivity

Mandip Singh

China’s maritime resurgence, though relatively recent, reflects a decisive shift from continental preoccupations to expansive sea power ambitions. This issue brief examines the evolution of China’s maritime strategy through three interlinked frameworks: the transition from “offshore defense” to “far-seas defense,” the intellectual influence of Mahan and Mackinder, and the operationalization of the Two Oceans Strategy. Central to this transformation is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which integrates economic development with security imperatives. China is expanding naval capabilities, securing critical sea lanes, and developing strategic infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific. Gwadar Port, a flagship component of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is analyzed as both an economic project and a potential strategic asset, despite its current operational and political challenges. This issue brief argues that China’s sea-land strategy reflects a long-term vision of geopolitical influence, combining maritime power projection with continental connectivity to secure its global interests.

In Islamabad, Iran Will Try to Cement Strategic Gains

Iranian leaders interpret U.S. President Donald Trump’s agreement to a two-week ceasefire as an admission that U.S. and Israeli application of overwhelming airpower achieved military, but not strategic, gains. Iran’s remaining leaders, many of whom have been elevated to key positions following airstrikes that killed their predecessors, assert they have emerged victorious after absorbing one of the most comprehensive and precise strike campaigns in modern military history. Iran remains in essential control of the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint, through which 20 percent of seaborne traded oil flowed daily prior to the conflict. Iran also retains the ability to cause damage in Israel and at key energy infrastructure targets in the Arab Gulf states, despite more than 13,000 strikes on its ballistic missile, armed drone, and related production sites that U.S. military leaders say severely degraded Iran’s arsenal.

Iran’s de facto civilian leader, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Majles (parliament), will try to cement Iran’s strategic gains when he meets with U.S. negotiators, led by Vice President JD Vance, in Islamabad on Saturday morning (local time). Ghalibaf has emerged as a top figure after Israeli air strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his designated chief executive, Supreme National Security Committee (SNSC) chair Ali Larijani. Strikes also apparently severely injured Khamenei’s son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei. In negotiating a war-ending accord, Ghalibaf and his team — who Trump perhaps mistakenly characterizes as more pragmatic than the slain elder Khamenei — see Washington’s acceptance of the ceasefire and Islamabad talks as a tacit U.S. admission that the regime cannot be toppled by outside powers.

The Strait of Hormuz in Brief: Non-Oil Shipments and Effects on U.S. Shippers

Frittelli, John; Goldman, Ben

Before U.S. and Israeli military operations began against Iran on February 28, 2026, the average number of ships from various countries transiting through the Strait of Hormuz (the Strait) was about 130 each day.1 As of April 7, 2026, only a handful of ships have risked the transit each day since the start of the operations for fear of attack by Iranian forces, which are reportedly negotiating with and permitting selected ships to pass through the Strait. Before the conflict began, the Strait was open to ship navigation without constraint as per long-standing international law,2 but since the conflict began, Iran has asserted control over the Strait.

The U.K. Maritime Trade Operations center has recorded 17 attacks on vessels since March 1, 2026, with several crew members killed or seriously injured.3 An estimated 1,000 ships are in a holding pattern in the Persian Gulf region: 800 ships in the Persian Gulf inside the Strait waiting to transit eastbound and 200 ships outside the Strait waiting to transit westbound.4 The announcement of a two-week ceasefire on April 7, 2026, to allow these ships to pass through the Strait without being fired upon does not appear to require Iran to give up its control over the Strait.

Four Alternative End States in Iran – the Only Good One Becomes Unlikely

Dr Graeme Herd

Operations ‘Epic Fury’ and ‘Roaring Lion’ seek regime change in the Iranian Islamic Republic, understood as an end to Iran’s missile (launcher and production site) and nuclear programmes. Success would be International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Tehran’s nuclear sites and a surrender of its stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material to the US. Iran would pose no imminent threat to Israel or to US in the longer term. Two other unstated but reasonable-to-expect outcomes would follow. First, the US consolidates its position as the primary security provider and stabilizer in the region. Second, the Iranian energy sector – as with Venezuela following Maduro’s ousting – opens to US investment and influence over strategic sales to preferred partners, and control of global supply and the Strait of Hormuz.

From the moment daylight strikes began on 28 February, at least four Iranian alternative end-state scenarios appeared possible, each resting on assumptions that can be made explicit.

The UAV-Enabled Anti-Air Defense Campaign in the Third Gulf War

Aaron Stein

In late 2020, drones burst onto the national security scene in a new way. During the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Turkey and Armenia that year, videos of Turkish long-endurance TB-2 and loitering Harop drones identifying and striking Armenian air defense systems flooded the internet. Even more sophisticated Russian systems like the S-300 were marked, monitored, and destroyed by Azerbaijan’s force of Turkish and Israeli drones. These images garnered lots of media attention at the time, and helped inaugurate a new role for drone warfare—hunting air defense systems.

The videos were more revelatory than innovative. The Israelis and, later, the Americans have used drones to spot air defense sites since the technology began to proliferate in the 1970s. However, with age comes innovation—specifically through the use of data links and high-definition video to share information with regional “shooters” and then to “market” success to an audience eager to understand how the war is unfolding.

Pathways for the War with Iran

Philip Wasielewski

After a month of combat operations, the United States and Israel have made it clear that they will not allow Iran to become a nuclear power. Based on Iran’s history of domestic repression and foreign terrorism, this is a positive development. However, an unexpected consequence is that Iran may emerge from this conflict with increased international influence due to its demonstrated ability to close the Strait of Hormuz. How Iran will use this newfound leverage remains to be seen and could depend on the length of the conflict and how it ends. The world could soon see an agreement that prevents a major international economic crisis and gives each side some claim to victory. The other possibility is a long conflict in which one or all of the parties try to achieve maximalist goals, resulting in worldwide economic distress, yet no guarantee that military force will give any party a final advantage over the other.

A New War or Just an Old One?

The fighting between Israel and America on one side and Iran on the other that began on February 28, 2026, was not the outbreak of a new war but the continuation of a five-decade-long conflict between Iran’s theocracy, its Sunni neighbors, and the West. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran has legitimized its rule by domestically incorporating Shia theology into all aspects of daily life and pursuing a foreign policy dedicated to the destruction of Israel and the removal of American influence from the region. Iran invested in nuclear and ballistic missile programs as a means to this latter end.

Jihadism in the Middle East: From hierarchical territorial control to dispersed local insurgency

Matteo Colombo

This brief argues that the main jihadi movements in the Middle East have experienced three interconnected and transformative crises since the collapse of Islamic State’s territorial control in 2019: a crisis of authority; a crisis of ideology; and a crisis of cohesion. These crises stem primarily from the decline of the central leadership and organisational capacity al-Qaeda and Islamic State in the Middle East due to the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Units (with US support), Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi (with Iranian and US support) and Global Coalition efforts against Islamic State. Peer networks of violent jihadi groups remain active across the wider Sahel–Horn–Middle East–Afghanistan-Pakistan region, even though their structure has evolved. With al-Qaeda and Islamic State having lost much of their capacity to hierarchically direct and control affiliates across the Middle East, new spaces have opened.

The result is a more networked and horizontally connected jihadist landscape rather than one dominated by strong central command. The erosion of central authority has also given jihadists more doctrinal flexibility in relation to local context. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is a key example of pragmatic adjustment. Today, jihadism in the Middle East is characterised by ideologies and practices that are more localised, pragmatic and fluid than in the pre-2019 period. Increasingly it is bottom-up and more networked than it is territorial. A key implication for policymakers is that countering such configurations requires tailored and locally anchored responses.

Was the Iran War Worth It?

Michael Froman

This week, President Donald Trump declared victory in Iran, and, on Wednesday, after the announcement of a two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan, he heralded a “big day for World Peace!” People are now asking whether the war was worth it. The truth is that it’s simply too soon to tell. The success or failure of the war to advance the United States’ national interest hinges as much on what happens next as it does on what happened over the course of the past forty-one days.

In the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s telling, Operation Epic Fury was a “capital V military victory.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine framed this victory in the context of “three distinct military objectives: destroy Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities, destroy the Iranian navy, and destroy their defense industrial base to ensure that Iran cannot reconstitute the ability to project power outside their borders.” This is consistent with the objectives Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby described during a conversation at CFR at the start of the war.

The five big sticking points in US-Iran talks

Paul Adams

US Vice-President JD Vance is to lead the US team during the talks, while reports suggest Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi will co-lead Iran's delegation The venue is ready, the guards are in place and the kerb along the approach road has received a fresh coat of yellow and black paint.

As hosts of vital US-Iranian talks, the Pakistani government officials are making optimistic noises, emphasising that unlike many others, they enjoy the trust of both sides. The man heading the US delegation, Vice-President JD Vance, is also sounding upbeat. "If the Iranians are willing to negotiate in good faith," he said before leaving the US, "we're certainly willing to extend the open hand."

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