America Lost India. Without a Trade Deal, It May Lose Its Next War Too

Pawan Deshpande

Source Link

Weakening America-India ties are not only a diplomatic error, they will likely prevent the country from doing well in the event of a new war.

India’s deepening ties with Russia and China are more than a diplomatic setback. They strike at the heart of America’s ability to prevail in the next major conflict. Without India as a manufacturing and strategic partner, the United States risks losing the kind of industrial edge that once made us unstoppable. Trade talks between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi may offer a reprieve, but only if Washington seizes the opportunity.

In World War II, America prevailed because of its industrial base. In the next one, it will fall short, and that’s why India matters. Between 1940 and 1945, American factories produced nearly 300,000 aircraft, 124,000 ships of all types, and 86,000 tanks. Ford retooled a plant for cars to one for bombers, turning out one B-24 an hour. General Motors shifted seamlessly to machine guns and engines. This adaptability, fueled by a vast labor pool of unemployed workers, immigrants, and women entering the workforce, was its decisive advantage.

That manufacturing prowess no longer exists in America. From pandemic supply shortages to depleted missile stockpiles in Ukraine and chronic naval shipbuilding delays, its industrial fragility is now undeniable. If the United States faces a multi-theater conflict with a peer adversary tomorrow, its factories can’t keep pace.

Its workforce problems are just as acute. Skilled machinists, welders, and technicians are retiring faster than they can be replaced. Defense contractors already face shortages for current projects, let alone the surge capacity a major war would require. Restrictive immigration policies have left us without the skilled labor that once fueled its wartime industries.

These weaknesses would be troubling in any era, but they are especially dangerous now, as the nature of war itself is changing. The Ukraine conflict has made clear what the next era of war will look like. Drone warfare is more about scale than sophistication. Inevitably, swarms of cheap drones can overwhelm even the best defenses. Victory will go to the country that can produce the most drones at the lowest cost. On this front, China already dominates. China holds a 70 percent share of the global drone market, and its manufacturers depend on Chinese components.

Why India Is Building Its Own Fifth-Generation Warplane

Brandon J. Weichert

Source Link

India’s AMCA project—slated to enter service in 2035—is more than a fighter jet. It is also a symbol of technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project represents a pivotal leap in the nation’s aerospace ambitions, aiming to develop a homegrown fifth-generation stealth fighter jet. As global tensions rise, with India forced to abandon their original plan to acquire US F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation warplanes—and with some weariness on New Delhi’s part to purchase the Russian-made fifth-generation plane, the Su-57 Felon—India’s AMCA is poised to enhance India’s air superiority and reduce reliance on foreign military imports.

Launched under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), this initiative underscores India’s push for self-reliance in defense technology. The AMCA was formally approved in 2023 with an initial funding of $1.8 billion for prototype development. By 2025, though, the project has accelerated, with prototypes expected to roll out by 2027 and with first flight targeted for 2028.

This stealth fighter will join an elite club dominated by the US F-35, Russia’s Su-57, and China’s J-20, marking India as the fourth nation to field such advanced aircraft.

The AMCA’s Key FeaturesYear Introduced: Not yet introduced (anticipated 2035)

Number Built: 0

Length: 18 m (59 ft 1 in)

Wingspan: 11.13 m (36 ft 6 in)

Weight: 27,000 kg (59,525 lb) MTOW

Engines: Two modified GE F414 afterburning turbofan engines

Top Speed: 2,600 km/h (1,600 mph)

Range: 1,620 km (1,010 mi) combat range

Service Ceiling: 20,000 m (65,000 ft)

Loadout: One 23mm GSh-23 cannon; 14 hardpoints; approx. 7 tons payload capacity

Aircrew: 1

The soft power of British royalty

Eliot Wilson

Source Link

When Prime Minister Keir Starmer paid his first visit to President Trump in the Oval Office in February, the stakes were high. Starmer, a stiffly self-righteous human rights lawyer from the progressive left, did not seem to have much in common with the bloviator-in-chief. Yet everyone was aware that the immediate future of the “special relationship” was on the table. For Britain, the stakes could not be higher.

The prime minister had a secret weapon. Capitalizing on Trump’s opening bonhomie, he produced a letter to the president from King Charles III.

“This is a letter from the king,” Starmer explained. “An invitation for a second state visit. This is really special. It’s never been done before.”

It was an uncharacteristically folksy, cracker-barrel performance, but it achieved exactly what the prime minister had hoped for. Trump was delighted. “The answer is yes,” Trump replied. “Your country is a fantastic country.”

No one in London had been able to take Trump’s positive attitude as a given. The meeting between the two leaders had promised any number of traps and hazards, but the opening bid of a missive from the 76-year-old hereditary sovereign of the United Kingdom had been decisive. The state visit will take place in a few days, from Sept. 17 to 19.

It is not entirely accurate that a second state visit has “never been done before.” Certainly, Trump is the first American president to be invited twice, but President Raymond Poincaré of France visited Britain in 1913 and 1919. Six crowned heads of Europe have also made two state visits. But there was enough truth in what Starmer said to make it plausible and persuasive, recognizing that Trump adores setting new precedents.

The British monarchy represents soft power at its peak. It is fashionable at the moment to take cynicism as a touchstone and imagine that realpolitik of a brutal and transactional kind represents sophisticated thought. This is the philosophy that has seen political scientist John Mearsheimer attract a loyal and contrarian following for his argument that NATO and the U.S. are ultimately to blame for the war in Ukraine.

Trump may not like India, but US tech giants do Story by

Samrat Sharma 

Source Link

Imposing a tariff as high as 50 per cent and asking the European Union to slap a tariff of up to 100 per cent makes it clear that US President Donald Trump does not hold India in high regard. American tech companies, on the other hand, seem to value India and are investing heavily. Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, Lam Research, and Google have recently announced or made deals worth $14 billion in India. Meta has also pledged to invest $100 million in collaboration with Reliance.

RISE OF INVESTMENT IN INDIA

Exponential growth in the artificial intelligence space has led to a significant rise in greenfield investments - foreign direct investments made by companies to launch business operations abroad. Eighty per cent of the greenfield projects in digital sectors between 2020 and 2024 were in the Global South. Of the 10 countries, most were in Asia. And within Asia, the highest recipient was India: $114 billion in digital economy sectors, according to UN Trade and Development.

With $74 billion, Malaysia was the second-highest recipient. Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Mexico, China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Thailand followed. Interestingly, it is the United States that leads the greenfield investment in digital economies in the Global South. The US invested $193 billion, followed by Taiwan at $61 billion, China at $51 billion, Singapore at $26 billion, and South Korea at $25 billion in 2020–2024.

By gaining a sweet spot in global tech investment, India attracted 3.1 per cent of the overall foreign direct investments of the world during 2020-24. It was two per cent during 2010–14, 0.6 per cent during 2000–04, and 0.2 per cent during 1990–94. China, too, gained share in global FDI. Its share rose from eight per cent in 1990–94 to 11.6 per cent during 2020–24.

From tanks to hashtags: South Asia’s new age of regime change

Mak Khan

Source Link

Not long ago, the fate of governments in South Asia was decided in the barracks. Generals whispered in midnight meetings, tanks rumbled into capitals by dawn, and radio stations announced “new orders” with military precision.

From Islamabad to Dhaka, it was a grimly familiar theater: coups carried out under the watchful gaze of Washington or Moscow, each side installing pliant allies in the great Cold War chess game.

That age of overt coups has ended. In its place, a subtler model has emerged—one that does not march, but trends. Regime change is now live-streamed, hashtagged, and algorithmically amplified. Smartphone-wielding protesters, often middle-class youth, become the vanguard.

Their fury is magnified by platforms designed to reward spectacle over substance. Armies, once the protagonists, now linger in the wings, stepping in only when popular momentum has made resistance impossible.

Foreign powers no longer ship weapons to generals; instead, they bankroll NGOs, amplify activists and subsidize influencers who can seed narratives at viral speed.

This is the “social media coup”: cleaner, less obviously authoritarian, and superficially democratic. Yet beneath the surface, it can be even more corrosive than the crude coups of old.

Across South Asia—Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan—governments have fallen or teetered under the weight of digital mobilization. Even India, the region’s elephant, cannot entirely ignore the tremors.

The question now is not whether South Asia is vulnerable to externally nudged upheaval, but whether these digitally engineered revolts leave anything behind but chaos.

Dynasty to meme in Sri Lanka

China keeps tight grip on rare earths, costing at least one company 'millions of euros'

Evelyn Cheng

Source Link

The European Chamber of Commerce in China said at least one of its members is "losing millions of euros" due to Beijing's curbs on rare-earth exports.

China controls the majority of the global rare-earth supply chain, giving Beijing leverage in trade talks.

The chamber also called on China to address several pain points for businesses as the country prepares its next five-year plan.

Mineral explorers hoping to meet the growing demand for rare earths are vying for a slice of nearly $1 billion in Brazilian funding to help make their projects a reality in a country with the largest reserves after China.

BEIJING — Beijing still isn't giving foreign companies access to critically needed rare earths, according to the European Chamber of Commerce in China.

At least one member has lost "millions of euros" as a result, the ECCC told reporters Monday.

The nearly 25-year-old business organization declined to share the name of the affected company, but said that other members still didn't have clarity on a consistent process for accessing the minerals.

Rare earths are a category of minerals that are critical for a swath of products from cars to semiconductors. China controlled over 69% of rare earth mine production in 2024, and nearly half of the world's reserves, according to the U.S. Geological Survey.

Beijing has leveraged this control in trade talks with the U.S. and other partners. Since late last year, China has ramped up its restrictions on exports of rare earths, even demanding proof that they will not be used for military purposes. China started issuing single-use export licenses following a mid-May trade truce with the U.S.

A spokesperson for German automaker Volkswagen said its "supply of parts containing rare earths is stable, and we are not experiencing any shortages. Our suppliers are continuously working with their subcontractors to obtain the necessary export licenses."

Chinese triad: a nuclear family affair

Source Link

Beijing parades its nuclear trinity for the first time as a show of strength and as anything but subtle warning to the United States and its regional allies.

This blog post was first published on Military Balance+ on 5 September 2025

If there was any lingering doubt as to the status of China’s intent to field a nuclear triad of land-, sea-, and air-launched systems, this was dispelled for good on 3 September during a parade celebrating the 80th anniversary of victory in the Second World War.

Chinese state media’s coverage of the parade in Beijing was explicit in drawing attention to the fact, describing the parade as unveiling ‘the nuclear triad for the first time’. Amid the plethora of conventional and nuclear systems officially debuting was the People’s Liberation Army Air Force JL-1/惊雷-1 (CH-AS-X-13) – a nuclear-tipped aeroballistic missile whose appearance suggests that it is reaching squadron service.

Low-quality imagery of the missile had previously emerged, but the parade marked the JL-1’s formal debut. The systems Beijing decides to show at parades have in the past been already in service, fielded with trial units, or in the final stages of development. The carrier for the JL-1 is the Xian H-6N variant of the H-6 bomber, the former identifiable by the large semi-recessed bay in the fuselage to house the missile. Five H-6Ns were displayed in the fly-by accompanying the ground parade but were not shown carrying the JL-1.

The aeroballistic missile was shown alongside the land-based DF-31BJ (CH-SS-10 mod X) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which is likely the silo-based version of the weapon with which Beijing has now populated many of the silos in its three missile fields. The triad on show was completed by the JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20) submarine-launched ballistic missile, which is currently being fielded aboard the Type-094 submarine class.

The scale of the parade, and what was shown, appeared intended to have both a domestic propaganda purpose and to provide an unambiguous message to international rivals as to the extent of Beijing’s nuclear and conventional capabilities. The event was not just about showing off but was also aimed at ‘aggressively asserting influence’, according to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, speaking at the IISS 2025 Prague Defence Summit.

Russia’s Black Sea Failures Are Lessons for the South China Sea

Lieutenant Roland M. Kolwitz, U.S. Navy

Source Link

Without any navy to speak of, Ukraine has been able to destroy one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, has pushed the Russian Navy out of the Sea of Azov, and is even forcing Russia to abandon its port at Sevastopol in annexed Crimea.1 Ukraine has used two main capabilities to achieve these victories: coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) as one-way attack boats.2 These systems are not revolutionary and have been used regularly by smaller forces to attempt to achieve victory over larger and more technologically advanced ones. Iran in the Strait of Hormuz and the Houthi rebels in the Red Sea have both implemented similar strategies to offset their lack of naval power.3

In the Black Sea, Ukraine’s effectiveness is amplified by Russia’s failure to modernize its navy.4 For this reason, it is important to avoid drawing broad conclusions about the effectiveness of USVs and CDCMs or to declare them a revolution in naval warfare. Nevertheless, they could be force multipliers for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea.

Ukraine’s successes against Russia in the Black Sea are largely thanks to its use of unmanned surface vessels, such as the Magura V (opposite page) and the Sea Baby (above right), and shore-fired cruise missiles (above left). Such a strategy could be a powerful force multiplier for U.S. forces in the event of a conflict with China in the South China Sea. AFP; Armed Forces of Ukraine; Security Service of Ukraine

Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles

One of Ukraine’s early naval victories in the ongoing war was the sinking of the Moskva, a Russian Soviet-era guided-missile cruiser.5 Ukraine used two shore-launched Neptune antiship cruise missiles—subsonic Ukrainian-built missiles similar to the U.S.-built Harpoon—to destroy the Moskva.6 This was a particularly surprising victory, as the Moskva was thought to be a capable air-defense platform with multiple 3D air-search radars. Some have argued she was busy tracking a drone when the missiles were fired; however, it should not have been hard for the Russian flagship to track and engage three air contacts at once.7 The Moskva also may have been blind to the in-bound missiles because the fire-control radar for her surface-to-air missiles did not appear to be operating.8 While this would explain why the cruiser could not defend herself with her arsenal of surface-to-air missiles, it does not explain why she did not use other countermeasures or engage with any of her six AK630 close-in weapon systems.9

Courage, Not Extremism, Must Define the Middle East’s Future

Ahmed Charai

Source Link

Peace will not be handed to us by extremists or slogans. It will be built by courage—the courage to confront terror and to replace despair with dignity.

The recent emergency summit in Doha, bringing together Arab and Muslim leaders, revealed both the promise of regional leadership and the contradictions that threaten it. I have no problem with the gathering itself, nor with speeches condemning Israel’s strike on Doha, which targeted Hamas operatives hiding on Qatari soil. But what left me speechless was the sight of the Iranian president arriving in Doha—the same leader whose regime had violated Qatar’s sovereignty just months ago—now speaking of “national sovereignty” and “solidarity against the aggressor.”

What peace is he talking about? The peace financed by Iran when it arms Hamas, which on October 7 murdered innocents in their homes, kidnapped children, and brutalized women? The peace imposed by Hezbollah, a fascist movement holding Lebanon hostage? The peace of the Houthis, who devastate their own people? Or the peace of the Revolutionary Guard, which jails and executes anyone who resists the mullahs’ rule?

Qatar does not need this kind of partnership. With its global investments, its skyscrapers rising over Doha, and its role in high-tech ventures in the West, Qatar has already demonstrated what forward-looking leadership can be. It has the capacity to serve as a positive influence, one that looks to the future of its own people and to new generations across the region.

That potential is not theoretical. Qatar’s leaders played a vital role in negotiating the release of hostages held by Hamas. They proved they can shape outcomes when they choose to act. My hope is that this influence will now extend beyond the battlefield of hostages—to freeing minds and communities from the grip of extremism, from the dead end of radical ideologies, and onto the path of modernity, development, and prosperity.

Qatar’s leaders are capable of this, and history would remember them for choosing the path of reason and light.

Iran’s Perilous Path Back to Power

Afshon Ostovar

Source Link

Ayear of sustained losses has left Iran’s grand strategy in ruins. The near destruction of Hamas in Gaza, the evisceration of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria deprived Iran of the proxies it had long relied on to threaten Israel. As a result, in June, Israel was able to conduct its 12-day war against Iran unencumbered by worries about regional escalation. That war demolished a long-held assumption about Iranian deterrence—the belief that Tehran could retaliate effectively against overt, direct attacks on its territory. More practically, it destroyed the country’s main air defenses, degraded its ballistic missile capabilities, and set back its nuclear ambitions.

Iran’s regime will certainly attempt to claw back its lost power. But regional developments since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s persistently assertive military footing have made it much harder for Tehran to take steps that could shore up its influence, such as rearming Hezbollah. Until Iran can defend its own territory, it may be impossible for it to rebuild its proxies or sprint for a nuclear bomb in a way that does not put the theocratic regime at further risk of collapse.

In the near term, Iran is likeliest to try to rebuild its military defenses by expanding its partnership with China. Until recently, Beijing has resisted backing one faction over another in the Middle East. But China’s calculus could be changing, too. It may well see fresh opportunities in assisting Iran to regain some of its diminished strength, given the rising tensions between Israel and Arab states—especially following Israel’s early September strikes on Hamas’s leadership in Qatar.

OBSTACLE COURSE

The Assad regime’s ouster last December—and the anti-Iranian stance adopted by Damascus’s new rulers—constitutes an underappreciated obstacle to Tehran’s ability to reconstruct its regional proxy strategy. For decades, Syria directly provided rockets and missiles to Hezbollah, the crown jewel of Iran’s proxy network; Assad also allowed Iran to smuggle weapons to Lebanon through Syrian territory. Although that effort met resistance after the outbreak of Syria’s civil war as Israel began to regularly conduct strikes on weapons storehouses in Syria and on convoys facilitated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran still managed to keep Hezbollah armed.

Echoes Of 1967 War: Will Israel’s Qatar Airstrikes Finally Forge An Arab Military Bloc? Can They Match The Israeli Might?

EurAsian Times Desk

Source Link

When Israeli jets struck a residential compound in Doha last week, reportedly aiming at Hamas’s political leadership, the impact spread far beyond Qatar. The attack reignited old debates across the Arab and Islamic world.

Within days, leaders gathered in Doha. Their message was not only anger over the strike but also a renewed call to revisit an idea that has surfaced repeatedly over the years: a joint Arab military alliance, sometimes referred to as an “Arab NATO.”

This time, the conversation unfolded in the middle of a crisis. At the emergency summit, the proposal moved to the forefront. For some, the strike served as proof that Arab states need to stand together militarily. For others, it was a reminder of the divisions and rivalries that have kept such efforts from turning into anything more than words on paper.

Doha Summit: From Discussion To Potential Action

The Arab-Islamic summit opened in Doha on Sunday, and the question of a joint military alliance was at the center of the agenda.

Regional reports suggested that delegates were prepared to consider forming a combined military force, a move that, if it happens, would represent one of the most significant steps toward Arab military coordination in decades.

This push did not come out of nowhere. Just days before the Doha summit, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had secured Arab League approval for a joint security framework, giving the discussions a concrete foundation. The timing made the talks feel less like abstract debate and more like a possible turning point.

Egypt, with its large military, is positioning itself as the anchor for the alliance. Cairo is presenting itself as the natural center for any Arab NATO, a role that would strengthen its influence across the region.

Qatar Rethinks the U.S. Security Umbrella

James Durso

Source Link 

After Israel’s attack on a Hamas meeting in Doha, Qatar, U.S. President Donald Trump expressed regret over the incident and directed Secretary of State Marco Rubio to finalize a defense cooperation agreement with Qatar.

When Qatari officials heard that news, they probably wondered, Why bother?

Qatar is a Major Non-NATO Ally of the U.S. and a major customer for American defense equipment. In recent years Doha provided financial support to Hamas (with U.S. and Israeli connivance), mediated U.S.-Taliban peace talks, hosted America’s Afghan refugee resettlement facility; mediated ceasefire talks between Israel and the militant group Hamas; hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, Al Udeid Air Base (upgraded at Qatar’s expense); gifted the U.S. a Boeing 747-8 aircraft as an interim Air Force One, agreed to purchase 210 Boeing aircraft and over 400 GE Aerospace engines, and entered an agreement that will “generate an economic exchange worth at least $1.2 trillion,” according to the White House.

What did Qatar get for all it did? It got the distinction of being attacked by both Iran and Israel in one year, though Trump helpfully 'assured' Qatar that Israel won't attack again, though he was immediately repudiated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Qataris reportedly received Israeli and American assurances in August that Hamas officials would not be targeted on Qatari soil, but that promise was broken.

Why did the attack happen now?

James M. Dorsey of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore noted, “In the last six weeks, Hamas has largely agreed to proposals put forward by the mediators, Qatar, Egypt, and the United States.” This may have motivated Israel to strike - before it was presented with a deal that would be hard to refuse.

Following Israel’s Strike in Qatar, Trump Should Reset the US-Qatar Relationship

Natalie Ecanow

Source Link

The US-Qatar relationship is in dire need of a reset, and Israel’s recent actions provide a great opportunity to do just that.

Washington can’t seem to quit Qatar. Secretary of State Marco Rubio made that much clear when he departed Israel for Doha on September 15. Speaking to members of the press, Rubio doubled down on the administration’s view that “Qatar can play a very key role” in negotiating an end to the war in Gaza.

Nearly two years have passed since the White House tapped Doha to mediate between Hamas and Israel. Despite repeated failures at the negotiating table, successive US administrations have refused to sideline Qatar, a longtime sponsor of Hamas that has repeatedly blamed Israel for the war the terrorist group started.

Israel issued a stark reminder of the patronage Qatar has offered Hamas when it targeted the terror group’s leadership in Doha on September 9. Qatar’s relationship with Hamas goes back to the 1990s, when Doha offered the group sanctuary following its expulsion from Jordan. Hamas chose Syria but, in 2012, established a home away from home in Doha. Qatar continues to shelter Hamas’s politburo and, at least until the outbreak of the current war, shoveled millions of dollars into the terrorist group’s coffers.

Qatari officials maintain that Hamas opened an office in Doha following “a request from Washington to establish indirect lines of communication with Hamas,” and that Doha has “no reason to close” the office if it can facilitate diplomacy. A former Obama administration official said in 2023 that there had been no such request.

Whatever the truth, the arrangement hasn’t worked to secure peace. Qatar has repeatedly failed to exercise leverage over Hamas, and neither the Biden nor Trump administrations have done anything about it. It’s past time for Washington to hold Qatar accountable for taking advantage of US trust.

Trump’s AI Action Plan Doesn’t Go Far Enough on National Security

Anthony De Luca-Baratta, and Joshua Curtis

Source Link

The Trump administration’s AI Action Plan seeks to curb lethal AI proliferation, but conflicting priorities on innovation, security, and open-source models risk undermining its effectiveness.

A year ago, we argued in The National Interest that artificial intelligence (AI)-powered autonomous weapons threaten to destabilize the international system. Technological and battlefield developments over the previous year have made the threat even more urgent. The need for US leadership to slow the spread of lethal AI is clearer now than ever. The Trump administration’s AI Action Plan is a welcome step in the right direction, though it suffers from internal tensions that could ultimately render it counterproductive.

The Double-Edged Sword of AI

By lowering the barriers to acquiring high levels of precision firepower and enabling automated kill chains, AI-powered autonomous weapons are rebalancing the battlefield, allowing smaller, poorer actors to better exploit asymmetric advantages. For instance, loitering munitions—First Person View (FPV) drones enhanced by AI to autonomously identify and engage targets even without GPS or humans in the loop—have allowed the Ukrainian military to partially close its firepower gap with Russia. Similarly, cheap drones, including loitering munitions, may end up reinforcing Taiwan’s daunting geography against a Chinese amphibious invasion.

But the digitization of warfare underlying this reordering is a double-edged sword. Low barriers to acquisition and operation of high levels of precision firepower will enable dangerous actors like terrorist organizations, criminal networks, and rogue states. Furthermore, actors of all kinds using AI-enabled autonomous weapons—but especially low-capacity actors that most benefit from the AI weaponry revolution—are likely to instigate more unintended escalations.

A case in point: in late 2024, Russia had already used Iranian Shahed-136 drones to regain the upper hand on the frontlines and devastate Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Iran, for its part, had begun using these drones to terrorize Israeli civilians.

Why Russia Has Slowed Its Advance in Ukraine

Stavros Atlamazoglou

Source Link

Russia’s recent change in tactics has led its grinding offensive to slow down in eastern Ukraine—but has also resulted in a notable decrease in monthly casualties.

The progress of the Russian military has slowed down as the Ukrainian forces are mounting successful counterattacks in several portions of the frontline.

Overall, however, the Russian forces continue to advance along several axes of advance, pressuring the Ukrainian defenders.

Russia’s Advances Are Slow, but Steady

In its latest intelligence estimate on the Ukrainian conflict, the British Ministry of Defence assessed that the Russian rate of advance in August had dropped after several months of increasingly larger territorial gains.

“Russian Ground Forces (RGF) likely seized between 450 and 500 sq km of Ukrainian territory in August 2025, a moderate decrease from the approximately 500-550 sq km in July 2025, and the approximately 550-600 sq km taken in June 2025. This follows month on month increase from March 2025 to June 2025,” the British Ministry of Defence estimated.

Russian progress has not come cheaply. In August, the Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian separatist forces lost approximately 28,790 men killed or wounded, according to Western estimates—losses of slightly under 1,000 casualties per day.

“It is likely that counter attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the vicinity of Pokrovsk, Kupiansk and Sumy contributed to the moderate reduction in the rate of Russian territorial gains in August 2025,” the British Ministry of Defence’s intelligence estimate added.

However, despite the decrease in Russian territorial gains over the past few weeks, it is clear that the Ukrainian forces are gradually losing territory to the advancing Russian military.

Russia Is Changing Battlefield Tactics in Ukraine

Pentagon Moves To Replace Weapons It Used In Operation Midnight Hammer

Joseph Trevithick

Source Link

U.S. military aircraft employed GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) and laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rockets around the operation to strike Iranian nuclear facilities earlier this year, according to Pentagon budget documents. It does seem somewhat unlikely that APKWS IIs were used directly in the strike mission, which we will address directly. Compared to what we’ve learned about the B-2 stealth bombers that dropped GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster bombs during Operation Midnight Hammer, much is still unknown about the contributions of other U.S. forces to the mission and in the lead-up to it.

The Pentagon has previously said that 125 aircraft, including the B-2s, took part in Operation Midnight Hammer. President Donald Trump has also said that the force package included stealthy F-22 Raptor and F-35 fighters, as well as dozens of aerial refueling tankers. The B-2s dropped 12 MOPs in total on Iran’s deeply buried nuclear facility at Fordow and another two on an underground site at Natanz, according to U.S. officials. The Iranian nuclear facility at Isfahan was also subjected to a barrage of more than two dozen Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles fired from a single submarine, very likely the Ohio class guided missile submarine USS Georgia.

A graphic with details about Operation Midnight Hammer that the Pentagon first showed at a briefing the morning afterward. DOD

“As the Operation Midnight Hammer strike package entered Iranian airspace, the U.S. employed several deception tactics, including decoys as the fourth and fifth generation aircraft pushed out in front of the strike package at high altitude and high speed, sweeping in front of the package for enemy fighters and surface to air missiles,” Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a press briefing the morning after the operation, but did not elaborate. “As the strike package approached Fordow and Natanz, the U.S. protection package employed high-speed suppression weapons to ensure safe passage of the strike package with fighter assets employing preemptive suppressing fires against any potential Iranian surface-to-air threats.”

The decline of the West and the rise of ‘the Rest’ will lead to a new world order

Amitav Acharya

Source Link

As Donald Trump rampages through the global economic system with his tariff war and throws the United States’ commitment to NATO into serious doubt, fears – even panic – are mounting about the collapse of world order. Part of the anxiety stems from how suddenly these changes appear to have unfolded. In the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis, what was often described as the US-led liberal international order seemed alive and well, though not without challenges.

Leading liberal internationalists believed not only that US primacy would endure, but that the world order it built would, in the words of the Princeton professor John Ikenberry, ‘survive and thrive’, and co-opt even its challengers, like China. Now, Trump’s second presidency gives fresh ammunition to the argument that he is destroying not only the liberal order, but the very notion of world order itself. It would be a mistake, however, to see things in such extremes.

Globalization is not disappearing, but taking a new, eastern turn.

As I argued when he first entered the White House, Trump is not creating this crisis – he is accelerating forces that had already undermined the old order. Yet, any new order emerging from the present crisis will retain some features of the old. For now, some comfort is to be found in the fact that no other country is as yet emulating Trump’s ‘reciprocal tariffs’ or supporting his contempt for multilateralism.

Globalization, too, is not disappearing, but taking a new, eastern turn. Traditional forms of global governance were already growing rusty. Now they are being joined by new forms which will become more salient in the post-Trump era. Global governance, however, is not going to disappear or be radically altered.

Beyond the West

Let’s start by challenging the assumption that the fate of world order depends on the US and western global dominance. Many of the key ideas underpinning world order – and the rules and institutions sustaining it – have come from a range of nations and regions, not just the West. These principles include the independence and territorial integrity of states, free trade and freedom of the seas, diplomacy and peace treaties, and moral values and humanitarian norms. Neither the decline of the West nor America’s withdrawal alters this historical reality.

The Battle for Pokrovsk Understanding the ground war in Ukraine

Lawrence Freedman

Source Link

Donald Trump’s optimism that Putin was ready to meet directly with Zelenskyy to find a way to end the war did not last long. Moscow, disappointed that Trump failed to turn the screws on the Ukrainians, has now returned to its default strategy of procrastination. The Kremlin says that the two men might meet but only when the necessary conditions for peace have been reached: one might have assumed that the point of the meeting would be to create the conditions. It is not clear what further options exist for a diplomatic breakthrough and Trump might just walk away. Adding to Russian chagrin, some progress has been made on security guarantees with a role for the US, even if minor, though all of this will only come into play in the unlikely event of a deal.

Which means that Ukraine must now keep fighting until Putin realises that he can’t meet his objectives by military or diplomatic means while the costs of trying to do so accumulate. One key priority must be to improve Ukraine’s defences against long-range drone and missile attacks, which are directed increasingly at civilians. Ukraine retaliates but, in contrast to Russia, the main focus of its long-range drone strikes recently has been Russia’s oil refineries. It has scored some substantial hits, taking out over ten percent of capacity, leading to shortages and long queues at petrol stations. It has also just unveiled a new long-range missile – the Flamingo – with a range of 3,000 km. I will return to this aspect of the war soon.

This post will consider the battle for Pokrovsk, which is important for the wider battle for Donetsk, the territory that Russia covets and which Trump suggested that Zelenskyy abandon to placate Putin. It has been in the headlines most recently because of a Russia breakthrough towards Dobropillia, north of the city, which now appears to have been thwarted. As I noted in my previous post, in arguing against proposals to concede Donetsk the Ukrainians put a big effort into countering the persistent narrative that they might as well give up this territory for the sake of peace because if they do not the Russians will press on and eventually take it by brute force.

The battle demonstrates how chaotic the fighting in Ukraine is now becoming, how different it is from standard perceptions of static lines, and why it will be incredibly challenging for Russian troops to achieve Putin’s objectives by force.

By Land or by Sea Continental Power, Maritime Power, and the Fight for a New World Order

S. C. M. Paine

Source Link

Great-power competition once again defines international relations. But the exact contours of today’s contest remain the subject of debate. Some observers emphasize ideological precedents from the Cold War. Others focus on changing military balances. Still others highlight leaders and their choices. In truth, modern conflicts over the international system flow from a long-standing, if unrecognized, disagreement over the sources of power and prosperity. The dispute originates from geography, and it has produced two antithetical global outlooks: one continental and the other maritime.

Are geopolitical fractures jeopardising cross-border justice?

Stefano Betti

Source Link

International judicial cooperation against crime is emerging as one of the casualties of current worldwide geopolitical tensions. Divergences between states, reflected in a wide spectrum of behaviours – from verbal hostility to the suspension of diplomatic relations and resorting to armed conflict – are having a significant impact on extradition and mutual legal assistance (MLA) channels. The significance of this problem is that the success of countries’ efforts in cooperating internationally and mitigating cross-border crime depends greatly on the proper functioning of these modalities.

This issue often remains under the radar of current-affairs coverage, mainly because it tends to be confined within legal proceedings that are either confidential or less likely to attract public attention compared to the commercial and economic impacts of ongoing upheavals. Yet this directly affects states’ ability to confront increasingly invasive forms of transnational organised crime such as human trafficking, environmental crime and different forms of cybercrime. These are often considered a threat to international security.

Criminal-justice treaties in the crosshairsThe status of the Council of Europe (CoE) Criminal Law Convention on Corruption offers a telling example of global tensions spilling over into the criminal-justice domain. The convention was formally denounced by Russia in 2023 in response to its sidelining in the CoE’s Group of States Against Corruption. Tellingly, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that continued ‘Western discrimination’ may lead to the denunciation of more CoE conventions. This could affect the entire spectrum of European treaties in the fields of MLA, extradition and money laundering, among others.

Another notable example is the decision by Hong Kong in 2020 to suspend the MLA and the extradition agreements that it had concluded with several Western countries in the 1990s and 2000s – including Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States – and to shelve a pending treaty with France. This move came as a retaliatory measure after these states had themselves suspended the same agreements with Hong Kong following the enactment of its controversial National Security Law.

Gaza’s interim future

Wolf-Christian Paes, Hasan Alhasan, Sascha Bruchmann

Source Link

The future of Gaza and the two-state solution looms over the United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) 80th session, scheduled to take place in New York in September 2025. Despite overwhelming support at the UNGA, the United States has vetoed resolutions for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza at the UN Security Council, bringing the international body to a standstill. To signal their displeasure at Israeli policy, several Western states, including Australia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom, have announced their intent to recognise Palestinian statehood at the UNGA’s upcoming session.

With international frustration mounting over Israel’s indifference to the humanitarian toll of its ongoing war in Gaza, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and several European states, including France and Norway, has sought to apply pressure on Israel and Hamas to accept a ceasefire in Gaza and make progress toward a permanent two-state solution. During a high-level UN conference held in July 2025, against which US President Donald Trump’s second administration unsuccessfully lobbied world leaders, the coalition endorsed a key proposal for the interim governance of Gaza once a ceasefire is secured. The ‘New York declaration’ outlines key principles regulating civilian control and administration, an international peacekeeping and stabilisation mission, and recovery and reconstruction of Gaza – all part of a phased transition toward full Palestinian statehood. show more

Governing GazaNoor Hammad

The declaration envisages drastic changes in Gaza’s governance, but questions regarding the mechanics of implementation abound.

The declaration calls for the establishment of a ‘transitional administrative committee’ under the umbrella of the PA, with both Arab states and Hamas’ politburo having previously indicated a preference for technocratic, rather than political, appointees. It is unclear, however, how long the committee would remain in control, although Egypt initially proposed that it should operate for six months before transferring power to the PA proper. Internal capacity-building, as provided by an international mandate, would be key here as Gaza’s civil service has been decimated by the war. A further point of uncertainty concerns the nature and extent of collaboration between the transitional committee, the PA, and the international stabilisation mission, as well as relevant multilateral organisations operating in Gaza. Much here will depend on the mandates of the committee and stabilisation mission. show more

Russia Is Losing the War—Just Not to Ukraine Story Jeremy Shapiro

Jeremy Shapiro 

Source Link

Vladimir Putin, we’ve been told since the start of the war in Ukraine, has goals that extend well beyond territory: He seeks to upend the post–Cold War international order, to reconstruct the Soviet sphere of influence, and to allow Russia to reassume its rightful position as a world power equal to the United States. Bilateral summits, such as the recent one between Donald Trump and Putin in Anchorage, offer a symbolic recognition of that aspiration—as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov highlighted not so subtly by showing up in Alaska wearing a CCCP (U.S.S.R.) sweatshirt.

But summits and sweatshirts won’t make Russia a superpower. Only a credible show of strength can do that. The war in Ukraine was meant to supply this, but it has instead become a slow-motion demonstration of Russia’s decline—less a catalyst of national revival than a case study in national self-harm.

Moscow has devoted considerable resources, manpower, and political will to its invasion of the country next door. In purely military terms, it has managed not to lose and may even be eking its way toward some sort of attritional victory in the Donbas. But even if it consolidates its territorial gains and keeps Ukraine out of NATO, Russia will have won only a pyrrhic victory, mortgaging its future for the sake of a few bombed-out square kilometers. In other words, Russia is effectively losing the war in Ukraine—not to Ukraine, but to everyone else.

In virtually any likely end-of-war scenario, Ukraine will remain a hostile, Western-armed neighbor—a permanent sucking wound on Russia’s western flank. Europe will continue to embargo Russian goods and build its energy future without Russia’s Gazprom. The Russian army, having shown itself moderately adaptable to modern warfare, will nonetheless be gutted of equipment, bereft of its best cadres, and reliant on foreign suppliers. To reconstitute it will take years and many billions of dollars. By then, Russia’s supposed mastery of modern drone warfare will probably be obsolete.

While Russia obsesses over Ukraine, its erstwhile friends and clients are quietly slipping away. In Africa, Wagner’s heirs struggle to hold their franchises together, and China and the Gulf states are buying up influence, drawing from far deeper pockets. In the Middle East, Moscow’s old claim to be an indispensable broker appears totally vacuous.

The Road to a NATO-Russia War

Andrew Latham

Source Link

Key Points and Summary – Russia’s mass strike on Ukraine spilled into NATO airspace when 19 drones crossed from Belarus into Poland, forcing intercepts and an Article 4 consultation.

-Warsaw, backed by allied F-35s, ISR and German Patriot units, downed multiple drones but stopped short of triggering Article 5.

U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. John Ryan, 555th Fighter Squadron F-16 Fighting Falcon pilot, prepares to take off for a routine training flight at Aviano Air Base, Feb. 17, 2022. The flights will support NATO’s enhanced air policing mission; integrate with allies and partners in the Black Sea region in an increased defensive posture along NATO’s border and to reinforce regional security. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Brooke Moeder)

-Analysts see a deliberate probe of integrated air defenses, a salami-slice test of resolve, and exploitation of ambiguity via Belarus.

-The real danger is escalation by accident—debris casualties, mistaken identity, or a panicked shot. The prudent course is firm interceptions, redlines and layered air defense, paired with restraint to deter further tests without stumbling into war.

Russia and NATO: War Coming Soon?

In the early hours of September 10, 2025, nineteen Russian military drones violated Polish airspace before being downed. Airports in Warsaw, Rzeszów, Lublin, and Modlin were closed, and parts of a downed drone struck a residential building in the Lublin region.

Nobody was injured, but the incursion forced NATO for the first time into direct kinetic confrontation with Russia. The direct political effect of the violation of Poland’s airspace was that it provoked Warsaw to invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which allows any member to request consultation if its territorial integrity or security is threatened.

Drums of war echo in UN Security Council

Krzysztof Mularczyk

Source Link

The US has told the UN Security Council that it would “defend every inch of NATO territory” after a suspected Russian drone incursion into Poland.

Poland brought down about 20 Russian drones in its airspace on September 10 with the backing of aircraft from its NATO allies. It was the first time a member of the alliance was known to have fired shots in aggression during the Ukraine war.

In a demonstration of support for Poland, acting US Ambassador to the UN Dorothy Shea, speaking at a session of the UN Security Council, said: “The United States stands by our NATO allies in the face of these alarming airspace violations.”

Shea also spoke about how Russia has intensified its bombing campaign against Ukraine since US President Donald Trump met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska in mid-August as part of his bid to broker an end to the Ukraine conflict.

“These [Russia’s] actions, now with the addition of violating the airspace of a US ally, intentionally or otherwise, show immense disrespect for good-faith US efforts to bring an end to this conflict,” Shea told the UN Security Council.

Her statement came in the aftermath of Trump’s comments on September 11 when he speculated that the drone incursion over Poland may have been by mistake.

The US earlier joined western allies in a collective statement on September 12 to express concern about the incident and accuse Moscow of violating international law and the founding UN Charter.

The statement also called on Russia to stop “its war of aggression against Ukraine” and desist from further provocations.

Russia defended itself at the UN Security Council meeting by saying its forces had been attacking Ukraine at the time of the drone incursions and that it had not intended to hit targets in Poland.

What if artificial intelligence is just a “normal” technology?

 Álvaro Bernis

Source Link

Opinions about artificial intelligence tend to fall on a wide spectrum. At one extreme is the utopian view that AI will cause runaway economic growth, accelerate scientific research and perhaps make humans immortal. At the other extreme is the dystopian view that AI will cause abrupt, widespread job losses and economic disruption, and perhaps go rogue and wipe out humanity. So a paper published earlier this year by Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor, two computer scientists at Princeton University, is notable for the unfashionably sober manner in which it treats AI: as “normal technology”. The work has prompted much debate among AI researchers and economists.

From Smartphone to Streets, Will Nepal’s Gen Z Revolution Deliver Change?

Meena Bhatta

Source Link

In an unprecedented 36 hours, the Himalayan Republic of Nepal experienced one of the most dramatic political upheavals since the abolition of the monarchy in 2008. What began as a peaceful, youth-led demonstration against corruption and nepotism spiraled into a nationwide resistance. Nepal’s streets and digital spaces converged into a powerful force of dissent resulting in the toppling of K.P. Sharma Oli’s government and the appointment of Sushila Karki, a former chief justice, as the head of the interim government.

Karki is Nepal’s 14th prime minster in the 17 years since Nepal was declared a republic. She is also the first ever woman to hold the post. Her interim leadership now has the mandate to undertake governance reform and hold fresh elections to gather a new public mandate.

What distinguishes this upheaval from prior political movements in Nepal is its genesis and character. Unlike Nepal’s past political movements, the Gen Z revolution was not designed in party offices or tea shops, but rather born online, in the glare of smartphone screens through social media and digital networks. This Gen Z Revolution represents more than an outburst of anger. It represents a significant shift in Nepal’s political structure, where digital tools empower and drive the young to challenge deep-rooted political imbalances.

The path ahead is far from straightforward forward, yet the uprising has planted a seed of hope for accountability, transparency. The fundamental question remains whether this revolution will produce genuine systemic change or fade into another cycle of instability. The real test hinges on translating the digital momentum into meaningful democratic and institutional reform.

The Global AI Rules Race: China’s Strategic Response to US Tech Dominance

George Gallwey

Source Link

Just as space dominance once symbolized global power during the Cold War, artificial intelligence now sits at the center of a high-stakes geo-strategic competition between the U.S. and China. But technological breakthroughs alone will not determine the outcome. A parallel battle over governance, in terms of who sets the rules, norms, and standards, may prove equally decisive in shaping not just AI, but the global balance of power.

In late July, China announced its Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Action Plan. The timing was conspicuously close to the Trump administration’s own recently released strategy, entitled Winning the Race. While Western attention has often focused on Beijing’s AI surveillance state and its drive for frontier-model supremacy, this plan signals a notable rhetorical, if not strategic, pivot. Increasingly, China now casts itself as a responsible global actor in contrast to a more isolationist and combative United States. By championing multilateralism and “shared governance” in AI, Beijing aims to embed its technologies and influence abroad before Washington can set the agenda. As Liza Tobin argued in her analysis of Xi’s global governance strategy, these moves are rarely ad hoc in nature. Rather, they form part of a systematic effort to reshape international norms and institutions in China’s favor. The AI plan should be read as a continuation of this broader project.

The US plan frames artificial intelligence as a transformative technology capable of shifting the global balance of power. It positions AI development and governance as a national security imperative, integrating domestic innovation, strategic partnerships, and foreign policy to safeguard American interests. A central pillar of the strategy is building a US-led alliance, promoting US-aligned safety standards, software, and hardware, and creating a web of interoperability that binds allies and partners to the American technology stack.

Here’s How Trump Can Prevent a War Over Taiwan

Jennifer Kavanagh

Source Link

China and the United States are closer than they’ve ever been to a war over Taiwan.

A dangerous feedback loop has set in over the past decade: Taiwanese defiance toward China provokes aggressive bluster from Beijing, leading to stronger rhetorical support for Taiwan in Washington. The self-reinforcing pattern repeats itself. Each time, it moves Taiwan more to the center of the U.S.-China relationship, increases the risk of conflict and provokes fretful analysis over what to do about this seemingly intractable situation.

This arc was not preordained. Nor is it immutable, and in Donald Trump, the United States has a norm-defying president uniquely positioned to reverse it.

The Trump administration’s best bet for avoiding war would be to boldly seek a fresh deal with China, restoring equilibrium across the Taiwan Strait by offering to dial back U.S. defense buildups in the region and putting Taiwan on notice that American military backup is neither assured nor boundless.

If that seems deceptively simple and logical, it’s because it’s worked before, to everyone’s benefit.

Taiwan has been a thorn in U.S.-China relations ever since Communist forces took control of China in 1949, driving the U.S.-backed Nationalists to Taiwan. China has never given up its goal of unifying the island with the mainland. In the 1970s, Beijing and Washington reached a nuanced compromise: The United States affirmed that the government in Beijing was China’s sole legal authority and acknowledged Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China. America also refrained from supporting Taiwan’s independence and limited contact with Taipei to unofficial channels, even while providing it with arms and other military backing.

This ambivalent balancing act proved remarkably successful, with the resulting stability allowing China, Taiwan and much of Asia to prosper. The United States benefited greatly from soaring trade and other cooperation with the region, and to this day Taiwan remains a vibrant, self-governing democracy.

Don’t Overestimate the Autocratic Alliance

Patricia M. Kim

Source Link

No moment captured the shifting global balance of power more vividly than when Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un walked in lockstep on the red carpet at China’s military parade in early September. The three autocrats, despite a long history of mutual suspicion, projected a show of unity against Washington. The message behind the carefully managed scene was unmistakable: China is at the center of a rising anti-Western bloc, while the United States is adrift—divided at home, faltering abroad, and rebuffed by its rivals.

U.S. President Donald Trump has made no secret of what he wants from each of the three leaders: a peace deal with Putin to end the war in Ukraine, a trade pact with Xi to rebalance the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship, and a summit with Kim to revive stalled diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. But all three have spurned his overtures. Instead of engaging on Washington’s terms, Kim, Putin, and Xi are now linking arms in Beijing, flaunting not only their growing willingness to challenge U.S. leadership but also their ability to do so in concert.

But beneath this show of solidarity, China, North Korea, and Russia remain uneasy partners. What the three countries have is a tactical alignment rooted not in trust or shared values but in overlapping grievances and necessity. History demonstrates that they are not natural allies. Each state remains wary of entrapment and is unwilling to subordinate its national interests to those of the others. And crucially, each still seeks something from the United States—leverage that Washington must wield wisely.

THREE’S A CROWD

The last time China, North Korea, and Russia aligned this closely was during the Korean War, which ended badly for all. Kim Il Sung, the grandfather of the current North Korean leader, invaded South Korea with Soviet and Chinese support. The gamble failed. North Korea became the isolated, impoverished pariah state it is today, while its southern rival, backed by the United States, flourished. For China, the intervention was costly, in both blood and treasure. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded, and scarce resources were drained from its economy, which was already battered by years of civil war and World War II. Worse, the war entrenched a permanent U.S. military presence on its doorstep and upended Beijing’s plans for Taiwan. Fearing a broader communist advance, the Truman administration reversed its hands-off approach and signed a mutual defense treaty with Taipei, indefinitely forestalling China’s goal of annexing the island, which remains unfinished business for China’s leaders to this day. For Beijing, the Korean War offered a sobering lesson: aligning with volatile partners, such as Pyongyang, out of ideological solidarity can incur enormous costs and generate long-term liabilities.