Europe’s desire for strategic autonomy is a ‘fait accompli.’ It just needs to decide what that means

François Diaz-Maurin

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At the Munich Security Conference last week, Europeans focused on meeting their own security needs in the face of continued threats from Moscow and rapidly eroding trust with Washington. Among the discussions, nuclear deterrence was high on the agenda, with several countries announcing bilateral talks on the issue.

But to achieve a credible deterrent to Russia that is no longer—or at least less—dependent on the United States capabilities, European countries will have to work out their different strategic visions. This process will include attempts to find common ground between two proposals for a strategic posture that would rely entirely on either conventional or nuclear deterrence to counter Russia’s threats. Those proposals, however, are insufficient. A European deterrence strategy will need to offer an integrated and holistic approach to the security of the continent.

Kremlin Struggles to Project Global Relevance Amid Peace Talks

Pavel K. Baev

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After inconclusive U.S.–Ukraine–Russia talks on February 17–18 in Geneva, Moscow is scrambling to keep U.S. attention. Washington extended sanctions on Russia for another year after the Kremlin offered frozen Russian assets to the “Board of Peace” and reportedly pitched $12 trillion in economic projects with the United States.

Facing economic strain at home and battlefield setbacks in Donbas, the Kremlin is trying to project global relevance, including rhetorically supporting Cuba amid U.S. sanctions and joining naval exercises with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

Russia’s attempts to project global reach may expose its limited leverage beyond Ukraine, weakening Putin’s hand ahead of further peace talks. Moscow’s ability to delay or reshape diplomatic outcomes could narrow significantly as sanctions continue to impact Russia’s economy and military gains stall.

Trump’s Vision for Greenland and the Emerging World Order

Erdem Lamazhapov

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President Donald Trump’s renewed bid to acquire Kalaallit Nunaat, also known as Greenland, is not adequately explained by the immediate benefits that possession of this country would give to the United States. Instead, this crisis is better explained in terms of the Trump administration’s political project, which seeks to reinvent the United States’ identity as a great power in an emerging post-rules-based international order. During his Davos speech, US President Donald Trump reaffirmed his desire to acquire Kalaallit Nunaat, citing that the US is a “great power, much greater than people even understand”. Trump also underscored that the US needed Greenland because it is a “part of North America, on the northern frontier of the Western Hemisphere,” which is a “core national security interest of the United States of America”. 

Trump reaffirmed the same security logic that was presented several months earlier, in the Trump administration’s November 2025 National Security Strategy which proclaimed the entire Western Hemisphere as the US sphere of influence under a “‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine” (White House 2025, 5). Just several weeks later, the Trump administration intervened in Venezuela. The Trump administration’s sphere of influence discourse is not an epiphenomenon but the driver of the US’ newfound expansionism in the Arctic.

How NATO is Surviving Donald J. Trump

Martin A. Smith

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By the end of the first year of President Donald Trump’s second term in the White House, descriptions of systemic crisis in – or even predictions of the end of – the transatlantic security alliance were commonplace. And yet NATO had not only survived, but by January 2026 was taking on new roles and responsibilities – playing a more important role in facilitating continuing western (including US) military assistance to Ukraine, and potentially also with regard to Greenland, and perhaps wider Arctic security. It was certainly true that Trump’s brusque and unpredictable approach to international diplomacy led to some bruising encounters with allies and partners. These proved short-lived, however, and were managed short of inflicting serious or durable damage on the core NATO institution. The analysis here seeks to explain how and why.

The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) places no automatic obligation on its signatories to offer military assistance to allies under attack. Article 5 merely requires each signatory to take “such action as it deems necessary”, leaving the door open in theory for them to take no enforcement action. Its content nevertheless suggested that signatories wanted something more solid and permanent than a traditional military alliance.

Myanmar: The ‘In-Between Space’ and Its Implications

K. Yhome

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Myanmar presents a perplexing case of a state that played a prominent role in global and regional affairs soon after its independence from colonial rule, but today it is mired in protracted internal conflicts and struggles to remain visible internationally. There is no dearth of literature elucidating the entrenched nature of Myanmar’s complex conflict dynamics and its ties with the outside world. 

Despite the rich body of work on Myanmar’s prolonged conflicts and its external role and engagements, a dimension that has not received much attention in existing literature is: How the emergence of regions impacted Myanmar’s identity and its internal conflict dynamics? This article views Myanmar through the lens of ‘in-between space’ and explores the process of regionalism in the making of ‘in-between space’ and the impacts of ‘in-betweenness.’ The notion of ‘in-between space’ is employed in various disciplines such as in the field of architecture, where ‘in-between spaces’ are viewed as ‘transitional spaces’ (Tzortzi 2024, 6685-6686) that lie on the boundary of two spaces, where the edge blurs the boundary between spaces. Similarly, in anthropology, the term ‘liminality’ describes an ‘in-between state’ of an entity that transforms into a new entity. In International Relations, the notion of ‘in-between space’ is used in the context of borderlands and frontiers between nation-states where sovereignty is contested and the line dividing role and responsibility blurs (Meier 2019, 3-4).

NATO Chief Says Europe Is ‘Dreaming’ if It Thinks It Can Defend Itself Without U.S.

Jeffrey Gettleman

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Mark Rutte, the secretary general of NATO, warned Europe on Monday that it could not defend itself without the United States in remarks aimed to address the growing worries that the United States and Europe are pulling apart over President Trump’s ambitions for Greenland.

“If anyone thinks here again that the European Union, or Europe as a whole, can defend itself without the U.S., keep on dreaming,” Mr. Rutte told members of the European Parliament in Brussels. “You can’t. We can’t. We need each other.”

Drones ‘change everything’ about combined arms combat, US Army aviation chief says

Zita Ballinger Fletcher

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HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — Drones are profoundly changing the Army’s approach to aviation and combined arms training, Maj. Gen. Clair A. Gill, commanding general of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence, told Military Times in an interview. During the Army’s first annual Best Drone Warfighter Competition in Huntsville, Alabama, the Fort Rucker-based aviation chief shared his insights about the impact of drones on military doctrine.

“The application of drone technology is only limited by your creativity,” he said. “It’s this constantly evolving game of technology and craftsmanship to create the desired effect that you want on the other end.” While Army aviators are no strangers to unmanned systems, drones being fielded today are immensely different from those developed over the last two decades, many of which tended to be larger and required more manpower to operate, Gill said.

Flipping the Script: Redesigning the US Air Force for Decisive Advantage

Timothy A. Walton & Dan Patt

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Despite the United States Air Force’s (USAF) stellar performance in recent operations, a geriatric fleet of aircraft, low readiness rates, and dismal prospects in a potential future conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) mean the service could decline within a decade from invaluable to incapable. More importantly, a weak Air Force would face major challenges defending the homeland, maintaining strategic deterrence, and projecting power in support of the nation, which could increase the likelihood the PRC starts a war and defeats the United States and its allies.

The Air Force needs to adopt a new approach to shaping its force that addresses the changed character of warfare, most consequentially against the peer threat of the PRC, and creates the capacity and flexibility to address global demands. The US Air Force’s traditional approach, involving expeditionary and serial power projection, is increasingly insolvent against the PRC for a variety of reasons: China can target in mass the gradual deployment of forces to the Indo-Pacific; forces are vulnerable at airfields once they arrive; the PRC could achieve its aims of aggression, such as invading Taiwan or seizing other allied territory, before US forces could roll back enemy defenses to attack the PRC’s center of gravity; and if the conflict continued, the Air Force would struggle to replace its losses, much less grow in size.1 Absent viable shifts, our analysis indicates that within a decade China could defeat the United States and its allies in a major campaign—even if the Air Force received additional funding for aircraft, weapons, or readiness.2 This suggests that more of the same approach to designing and fielding an Air Force will not work well in the future.

USFK Aerial Encounter With China Underlines the Hidden Danger of OPCON Transfer

James JB Park

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In the current structure of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) and its operational planning architecture, unilateral military actions that risk unnecessary third-party escalation – particularly involving China or Russia – are exceedingly rare. The system is deliberately designed to ensure tight coordination, strategic clarity, and alliance cohesion.

Yet on February 19, an unprecedented exercise unfolded: dozens of United States Forces Korea (USFK) fighter jets patrolled the overlapping zones of South Korea’s and China’s Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) over the West Sea (Yellow Sea). The move, widely interpreted as directed at the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), led to a China-U.S. aerial standoff.

Four years into its full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia is feeling the effects

Steve Rosenberg

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At first glance, Yelets in winter looks like something from a Russian fairy tale.nFrom the embankment I spy the golden domes of Orthodox churches and, down below, ice fishermen dotted along the frozen river. But in this town, 350km (217 miles) south of Moscow, the fairy tale feeling is transient. On the riverbank I spot an army recruitment billboard. It promises a one-off sum equivalent to £15,000 to anyone who'll sign up to fight in Ukraine.

Close by there's a poster of a Russian soldier taking aim with a Kalashnikov. "We're there where we need to be," the accompanying slogan declares. The Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Outside Russia it was widely seen as an attempt to force Kyiv back into Moscow's orbit and to overturn the entire post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.

The Tragedy of Great-Power Foreign Policy

Stacie E. Goddard

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For almost 30 years after the Cold War ended, American foreign policy elites argued that the United States should use its unmatched military and economic power as a force for transformation. For some, this meant working to expand the role of multilateral institutions such as NATO, promoting unfettered free trade, and protecting human rights worldwide, even by using military force. Others believed that the United States should wield its military power as democracy’s spear by subduing violent terrorists, overthrowing tyrannical regimes, and deterring potential revisionist powers. These views, however, were two sides of the same coin: underlying both was a belief that the United States must maintain its dominant position in the world and, when necessary, wield its might to defend liberal rights.

But after the failures of U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of rival great powers, and the weakening of American democracy at home, this era of relative bipartisan consensus has ended. U.S. foreign policy is in disarray, with no obvious vision for what should come next. For Emma Ashford, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, the path forward lies in what she calls “realist internationalism.” Grounded in a long tradition of realist thought, this strategy places the national interest—not ideology—at the center of foreign-policy making and views the pursuit of democratization abroad as unnecessary, even foolish.

After the rupture: Middle powers and the construction of new order

Anthony Dworkin

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The international system is no longer held together by a single dominant vision of order. The norms, institutions and power structures that shaped global governance after the second world war, later broadened and deepened in the post-cold war moment, are eroding without a clear successor. The US is retreating from its role as architect and guarantor of that order—imperfectly exercised in any case—while simultaneously asserting its dominance through unilateral action and displays of force in Greenland, Iran and Venezuela. At the same time, China and Russia are advancing competing models of order.

In this context, rising and middle powers are actively pursuing new strategies to secure their autonomy and expand their influence. They are challenging established hierarchies, reshaping economic and connectivity networks and building alternative forms of cooperation that do not rely on Western leadership and involvement; some formats are in fact specifically built to circumvent or exclude Western structures and stakeholders. From infrastructure corridors to conflict management and development finance, these players and their actions are generating new sources of order in an increasingly entropic system.

Bonus Podcast Episode: Is There an Endgame in Ukraine?

Michael Kofman

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February 24 marks the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After Moscow’s initial onslaught, Ukrainian counteroffensives, and slow Russian gains since, the war has settled into a brutal pattern of attrition, adaptation, and endurance. Ukrainian cities are rationing electricity, as the Ukrainian military struggles to muster the manpower and munitions needed to gain a decisive edge. Meanwhile, the battlefield has become a hellscape of drones and artillery fire—with no clear breakthrough for either side in sight.

Michael Kofman has been one of the sharpest observers and analysts of the changing nature of the war, from Russia’s troop buildup in late 2021 to the present, in the pages of Foreign Affairs and elsewhere. He has also considered the geopolitical implications of each new phase of fighting—what the continued threat of a belligerent Russia means for the West, and how Ukraine’s allies can prepare it for sustained conflict. Now, as the war enters its fifth year, Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that “Russia retains battlefield advantages, but they have not proved decisive, and more and more, time is working against Moscow.” “Yet ending the conflict on terms acceptable to Ukraine,” he writes, “will not be an easy feat, either.”

Four years into its full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia is feeling the effects

Steve Rosenberg

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Posters offering large sums of money for joining the army are everywhere in Russia At first glance, Yelets in winter looks like something from a Russian fairy tale. From the embankment I spy the golden domes of Orthodox churches and, down below, ice fishermen dotted along the frozen river. But in this town, 350km (217 miles) south of Moscow, the fairy tale feeling is transient. On the riverbank I spot an army recruitment billboard. It promises a one-off sum equivalent to £15,000 to anyone who'll sign up to fight in Ukraine.

Close by there's a poster of a Russian soldier taking aim with a Kalashnikov. "We're there where we need to be," the accompanying slogan declares. The Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Outside Russia it was widely seen as an attempt to force Kyiv back into Moscow's orbit and to overturn the entire post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.

Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia

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Some 55,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, while the BBC has confirmed the names of almost 160,000 people killed fighting on Russia's side.

Four years after Russia's full-scale invasion, here's a look at the situation on the ground in Ukraine.

Russia grinds forward in the east

Analysts at the US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW), say Russia took about 4,700 sq km (1,800 sq miles) of territory in 2025 - an area about twice the size of the city of Moscow - although Russia claims to have taken 6,000 sq km. In eastern Ukraine, Moscow's war machine has been churning mile by mile through the wide open fields of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions - also known as the Donbas - surrounding and overwhelming villages and towns.

A war foretold:how the CIA and MI6 got hold of Putin’s Ukraine plans and why nobody believed them

Shaun Walker

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William Burns had travelled halfway around the world to speak with Vladimir Putin, but in the end he had to make do with a phone call. It was November 2021, and US intelligence agencies had been picking up signals in the preceding weeks that Putin could be planning to invade Ukraine. President Joe Biden dispatched Burns, his CIA director, to warn Putin that the economic and political consequences if he did so would be disastrous.

Fifteen years earlier, when Burns was US ambassador in Moscow, Putin had been relatively accessible. The intervening years had concentrated the Russian leader’s power and deepened his paranoia. Since Covid had emerged, few had been granted face time. Putin was squirrelled away at his lavish residence on the Black Sea coast, Burns and his delegation learned, and only phone contact would be possible.

Musk cuts Starlink access for Russian forces - giving Ukraine an edge at the front

Paul Adams

Source Linik

Evidence is mounting that Elon Musk's decision to deny Russian forces access to his Starlink satellite-based internet service has blunted Moscow's advance, caused confusion among Russian soldiers and handed an advantage to Ukraine's defenders. But for how long? And what can Ukraine's military achieve in the meantime?

"The Russians… lost their ability to control the field," a Ukrainian drone operator who goes by the callsign Giovanni told us. "I think they lost 50% of their capacity for offence," he said. "That's what the numbers show. Fewer assaults, fewer enemy drones, fewer everything." mIt's still early to assess the impact of a change that only came into effect at the beginning of the month, after Ukraine's defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, asked Elon Musk's SpaceX company to block Russian access to Starlink.

AI Safety Meets the War Machine

Steven Levy

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WhenAnthropic last year became the first major AI company cleared by the US government for classified use—including military applications—the news didn’t make a major splash. But this week a second development hit like a cannonball: The Pentagon is reconsidering its relationship with the company, including a $200 million contract, ostensibly because the safety-conscious AI firm objects to participating in certain deadly operations. 

The so-called Department of War might even designate Anthropic as a “supply chain risk,” a scarlet letter usually reserved for companies that do business with countries scrutinized by federal agencies, like China, which means the Pentagon would not do business with firms using Anthropic’s AI in their defense work. In a statement to WIRED, chief Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell confirmed that Anthropic was in the hot seat. “Our nation requires that our partners be willing to help our warfighters win in any fight. Ultimately, this is about our troops and the safety of the American people,” he said. This is a message to other companies as well: OpenAI, xAI and Google, which currently have Department of Defense contracts for unclassified work, are jumping through the requisite hoops to get their own high clearances.

From Seats to Sorties: Why the Pentagon Should Buy Software the Way It Buys (Some) Weapon Systems

Ben Van Roo

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That’s Boeing, talking about the C-17 Globemaster III, a plane it hasn’t manufactured since 2015 but still sustains under a $23.8 billion performance-based logistics contract. The Air Force doesn’t buy C-17 spare parts. It doesn’t buy repair actions. It buys readiness. The contract specifies a mission capable rate, a cost per flying hour, and maintenance man-hours per flying hour. Boeing figures out how to deliver. If parts last longer, if predictive maintenance catches failures before they happen, Boeing keeps the margin. If readiness drops, Boeing eats the cost.

This arrangement has been running since 1998. The fleet consistently beats its 82.5% mission capable rate target (87%+ and climbing). When the Air Force needed to evacuate 124,000 people from Kabul in a matter of days, the C-17s delivered. That’s not a PowerPoint metric, it’s a real-world stress test of the readiness PBL purchased, and it passed.

India is building AI, not just using it: Sam Altman at Express Adda, key takeaways

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OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, on Friday, February 20, painted a vivid picture of artificial intelligence (AI) and its implications for India and the world. The CEO sat down with Anant Goenka, Executive Director of The Indian Express Group, at Express Adda in New Delhi. In the hour-long interaction, the OpenAI executive touched upon a wide range of topics surrounding AI, from intensifying competition to talent wars to massive infrastructure investments to gargantuan levels of compute deemed necessary for frontier models.

Altman also expressed his views on India. He sees the fourth-largest economy as a rapidly emerging AI powerhouse with remarkable builder energy and the fastest-growing Codex market globally. He believes India should develop the complete AI stack vertically and democratise AI technology. Even though optimistic about India's potential to lead, he acknowledged job displacement challenges that require rapid adaptation.

Attacks on Indians Compromise Moscow’s Ability to Attract New Migrants

Paul Goble

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Moscow wants to replace departing migrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus with new ones from India. Attacks on Indians studying in Russia, however, make that an unlikely prospect, as Indian workers will hardly want to face such xenophobia. If Moscow cannot attract new migrants, however, many jobs that such workers now perform will go unfilled, adding to popular anger when streets are not cleaned or packages are not delivered and undermining the prospects for economic recovery even further.

This spread of Russian xenophobic attacks on Central Asians to Indians almost certainly presages more xenophobic attacks by Russians on the non-Russian quarter of the population, threatening Russia’s stability and even territorial integrity.

Tech Is the Bright Spot in India-U.S. Relations

Rudra Chaudhuri

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On Feb. 2, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi posted on X that after speaking with his “dear friend President Trump,” Indian goods imported by the United States would now enjoy a reduced tariff of 18 percent. U.S. President Donald Trump was similarly warm in his follow-up social media post, writing, “Out of friendship and respect for Prime Minister Modi and, as per his request, effective immediately, we agreed to a Trade Deal between the United States and India.” The president added that Modi was one of his “greatest friends.”

The broad contours of a deal were discussed on a phone call between the two leaders on Jan. 27. A joint statement was published on Feb. 6. A White House fact sheet authored by the Trump administration alone was published a few days later. Even now, the terms of the “deal” are being debated within India. Details are still being clarified; naysayers argue that the United States has essentially arm-twisted India into deprioritizing its relations with Russia.

The Quiet Collapse of Sovereignty How Pakistan’s Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis Are Converging

Frank Genovese

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Today, many critics argue that the country stands at the edge of a different reality. A reality where foreign alignment is no longer strategic cooperation but structural dependence. A reality where participation in global platforms branded as peace initiatives is seen not as diplomacy but as normalization of power politics. And most dangerously, a reality where domestic democratic outcomes appear increasingly entangled with external expectations.

This shift has not happened overnight. It has unfolded quietly through economic vulnerability, security partnerships, and institutional pressure.

Tajikistan Becomes Latest Victim of Cross-border Attacks from Afghanistan

Syed Fazl-e-Haider

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In late 2025, Tajikistan faced deadly cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, including November drone strikes killing five Chinese miners and a December 24 clash killing two Tajik officers. Militant groups, potentially including Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), operate from Afghan safe havens. This regional threat has prompted neighboring states to take a firmer stance against the Taliban and demand the eradication of terrorism. Consequently, Tajikistan is heavily fortifying its border by building numerous new security checkpoints in response to the danger stemming from Afghanistan. 

On December 24, 2025, five people—including two Tajik officers—were killed in an armed clash between Tajikistan’s security forces and three militants, who were trying to enter Tajikistan through the 870-mile-long border with Afghanistan (Radio Ozodi, December 24, 2025). Tajik authorities claimed it was the third militant act, or illegal border crossing, from Afghanistan into Tajikistan in December alone. The State Committee for National Security called for the Taliban to apologize over repeated cross-border attacks and criticized the Afghan government’s repeated irresponsibility in fulfilling its international commitments to ensure security and stability along the Tajik–Afghan border (Afghanistan International, December 25, 2025).

The Afghan Taliban’s ‘Digital War’ Against Pakistan

Rahim Nasar

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On October 9, 2025, Pakistan allegedly carried out airstrikes on the outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan, to target key leaders of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), particularly its head Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud (Hash e Subha, October 11, 2025). Pakistan repeatedly requested the Taliban authorities to refrain from harboring the TTP leadership inside Afghan territory (The News, September 17, 2025). The airstrikes were unofficially termed as an “act of compulsion” to defend Pakistani territory against militants and to undermine their hideouts. In response, the Taliban have launched a digital anti-Pakistan campaign.

Websites and social media are playing a leading role in strengthening the Afghan Taliban’s political and security narratives and anti-Pakistan rhetoric (Alemarah, March 14, 2025). Platforms such as Al-mirsaad, Omid Radio, the Kabul Times, Hewad, Anis daily, and YouTube channels including Yad and Maihan are actively promoting the Taliban’s core policy visions and marginalizing dissent (CPJ, August 13, 2025). The sophisticated media strategies and propaganda networks of the Taliban demonstrate the new Afghan government’s preparedness for digital media warfare in the age of communication.

Waste, Informality, And Circular Economy: Sustainability In Myanmar

Pyae Phyoe Mon

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Myanmar is increasingly dealing with environmental challenges as a result of urbanisation, a poorly functioning government, and an inadequate waste management system. However, an informal community of garbage collectors and junk shop operators offers minimal support for Myanmar’s recycling sector. In this context, the article takes a look at informal garbage collectors in Myanmar in terms of the circular economy concepts they have already adopted, the obstacles they confront, and how they may be integrated into a country’s sustainability strategy. This is a call for an inclusive circular economy that balances sustainability and social equality.

Energy Dominance With Chinese Characteristics

Carolyn Kissane

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Over the past two decades, China has transformed from a strategically weak energy power, dependent on imports of oil and gas, into the world leader in clean energy. Today, China produces the most wind turbines and solar panels, controls nearly every stage of global battery supply chains, exports electric vehicles at prices Western automakers struggle to match, and builds nuclear reactors at a breakneck pace. Even though none of these technologies were discovered in China and none of these industries originated there, the country has become the market maker and dominant player for each one. In other words, by commanding

Sen. Warner: The Idea That Trump Is Going To Launch A War With Just Israel Is Not In The Best Interest Of The U.S.

Tyler Stone

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KATY TUR, MS NOW HOST: And the Iranians are—by the way, we can put up some of the social media messages from the Ayatollah. The Iranians are saying, you know, they're making their own threats. It doesn't sound like we're in the middle of negotiations, frankly.

They're threatening their own force and sinking our warships and putting them at the bottom of the ocean. But I'm just hoping you can give this to me a little bit straighter, because you have a good relationship with Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State. You say you want to see plans for what's happening, so it sounds like you haven't seen anything much from this administration.

But how actually concerned are you that there are currently plans for a military operation in Iran? And do you believe that those plans are just, you know, pie-in-the-sky plans, or are they actual actionable plans that the administration is ready to use?

Qatar is not our friend Islamists in Doha are buying influence in the West on an almost unprecedented scale.

Joel Kotkin

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The key to the Qatari approach lies in embracing the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy of infiltrating Western institutions, including through the electoral process. But this does not translate into adapting to Western values, notes scholar Mark Menaldo. Instead, it advances an ideology developed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s intellectual founder, Sayyid Qutb, that ‘cannot accommodate democratic principles such as legal pluralism’ outside Islamic practice.

America was the main object of Qutb’s anger. He saw America, where he lived for a short time, as a society that was sick and obsessed with sex and materialism. Americans, he suggested more than half a century ago, were already at ‘a point of no return when it comes to moral redemption’. The Muslim Brotherhood calls not just for the destruction of Israel, but also for the replacement of corrupt, infidel Western democracy with an Islamic world order.

Exclusive: Douglas Macgregor on The Coming Air and Missile War with Iran Should the war come, the Trump White House may need an off-ramp...

Douglas Macgregor

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President Trump has assembled the largest concentration of U.S. Air and Naval power in the Middle East since Iraq was attacked in 2003. Dan Grazier, a retired Marine officer and senior fellow at the Stimson Center notes that there are now nearly 100 aerial refuelers in the Middle East in addition to the carrier strike groups and fighter aircraft suggesting a much larger operation of longer duration.

To experienced eyes, the composition of the attacking force suggests one strategic purpose: A level of destruction designed to induce the disintegration of the Iranian State and its society. Is “disintegration” with the use of standoff attack an attainable political military objective? Will Iran fall to pieces like a “House of Cards” under the crushing weight of U.S. and Israeli air and missile attack? The answers are unclear, but the political and military leaders who start air and missile wars are usually convinced that the application of massive firepower from a distance will be stunningly effective.

Donald Trump’s Iran Trap

Michael Doran

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For years, Donald Trump defined himself against the architects of the Iraq War. He cast Middle Eastern interventions as moral vanity projects paid for in American blood and treasure. He promised no more regime change. No more endless wars.

Yet as nuclear talks with Iran falter, American warships mass off Iran’s shores and bombers move into range. The president who rose by denouncing George W. Bush now finds himself reviving the logic of Bush’s Middle East policy.

How did we get here? More importantly: What does this moment reveal about American power—about what truly changes, and what never does?

The Tragedy of Great-Power Foreign Policy

Stacie E. Goddard

Source Link

For almost 30 years after the Cold War ended, American foreign policy elites argued that the United States should use its unmatched military and economic power as a force for transformation. For some, this meant working to expand the role of multilateral institutions such as NATO, promoting unfettered free trade, and protecting human rights worldwide, even by using military force. Others believed that the United States should wield its military power as democracy’s spear by subduing violent terrorists, overthrowing tyrannical regimes, and deterring potential revisionist powers. These views, however, were two sides of the same coin: underlying both was a belief that the United States must maintain its dominant position in the world and, when necessary, wield its might to defend liberal rights.

But after the failures of U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of rival great powers, and the weakening of American democracy at home, this era of relative bipartisan consensus has ended. U.S. foreign policy is in disarray, with no obvious vision for what should come next. For Emma Ashford, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, the path forward lies in what she calls “realist internationalism.” Grounded in a long tradition of realist thought, this strategy places the national interest—not ideology—at the center of foreign-policy making and views the pursuit of democratization abroad as unnecessary, even foolish.

China’s Afghan Gold Rush Is Turning Deadly

Sarah Godek

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Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, China has dominated Afghanistan’s mining industry. But the mines, primarily located along both sides of the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, are now turning into a lethal minefield. Chinese nationals have been increasingly targeted by militants, with the most recent incidents resulting in the death of five Chinese miners and workers in Tajikistan in cross-border attacks from northern Afghanistan. Chinese mining is spurring resentment from locals, while the miners are also caught in the crosshairs of both anti-Taliban feeling and border tensions.

Since the Taliban takeover, Chinese nationals have been in a gold rush in northern Afghanistan due to record high gold prices. Some of the efforts are legal, with both the Chinese government and Taliban leadership’s support, but many are ad hoc arrangements, at best informally sanctioned by local Taliban leaders. The influx of inexperienced investors has resulted in a sense of lawlessness, with local Afghans clashing with both Taliban and Chinese miners in the area mostly over mining rights.

The Erosion of Swiss Banking Reliability

Frank Salvato

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For more than a century, wealthy families did not simply deposit funds with Swiss banks—they sought a sanctuary. Switzerland offered what few jurisdictions could promise: neutrality in turbulent times, stability amid political swings, and a near-sacred respect for private capital and secrecy.

Switzerland’s standing as a financial sanctuary has floundered. Political gamesmanship and an increasingly aggressive compliance regime have combined to reshape the country’s once-unassailable brand. For global family offices and ultra-high-net-worth individuals who require discretion and predictability, Switzerland is no longer a viable choice.

The most dramatic rupture came in March 2023, when Credit Suisse collapsed and was forced into an emergency takeover.

Why Economic Pain Won’t Stop Russia’s War

Dr Richard Connolly

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One of the enduring beliefs of liberal internationalism is that economic pressure can substitute for military force. Sanctions, trade restrictions and financial isolation are supposed to raise the costs of aggression to such an extent that governments eventually revise their aims. This faith has been widely applied to Russia’s war against Ukraine. As Russia’s economy shows signs of strain – slowing growth, persistent inflation, high interest rates and deteriorating investment prospects – hopes periodically re-emerge that economic pain will compel Moscow to change course.

History, however, offers limited comfort for this view. Wars are rarely abandoned because they become expensive. They are more often terminated when states are defeated militarily, when ruling coalitions fracture, or when regimes themselves collapse. Economic pressure, where it matters, tends to operate through these channels rather than through persuasion alone. The experience of Russia today fits this broader pattern. Its economy is under strain, but that strain is unlikely to prove decisive.