Pakistan's Doctrine Of Military Led Diplomacy

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On the morning of November 5, 1971, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House to debrief after Nixon’s meeting the previous day with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Gandhi had come to Washington to press Nixon on the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in East Pakistan. Seven months after Operation Searchlight had begun, approximately ten million Bengali refugees had crossed into India. Gandhi wanted the United States to pressure Yahya Khan to stop the killing.

Kissinger was not sentimental about Gandhi either. “The Indians are bastards anyway,” he replied. “They are starting a war there.” Then, reflecting on what he felt he had achieved by receiving Gandhi cordially while conceding nothing: “While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted too. She will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn’t give her a warm reception and therefore in despair she’s got to go to war.”

Opinion – The Need for a More Assertive Diplomatic Stance from China on Iran

Sergio Villarroel

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In such a stalemate, the position of non-belligerent powers carries significant weight. Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz has transformed a local conflict into one with global consequences. Despite the relative caution shown by the major powers, the message from non-belligerent countries has been clear: these nations do not wish to be drawn into a conflict they did not start and in which there appear to be no clear gains, not even for the initiators. In this respect, China's stance is quite revealing.

At first glance, China's relatively passive attitude toward the conflict may seem somewhat perplexing. China and Iran have maintained close political and economic ties for decades. Despite the sanctions imposed, China accounts for approximately 80% of Iran's oil exports, and the Chinese yuan has become indispensable for the survival of the Iranian regime. Iran, for its part, is a major energy supplier for China and a strategically vital point within its Belt and Road Initiative.

Iran Resisted a Powerful Attacker. Taiwan Can, Too.

Daniel Byman and Seth G. Jones

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As the United States’ and Israel’s war with Iran grinds to an uncertain conclusion, observers have been quick to label it a win for China. The war has damaged American prestige around the world and angered countries and their populations whose economies face inflation and disrupted supply chains. But a closer look at Iran’s methods in resisting the United States reveals uncomfortable lessons for China as it weighs whether to follow through on its threats to take Taiwan.

Iran prevented the far more powerful United States from winning a war that, on paper, it should have walked away with. Iran weathered decapitation strikes and continued to counterattack, despite heavy bombing and inferior weapons. Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz is particularly instructive. Its navy had only dilapidated surface ships, a small number of diesel-powered submarines and numerous small, fast-attack speedboats. Iran’s air force had no advanced attack aircraft and no true bombers.

Europe Still Needs China Washington, Not Beijing, Is the Bigger Threat

Da Wei

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In 1969, with the Cultural Revolution raging at home and tensions rising abroad, Chinese leader Mao Zedong instructed four elder military leaders to study the relationships between China and the world’s two superpowers. Using Mao’s theoretical framework of “contradictions,” which states that the struggle between opposing forces is what drives history forward, they posited that the contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union was greater than that between China and the Soviet Union, which in turn was greater than that between China and the United States.

New Five-Year Plan Could Boost PLA Combat Power

K. Tristan Tang

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The Outline of its 15th Five-Year Plan contains new development priorities for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) through 2030, as well as a high degree of continuity with directives from previous plans. This iteration adds a section on military governance, in addition to the recurring focus on combat capability and military–civil fusion, and emphasizes military theory, military governance, and “spin-on” mechanisms for facilitating the integration of civilian technologies into the PLA.

The repeated appearance of policies that have existed for years highlights the limited effectiveness of past reforms. The Outline’s release has been accompanied by a number of specific regulations and implementation mechanisms to further obligate compliance with policy directives.

A New Era of U.S.-China Interaction: From Competing to Racing

Evan S. Medeiros

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This essay examines the U.S.-China trade war in 2025 as a possible turning point in the U.S.-China competition, arguing that the trade war created new power dynamics around a supply chain race that centers on leveraging chokepoints in critical minerals and advanced technologies.

Note: The author would like to thank the following colleagues for their superior research assistance: Jessica Shao, Davis Di, and Henry Wessel. This is the final essay in a series of four essays in 2025–26 on trade policy made possible by the generous support of the Hinrich Foundation.

Türkiye and Azerbaijan Contend With Potential Kurdish Role in Iran Conflict

Fuad Shahbazov

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Ankara has signaled from the outset of the Iran conflict that it would consider military intervention in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region should a Kurdish-led insurgency materialize. Türkiye views potential Kurdish militancy in Iran as a direct national security threat, strongly opposes any armed Kurdish role, and has signaled it could consider intervention to prevent Kurdish cross-border insurgency and regional destabilization.

Azerbaijan fears Kurdish involvement in the Iran conflict could destabilize Iran’s northwest, inflaming ethnic tensions and endangering Azerbaijani minorities in the region along with regional connectivity drives. Ankara and Baku coordinate diplomatically and militarily to contain spillover risks.

Why the Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Won’t Hold

Alexander Langlois

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Washington hosted the first direct talks between Israel and Lebanon since 1993 on April 14, marking the latest effort to expand the Abraham Accords and bring about a ceasefire. Hailed as a “historic opportunity,” the meeting comes amid major regional upheaval across the Middle East, with Lebanon among the main arenas. Yet the effort to normalize relations between the two eastern Mediterranean countries within the Abraham Accords framework, even if successful, is highly unlikely to resolve the conflict or the core issues plaguing the civilians—particularly Lebanese—caught in the crossfire of Israel’s ongoing conflict with Hezbollah.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio opened the meeting with a brief statement, describing the talks as a “process” with “complexities” that he hoped would produce an outcome in which “the people of Lebanon can have the kind of future they deserve, and so that the people of Israel can live without fear of being struck by rocket attacks from a terrorist proxy of Iran.” Recognition of the difficulties plaguing the long-running issue is certainly welcome, but the overall statement ultimately indicates why the overall approach misses the mark.

The Emirates on the Tightrope

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On Sunday, March 22, the United Arab Emirates’ foreign minister, Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan, maternal brother of UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, put on a brave face. The evening prior, President Donald Trump declared that if the Strait of Hormuz was not opened within forty-eight hours, he would order strikes on Iranian power plants. The announcement prompted Iran’s military command to specify that any such attack would bring destruction to the energy, IT, and water facilities servicing the American military within the Gulf. 

Because the power stations and desalination plants on the target list were public utilities, serving resident populations as well as the range of forces directed by US CENTCOM, Iran’s prospective retaliation imperiled practically everyone living in the UAE. Paying little heed to the fact that his own allies were driving the escalation—and, indeed, had started the war itself—the UAE’s foreign minister responded to Tehran’s threat by proclaiming, “We will never be blackmailed by terrorists.”

Three Scenarios for the Gulf States After the Iran War

Andrew Leber and Sam Worby

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The Middle East Program in Washington combines in-depth regional knowledge with incisive comparative analysis to provide deeply informed recommendations. With expertise in the Gulf, North Africa, Iran, and Israel/Palestine, we examine crosscutting themes of political, economic, and social change in both English and Arabic.

Amid a tenuous U.S.-Iran ceasefire, Arab Gulf monarchies are aiming to project strength. “We prevailed through an epic national defense . . . in the face of treacherous aggression,” Emirati diplomatic adviser Anwar Gargash wrote on X. Saudi-owned newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat emphasized the kingdom’s “intensive political consultations” with regional countries as leading to the present calm.

The Road to 2040: A Summary of Our Forecast

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In this glimpse into the next 19 years, we forecast several significant changes and disruptions in the global structure, which will be summarized here. However, one fact that will not change is the United States’ position as the sole global power. Over the next 19 years, it will adopt a new strategy to maintain power at the lowest possible cost. This strategy will resemble isolationism, in that the U.S. will not be drawn into regional military conflicts in any significant capacity. The U.S. will support its allies with supplies, training and some air power, however, it will contain regional problems in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, rather than directly and forcibly engaging. This will prove to be a prudent strategy and help the U.S. sustain its global dominance.

In Europe, the European Union as an institution will collapse or redefine itself as a more modest trade zone encompassing a smaller part of the continent. The current free trade structure is unsustainable because its members, particularly Germany, have grown overly dependent on exports. This dependency makes these economies extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in demand outside of their own borders. Germany is the most vulnerable country and will experience economic decline due to inevitable fluctuations in the export market.

Army wants unmanned ground vehicle for ‘last tactical mile’

Drew F. Lawrence

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U.S. Army Soldier, Spc. Byron Clutier, assigned to the 101st Airborne Division, operates a Hunter Wolf Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) during a training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, April 13, 2026. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Mariam Diallo)

The Army is looking for an autonomous, unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) to supply frontline troops and evacuate wounded personnel across “the most dangerous and logistically complex” segment of the battlefield, according to a government notice posted Thursday. “The last tactical mile” is the final space between support units and forward lines where equipment, ammunition, supplies and casualties pass “under the greatest threat from enemy observation and fires,” officials wrote.

Weaponized Hesitation: Authority and Tempo in Gray-Zone Competition

Jerae Perez

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The Ambiguous Encounter

Civilian vessels are historically treated with great respect and caution in contested maritime regions. However, civilian vessels are increasingly being coordinated to apply military pressure without crossing formal escalation thresholds. At first glance, these civilian encounters may appear legitimate but become militarily ambiguous when their deliberate movements impose obvious and severe military consequences.

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A sudden screen of fishing vessels does not show chaos. It shows a pattern. A cluster of civilian-flagged vessels adjusted course in coordinated fashion, narrowing the space around a partner nation patrol craft operating in contested waters. The maneuver was gradual, deliberate, and familiar. No weapons were visible. No collision occurred. But the intent was clear enough to anyone who had watched similar encounters unfold. Inside the watch floor, the maritime picture was stable. The vessels were tracked. The communications feed was live. Reporting from earlier in the week had warned of activity designed to pressure without provoking open conflict. Nothing about the situation was technically confusing.

The Dollar Was Never Just a Currency

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In August 1971, Richard Nixon went on television and ended the world. Not with a war, though wars were already in progress. With a sentence: the United States would no longer convert dollars to gold. The Bretton Woods order, which had governed international finance since 1944, collapsed in a televised press conference. The dollar, which every central bank was accumulating and every major currency was pegged to, was suddenly backed by nothing except the continued willingness of the world to treat it as if it were backed by something.

Washington had three years to figure out what that something would be. The answer was oil.

Is Ukraine winning the drone race?

Lawrence Freedman

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Barely six months ago it appeared that Russia was ahead in the drone race. I wrote last September about an elite unit established by the Russian Ministry of Defence, which acquired and developed new drone technologies, tested new tactics, and trained drone operators. They were well funded and professional, and worked systematically against Ukrainian supply lines. They were causing the Ukrainians major problems in holding onto their positions, for example in Pokrovsk. Russian forces prepared their offensives through ‘battlefield air interdiction’ (BAI) bringing together drones, glide bombs, artillery and missiles to target Ukraine’s logistics and drone operators.

It was a concerning time, for up to this point the Ukraine had led the drone race. It still demonstrated enormous innovative capacity, yet this might be undone by Russia’s ability to outproduce Ukraine and its ruthless and methodical tactics.

The US Air Force Employed Its AI-Enabled ‘WarMatrix’ System in March Wargames

Peter Suciu

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A two-week US Air Force wargame hosted in Alexandria, Virginia, marked the first large-scale use of the “WarMatrix” AI system to guide decision-making. Artificial intelligence (AI) continues to be among the biggest “game changers” in the modern era. It automates tasks, can be used to analyze vast amounts of data, and enhances decision-making. For those reasons and many others, AI is also impacting wargaming at all levels. For the “gamer” community, AI promises to deliver even more realistic and immersive experiences. For the US military, however, it can help better prepare warfighters for future conflicts.

The WarMatrix Reloaded

Last month, the United States Air Force put the AI-enabled WarMatrix wargaming platform through the paces. During a two-week-long event hosted by Systems Planning and Analysis in Alexandria, Virginia, more than 150 servicemembers participated in an AI-supported wargame—including participants from Pacific Air Forces leadership and the Air Force Warfare Center, as well as from the other branches of the US military and allied partners.

Russia After Putin – Analysis

Philip Wasielewski

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(FPRI) — Vladimir Putin, 73, has been Russia’s leader for over a quarter of a century and the driving force behind Moscow’s efforts to reassert control over its former Soviet and Tsarist empire. His eventual departure from the world stage will bring hope that a new Russian leader will end these imperial impulses and behavior. However, a review of Russian history, political culture, and elite and public opinion provides a clear warning that such hopes are unlikely to be realized. Russia after Putin is likely to be very similar to Russia under Putin.

As either president or prime minister, Putin’s 27 years in power are the second-longest period of post-Tsarist rule in Russian history after Joseph Stalin’s. Should Putin remain in office, he will surpass Stalin’s record of being in power for 30 years and 11 months in July 2030. There are no indications that, as long as he lives, Putin will give up power voluntarily.

Ukraine’s Success Still Needs Troops More Than Robots

Luke McGee

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Back in 2022, many people assumed, including U.S. officials and other credible thinkers, that if Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Kyiv would fall in a matter of days. After Ukraine proved unexpectedly resilient, there has been a rush to learn the lessons of Kyiv’s approach to war.

But while outsiders have focused on technological innovation such as drones and robots, Ukrainians say that military success is still built on a human foundation. Recruiting, and motivating, soldiers is an increasingly tough task in the fifth year of the war—especially as Ukraine battles demoralizing Russian propaganda. Despite moments like the seizure of a Russian position through unmanned vehicles, defending the homeland still needs human beings—and lots of them.

The Return of Power in a Fragmenting World

Eko Ernada

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For much of the post-Cold War era, globalisation was presented not merely as a trajectory but as a universal pathway, one that would integrate economies, societies, and political systems into a shared, increasingly cooperative order. This narrative, however, was never neutral. It reflected a particular historical moment shaped by Western dominance, in which globalisation appeared as both an economic process and a normative project. It promised a future where interdependence would soften geopolitical rivalry and constrain the exercise of power. 

Today, that promise appears less like an inevitability and more like a historical assumption under strain. Rather than dissolving geopolitics, globalisation is increasingly being reshaped by it. Building on Eswar Prasad’s analysis in Foreign Affairs (2026), this article argues that the current shift is not simply a disruption of globalisation, but a revealing moment, one that exposes how global economic integration has always been entangled with power, hierarchy, and strategic interest.

AI boom’s real profits are being made in Asia

Nigel Green

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A 58% jump in TSMC’s quarterly profit, announced on April 16, should change how investors think about the AI economy. Those numbers are not speculative, based on projections or optimistic. They’re realized profits, delivered here and now. A fourth consecutive quarter of record revenue reinforces the point. Advanced chips accounting for roughly 75% of wafer revenue make it even clearer.

I see this as a signal that the global conversation around AI is still missing where a lot of the real money is being made. Most of the attention remains fixed on the companies building AI models and applications. That narrative is dominated by the US, specifically Silicon Valley, where breakthroughs are announced and valuations are built around future potential.

Enhancing Mission Analysis: Integrating Artificial Intelligence Into the Military Decision-Making Process

Thad D. Weist, Skyler G. Kepley 

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This article details an experiment at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) testing the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents, built on the Palantir Vantage platform, into Step 2 (Mission Analysis) of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). A traditional 14-student human staff was compared against a two-student AI-augmented team using specialized AI personas (Overall, IPOE, Combined, and MA Brief agents) to generate running estimates, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) products, problem/mission statements, and other key outputs. 

The experiment concludes that AI serves as a powerful cognitive partner for accelerating Mission Analysis, particularly in text-heavy tasks and filling expertise shortfalls, but requires human validation for realism, graphics, and final judgment to enhance commander decision-making in modern warfare.

A retired general’s warning: America can’t fight the AI arms race on tech it doesn’t control

Robert F. Dees

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US Defense Secretary William Cohen swears in three American soldiers who are re-enlisting in the army during a visit to US Camp Stanley, 2nd Infantry Division, near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which divides the two Koreas, 40 kilometers north of Seoul 17 March 2000. Cohen is on a two-day visit to South Korea. (2nd R) is Major General Robert F. Dees, Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division.

The United States is entering a new phase of strategic competition—one where artificial intelligence is no longer an emerging capability, but a decisive element of military power. In this unfolding AI arms race, speed matters. Capability matters. But above all, control matters. That’s why the recent standoff between Anthropic and the Pentagon should concern anyone focused on America’s national security.

How the Pentagon Can Manage the Risks of AI Warfare

Paul Scharre

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The U.S. military struck more than 13,000 targets in the war on Iran, and used artificial intelligence to help plan operations. AI tools were used to synthesize intelligence, help prioritize targets, and build strike packages. The battle space is changing, but the age of AI warfare is already here. In addition to Iran, AI has been used for real-world operations in Ukraine, Gaza, and Venezuela. And next up is agentic warfare, in which AI systems are used as agents to take action. Over the next few years, these AI agents will be adopted by militaries to improve workflows in everything from logistics and maintenance to offensive cyberoperations.

Given all these capabilities, AI has the potential to dramatically change the cognitive speed and scale of warfare. Yet military AI comes with profound risks. The dangers go beyond the use of autonomous weapons, which was one of the sticking points in the recent dispute between the Pentagon and leading AI company Anthropic. General-purpose AI systems such as large language models are prone to novel failure modes, vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, and have even been demonstrated to lie and scheme against their own users.

Cyberwar’s New Frontier

Brianna Rosen

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In late 2025, the U.S. artificial intelligence company Anthropic announced it had disrupted a Chinese state-sponsored group that had used the company’s own technology to attack roughly 30 Western technology, finance, government, and critical infrastructure targets—all with minimal human supervision. It was the first reported AI-orchestrated espionage campaign. But it will not be the last. Just a few months later, Anthropic revealed that its latest model, Mythos Preview, had autonomously uncovered critical vulnerabilities in every major operating system and web browser. 

The Command Friction that the Army’s Division-Centric Warfighting Approach Must Overcome

Michael Carvelli

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A division major updates a common operational picture during a campaign in the Pacific. An engineer company leaves one mobile brigade combat team and joins another on a different island. A signal package shifts with it. The icon moves in seconds. The operation does not. The gaining brigade now needs lift, fuel, maintenance support, communications integration, protection, reception, staging, onward movement, and rehearsals. The losing brigade now needs replacement capacity or a revised scheme of maneuver. The sustainment architecture changes across distance and water. The task organization decision looked simple. It reshaped the operation.

Major General James Bartholomees and Major Greg Scheffler’s recent Modern War Institute article captures the logic of the Army’s renewed division-centric approach. The Army is rediscovering the division as the warfighting unit of action. Divisions now hold and synchronize more artillery, intelligence, signal, cyber, electronic warfare, engineer, and sustainment capability. Brigade combat teams receive mission-tailored packages built for a specific fight. Division-separate battalions function as warfighting headquarters. Supporting formations stay mobile enough to keep pace with maneuver. Those principles fit the battlefield the Army expects to fight on. They also illuminate friction that senior leaders should address now.

The Geopolitical Importance of India’s Shrinking ‘Red Corridor’

Jagannath Panda

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India’s long struggle against Left-Wing Extremism (LWE, or Naxalism) is an internal security challenge, but it is also a larger test. Could the Indian state could govern its own margins while aspiring to global power status?

For decades, the Naxal problem represented more than violence in remote forests. It reflected weak state presence, poor infrastructure, political neglect, uneven development, and the ability of anti-state forces in India to exploit local despair. It also invited external scrutiny and strategic interest from rival powers that understood a divided India would be easier to contain than a cohesive India. That is why the decline of the Red Corridor, previously stretching across 10 states, matters far beyond policing statistics. On April 8, the Ministry of Home Affairs said that “no district in the country falls under the LWE-affected category.”

China Was Once Buying Up Sri Lankan Ports. Now It’s India’s Turn

Kriti Upadhyaya

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Nearly 20 years after China stirred fears about “debt trap diplomacy” with its construction and takeover of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, India is stepping into the fold, acquiring a majority stake in Sri Lanka’s largest commercial shipyard. Last month, Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), India’s leading defense public-sector undertaking, responsible for the construction and repair of Indian warships, acquired a majority 51 percent stake in Colombo Dockyard PLC (CDPLC). CDPLC is Sri Lanka’s largest commercial shipyard, located inside Colombo Harbor on one of the world’s busiest east-west shipping lanes.

The transaction, valued at $26.8 million, marks the first international acquisition ever made by an Indian shipyard, public or private. It also suggests India’s strategic calculus in its own maritime neighborhood has structurally evolved. CDPLC is not a greenfield project. It is a functioning, 52-year-old commercial yard with four graving drydocks, capacity to handle vessels up to 125,000 deadweight tons, and a client base spanning Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In November 2025, before the acquisition closed, CDPLC secured the largest shipbuilding contract in its history (valued at $150 million) from France’s Orange Marine for two advanced cable-laying vessels. The yard services more than 200 vessels annually.

Expanding India’s Role in the International Semiconductor Ecosystem

Sujai Shivakumar, Hideki Tomoshige, and Jeffrey D. Bean

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India is positioning itself as an increasingly important node in the global semiconductor ecosystem, building on its established strengths in chip design and deep pool of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent. Backed by significant government initiatives and growing international partnerships, India is expanding capabilities in manufacturing, advanced packaging, and precompetitive research. These efforts come at a time when global semiconductor supply chains remain highly concentrated, creating opportunities for India to contribute to diversification and resilience.

At the same time, India faces structural challenges—including infrastructure gaps, regulatory complexity, and workforce constraints—that will shape the pace and scale of its progress. If successfully addressed, India could strengthen its domestic electronics sector, reduce reliance on imports, and play a larger strategic role in allied technology ecosystems. Its trajectory will have important implications not only for its own economic growth but also for global semiconductor supply chain resilience and geopolitical stability.

Cyberwar’s New Frontier How AI Agents Will Threaten Global Security

Brianna Rosen

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In late 2025, the U.S. artificial intelligence company Anthropic announced it had disrupted a Chinese state-sponsored group that had used the company’s own technology to attack roughly 30 Western technology, finance, government, and critical infrastructure targets—all with minimal human supervision. It was the first reported AI-orchestrated espionage campaign. But it will not be the last. Just a few months later, Anthropic revealed that its latest model, Mythos Preview, had autonomously uncovered critical vulnerabilities in every major operating system and web browser. In the hands of criminal networks, terrorist groups, or countries unconstrained by AI safety concerns, virtually any system

With Hormuz Closed, China Is Wiring the Globe’s Clean Energy Future

David M. Hart

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The blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has thrown many nations dependent on Middle East oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) into crisis. Beyond immediate measures to reduce energy consumption, the Iran war is now causing these countries to accelerate longer-term plans to build out solar and wind power, install batteries to balance their grids, and expand the role of electric vehicles (EVs).

An electric vehicle from Chinese company NAT is on display during the International Auto Show, in Pasay City, the Philippines, on April 11, 2026. Daniel Ceng/Anadolu/Getty Images

China is the clear winner. The country dominates all three industries and was already promoting them aggressively in export markets before the war. But this major advantage is only part of the postwar story. Beijing is also winning in other manufacturing sectors and electrical infrastructure writ large, and it is positioning itself to win the next generation of energy technologies. China’s progress may be good for the global climate, but as each day of hostilities passes and energy demands grow, it deepens the United States’ long-run geoeconomic challenge.

The Tech High Ground What It Will Take to Gain the Advantage Over China

Jake Sullivan

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The countries that prevail in great-power rivalries are those that adapt. Athens and Sparta and their allies constantly innovated so their navies could outperform one another. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union spent nearly two decades engaged in a space race. Now, technology is the central front in U.S.-Chinese competition and in the broader contest to shape the world, and the United States must adapt again. This rivalry is playing out across frontier sectors including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and clean energy. To prevail, Washington needs a clear definition of success and a clear and consistent strategy for how to achieve it.

For decades, U.S. policy toward China rested on a quiet but powerful assumption: Beijing was essentially running the same race as the United States, just a few steps behind. China was seen as a copycat—adept at imitation, lagging on innovation, and ultimately dependent on access to Western technology. The American lead was assumed to be durable, perhaps even self-sustaining.

How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

David Pierson

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That approach is now drawing renewed attention after U.S. officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by U.S. intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East. Chinese arms sales to Iran exploded in the 1980s and have all but vanished in the last decade to comply with a United Nations embargo and U.S. sanctions. Chinese support for Iran in recent years has instead come in the form of components that could be used in both civilian technologies as well as missiles and drones.

How the Iran war made China stronger

Ian Bremmer

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The conventional wisdom was that a destabilizing war in the oil-producing heart of the Middle East would badly hurt China, the world's leading oil importer, and its sputtering economy. It hasn’t worked out that way. So far, China is weathering the US-Israeli war with Iran better than many of its neighbors and looks set to emerge relatively stronger.

Unlike Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, who have launched wars against overmatched opponents only to face unwelcome surprises, President Xi Jinping has avoided unnecessary risks to position his country for long-term strength and stability. We saw Xi’s caution in his responses to both the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s structural economic weaknesses of recent years. We also saw it in Xi’s unwillingness to directly support Russia’s war in Ukraine, or even to recognize Putin’s territorial claims. Now we see it in Xi’s reluctance to criticize Trump’s bombing campaign against his allies in Tehran, or to come to Iran’s direct aid. The invitation for the US president to visit Beijing next month stands.

What the Iran War Means for the “Axis of Resistance”

Hamidreza Azizi

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In the final weeks before his death, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cast the mounting hostility of U.S. President Donald Trump in religious and explicitly Shiite terms. Rejecting calls for capitulation, he invoked the example of Imam Hussein—the third imam, or spiritual leader, of the Shiites—refusing to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad ruler widely associated in Shiite memory with tyranny and injustice. Defiance, in this light, was not simply a strategic imperative but a value rooted in history and identity.

Why “Mowing the Grass” Won’t Work in Iran

Mona Yacoubian

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At some point—whether sooner or later—major hostilities against Iran will come to an end. When the formal war with Iran concludes, Israel may hope that the United States would agree to pivot to a “mowing the grass” strategy against Iran—periodic attacks to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities and keep Tehran off balance. Yet this approach will not work. Instead, it will lay the foundation for prolonged regional instability and global disruption.

In search of an Iran war off-ramp, President Trump has signaled his desire for an exit strategy—whether through a successful ceasefire negotiation or by some other, yet to be announced, deus ex machina. His claims of regime change, entombed enriched uranium, and a devastated Iranian military set the stage for a near-term U.S. withdrawal from the conflict. Yet, the president has also highlighted the possibility that the United States could return to undertake “spot hits” on Iran as needed. In practice, such a plan could easily evolve into “mowing the grass” in Iran, enduring low-intensity conflict punctuated by more intensive interventions.