Nigel Gould-Davies
When Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, he expected a quick victory. His failure transformed the Kremlin’s main task from managing his re-election in 2024 to mobilising Russia’s human and material resources to win a major war of aggression. This fundamental policy shift has broken long-standing bargains with society and elites. It is also straining the resources needed to fight the war and maintain domestic control.
The bargain with societyBefore the war, the regime had a clear authoritarian bargain with the population: stay out of politics and the state will leave you alone. Despite a decade-long decline in real incomes, this remained a compelling proposition for most Russians, especially as repression grew more severe.
The war has driven even greater repression. Opposition politics and independent media are outlawed. New laws criminalise even the mention of ‘war’, with up to 15 years in prison. Internet censorship and surveillance, including software to detect authors of anonymous posts, have intensified. But the biggest change is one not of degree but of kind: the regime now seeks not to demobilise the population from politics but to mobilise it behind the war. This demand for active support, not merely acquiescence, marks a fundamental shift from authoritarian towards totalitarian rule. State media and the Orthodox Church now serve up a vitriolic and hysterical diet of wartime propaganda. Education and training instil these messages into schools, universities and administrations. The militarisation of Russian society is under way.
But despite public (and sometimes shrilly performative) expressions of support, there are few signs of genuine mass enthusiasm for the war. Escalating repression suggests the Kremlin lacks confidence that the war is, or will remain, popular. The fact that the regime began the September 2022 ‘partial mobilisation’ of over 300,000 conscripts so late, kept it so short and recruited from prisons, shows the state’s sensitivity to the public anxiety fuelled by demanding the ultimate sacrifice. Even in this repressive environment, the Kremlin’s internal polling suggests that a majority of the population now favours peace talks.
The bargain with elitesElite opinion matters more than popular views in Russia. The regime needs elites to fulfil essential functions, and they are also better placed to protect their interests. Their pre-war bargain was obedience in return for relative wealth and security, including the ability to travel and send their money and families to the West.
By decisively subordinating stability and prosperity to geopolitical obsession, the war is breaking this bargain too. State control over the economy is growing as the economy moves towards a war footing and businesses are pressured to produce for, and make financial contributions to, the war effort. Sanctions are harming economic growth, disrupting supply chains and cutting off elites from the West. The domestic business environment is becoming more unpredictable and violent. Armed crime has risen by 30%.
Some elites, notably the siloviki (security personnel), have internalised Putin’s justification for invasion. Politicians express performative support, such as with visits to the front lines, to advance their careers. But a large part of the elite has been unhappy with the war from the start yet continues to work for the system that launched it. More informed and less susceptible to propaganda than the general public, but also subjected to growing surveillance, they do so out of fear and, in some cases, a conviction that they are serving the people, rather than the regime.
Strains on resourcesThe war has strained Russia’s resources. Real incomes are falling; Russia has recorded its second-highest budget deficit since the break-up of the Soviet Union; and nearly a million citizens, many highly educated, have fled the country. At the same time, war-fuelled federal spending rose by 58.7% over the past year. Nearly one third of federal government spending will be devoted to defence and domestic security. Reflecting these difficulties, much economic data has been classified.
Since the regime is more concerned about defeat in Ukraine than domestic instability, it will continue the war by demanding even more of its people while offering steadily less. But to avoid provoking a dangerous adverse reaction it will, where possible, calibrate resource mobilisation – habituating the population to the war and preparing the ground for further escalation.
Russia’s system now and tomorrowThe war has made Russia more repressive, intrusive, secretive and isolated from the West, as well as poorer. In all these ways, it increasingly resembles the Soviet Union. But three differences suggest that Russia will find it harder to manage the stresses that war imposes.
Firstly, for all its repression, the state is still less controlling than in Soviet times. There is no ruling party to penetrate and monitor every institution (though the Federal Security Service is a functional equivalent) and no coherent ideology to legitimate the regime. And while the state’s role has deepened, private ownership remains the basis of the economy.
Secondly, for all its isolation, Russia is still more open to the outside world. Russians can access the internet – including, with a VPN, blocked websites – and can leave the country without difficulty. Curtailing these freedoms are obvious next steps. The war has also stoked unprecedented public infighting, albeit within limits defined by Putin, among silovik structures. Even state television propaganda shows occasionally carry critical views about the war.
Thirdly, Russia is much weaker in relation to the West that the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. As former finance minister Mikhail Zadornov recently noted, the West’s resources are ‘incomparable’. If the West commits to giving Ukraine the means to win the war, the contest will be very unequal.
In short, Russia’s capacity to mobilise and indoctrinate its citizens is weaker, and the resources it needs are greater, than those of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Against this background, Putin has launched the country’s most costly aggression since the 1939–40 Winter War against Finland. There are no signs yet that the breaking of key stabilising bargains is bringing the system close to crisis. But the strains it faces will deepen.
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