Indian Strategic Studies: 07/25/25

25 July 2025

Building Taiwan's Resilience

China’s increased military threats and intimidation activities against Taiwan and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have prompted Taiwan’s government and civil society to strengthen the country’s resilience. Although Taiwan has a rich history of volunteerism and ample experience with disaster response,

he efforts to build the nation’s civilian resilience against a potential wartime scenario are still in their initial stages. In this report, the authors consider aspects of Taiwan’s civilian resilience preparedness efforts that are particularly pertinent to building resilience against potential acts of war, which could range from a military blockade to kinetic strikes and even invasion.

The authors define civilian resilience as civilian society’s ability to anticipate, prepare for, mitigate, and survive an act of war and rebuild following the end of hostilities. They apply an analytical framework based on seven thematic resilience areas (psychological resilience and societal cohesion, health and welfare,

critical infrastructure and vital services, continuity of government and governance, transportation and mobility, food and water, and external networks) to evaluate Taiwan’s civilian resilience, its strengths and vulnerabilities, and how Taiwan could improve its civilian resilience capabilities. Drawing on their review of open-source primary and secondary sources and more than 40 interviews with government officials,

subject-matter experts, civic leaders, and others from Taiwan, the United States, and Europe, the authors identify key areas in which the United States and the international community could further assist Taiwan’s civilian resilience preparations.

Taiwan’s government and civil society have initiated various resilience preparedness initiatives, which are supplemented by Taiwan’s rich history of volunteerism and ample experience with disaster response. Taiwan has solid foundations for further resilience-building, such as a well-developed health care system, a proactive civil society, and existing disaster management infrastructure.

The Military Implications of China's Guowang Megaconstellation

In my previous post on Chinese military satellite communications, I detailed the PLA’s long-standing reliance on a limited number of geosynchronous (GEO) satellites. This architecture, while functional, presents a significant vulnerability.

High-value, slow-moving satellites in predictable orbits are prime targets in a potential conflict. Beijing knows this. For years, Chinese strategists have watched the development of Western low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations with a mixture of envy and alarm. Now, China is fielding its own megaconstellation, “Guowang” (国网).

Guowang is far more than a commercial broadband venture; it is a foundational component of the PLA’s vision for future warfare, designed from the ground up to enable multi-domain precision combat and dismantle the information superiority the United States has long taken for granted.

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14 Guowang/Jishu Shiyan test satellites launched from July 2023 to April 2025 trace two inclined LEO planes around Asia, illustrating China’s early mesh for the planned constellation. I recommend folks check out this Space Review article for analysis of Guowang’s initial deployments (graphic: spaceaware.io).

The Guowang (国网), or “National Satellite Internet,” program was born out of strategic necessity. The project entered the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) coordination queue in September 2020; Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Starlink’s battlefield role accelerated work.

PLA observers saw firsthand how a resilient, proliferated LEO network could provide critical battlefield communications even under attack. This underscored the strategic value of a space-based internet network for military operations and accelerated China’s own plans.

The 40 'Red Hackers' Who Shaped China’s Cyber Ecosystem

Between January and March 2025, the United States indicted or sanctioned individuals and companies linked to Chinese state-sponsored threat actors known as APT27, Red Hotel, and Flax Typhoon – labels used by cybersecurity researchers to group entities with similar tactics.

Many of the individuals behind these groups trace their roots to an earlier community of elite hackers known as ‘red hackers’ or ‘Honkers’, active in online forums during the mid-1990s and 2000s.

Over the following two decades, these Honkers evolved from informal hacker collectives into key architects of China’s cyber apparatus. Many founded security startups, helped build cybersecurity teams at major tech firms such as Baidu, Alibaba,

Tencent, and Huawei and helped shape a cybersecurity market driven by attack-defence capabilities. Today, these capabilities likely serve as key enablers of China’s advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, as cyber operations are increasingly carried out through private-sector proxies.

A recent report by the Cyber Defense Project at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich titled ‘Before Vegas: The “Red Hackers” Who Shaped China’s Cyber Ecosystem,’ charts this evolution.

It focuses on 40 influential figures – referred to as ‘The Red 40’ – and traces how informal talent was gradually absorbed into a tightly integrated ecosystem: one where informal networks, private enterprise, and state interests intersect through a mix of grassroots experimentation, strategic alignment, and increasing institutional control.

Israel’s Gaza War Faces an Inflection Point

Seth J. Frantzman

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continue to expand operations in Gaza. On July 20, the IDF told Gazans to evacuate an area near the coastal town of Deir al-Balah. This town was built around a refugee camp established for Palestinians who fled Israel in 1948. Hamas continues to rule Deir al-Balah,

despite more than 650 days of war in which the IDF has operated in around 70 percent of Gaza. The IDF’s decision to focus on Deir al-Balah represents a new attempt to pressure Hamas into a ceasefire deal. Hamas and Israel have not been able to agree to a deal in weeks of talks in July.

Israel’s IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir is trying to wage a complex war without a clear political strategy from above. There is no clear way to replace Hamas governance in the Strip. The Israeli government opposes the Palestinian Authority’s rule over Gaza from the West Bank. As such,

a power vacuum is likely to occur. In Gaza, the IDF has asked civilians to leave areas where the IDF is operating. This has resulted in relocating them all to areas under Hamas control. This area is shrinking now, as Hamas clings to a small number of places on the coast, such as Deir al-Balah.

Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza has dragged on for 21 months. The war began with a brutal Hamas attack on Israel in which more than 1,200 people were massacred and 251 taken hostage. Today, fifty hostages remain in Gaza. For Israel’s generals, the official goal of the war is to return the hostages. How that will happen is not clear. In general, the IDF has only been able to free a handful of hostages through special forces raids.

Most hostages have returned in two deals: one in January 2025 and one in November 2023. The United States has supported a hostage deal, and Qatar and Egypt have tried to mediate. Qatar hosts Hamas political leaders, allowing it to host talks while Hamas is in close proximity. With Hamas losing many of its commanders in Gaza, it appears that Hamas political leaders in Qatar hold most of the sway over future decisions.

Behind the Zhong Sheng pseudonym: Understanding China’s official diplomatic voice

For understanding China’s stance and intentions on foreign affairs, few sources offer clearer insight than the Zhong Sheng commentaries published in the official People’s Daily newspaper. These occasional editorials – the pseudonym “Zhong Sheng” meaning Voice of China – represent the authoritative view of the Chinese Communist Party, not that of an independent individual but by the Party-state apparatus specifically to signal official positions.

The 2025 commentaries so far reveal a sophisticated messaging strategy that is a combination of reassurance with assertiveness, aimed simultaneously at bolstering domestic legitimacy and global influence. With most commentaries aimed at the United States, they provide insights into the Chinese perspective of bilateral relations.

Early in the year, the tone was notably defensive, primarily responding to US actions, particularly the imposition of unilateral tariffs and protectionist measures. These editorials emphasised China’s resilience and right to retaliate, painting US actions as self-defeating and destabilising to the global economy.

By the middle of this year, however, a rhetorical shift had emerged. Commentaries surrounding economic talks held in Geneva and London began emphasising the establishment of consultation mechanisms, substantive tariff rollbacks, and pragmatic cooperation frameworks. This evolution reflects Beijing’s assessment that US pressure tactics were failing to produce leverage, hinting at growing confidence in China’s ability to engage the United States on equal terms.

The ideological foundation of these editorials rests on two fundamental principles: mutual benefit and equality. The term “win-win cooperation” appears repeatedly as the essential framework through which China insists a relationship must operate. The editorials reinforce the idea that both China and the United States stand to gain only through interdependence.

Simultaneously, “equal footing” is presented as a diplomatic red line. China’s insistence that no dialogue will be accepted under duress is repeated. Articles declare that “Pressure, threats and blackmail are not the right way to deal with China.”

The Chinese Communist Party's Strategic Engagement in South Asia

In the first two weeks of 2025, Vice-Minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC) Sun Haiyan met with the Bangladeshi and Nepali ambassadors to China. This was in line with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deploying an increasingly sophisticated party-to-party diplomatic strategy across South Asia,

revealing a comprehensive approach to regional influence that extends beyond traditional state-to-state relations. Through the IDCPC, which is also known as the International Liaison Department, Beijing has developed a systematic framework for building and maintaining influence through party-level relationships in South Asia, demonstrated by an intensive series of diplomatic engagements throughout 2024.

The IDCPC, established in 1951, serves as the CCP's primary organ for conducting relations with foreign political parties and organisations. While technically separate from China's state diplomatic apparatus under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the IDCPC plays a crucial and complementary role in advancing Chinese foreign policy objectives.

The department maintains contacts with hundreds of political parties across the globe and has evolved from its original focus on communist and socialist parties to engage with a broad spectrum of political organisations.

Under Minister Liu Jianchao's leadership, the IDCPC has taken on an increasingly prominent role in China's international engagement strategy, particularly in developing regions like South Asia where party-to-party relationships offer unique channels for influence building.

The IDCPC's organisational structure reveals a carefully calibrated approach to diplomatic engagement. At the helm, Liu handles strategic-level interactions, while Vice-Minister Sun manages regular diplomatic engagements across the region. Liu,

appointed in 2022, has taken a more active diplomatic role than his predecessor and could become the country’s next foreign minister. Sun spent the majority of her career at the IDCP. Prior to her appointment as the first female vice-minister of the IDCPC in 2023, she was the Chinese ambassador to Singapore.

Who Will Rule Crypto? The China-US Battle for Global Financial Leadership

Dingding Chen

In 2025, China and the United States are deepening their rivalry in a new arena: digital currency infrastructure.

In May, Hong Kong passed landmark legislation to regulate fiat-referenced stablecoins, underscoring its ambition to become a digital finance hub and align with Beijing’s broader strategy to promote the digital yuan (e-CNY) as an alternative to the U.S. dollar.

Meanwhile, U.S. policymakers and fintech firms are ramping up efforts to expand the reach of dollar-backed stablecoins, reflecting a growing competition over who sets the rules of the emerging digital monetary order.

China has been actively promoting the e-CNY, with the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) announcing plans to establish an international operation center for the digital yuan in Shanghai.

This initiative aims to enhance the global presence of the e-CNY and reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar in international trade. The PBOC aims to integrate the e-CNY into supply chain financing and cross-border payments – particularly between mainland China and Hong Kong – where projected usage is expected to reach $8 billion in 2025.

Yet, analysts at J.P. Morgan maintain that the e-CNY is unlikely to erode the U.S. dollar’s dominance in global transactions, and the data tells a clear story. In 2022, the U.S. dollar accounted for 88 percent of global FX transactions, 70 percent of foreign currency debt issuance, and 48 percent of cross-border liabilities, while the Chinese yuan made up just 7 percent of FX turnover.

However, the e-CNY’s role in facilitating trade within the BRICS bloc and other emerging markets could gradually erode the dollar’s influence in specific regions. At the 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro,

leaders reaffirmed their commitment to de-dollarization, calling for alternative payment systems and criticizing unilateral dollar-based trade measures. The bloc has condemned unilateral tariffs, viewing them as harmful to global economic stability.

Geopolitics In An Era Of Change: Eurasia In Focus Of US Policy Through Cooperation Of Minsk, Abu Dhabi And Washington – Analysis

IFIMES

In the first half of the 21st century, the international order is undergoing a dynamic transformation, where traditional security frameworks are losing their foothold, and new actors and alliances are decisively reshaping the global order.

Against this backdrop, Eurasia is emerging as a key geopolitical and geoeconomic stage, a space where the interests of major powers intersect, where energy resources flow along strategic corridors, and the security balance hinges on stable and pragmatic relations.

For the United States, Eurasia is no longer a distant region of secondary importance; it is becoming a key challenge as well as a potential driver of stability and prosperity in the 21st century. In this context, Washington is closely observing the evolution of its relations with the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)[2],

which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. While relations with Russia remain strained by numerous security and political tensions, the other EAEU members maintain diverse and significant economic and diplomatic cooperation with the United States – across trade, energy, education, and investment.

Belarus particularly stands out, as its strategic position and openness to partnerships beyond traditional frameworks offer a new opportunity for American diplomatic and economic presence in Eastern Europe. Similarly,

Kazakhstan remains a crucial energy partner and a bridge to Central Asia, while Armenia and Kyrgyzstan show interest in diversifying their foreign relations and strengthening institutional ties with international actors.

Within the Eurasian Economic Union, the United Arab Emirates and Belarus are building a functional and stable bilateral model of cooperation based on shared interests, investment, and political dialogue. This framework not only paves the way for deeper regional integration, but also lays the foundation for greater US engagement with the new Eurasian reality.

The Importance of Kachin State to Myanmar’s Revolution

Michael Martin

Four years on, Myanmar’s civil war has spread to all 14 regions and states, as well as the major cities of Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Yangon. According to the analysis of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, opposition groups have effective control over 34 percent of the country’s landmass,

including all but one of the border townships. Townships under opposition control form a crescent that arcs from Rakhine State in the west, through Chin State, Sagaing Region, across Kachin State, and into Shan State in the east. Almost all of the cross-border towns with neighboring Bangladesh, China, India, and Thailand are under the administration of opposition forces.

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and its affiliated People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) have reportedly captured more than 300 military installations and 15 towns in Kachin State, Shan State, or Sagaing Region since the 2021 coup. The KIA and its allies have also taken control of all but one of the border crossings into China. In addition, they control most of Kachin’s valuable mining region, including its rare earth mines.

The KIA’s latest military offensive is Bhamo, a strategically important city in eastern Kachin State. If the KIA can capture Bhamo, it will effectively control all of eastern Kachin State. Myanmar’s military junta has reinforced its estimated 3,000 troops in Bhamo; it’s also conducting up to 50 airstrikes each day to help defend the city. In addition, the junta has launched a counteroffensive in an attempt to retake control of some of Myanmar’s valuable jade mines.

The People’s Republic of China has stepped up its military assistance to Myanmar’s military junta, in part to help the defense of Bhamo. China is apparently concerned that the loss of Bhamo will significantly weaken the junta and could lead to another state—in addition to Chin State and Rakhine State—falling under the control of the anti-junta opposition.

Gaza health ministry says 33 people died from malnutrition in 48 hours

At least 33 Palestinians, including 12 children, have died as a result of malnutrition across the Gaza Strip in the past 48 hours, the Hamas-run health ministry has said.

The deaths of 11 adults and four children were reported over the past day, a spokesman told the BBC.

It came as UN Secretary General António Guterres told the UN Security Council that "malnutrition is soaring" and "starvation is knocking on every door" in Gaza.

He has said the 2.1 million population is facing grave shortages of basic supplies and that Israel has an obligation to facilitate humanitarian assistance by the UN and its partners.

The Israeli military body responsible for co-ordinating aid deliveries, Cogat, accused Hamas of "conducting a false campaign regarding the humanitarian situation".

It has insisted that Israel acts in accordance with international law and facilitates the entry of aid while ensuring it does not reach Hamas.

WHO condemns Israeli attacks on facilities in central Gaza

UK and 27 other nations condemn Israel over 'inhumane killing' of Gaza civilians seeking aid

International journalists, including the BBC, are blocked by Israel from entering Gaza independently, so it is difficult to verify the number of reported malnutrition deaths.

However, footage filmed by a local Palestinian journalist working for the BBC at al-Aqsa Martyrs hospital in the central city of Deir al-Balah showed the emaciated body of a man called Ahmed al-Hasanat, who doctors said had died from malnutrition on Tuesday.

Health officials said a 13-year-old boy, Abdul Hamid al-Ghalban, also died in the southern city of Khan Younis. Photos from AFP and Anadolu news agencies showed the teenager's small

Iran and the Logic of Limited Wars

Raphael S. Cohen

Israel's air war against Iran—“Operation Rising Lion”—may be over, but the controversy surrounding the attacks lives on. One key question is whether the U.S. strikes on the Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan, dubbed “Operation Midnight Hammer,” succeeded in obliterating the deeply buried Fordow site or merely incapacitated it for a few months.

The extent of the damage to Iran's nuclear program is, of course, important from an operational perspective. But the broader critique—that the 12-day air campaign was somehow foolhardy because it may not have permanently destroyed the Iranian nuclear program—misses the point.

Operation Rising Lion was a limited war fought with limited means for an even more limited period—all of which, in turn, means that the campaign's objectives were also limited. The campaign,

therefore, needs to be judged against the alternative strategies—engaging in a longer, more protracted campaign or doing nothing militarily and sticking with diplomatic options. And by that measure, the operation was a success.

To begin with the option of a longer war: There were certainly more targets left in Iran when U.S. President Donald Trump called an end to the war. Although a full public accounting of the attacks' effects will take time, the Israeli military claims it eliminated roughly 1,000, or 40 percent to 50 percent,

of Iran's ballistic missiles; destroyed 250 (or roughly two-thirds) of Iran's missile launchers; killed several dozen senior Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists; and set the nuclear program back by “years.” In other words, even by the Israeli military's own estimates, Iran's nuclear program is not demolished, it retains most of its missiles, and most of its military leaders remain untouched.

Golden Dome Could Learn from SDI Politics

William Courtney

President Trump has proposed that to “protect our homeland” he would move ahead with a Golden Dome missile defense. The Department of Defense is seeking a hefty budget increase for it next year, but the program is controversial.

Missile defense was contentious also in the 1980s when President Ronald Reagan offered a vision to render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” Golden Dome proponents might avoid some of the disputes of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) era.

Golden Dome recalls Reagan's concept for SDI to defend the United States against long-range ballistic missiles. It was seen as futuristic or infeasible. Although controversy weakened support for SDI, ever since Reagan's presidency Congress has funded work on long-range missile defense. This is in addition to Congressional backing for tactical ballistic missile defense to safeguard U.S. forces on land and at sea.

Although controversy weakened support for SDI, ever since Reagan's presidency Congress has funded work on long-range missile defense.

Don't Exaggerate

Reagan's vision was seen by many as other-worldly, sapping SDI's credibility. A 1987 American Physical Society study said directed energy technologies, if ever to work, needed gains of a hundred times or more. Rigged tests spawned criticisms. A Reagan decision document warned of a Soviet missile defense “breakout,” but the USSR was lagging.

Edward Teller, a hydrogen bomb designer, touted to Reagan the idea of an x-ray laser powered by a nuclear explosion in space, possibly over the heads of Americans. Teller lost ground when he claimed a laser could shoot down the “entire Soviet” land-based missile force. The Reagan administration soon vetoed this concept, clarifying that SDI would be nonnuclear only.

Why are young women increasingly left-wing?

There has been much commentary about boys and young men turning to the right. The surprise Netflix hit “Adolescence” set off another cascade of columns on the crisis of masculinity and the malign influence of Andrew Tate.

These worries are not unjustified. Some young men are attracted to misogynistic online content, and that can act as a gateway to the broader far right universe with the help of social media algorithms. It’s true that more boys struggle in the education system, that deindustrialisation has taken away the standard career paths for boys who get poor exam grades, and that it’s getting harder for men with low status jobs to find a partner.

But there has been much less written on a substantially bigger shift in voting behaviour amongst young women, who are moving leftwards fast (Gaby Hinsliff and Cas Mudde are honourable exceptions). John Burn-Murdoch highlighted the worldwide phenomenon of polarisation between the genders in younger age groups last year. It’s clear from his graphs that, in most countries, it’s driven more by women shifting left than men right (South Korea is a notable outlier). Yet it’s the men that have got most of the attention.

It's a phenomenon that’s continued in more recent elections. In the UK last year almost a quarter of 18-24 year old women voted Green (according to YouGov), and just 12% voted for any right-wing party. Since the election YouGov data suggests Reform’s support in this age group hasn’t risen – all the increase in their vote has come from older people – and that the Greens are doing a lot better.

In Germany, earlier this year, 34% of 18-24 year old women voted for Die Linke, driving the left-wing party’s dramatic resurgence and helping them get back into the Bundestag. In Spain, at last year’s European elections a poll found 59% of 25-30 year old women saying they’d vote left-wing. In Australia, according to a 2024 analysis, Gen Z women are by far the most left-wing voter segment.

Hegseth Attends Meeting on Ukraine After Skipping Last Session

John Ismay and Eric Schmitt

Days after President Trump shifted his tone on Ukraine, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth participated in a meeting on Monday of the roughly 50 nations supporting the embattled country.

The collection of countries, which is known as the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, was founded during the Biden administration by Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III. But Mr. Hegseth has largely taken a hands-off approach, ceding leadership of it to Britain shortly after Mr. Trump took office in January.

When the contact group met in person at NATO headquarters in April, Mr. Hegseth opted to call in. He did not participate in the next meeting, which was in June.

Mr. Trump initially expressed deep skepticism of giving U.S. military support to Ukraine, which Russian forces invaded in 2022. But last week, he said the United States would help Europe send more weapons to Ukraine and warned Russia that if it did not reach a peace deal within 50 days, he would impose a new round of punishing sanctions.

A spokesman for the Pentagon declined to comment on Monday regarding Mr. Hegseth’s role in Monday’s meeting. The Defense Department said in a statement that it would not comment on internal discussions between the administration and partner nations.

A senior American official, speaking on the condition of anonymity before the meeting to discuss internal planning, said the United States expected “several countries” to commit to purchasing additional “capabilities” — weapons, munitions and equipment — to donate to Ukraine.

Ukrainian leaders have repeatedly said their greatest need is more air-defense systems like the American-made Patriot and the interceptor missiles they fire, which are effective against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.

Iran’s Leaders Turn to a New Brand of Nationalism After Israeli and U.S. Attacks

Erika Solomon and Sanam Mahoozi

The event had all the typical trappings of Ashura, Iran’s ritualistic Shiite Muslim mourning period. The kneeling crowds were dressed in black. They beat their chests in unison. Then, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, beckoned the man leading the chants, videos of the event showed, and whispered in his ear.

Grinning, the singer broke into a tune that would have been wildly out of place at a religious ceremony for the Islamic Republic just a few weeks ago: “Ey Iran, Iran,” a patriotic anthem.

“In my soul and spirit, you remain, O homeland,” he sang, as the crowd recited the words back to him. “Wasted be the heart that does not tremble for you.”

Iran has emerged from its war with Israel — briefly joined by the United States — deeply wounded. Its military defenses are battered, its nuclear program was pummeled and its population has been devastated by a heavy civilian toll over the 12-day war.

Amid that bleak outlook, the country’s leaders see an opportunity. Outrage over the attacks has set off an outpouring of nationalist sentiment, and they hope to channel that into a patriotic moment to shore up a government facing daunting economic and political challenges.

The result has been an embrace of ancient folklore and patriotic symbols that many of Iran’s secular nationalists once saw as their domain, not that of a conservative theocracy that often shunned Iran’s pre-Islamic revolutionary heritage.

In the ancient city of Shiraz, a billboard depicts Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel kneeling before a statue of Shapur I, the third-century Persian king, mimicking a frieze from the ruins of the ancient city of Persepolis.

In Tehran’s Vanak Square, a popular shopping area, a billboard has been erected for Arash the Archer, the mythological figure said to have created Iran’s borders by launching his life force from an arrowhead. Now, alongside his arrows, it is the missiles of the Islamic Republic being fired, too.

America’s Pill Problem

Nearly 25 years ago, Americans discovered just how critical the antibiotic ciprofloxacin could be. Commonly prescribed for bacterial infections, “cipro” is also the first-line treatment for anthrax exposure. In September 2001,

just one week after the 9/11 terror attacks, the American public found itself contending with yet another nightmare: someone was sending anthrax through the U.S. Postal Service to media companies and congressional offices—ultimately killing five people and infecting 17 others. Those with even the smallest risk of exposure lined up for treatment.

Today, anthrax remains one of the deadliest and easiest biological weapons to produce. Yet 80 percent of the U.S. supply of ciprofloxacin is still imported. Moreover, most of those imports, whether from Europe, India, or Jordan, rely on key starting ingredients made in China.

It’s not just cipro. The United States is alarmingly dependent on imports for many of its critical medicines and their ingredients. Over the last two decades, according to U.S. Census Bureau data, U.S. pharmaceutical imports have grown by an average of nine percent annually. Over the last 12 months, the value of U.S.

pharmaceutical imports has ballooned 40 percent, to $315 billion; the pharmaceutical sector, which U.S. manufacturers once dominated, was the fifth-largest U.S. import category in 2024. By volume, China and India are the largest suppliers of drugs and their ingredients to the United States, including common antibiotics,

statins, and other older low-cost generic medicines. By value, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland dominate the U.S. pharmaceutical trade, largely through their exports of top-selling branded drugs such as Viagra and Botox and patented medicines such as new weight-loss treatments and Keytruda,

the top-selling cancer drug. The United States has long dominated the production of innovative medicines, but even that market segment is at risk: in 2024, one-third of the new compounds licensed by U.S. pharmaceutical companies reportedly were made by Chinese biotechnology firms.

America Should Assume the Worst About AI

Matan Chorev

National security leaders rarely get to choose what to care about and how much to care about it. They are more often subjects of circumstances beyond their control. The September 11 attacks reversed the George W. Bush administration’s plan to reduce the United States’ global commitments and responsibilities.

Revolutions across the Arab world pushed President Barack Obama back into the Middle East just as he was trying to pull the United States out. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended the Biden administration’s goal of establishing “stable and predictable” relations with Moscow so that it could focus on strategic competition with China.

Policymakers could foresee many of the underlying forces and trends driving these agenda-shaping events. Yet for the most part, they failed to plan for the most challenging manifestations of where these forces would lead. They had to scramble to reconceptualize and recalibrate their strategies to respond to unfolding events.

The rapid advance of artificial intelligence—and the possible emergence of artificial general intelligence—promises to present policymakers with even greater disruption. Indicators of a coming powerful change are everywhere. Beijing and Washington have made global AI leadership a strategic imperative,

and leading U.S. and Chinese companies are racing to achieve AGI. News coverage features near-daily announcements of technical breakthroughs, discussions of AI-driven job loss, and fears of catastrophic global risks such as the AI-enabled engineering of a deadly pandemic.

There is no way of knowing with certainty the exact trajectory along which AI will develop or precisely how it will transform national security. Policymakers should therefore assess and debate the merits of competing AI strategies with humility and caution. Whether one is bullish or bearish about AI’s prospects, though,

Europe’s Security Plans Must Extend Beyond its Backyard

Chels Michta

The recent decision taken at The Hague by European NATO allies to increase defense spending to 5% by 2035 has been justly celebrated as a step in the right direction. And though one can be skeptical whether the decade-long timeline will survive the test of political will,

it nonetheless marked the recognition that rearmament is no longer a theoretical conversation while bringing the alliance closer to operationalizing NATO’s new regional plans.

The final communique — remarkably brief by past NATO standards — conveyed a sense of determination and purpose, giving the US administration and European governments a justifiable reason to call the summit a success.

While the meeting focused on Russia and European security, the new spending commitments cannot be considered separately from other theaters. The US and its European allies must now find a way to broaden the conversation so that European rearmament dovetails into the larger geostrategic environment the West faces.

For although all eyes were on the Atlantic theater at The Hague, democracies face a challenge to their security that is truly global in nature, as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea work jointly to dismantle the security system America and its allies have built.

The difference between preserving a modicum of systemic stability, and hence peace, and an all-out military confrontation will likely come down to four key regions: Europe, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and the Indo-Pacific.

Two of these theaters have already been engulfed in war, while the remaining two are increasingly areas of concern, both due to North Korea’s aggressive nuclear and missile program and China’s massive military buildup, especially the expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, which has surpassed the US Navy in fleet size.

Are Soldiers Obsolete?

Vilda Westh Blanc

The U.S. Army has long believed that its greatest asset is the American soldier—tough, disciplined, and trained for combat. But as AI and autonomous systems take center stage on the battlefield, even that longstanding truth is up for debate.

With recruitment rates at historic lows and battlefield technology evolving faster than military bureaucracy, one must ask: will tomorrow’s wars be fought by people at all? And if soldiers won’t be fighting in trenches or engaging in face-to-face gunfights, why are we still training them for it?

We’re at a moment of convergence. Three crises, plummeting enlistment, outdated training regimes, and the rapid rise of military artificial intelligence, are forcing a sweeping reassessment of what the Army is, what it needs to be, and who (or what) actually fights wars in the 21st century.

The use of AI and autonomous systems is already transforming military operations. From real-time battlefield analytics to drone swarms capable of autonomous targeting, AI is fundamentally reshaping how wars are both planned and fought. Warfare no longer hinges purely on human strength, endurance, or even marksmanship. Instead, war is becoming a contest of speed, data, and automated systems.

Battlefield AI can detect threats faster than human scouts, manage logistics with remarkable efficiency, and analyze thousands of data streams to help commanders make quicker, more informed decisions. For an Army struggling to maintain end strength, that’s not just innovation, it’s survival.

With recruitment numbers down nearly 25% from pre-pandemic levels, the Army is confronting a hard reality: there may never again be enough young Americans willing or eligible to serve in a conventional capacity. Roughly only one in four Americans aged 17 to 24 qualifies for military service without waivers. That eligibility pool continues to shrink due to rising obesity, drug use, and educational deficiencies.

The US Air Force’s New Drones Are a Game Changer

Harrison Kass

The US Air Force’s forthcoming Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program is designed to serve as an autonomous drone wingman to the sixth-generation F-47 NGAD, marking the beginning of a new era in airpower, where automated and manned aircraft work in synchronization.

The CCA drones, which are designated as fighter aircraft, are being built to provide combat capability at a mere fraction of the cost of standard, manned fighter jets. The CCAs will be built with an emphasis on survivability, autonomy, and adaptability, with the Air Force planning to procure about 1,000 units, allowing for two CCAs to be paired with each manned fighter.

The result, in theory, will be scalable force multiplication while controlling costs and reducing risk exposure for human pilots. While the CCA is ostensibly a pairing between manned and autonomous platforms, the program is undoubtedly the next step in a shift away from manned fighters toward autonomous or unmanned fighters. If the CCA program goes well, expect the fighter developed after the F-47 to be completely unmanned.

The CCA program will feature two distinct platforms: the General Dynamics YFQ-42A and the Anduril Industries YFQ-44A. In March 2025, the Air Force designated both CCA platforms as a “fighter,” the first time any drone has received the fighter designation. The symbolism is clear, marking a doctrinal shift towards the use of drone aircraft.

The YFQ-42A is derived from the XQ-67A demonstrator, which first flew in early 2024. The YFQ-44A is derived from Anduril’s Fury drone. Both drones are part of the Air Force’s Increment 1 effort, which focuses on air-to-air missions and integration with manned fighters, such as the F-35 Lightning II and F-47 NGAD.

Ground testing for both CCA platforms commenced in May 2025. First flights are expected in late summer. The Air Force is expected to make a final production decision by the end of fiscal year 2026. Operational fielding of the CCAs could begin as early as the late 2020s.

The United States is Falling Behind in Drone Technology

William Lawson

The Pentagon has announced what Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth calls a “Top Gun” event for battlefield drones like those deployed by Ukraine against Russian forces. Hegseth recently announced an all-out effort to assert “American drone dominance,” of which this event is a part. The so-called Top Gun school will be part of the semi-annual Technology Readiness Experimentation (T-REX) event at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, in August.

Beginning in 2023, T-REX has served as a showcase for emerging technologies, including new drone prototypes. This will be the first year that T-REX will host a head-to-head simulated drone combat in urban and other environments. The exercises will feature first-person viewer (FPV) drones, which are kamikaze-style drones widely used in the Ukraine War.

American forces are rushing to close the gap between US drone capability and that of Russia, Ukraine, China, and Israel. Realistic exercises are imperative to understanding what works and what does not. The Top Gun exercise is a crucial first step in that direction, pitting “red vs. blue” forces in simulated combat. Counter-drone technology will also be showcased during the exercise, forcing participants to account for every possible contingency.

Russia has reportedly equipped its frontline soldiers with approximately 1.5 million small drones last year, and this number is expected to continue growing. Ukraine, however, may have surpassed that output, supplying its troops with 200,000 drones per month. Current American manufacturing capability cannot approach those numbers, not least because the infrastructure and doctrine for their deployment are still being developed.

China also has an advantage driven by its dominance in manufacturing, not only small drones, but also the electronic and digital components required for drone operation. American manufacturing capacity will need to expand rapidly if the United States seeks to catch up with China.

Hegseth is attempting to streamline the drone development process by opening the door to manufacturers and entrepreneurs, while also easing the procurement process for drones by allowing military units to bypass the traditional, bureaucratic Pentagon procurement process.

Three Years of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions Against Russia Making a Difference?

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the United States has implemented a broad sweep of sanctions focused on isolating Russia from the global financial system, reducing the profitability of its energy sector, and blunting its military edge. These added to a bevy of sanctions that the United States imposed on Russia after it annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014.

The reelection of U.S. President Donald Trump injected uncertainty into the future of U.S. support for Ukraine, but his administration has not lifted or relaxed the sanctions regime against Russia implemented under President Joe Biden.

As the United States has pushed for new ceasefire talks to no avail, Trump’s ire with Russian President Vladimir Putin has grown, prompting new tariff threats to bring Russia to the negotiating table and more arms for Ukraine.

Financial sector. The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.

It also barred the largest Russian bank and several others from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a Belgium-based interbank messaging service critical to processing international payments. The U.S. Treasury Department prohibited U.S. investors from trading Russian securities,

including debt; all together, the sanctions restrict dealings with 80 percent of Russian banking sector assets. Washington has also sought to seize the U.S. assets of sanctioned Russian individuals, including President Vladimir Putin.

CFR President Mike Froman analyzes the most important foreign policy story of the week. Plus, get the latest news and insights from the Council’s experts. Every Friday

Spain’s anti-migrant riots are a warning to Europe

Another flashpoint has emerged in Europe’s long-simmering migrant crisis. Torre Pacheco, a small town in southern Spain, has been the scene of days of fighting between right-wing groups and mainly Moroccan migrants. While a tentative peace has been restored, tensions remain.

On 9 July, a 68-year-old local man, Domingo Tomas, was confronted by three young men during an early morning walk. One of the trio – all were described as being of ‘Moroccan origin’ and in their early 20s – brutally beat him. Images of Tomas’s bloodied and bruised face quickly went viral.

Agitators descended on Torre Pacheco in the days afterwards. Calls for a ‘Maghrebi hunt’ – essentially, a hunt for North African immigrants – spread on far-right forums. On the night of 11 July,

thugs clashed with masked Moroccan youths, leaving several people injured and a trail of damage. More fighting and vandalism – including the destruction of a kebab shop owned by a Muslim local – took place over the following nights.

Order was largely restored on 14 July after police stopped cars carrying weapons from entering Torre Pacheco. Fourteen arrests have been made since the unrest began and a heavy police presence remains in the town.

Politicians from Spain’s left-wing government, led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, have rightly condemned the far-right thuggery. Indeed, there appear to be strong grounds to think that extremist groups played a role in stoking up much of the violence that unfolded.

Yet the government has had little to say about the organised violence from the other side of those clashes. Despite police ordering people to stay indoors, some migrants clashed with police and possibly also locals – not just with the organised far right.

How Russia Ended the Taliban’s Isolation

Giorgio Cafiero

Nearly four years after the Taliban reconquered Afghanistan, numerous countries have diplomatically engaged with the Islamic Emirate, accepting its rule as a political reality. Yet, no government had formally recognized the “Taliban 2.0” until Russia did so on July 3.

While Russia’s decision marked a major victory for the Kabul regime, exiled Afghan dissidents and human rights advocates strongly criticized Moscow’s move, arguing it risks legitimizing gender apartheid in Afghanistan while dimming prospects for democratic reforms.

Still, in the face of Afghanistan’s enduring hardships, Russia’s decision may mark the beginning of a new chapter—one in which greater international engagement could help steer the war-torn, impoverished country toward economic revival and enhanced stability.

The fact that Russia was the first to recognize the Islamic Emirate was unsurprising. Since the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Russia-Taliban diplomatic engagement has steadily deepened.

In March 2022, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accredited Taliban envoy Jamal Nasir Gharwal as chargé d’affaires at the Afghan embassy in Moscow, with Gharwal formally assuming control of the mission the following month. This gradual normalization continued with Moscow revoking its terrorist designation of the Taliban in April 2025, paving the way for official recognition earlier this month.

Both Moscow and Kabul hope that Russia’s act of recognition will serve as a precedent, prompting a gradual cascade of similar moves by other non-Western nations.

“The decision to be the first country in the world to recognize the Taliban state was driven by Moscow’s desire to present itself as a leader in the region who is not afraid to set precedents. In this regard, the Kremlin hopes that its decision will be followed by other countries,” Nikita Smagin, an independent expert on Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East, told this author.

Shifting Tides: The National Security Implications of the United States’ Pacific Drawdown

Charles Edel, Kathryn Paik, and John Augé

For the last decade, the United States has maintained that it is a “Pacific power,” and multiple administrations have affirmed the importance of the vast Pacific Islands region to U.S. national security. Increased engagement with the Pacific, which began under the first Trump administration,

has broad bipartisan support as a security priority. As the first 100 days of the second Trump administration drew to an end, rhetoric coming out of the administration echoed this trend, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth visiting Guam and Hawaii on his first trip to the Indo-Pacific, during which he stressed the critical nature of Pacific U.S. territories at the “tip of America’s spear” of deterrence.

However, Pacific leaders have consistently stated that they look to actions, and not just words, as proof of a nation’s commitments. Here, recent cuts to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the pausing of U.S. foreign assistance, enacting tariffs on small and vulnerable island economies, and deprioritizing climate change—the top priority for the region—have had a decidedly negative impact.

Regardless of U.S. intent, the perception across the Pacific of the United States as a disinterested and mercurial partner undercuts the country’s ability to build meaningful and lasting partnerships in the Pacific and simultaneously opens space for China to displace U.S. influence and presence in this critical region.

In a region that has quietly become a stage for great power competition, this perception of U.S. disinterest not only opens new entry points for Beijing’s influence but also puts wind in the sails of a new narrative: that it is China, not the United States, that is the committed partner and protector of global rules and norms.

While it is too soon to understand the full implications of the United States’ recent actions, early signs in the Pacific suggest that the trajectory is counter to U.S. interests. Reversing this trend will require quick action, sincere engagement, and creative diplomacy.

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