India’s Russian Oil Dilemma

Saswata Chaudhury

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The U.S. has threatened to impose an unspecified penalty in addition to 25 percent punitive tariffs on India for its imports of Russian oil. To avoid these sanctions without harming India’s economic interests, India has two broad options: restructuring supply chains or diversifying export markets. Using the first option, India can reduce its dependence on Russian oil by reverting to traditional oil-importing routes, such as the Middle East, the U.S., Africa, and Latin America. Or, India can identify alternative markets beyond the European Union (EU), such as the Asia-Pacific and African countries, for exporting refined oil products.

The sanctions by the EU on Russia introduced significant uncertainty and volatility in the global oil market. While European countries have established new supply relationships with Middle Eastern producers, Russian oil flows have shifted predominantly to Asia. The top three destinations for Russian crude oil exports are: India (with a 28 percent share and 1.69 million barrels per day (mbd)), China (with an 18 percent share and 1.09 mbd), and Turkiye (with a 7 percent share and 0.4 mbd).

Countries like India, which have significantly increased their crude oil imports from Russia in recent times and enhanced export of refined petroleum products to Europe, may face challenges due to the sanctions. The EU sanctions have significantly altered Russia’s energy trade dynamics. Prior to the conflict, in 2021, Russia’s exports to Asia and Oceania accounted for 34 percent of its crude oil and 16 percent of its petroleum products. However, by 2024, this region became the primary destination for 63 percent of Russia’s crude oil exports and 36 percent of its petroleum product exports.

To attract buyers, Russia has been offering substantial discounts on its crude oil, pricing it $15-20 below the international benchmark price. As a result, India emerged as Russia’s largest crude oil importer between 2023 and 2024, surpassing China. During this period, India’s share of Russian crude oil imports increased from 30 percent to 34 percent, while China’s share decreased from 32 percent to 26 percent. Indian refiners, including Reliance Industries and Nayara Energy, have leveraged the discounted prices of Russian crude oil to ramp up imports, refining the oil into products like diesel and jet fuel for export to European markets.

Exclusive-Missed signals, lost deal: How India-US trade talks collapsed

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NEW DELHI/WASHINGTON (Reuters) -After five rounds of trade negotiations, Indian officials were so confident of securing a favourable deal with the United States that they even signalled to the media that tariffs could be capped at 15%. Indian officials expected U.S. President Donald Trump to announce the deal himself weeks before the August 1 deadline. The announcement never came. New Delhi is now left with the surprise imposition of a 25% tariff on Indian goods from Friday, along with unspecified penalties over oil imports from Russia, while Trump has closed larger deals with Japan and the EU, and even offered better terms to arch-rival Pakistan.

Interviews with four Indian government officials and two U.S. government officials revealed previously undisclosed details of the proposed deal and an exclusive account of how negotiations collapsed despite technical agreements on most issues. The officials on both sides said a mix of political misjudgment, missed signals and bitterness broke down the deal between the world's biggest and fifth-largest economies, whose bilateral trade is worth over $190 billion. The White House, the U.S. Trade Representative office, and India's Prime Minister's Office, along with the External Affairs and Commerce ministries, did not respond to emailed requests for comment.

India believed that after visits by Indian Trade Minister Piyush Goyal to Washington and U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance to Delhi, it had made a series of deal-clinching concessions. New Delhi was offering zero tariffs on industrial goods that formed about 40% of U.S. exports to India, two Indian government officials told Reuters. Despite domestic pressure, India would also gradually lower tariffs on U.S. cars and alcohol with quotas and accede to Washington's main demand of higher energy and defence imports from the U.S., the officials said.

"Most differences were resolved after the fifth round in Washington, raising hopes of a breakthrough," one of the officials said, adding negotiators believed the U.S. would accommodate India's reluctance on duty-free farm imports and dairy products from the U.S.It was a miscalculation. Trump saw the issue differently and wanted more concessions.A lot of progress was made on many fronts in India talks, but there was never a deal that we felt good about," said one White House official. We never got to what amounted to a full deal - a deal that we were looking for."

Photos Show Indian Navy Maneuvers in China-Claimed Waters

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The Indian and Philippine navies joined in the South China Sea for their first-ever joint exercise this week, drawing a protest from China. Newsweek contacted the Indian Defense Ministry and the Philippine military for comment via email. The drill comes as India seeks to expand its engagement in the Asia-Pacific. This outreach includes deeper ties with Washington and U.S. allies such as the Philippines—which, like India, has a long-running territorial dispute with China.

Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has been pushing back against Chinese maritime forces' expansive activities within the Southeast Asian country's maritime zone. Philippine guided-missile frigate BRP Miguel Malvar, Indian guided-missile destroyer INS Delhi and Indian anti-submarine corvette INS Kiltan navigate side by side during an exercise. Armed Forces of the Philippines The naval exercises took place Sunday and Monday within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, off the main Philippine island of Luzon.

the Philippine military said in a statement. Featured activities included drills on air defense, communications, rendezvous operations and maneuvering. Participating Philippine ships included the guided-missile frigates BRP Miguel Malvar and BRP Jose Rizal, along with air force search and rescue aircraft and a C-208B reconnaissance aircraft. Philippine navy personnel aboard Philippine guided-missile frigate BRP Jose Rizal simulate torpedo launcher operations to enhance crew readiness. Armed Forces of the Philippines

The Indian contingent featured the guided-missile destroyer INS Delhi, anti-submarine warfare corvette INS Kiltan and fleet replenishment tanker INS Shakti. Two multi-role naval helicopters also participated. China, which frequently criticizes U.S. and other foreign military cooperation with the Philippines, issued a condemnation of the drills on Monday. Disputes over territory and maritime rights and interests should be settled through negotiation and consultation by countries directly concerned, and no third party is in any position to interfere in that," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told reporters.

Is the Taliban’s Afghanistan a Safe Haven for Terrorist Organizations?

Muhammad Murad

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On July 24, the United Nations Security Council’s Monitoring Committee released its 36th report on the Islamic State (ISIS), also known as Daesh, as well as al-Qaida and associated groups. The report indicates that the threat from ISIS, al-Qaida, and their affiliates remains “diverse and dynamic.” In Asia, the report focused only on two regions – South Asia and Southeast Asia – and it was clear the former was the larger concern. In particular, the report underscored “growing concerns about the threat from foreign terrorist fighters” in South Asia – and especially in Afghanistan.

“The de facto authorities in Afghanistan continued to maintain a permissive environment for a range of terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida and its affiliates, posing a serious threat to the security of Central Asian and other countries,” the report stated. The Monitoring Committee said that al-Qaida’s presence in Afghanistan – which mainly consists of fighters of Arab origin who had fought alongside the Taliban in the past – “had been drastically downsized” and thus “did not present an immediate threat for regional States.” According to the report, al-Qaida’s presence was limited to just six provinces of Afghanistan.

Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, Uruzgan and Zabul. However, the report also noted al-Qaida’s stated ambition “to reactivate cells in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya and Europe.” The report also identified three new training sites, although “likely to be small and rudimentary,” for fighters belonging to both al-Qaida and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – an anti-Pakistani terrorist group operating mainly from Afghan soil. Pakistan’s government has repeatedly accused the Taliban regime in Afghanistan of providing safe haven to the TTP, which has stepped up its attacks on Pakistani targets. 

The Taliban have consistently denied such claims, but the U.N. report found that the TTP “continued to receive substantial logistical and operational support from the de facto authorities” in Afghanistan (i.e. the Taliban government). Besides al-Qaida and its affiliates, ISIS, with its local affiliate Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), also maintains its presence and is active in Afghanistan, which seems to be of major concern not only to the international community but also to the Taliban. The report identified ISKP as “the most serious threat, both regionally and internationally” of any terrorist group in South Asia.

Iranian President’s Visit to Pakistan Signals Islamabad’s Growing Role in Global Politics

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Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent state visit to Pakistan comes at a critical time and reflects a careful effort to strengthen relations with Islamabad amid a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. Pakistan and Iran signed several agreements during the visit to boost bilateral trade to $10 billion annually. The two countries have also agreed to combat terrorism in their border regions more effectively. We can easily, in a short time, increase the volume of trade from the current $3 billion to the projected goal of $10 billion,” Pezeshkian said during a joint media conference with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. 

The Pakistani leader echoed the sentiment, saying, “We also jointly hope that the $10 billion trade target is achieved at the earliest.” During his visit, the Iranian president also held meetings with the country’s top military leadership, including Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Sahir Shamshad Mirza, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Babar Sidhu, and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Lt. Gen. Asim Malik. The visit is important for several reasons; it went beyond bilateral talks amid geopolitical shifts. Pezeshkian’s visit to Pakistan is his first trip abroad after the June 2025 Iran-Israel conflict. 

The war, initiated by an Israeli attack on Iran and later joined by the U.S. through strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, pushed Iran to find regional partners to counter international isolation. Pakistan was quick to condemn the Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran as violations of Iran’s sovereignty. Additionally, Pakistan justified Iran’s retaliation against Israel by citing Tehran’s right to self-defense and offered support to it at international forums like the United Nations. For Pakistan, the Iran-Israel conflict heightened concerns about regional instability, which could potentially spill into its volatile Balochistan Province. Furthermore, the prospect of Israeli air dominance near Pakistan’s western border likely raised alarms in Islamabad about shifting security dynamics. 

This is especially important given Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and its rivalry with India. Pakistan aims to ensure stability along its 905-kilometer border with Iran. Moreover, Pakistan does not want to see the Iranian regime weakened in a way that could create a safe haven for extremist groups operating on both sides of the Iran-Pakistan border regions. In this context, Pezeshkian’s visit to Pakistan after the war signaled Iran’s intention to strengthen its alliance with Islamabad to deter further aggression. The visit also serves as a reminder that Pakistan’s ongoing diplomatic maneuvering regarding Iran goes beyond its relationship with Tehran.

China Has an Arctic Strategy. America Needs One, Too | Opinion

Ilan Berman

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With the return of the Trump administration, the concept of great power competition has seen something of a renaissance. To its credit, the view of China as a predatory global player that emerged during President Donald Trump's first term in office was perpetuated by his successor, Joe Biden. Even so, recent months have seen strategic competition between the United States and China in everything from strategic minerals to trade expand to virtually every corner of the world.

But one place where real competition hasn't yet kicked off in earnest is the Arctic. It's certainly true that the Trump White House grasps the strategic importance of the region; during its first term in office, it reopened Arctic waters for drilling as part of a robust America First energy policy, and there's now a broad understanding among administration officials that the area is one of vital national interest. Still, it's fair to say that U.S. attention to the Arctic hasn't kept pace with that of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Back in 2018, the government of Xi Jinping issued its official Arctic strategy. That document framed the PRC as a "Near-Arctic State" and outlined a broad vision for engagement and investment in the region. Since then, China has become a stakeholder in Russian Arctic projects like the Yamal LNG pipeline and a deep-water port in Arkhangelsk. It has made inroads among other Arctic states as well by establishing research facilities in Iceland and Norway's Svalbard peninsula. 

Studies have estimated total Chinese investments in the Arctic to total in excess of $90 billion to date. To what end is a hotly debated topic. A recent study by Harvard University's Belfer Center has argued that those investments are decidedly more modest than advertised, and less significant than many assume. National security experts, though, warn that the PRC's inroads are the prelude for an expanded, multi-domain strategy designed to make the Arctic a real domain of competition. The stakes are massive because the region is strategically vital for a range of military, economic, and geopolitical reasons.

How the Global South Is Charting Its Own Path

Jeffery A. Tobin

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There is no shortage of commentary warning that the world is plunging into a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing. However, that framing misses the more consequential development already underway: the Global South is no longer seeking to align itself with one side or another. On the contrary, it is actively realigning the global order on its own terms. The Global South is charting a new geopolitical configuration, one that neither follows the traditional binary of East vs. West or United States vs. China nor revives the Non-Aligned Movement’s passive stance during the Cold War. 

Instead, this “third map” reflects how Global South nations are asserting agency by turning regionally, engaging in strategic multi-alignment, and reframing development and sovereignty. From Latin America to Africa to Southeast Asia, countries are constructing overlapping ecosystems of influence—trade blocs, digital frameworks, regulatory compacts, and diplomatic coalitions—that are neither tethered to Washington nor subordinate to Beijing. Instead, these represent definitive moves toward strategic autonomy.

Donald Trump’s return to office has only accelerated this transformation. His administration’s revival of “America First” policies—marked by cuts to development aid, open skepticism toward multilateral institutions, and revived tariffs—has confirmed what many in the Global South already suspected; reliance on US leadership is, at best, provisional. At worst, it leads to vassaldom. The result won’t be a wholesale pivot to China, but something more structurally significant—a turn inward and sideways, toward regional integration and South-South cooperation. Multiple studies have begun to sketch the contours of this new order.

A recent United Nations Trade and Development report shows that South-South trade doubled from $2.3 trillion in 2007 to $5.6 trillion in 2023, signaling growing integration and diversification away from traditional Northern-centric trade patterns. The World Economic Forum details how South-South and triangular cooperation increasingly brings Global South nations together to tackle development challenges using shared innovations and tailored local solutions. A recent analysis from the Boston Consulting Group emphasizes that Global South nations are directing their own trajectories—multi-aligned, trade-diversified, and regionally networked—to carve influence through alliances like BRICS, ASEAN, AfCFTA.

Chinese scientists draw on Ukraine war lessons and propose an upgrade for PLA drones

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In Ukraine, about nine in 10 Russian drones have been shot down by advanced air defences, according to various estimates. Ukrainian air force data suggested that about 15 per cent of drones had penetrated its defences between April and June – rising from just 5 per cent previously. But a group of Chinese aerospace engineers and defence researchers have now proposed a radical technological enhancement for combat drones that may dramatically increase their ability to survive to nearly 90 per cent. At the heart of the proposal was an innovative concept: 

fitting compact, side-mounted rocket boosters to small or medium-sized drones so they can perform instantaneous, high-G manoeuvres in the final seconds before a missile impact. According to the researchers, this “terminal evasion” system allowed drones to perform abrupt, unpredictable course changes that even the most sophisticated missiles could not track or follow. In extensive digital simulations detailed in a paper published in the Chinese defence journal Acta Armamentarii last month, the system saw a huge improvement in survival rates, passing 87 per cent.

In many cases, the drones effectively caused missiles to detonate harmlessly in empty space. In modern wars, including the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, combatants have “extensively employed drones for reconnaissance and aerial combat, making [them] increasingly crucial on the battlefield”, wrote the project team led by Bi Wenhao, an associate researcher with the National Key Laboratory of Aircraft Configuration Design in Northwestern Polytechnical University in Xian. Chinese military analysts, after studying the war in Ukraine and other areas, “place higher demands on the evasion capability and survivability of unmanned combat aircraft”, the team wrote. 

Taiwan seals deal for Ukraine combat-tested drone software to counter Beijing Traditionally, drones are expected to make evasive moves long before the missile hits, but this can end their mission. As an alternative, Bi’s team suggested taking evasive action at the last possible moment. The concept hinges on three critical principles, the first is precise timing, which means the anti-drone missile must ignite within a one to two-second window before impact – early enough to alter trajectory, late enough to deny the missile time to correct.

Iran’s Dangerous Desperation

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Rarely in modern history has a military offensive been as loudly and persistently foreshadowed as the June 2025 Israeli and American strikes on Iran’s nuclear program. For more than three decades, leaders in Tel Aviv and Washington have issued stark warnings about the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions and activities, and five American presidents have pledged to prevent Tehran from crossing the threshold of nuclear weapons capability.

Despite this forewarning and the signals of imminent preparations, Israel’s initial attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—capped by a brief but decisive U.S. intervention—still shocked Tehran and much of the world. The element of surprise helped facilitate the stunning success of the operation, which briskly decapitated Iran’s military leadership, secured Israeli air superiority over Iranian territory, blunted Iran’s ability to retaliate, and inflicted substantial damage on the crown jewels of the country’s nuclear infrastructure.

The virtuoso execution of the operation and the absence of an effective counterattack by Tehran or its once fearsome network of regional proxies led to another surprise: the rapid denouement to the crisis via an American-imposed cease-fire on the conflict’s 12th day. In less than two weeks, the joint U.S.-Israeli effort accomplished what many had thought impossible, delivering an extraordinary setback to Iran’s nuclear program without igniting a wider regional conflagration.  Tehran’s retaliatory missile attacks on Israel, as well as a performative strike on the U.S. airbase in Qatar, were showy but ineffectual. 

For many in Washington, the result seemed to exorcise the ghosts of failed or frustrated American military interventions in the Middle East over the past four decades. The remarkable outcome compounded a broader collapse in Tehran’s strategic posture that had begun the preceding year, when Israel decimated the regime’s most valuable asset—the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah—and Iran’s foothold in Syria crumbled alongside Bashar al-Assad’s regime. As the June conflict erupted, Iran’s ostensible strategic partners in Moscow and Beijing offered nothing more than mild condemnations.

Israel Is at a Strategic Dead End

Shai Feldman

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Israel’s war in Gaza has reached a strategic dead end. In recent months, Israel has had phenomenal success in setting back Iran’s nuclear program by up to two years (with significant American help) and demolishing the threat posed by Hezbollah from Lebanon. By contrast, the results of Israel’s 22-month fight in Gaza are abysmal even by the stated objectives of the Israeli government. There are no signs of an imminent Hamas collapse; on the contrary, although the IDF is said to have gained control of 75 percent of Gaza’s territory, a recent INSS assessment asserts that half of Gaza’s population is currently concentrated in areas still controlled by Hamas. 

The same assessment also asserts that Hamas continues to hijack “most” of the humanitarian aid entering Gaza. Moreover, the limited success that Israel has had so far in Gaza was associated with horrific death and destruction, with Palestinian casualties (estimated by Hamas’ Ministry of Health) reaching some 60,000 dead and at least that number wounded. The magnitude of the physical damage caused is also unimaginable, with entire towns such as Rafah and Khan Junis flattened, producing scenes reminiscent of Russia’s destruction of Chechnya. By late July. 

Finally, in separate reports, two Israeli human rights NGOs and David Grossman, one of Israel’s most gifted writers, have recently described Israel’s conduct in Gaza as genocide. The effect of these developments on Israel’s standing in international public opinion and the reaction of various governments to the changes in public mood—including in countries with long-standing records of supporting the Jewish state—has been devastating. This is especially the case within the European Union, some of whose members have considered suspending Israel’s participation in its flagship Horizon Europe grant program, a key source of funding for scientific research and technological innovation. In addition, 

by the third week of July, a growing number of European governments, led by France, have threatened to recognize Palestinian statehood unilaterally and thus unconditionally.These developments have had two very serious negative implications for Israel’s confrontation with Hamas: First, Israel’s attempts to coerce Hamas to accept a ceasefire and hostage release deal on its terms by threatening to extract additional heavy costs from Gaza’s population have been ineffective, as Gaza seemed to have already suffered the worst. Not surprisingly, therefore, Hamas was clearly unmoved when Israel’s defense minister, Israel Katz.

Recognizing Palestine Won’t Help Gaza

Lawrence J. Haas

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“We need an immediate ceasefire, the release of all hostages, and massive humanitarian aid for the people of Gaza,” French leader Emmanuel Macron declared in announcing that France will recognize a Palestinian state next month—an announcement that British prime minister Keir Starmer and Canadian prime minister Mark Carney quickly echoed. We must,” Macron went on, “also ensure the demilitarization of Hamas, secure and rebuild Gaza. And finally, we must build the State of Palestine, guarantee its viability, and ensure that by accepting its demilitarization and fully recognizing Israel, it contributes to the security of all in the region.”

Fine sentiments all. But, like similar ones intoned by Western leaders for decades, they skirt the obvious hurdles that make their objective so elusive, thereby turning the announcements into little more than moral grandstanding Worse, their words will embolden Hamas, planting the seeds for more war between Israel and Gaza and condemning the people of Gaza—the very people on whose behalf these leaders profess to speak—to more suffering from committed terrorists who care far more about killing Jews than enriching Gazans.

French, British, and Canadian recognition of a new state of Palestine assumes that the Palestinian Authority (PA), which runs the West Bank, will once again run Gaza, which it ran until 2007, when Hamas ousted it in a violent coup. How shall the PA reassume control? Macron and company don’t seem to have any good answers.We must,” the French president said, “ensure the demilitarization of Hamas.” Note the passive tense. Who will do the demilitarizing? Will Paris send troops to dislodge Hamas from Gaza? Will London or Ottawa? Will any nation or combination of nations do so? Macron doesn’t say, since it’s easier to avoid that thorny issue than confront it head-on.

Will Hamas “disarm” itself and “play no role in the future of governance in Palestine,” as Carney insists, “must” happen? That’s inconceivable. Lest anyone needed a refresher course about Hamas, Ghazi Hamad, a senior official with the group, told Al Jazeera over the weekend: “Our weapons equal our cause.”Moreover, with Palestinian recognition on the horizon, Hamas feels vindicated. A Hamas official, Ghazi Hamad, put it like this: “Why are all these countries recognizing Palestine now? The overall outcome of October 7 forced the world to open its eyes to the Palestinian cause, and to act forcefully in this respect.

Israel Is Fighting a War It Cannot Win

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The war that erupted after the Hamas-led massacre of October 7, 2023, has become the most transformative conflict in the Middle East since the Arab Spring. Yet more than 22 months after the Israel Defense Forces launched a campaign to destroy Hamas, Israel still has no defined political endgame. Negotiations over a cease-fire in Gaza have faltered, and Israel’s failure to envision the war’s “day after” has deepened a humanitarian catastrophe in the strip, which now includes worsening hunger. As the conflict increasingly becomes a deadly regional and international problem, actors outside Israel are stepping in to try to bring resolution.

encouraging other countries to recognize the state of Palestine and support the creation of states along borders delineated in 1967 on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions. Canada, France, and the United Kingdom have said that they will recognize the state of Palestine by September unless the war ends. Israel’s current government appears unable to change its approach, even though its principal military objective—to dismantle Hamas’s terror infrastructure—has largely been achieved. The absence of any long-term Israeli vision has left Israel, Gaza, and the broader region in a protracted state of chaos. 

Wars without a clear political goal cannot be won. They cannot be ended. The longer the vacuum in Israel’s planning persists, the more international actors will have to come together to prevent an even worse catastrophe than the one currently unfolding. They must do so not only for the sake of Israelis and Palestinians but for the region’s stability and their own interests. The war that followed Hamas’s October 7 slaughter was just. Today it is becoming unjust, immoral, and counterproductive, shifting responsibility for the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza from Hamas to Israel.

Two events have reshaped the strategic landscape of the Middle East in the twenty-first century: the Arab Spring and the October 7 attacks. The Arab Spring, which began in late 2010, radically altered the internal dynamics of many Middle Eastern regimes. It empowered street movements and weakened autocrats’ traditional legitimacy, forcing even the most authoritarian leaders to become more responsive to their publics’ sentiment. Israeli and U.S. leaders should have understood that, in the long run, the Arab Spring would influence how a variety of regional actors responded to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

India, the US and the Quad: managing tensions to meet the China challenge

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India’s continued purchase of weapons and energy from Russia is raising difficulties in its relationship with the United States that are extending across the Indo-Pacific. This is not just a bilateral irritant. It has implications for the effectiveness of the Quad, regional stability and the long-term challenge of constraining China’s ambitions. The US-India relationship has always required careful handling, but the return of Donald Trump to the presidency has brought fresh volatility. Trump’s frustration with the ongoing war in Ukraine—and with countries he views as insufficiently supportive of US efforts to isolate Russia—is now focused on India. 

His administration is reportedly considering secondary sanctions on countries buying Russian oil, and India’s substantial increase in Russian energy imports is drawing fire. According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, India bought more than €200 billion worth of fossil fuels from Russia between the start of the full-scale attack on Ukraine and March 2025. Russian oil has grown from less than 1 percent to around 40 percent of India’s crude imports.

On defence, while India has diversified procurement—signing major deals with the US, 

France and Israel—Russian arms still accounted for 36 percent of its military imports in 2020–24. Under the Biden administration, there were already concerns over India’s ties with Moscow and its muted response to the 2022 assault of Ukraine. But Washington largely chose to work around those differences to preserve the broader strategic partnership. With Trump back in the Oval Office and with Russia’s war in Ukraine enduring, tolerance has understandably thinned. Yet India’s Russia relationship is not easily cast aside. Moscow has been a key supplier of arms and a strategic partner for decades. Indian officials remain clear-eyed about this legacy.

They are pursuing what they call a ‘measured, calibrated, and professional’ approach towards the US. India continues to hope for a bilateral trade agreement with the US, aiming to lift trade from US$200 billion to US$500 billion by 2030. But India’s patience has not been matched by Trump’s rhetoric. His claims of mediating India-Pakistan ceasefires were poorly received in New Delhi. The imposition of tariffs and punitive measures—partly due to India’s ties with Moscow—has had the unintended effect of uniting India’s political left and right in scepticism towards the US.Despite the severe damage to the relationship, a permanent breakdown is unlikely.

A Welcome U-Turn in Ukraine

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The test for Ukrainian democracy last month started with a self-inflicted wound by President Zelenskyy and his allies in the Rada, Ukraine’s parliament. On July 22, the Rada voted overwhelmingly to strip two of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions—the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)—of their independence by placing them under the direct control of Ukraine’s Prosecutor General, Ruslan Kravchenko. Not surprisingly, Kravchenko is considered loyal to Zelenskyy and his majority party in the parliament.

According to the government’s critics, President Zelenskyy asked parliament to pass this law to prevent investigations into corruption by some of his ministers and members of parliament from his party. Zelenskyy’s government denied these allegations and insisted that the NABU and SAPO had become ineffective institutions that needed reform. It also alleged that Russian spies had infiltrated these organisations. If true, ineffectiveness and spy penetration are serious problems for powerful entities such as the NABU and SAPO. 

But Zelenskyy’s remedy—removing their independence and placing them under the control of a political ally—was flawed. Ukrainian civil society certainly thought so. Massive demonstrations against the government mobilized immediately—the biggest against Zelenskyy since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Strikingly, many of the protesters were young people who were not old enough to participate in the last major demonstrations in Ukraine during the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity. Many European leaders sided with the protesters. The European Union even suspended aid to Ukraine.

Zelenskyy and his allies in parliament quickly responded to this backlash. A week later, on July 31, the Rada passed and Zelenskyy signed a new law restoring the independence of the NABU and SAPO, albeit with some minor restrictions still in place. Ukrainian civil society leaders rightfully claimed success. That’s how democracy is supposed to work. The hyperbolic claims by some Western critics that Zelenskyy had become a dictator proved unfounded. Autocrats like Putin do not respond to protesters. They arrest them. They kill them.

They escaped Ukraine's front lines. The sound of drones followed them

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In a cramped apartment in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, Pavlo, a 30-year-old drone operator who had recently returned from the front, unzipped a black case about the size of a pizza box. Inside, there was a four-rotor drone he intended to fly around the room. He pressed buttons on the control unit and pushed the antenna to different positions. Nothing happened. "Sorry, not today," he said, with a smile. The unit looked fine, but something was broken. At the front, Pavlo, who asked to be identified only by his first name, was a pilot of first-person view (FPV) drones. 

These small, highly manoeuvrable drones have front-facing cameras that allow them to be flown remotely. Over the past year or so, bomb-laden FPVs have become ubiquitous on the front lines in Ukraine, replacing the heavy weapons that characterised the war's first phase. The FPVs chase armoured vehicles, hunt infantry units through treelines and stalk individual soldiers to their deaths. "You cannot hide from the FPV, and to run is useless," Pavlo said. "You try to be as calm as possible, and you pray."

Even when an FPV is too high to see clearly, or hidden behind foliage, soldiers can hear its distinctive, high-pitched whine. After more than a year at the front, Pavlo has returned home to the Kyiv apartment he shares with his wife. But the sound of the drones has followed him. Everyday mechanical tools like lawnmowers, motorcycles and air conditioners remind him of the FPVs that hunted him and his unit mates. And nature is not an escape. Pavlo can no longer hear the sound of bees and flies buzzing near him without a creeping panic. "I don't like to go into nature anymore and hear this sound, because it reminds me so hard of the drones," he said.

Trauma associated with sound is not new – generations of soldiers have been affected by sudden noises after returning to civilian life. But as the war in Ukraine has evolved into a conflict driven by drone technology, the trauma has evolved with it. Over the past year, the majority of patients – if they are not physically wounded – have mental health injuries as a result of being under drone activity," said Dr Serhii Andriichenko, chief psychiatrist at Kyiv's military hospital. "We call this droneophobia."The first trial of its kind: A Russian solder takes 

Putin and Trump's relationship has soured - but behind the posturing, a Ukraine deal is still possible

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Has the relationship between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin gone off the rails? A popular Russian newspaper thinks so. It turned to trains to illustrate the current state of US-Russian ties. A head-on collision seems unavoidable," declared tabloid Moskovsky Komsomolets recently. The Trump locomotive and the Putin locomotive are speeding towards each other. And neither is about to turn off or stop and reverse." For the 'Putin locomotive', it's full steam ahead, with the so-called 'Special Military Operation': Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kremlin leader has shown no desire to end hostilities and declare a long-term ceasefire.

Meanwhile, the 'Trump locomotive' has been accelerating efforts to pressure Moscow into ending the fighting: announcing deadlines, ultimatums, threats of additional sanctions against Russia and hefty tariffs on Russia's trading partners, like India and China. Add to all of that the two US nuclear submarines which President Trump claims he's repositioned closer to Russia. When you switch from talking about locomotives to nuclear subs, you know things are serious.

But does that mean the White House is really on a "collision course" with the Kremlin over Ukraine? Or is a visit to Moscow this week by Donald Trump's special envoy, Steve Witkoff, a sign that for all the posturing, a deal between Russia and America to end the fighting is still possible? In the early weeks of the second Trump presidency, Moscow and Washington appeared well on track to reboot their bilateral relations. No hint of a head-on collision. Far from it. At times it seemed as if Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump were in the same carriage, moving in the same direction. 

In February the United States sided with Russia at the United Nations, opposing a European-drafted resolution that had condemned Russia's "aggression" in Ukraine. In a telephone call that month the two presidents talked about visiting each other's countries. It felt like a Putin-Trump summit could happen any day.PRESS SERVICE OF THE 24 MECHANIZED BRIGADE HANDOUT/EPA/Shutterstock The U.S. backed Russia at the UN in February, voting against a European resolution that condemned Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Trump administration was exerting pressure on Kyiv, not on Moscow.

How far does the US military have to go to catch up on drones?

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More than a year before the Dec. 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack, Britain’s Royal Navy gave the world a preview of the future of warfare when carrier-based torpedo-bombers launched a surprise attack on the Italian navy, damaging and destroying several vessels. Now, Ukraine and Israel have both shown that small drones launched from behind enemy lines have the potential to devastate an adversary’s most valuable weapons systems. The Pentagon recently announced a series of new initiatives that are meant to catapult the U.S. military into the forefront of small drone warfare. But the Defense Department, to put it mildly, has a very long way to go.

Currently, the U.S. military is nowhere near Ukraine’s ability to mass produce and use small drones, but the comparison is a bit unfair, a former defense official told Task & Purpose. Both Ukraine and Israel face an existential threat, the official said, adding that “Nothing focuses the mind like the prospect of being killed. You pick any tool that is handy, and you use it. And if it doesn’t work, you throw it away and don’t worry about how much it cost.”Recent changes announced by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth about how the U.S. 

military acquires and fields small drones could be a step forward in how the American defense industry produces drones at the scale that Ukraine is. In a July 10 memo, Hegseth called for every squad to have “low-cost, expendable drones” by the end of 2026, with priority going to equipping combat units in the Indo-Pacific region. In a major change, Hegseh wrote that small drones “resemble munitions more than high-end airplanes,” so they should be categorized as consumables. In other words, troops can treat small drones as munitions instead of aircraft, and that will allow the U.S. military to buy many more of them, said Caitlin Lee, of the RAND Corporation.

“I think this move to treat small drones like munitions is a recognition of the fact that we don’t need four FAA flight restrictions on these small drones,” Lee said. “We don’t need triple redundancy on their software or hardware. They’re unmanned, so let’s not get wrapped around the axle with the regulation. The line between a drone, a loitering munition, and a missile is just getting blurrier and blurrier, and I think this is a recognition of that.”https://www.dvidshub.net/image/9132867/drone-grenade-drop-gta A soldier operates a small drone before a M67 grenade drop in the Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, June 25, 2025. Army photo by Sgt. Collin Mackall.

US leaves Syrian base where American troops fought Wagner mercenaries

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U.S. troops have withdrawn from the outpost in Syria where a handful of American special operators and Marines fought off an assault by Russian mercenaries in 2018, a battle in which the American troops left a force 10 times their size scattered across the desert battlefield. The end of the U.S. presence at Mission Support Site Euphrates came as part of a wider drawdown in Syria in May, with American troops withdrawing from multiple bases used in the fight against ISIS, according to a new quarterly report from the Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector General on Operation Inherent Resolve.

Mission Support Site Euphrates is an outpost on the eastern banks of the Euphrates River in Khasham, Deir ez-Zor province. In 2018, a small group of U.S. troops and Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, were at the base, along a line of demarcation along the Euphrates River meant to help avoid conflict with Russian military elements backing the Assad regime. But in February 2018, the outpost was attacked by a force of roughly 500 pro-regime forces. That included members of the Russian mercenary firm the Wagner Group.

What ensued over the subsequent hours came to be known as the Battle of Khasham, or Battle of the Conoco Fields. U.S. Army Green Berets and Delta Force soldiers, Air Force Combat Controllers and Marines held the outpost as American war planes and helicopters poured bombs and rockets onto the Russian and Syrian troops. The Department of Defense — as well as the Wagner Group and the now-deposed Assad regime — have been historically tight-lipped about the events of the battle in the years since, although some details have come out. One of the most revealing reports came from the citation for an Air Force Cross given in 2020 to an Air Force combat controller who participated in the fight. 

On Feb. 7, 2018, “a professionally trained and technically proficient combined arms enemy assault comprised of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery tubes and a battalion of infantry soldiers” advanced across the river and attacked the outpost. Roughly 30 American special operations forces were there with Kurdish SDF fighters. When Delta Force soldiers and Army Rangers at the outpost came under attack, a platoon-sized force of Marines and Green Berets were about 20 miles away and began making their way toward the fight. But it took them far longer to get to the outpost than they imagined, in part due to poor visibility and damaged roads. 

Confronting Core Problems in Cybersecurity

Sara Frueh

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It’s common for governors and mayors to declare a state of emergency and activate the National Guard in the aftermath of hurricanes, tornadoes, and other natural disasters. But last month, officials in Minnesota took these steps in the wake of a major cyberattack on the city of St. Paul — a testament to how disruptive these attacks have become. The attack, and the city’s efforts to contain the damage, hobbled city operations and a range of services online and in real life for citizens. Cyberattacks are an enormous problem, and it’s getting worse in the sense that more people and products and services rely on cyber components,” said John Manferdelli, an independent consultant and National Academy of Engineering member, in a recent interview.

Manferdelli, a mathematician and cryptographer who has held cybersecurity leadership positions at Microsoft, Intel, and Google, is now leading work at the National Academies to steer the nation’s cyber systems toward greater security and resilience. He recently chaired a committee that wrote the report Cyber Hard Problems: Focused Steps Toward a Resilient Digital Future, and currently leads the Forum on Cyber Resilience. There are two reasons the attacks are increasing,” said Manferdelli. “One is that the use of cyber technology is just exploding — everything is cyber enabled. 

And the second is, it’s easy to do. People have made some progress on making it less easy to do, but not a lot. The prevention regime is pretty modest.” Governments are some of the most skilled cyberattackers, often launching “polite” attacks meant to collect intelligence rather than to disrupt anything, Manferdelli said. “But increasingly, attacks are actually meant as sort of a weapon. So, in Ukraine, for example, there have been loads of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in the last year or two — wastewater plants, electrical generation, telecommunications.”

Frequently, attackers’ motivation is solely monetary, as in ransomware attacks, in which an attacker locks an individual’s or company’s data and demands payment for its release. “There’s been a gigantic increase in these attacks over the past two years, and it’s still growing,” he said. “They are carried out by countries and just regular old criminals.” Whatever their motivation, attackers often operate with impunity, explained Manferdelli. “Unlike other crimes, you can be in one country and commit a cybercrime in another country. Sometimes it’s hard to tell who did it, because if they’re practiced, they’re probably very good at concealing their tracks. 

The Tactical and the Textual

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The day before I headed to Camp Buckner for Cadet Field Training (CFT), an unexpected email landed in my inbox: a last-minute opportunity to join the "Writing Matters" Academic Individual Advanced Development (AIAD) in Washington, D.C. “Writing Matters” was an academic development opportunity sponsored by West Point’s Stokes Fellows Program—a specialized program designed to give cadets advanced experience in writing during their time at the academy. A month and a half later, three other cadets and I packed ourselves into a rental car to go speak with some of the best writers in the Army. 

Unsure of what I had gotten myself into, the unfamiliar felt strangely familiar—like stumbling through the dark in CFT with NVGs. I was uncertain whether I'd emerge successful or end up knee-deep in a swamp. This time, instead of learning about ambushes or tactical movements, I was learning how the Army wages war with one of its more subtle, unexpected weapons: words. Over the next two weeks, I learned that professional writing is not just a bureaucratic task, but essential for military leadership and mission success. A leader must be as proficient in written communication as they are in tactical execution, as effective communication goes beyond mere instruction, forming the backbone of operational success for the Army.

In fairness to my other training as a cadet, professional communication is already a central part of field training. For instance, CFT demanded I lead under communicative pressure, ensuring every word mattered- whether briefing a team before a patrol or assigning sectors of fire during a mission. Therefore, my priorities were focused on my technical and tactical skills and the verbal communication required to achieve success in a field environment, rather than becoming a stronger writer. Time spent meticulously crafting an email or memo felt like time diverted from more ‘tangible’ military skills like marksmanship or tactical manoeuvres. 

Writing seemed like an afterthought- relegated to after-action reviews or academic essays. However, my perspective was about to change. During my AIAD, I had the opportunity to speak with senior officers and government leaders who utilize professional writing skills daily. Yet, as a cadet, it can be challenging to understand how professional writing is intertwined with successful leadership, since much of our writing is for academic purposes. However, a day spent at the Pentagon talking with two West Point graduates whose work is centered on professional writing provided a valuable perspective that helped me connect the two aspects. They shared their experiences as cadets.