Indian Strategic Studies: 08/05/25

5 August 2025

Sotheby's returns Buddha jewels to India after uproar

Auction house Sotheby's has returned a set of sacred jewels believed to be linked to the Buddha's remains to India, after facing mounting pressure from the Indian government and global Buddhist leaders.The Piprahwa Gems - described by archaeologists as one of the most astonishing finds of the modern era - were due to be auctioned in Hong Kong in May. But the sale was called off following diplomatic intervention and threats of legal action from Delhi. The Mumbai-based conglomerate Godrej Industries Group has acquired the jewels, Sotheby's said. Sotheby's said it was "delighted" to facilitate the return, following two months of negotiations involving the owner, the new buyer and the Indian government. The relics will now go on permanent public display in India, the auction house said.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the return on Wednesday, calling it a "proud and joyous moment" and a victory for the country's cultural heritage. The relics, he said on X, were coming home after 127 years. Godrej Industries Group, the buyer of the jewels, serves over 1.1 billion consumers worldwide across sectors including consumer goods, real estate, agriculture, finance, and chemicals, according to its website. Many of its products are household names in India. We are deeply honoured to contribute to this historic moment.

The Piprahwa gems are not just artefacts - they are timeless symbols of peace, compassion, and the shared heritage of humanity," Pirojsha Godrej, Executive Vice Chairperson of Godrej Industries Group, was quoted as saying in a government press statement.Jewels linked to Buddha remains go to auction, sparking ethical debate Unearthed in 1898 by English estate manager William Claxton Peppé from a stupa in Piprahwa in northern India, near the Buddha's birthplace, the cache included nearly 1,800 pearls, rubies, sapphires and gold sheets - buried alongside bone fragments identified by an inscribed urn as belonging to the Buddha himself.

Peppé eventually handed most of the gems, relics and reliquaries to the colonial Indian government: the bone relics went to the Buddhist King of Siam (Rama V). Five relic urns, a stone chest and most other relics were sent to the Indian Museum in Kolkata - then the Imperial Museum of Calcutta. For over a century, the rest of the dazzling jewels remained largely hidden in a British private collection. A set of 300 gems held by the Peppé family was publicly displayed at Sotheby's Hong Kong in February and May. Over the past six years, the gems have appeared in major exhibitions, including The Met in 2023. The family has also launched a website to share their research.

A Faustian Bargain for the Global South

The spotlight on US President Donald Trump’s tariffs is distracting attention from a broader strategic effort by the United States and other major powers to preserve their technological dominance at the expense of the developing world. Two recent trade deals reveal how this approach undermines long-term economic development. NEW DELHI – US President Donald Trump’s tariff policies have unleashed global economic turmoil and a wave of protectionist measures. While many of his frequently changing tariffs may prove short-lived, their use as geopolitical weapons is poised to reshape international

But the current fixation on Trump’s tariffs diverts attention from the larger goal: the United States is leveraging its economic power to push for market liberalization and preferential access for American firms, often at the expense of lower-income countries’ development prospects. Today’s US-China standoff is a prime example. America’s hostile posture toward China – maintained under both Trump and former President Joe Biden – has never been just about trade. Rather, it reflects a strategic ambition to preserve US technological dominance by preventing China from catching up in key sectors.

That effort has since become part of a broader campaign to restrict access to advanced technologies across the developing world. The primary tool for achieving this goal has been the imposition of increasingly restrictive intellectual-property (IP) rules that aim to privatize knowledge through patents, copyrights, and industrial designs. This helps explain why the trade agreement with Indonesia includes several provisions designed to limit the country’s ability to move up the value chain into knowledge-intensive industries. Tellingly, Indonesia will eliminate 99% of its tariffs on American industrial, food, and agricultural imports, while Indonesian exports to the US will face an average tariff rate of 19%.

The immediate impact will be felt most acutely by Indonesian farmers, who must now compete against subsidized US agricultural products. But the longer-term risks lie in the dismantling of non-tariff barriers, which could severely constrain Indonesia’s ability to diversify its economy and curtail its access to critical technologies. According to the joint statement announcing the deal, American firms will receive sweeping privileges. Indonesia will remove all content requirements for US-made goods and accept American vehicle-safety and emissions standards, which are far more lenient than its own.

China Has Picked Its New Model Entrepreneurs

Lizzi C. Lee

On July 15, five of China’s most prominent private-sector entrepreneurs sat shoulder to shoulder at a press conference in Beijing hosted by the State Council, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ruling body. Above their heads, a banner enjoined them to “carry forward the entrepreneurial spirit” and to serve as “excellent builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” One after another, they spoke of innovation, social responsibility, and their gratitude to the state.

Their remarks were punctuated by phrases like “broad prospects,” “great potential,” and “just the right time”—rhetorical markers closely associated with Xi-era political discourse. Our analysis of China’s official government portal found that the phrase “just the right time” has appeared in policy commentary consistently since 2014, while “great potential”—a particularly Xi-inflected phrase—has surfaced 76 times out of 79 total uses since President Xi Jinping came into office.

PLA Navy Shifts Training Focus from Near-Shore to Blue-Water Operations

Yu-cheng Chen, K. Tristan Tang

In June 2025, the Liaoning and Shandong carrier strike groups conducted operations in the Western Pacific, achieving three major milestones with significant strategic implications for the U.S. military and Indo-Pacific regional states. The three key milestones include the first simultaneous deployment of two carrier strike groups beyond the First Island Chain; the first time a Chinese carrier has operated beyond the Second Island Chain; and a record-breaking duration for carrier operations outside the First Island Chain. These military actions were part of far-seas mobile operations training, conducted within the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s annual routine training program.

This indicates that the Chinese Navy has begun to regularize far-seas mobile operations training, which may require the United States to adjust its force posture in the region. Together with the large-scale PLA military operations around Taiwan that have taken place since 2022, these developments suggest that the Central Military Commission likely assesses that the Chinese military possesses comprehensive near-seas combat capabilities, implying that the PLA Navy could believe it has secured operational dominance in nearby waters and may adopt more assertive actions against foreign naval vessels in these areas.

On May 27, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) Liaoning aircraft carrier crossed the first island chain and entered the Western Pacific. On June 7, the Shandong carrier group followed suit, transiting from the South China Sea into the Philippine Sea. While in the Western Pacific, the carrier groups engaged in a round of far-sea realistic combat training (远海实战化训练) and adversarial drills (对抗演练). The drills included reconnaissance and early warning, counter-strike operations, anti-surface assaults, air defense, and round-the-clock tactical flights by carrier-based aircraft; achieving new milestones for the PLA Navy (PLA Daily, July 1). By June 22, both groups had returned to the East and South China Seas, respectively.

The drills constitute a shift in the PLAN’s focus toward long-range operations. This likely stems from an assessment by the PLA’s Central Military Commission (CMC) that the navy has achieved sufficient combat capability in the country’s near seas (近海). This is something that could have important implications for U.S. force posture in the region. The PLA has begun to cross the Second Island Chain, which includes Guam, in the Western Pacific. This shift brings Chinese forces closer to Hawaii. As a result, the United States may need to adjust its force deployments and rotation schedules accordingly.

Amid Geopolitical Tensions, Baloch Militant Attacks Undermine Sino–Pakistan Projects

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has become a prime target for Baloch separatists and jihadist groups, with attacks escalating since 2021 and culminating in high-profile incidents like the March 2025 Jaffar Express hijacking. These attacks reflect deeper regional and geopolitical tensions, as CPEC’s trajectory is increasingly entangled with conflicts involving Iran, India, and the marginalization of Baloch communities.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of the People’s Republic of China’s “One Belt One Road (OBOR)” Initiative, aims to connect Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to Pakistan’s Gwadar port. This would provide a shortcut for China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf, in addition to numerous economic benefits for Pakistan. However, the project faces persistent threats from Baloch separatist and Islamist militant groups, with attacks targeting Chinese nationals and infrastructure escalating since 2021.

The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has intensified its campaign against the CPEC, exemplified by Operation Dara-e-Bolan in Mach, Balochistan, on January 29, 2024, along with a series of coordinated attacks in March 2025. The March attacks included the high-profile hijacking of the Jaffar Express train on March 11, which killed 59 people and took hundreds hostage (see Terrorism Monitor, May 6, 2024). While Pakistani officials claim BLA attacks aim to sabotage Pakistan’s close alliance with China, the targeted killings of Chinese nationals highlight the CPEC’s significant security vulnerabilities (Dawn, June 10, 2024).

For example, Baloch militants killed nine Chinese workers at the Dasu Hydropower Project on July 14, 2021 (The Hindu, July 31, 2023). The signing of six new pacts in 2023 to inaugurate CPEC’s second phase further motivated Baloch separatists, leading to attacks on Chinese workers since 2024. These included yet another attack at the Dasu Dam. These attacks cast doubt on the effectiveness of security measures protecting CPEC projects and Chinese personnel, as well as the project’s future viability.

Taiwan Bounty: PRC Cross-Agency Operations Target Taiwanese Military Personnel

For the first time, public security authorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are targeting Taiwanese military personnel and so-called “Taiwan independence” forces through a law enforcement framework. Akin to techniques previously used in Hong Kong, the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau recently issued a “wanted” notice offering a reward for information leading to the apprehension of 20 retired and active personnel in Taiwan’s Information, Communication, and Electronic Force Command (ICEFCOM).

The operation appears to involve close coordination between the Public Security Bureau and state media outlets. Within minutes of the announcement, the photos and ID numbers of the 20 Taiwanese personnel were plastered across the Chinese Internet, as was a detailed report purporting to show how they had launched a cyberattack against PRC institutions. Part of a growing trend of cyber and psychological warfare tactics, this latest operation sought to reframe the issue by portraying the PRC as a victim and Taipei as an aggressor, while also aiming to deter any future pro-independence activities by threatening punishment.

Over the past two years, Hong Kong authorities have placed bounties on 19 prominent pro-democracy activists of Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) 1 million ($127,000). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) now appears to be extending similar tactics to its broader hybrid warfare playbook, this time targeting Taiwan’s military personnel. In early June, the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau (PSB) issued a “wanted” notice offering a renminbi (RMB) 10,000 ($1,400) reward for information leading to the apprehension of 20 retired and active personnel in the Information.

Communication, and Electronic Force Command (ICEFCOM; 國防部資通電軍指揮部) of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND). This marks the first known instance of PRC public security authorities targeting Taiwanese military personnel and so-called “Taiwan independence” (台独) forces through a law enforcement framework. The level of cross-agency coordination involved in the operation far exceeds the norm for local PSB branches. It engaged state and state-affiliated entities across multiple domains, employing mutually reinforcing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Its goal was to erode morale and exert psychological pressure on Taiwan’s military while discrediting its reputation in the public sphere.

The Big Mistake the West Is Making About Russia, China, and Iran

Anna Borshchevskaya

Neither Russia nor China came to Iran’s rescue in June this year during the US-Israel-Iran crisis. Moscow and Beijing condemned the Israeli military campaign and targeted US airstrikes against the Iranian nuclear facilities, but did little to help Iran in any meaningful way. Many commentators concluded that the crisis highlighted the limits of the so-called “axis of upheaval” between Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea. Some went further to suggest Russia’s and China’s policies are failing in the Middle East, and that this axis falls apart when it matters.

It is undeniably true that Tehran couldn’t count on its professed strategic partners in this crisis, especially when the United States demonstrated it was willing to use force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. But the consensus is wrong: the Russia-Iran-China axis hasn’t fallen apart. To the contrary, these countries appear to be willing to work together even more closely now than before the 12-day war to undermine US interests.

Russia and Iran continue to expand their cooperation outside the conventional military realm. Earlier this month, Moscow’s Soyuz rocket launched an Iranian communications satellite into orbit from Russia’s Far East. This launch is not a one-off event. Three years ago, Russia launched Iran’s Khayyam satellite into orbit from Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Moscow, for its part, has been quietly expanding space collaboration across the Middle East in previous years, and China has been doing the same. Moreover, Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea all cooperate in space.

Space collaboration entails the sharing of surveillance, communication, and navigation. Analysts increasingly see space as the future of military operations because it enables modern warfare across multiple domains. And at a time when the West is looking to establish norms of responsible state behavior in space, its top adversaries are signaling they will challenge these efforts. The West should not write off military collaboration between its top adversaries. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea all remain focused on building advanced drones—at a rate faster than in the West, as some experts note.

The Future of Maritime Presence in the Central Arctic Ocean

Climate models project that the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) may soon become ice-free in summer for a limited window of time, opening a seasonally navigable route that connects Asia to Europe by crossing over the North Pole. This Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) and its surrounding waters in the CAO have seen little activity and would be available for seasonal commercial and surface military activity, particularly from the surrounding exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Canada, Denmark (through Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, Russia, and the United States.

In this report, the authors explore how global actors may leverage new maritime access in the CAO for economic, political, and military gain. Drawing on insights from climate models, literature, and expert interviews, they examine current and potential future maritime uses of the ocean and the TSR by Arctic states and other actors. They then present a scenario in four phases of how these activities could plausibly develop in the CAO over time. The authors find that the most plausible scenario for maritime use of the CAO in the next 25 years is one of limited activity, though numerous factors could lead to expanded commercial and military presence by global actors.

The most plausible scenario for maritime use of the CAO in the next 25 years is one of limited activity, though ice melt will continue to expand windows of opportunity for activity throughout the 21st century and numerous factors could lead to expanded commercial and military presence by global actors. Fishing in the CAO is prohibited until at least 2037 and will likely be of limited commercial appeal. The CAO will still hold little appeal for extractive activities, such as mineral mining, because closer-to-shore resources continue to offer material at a competitive cost. Increased activity in the CAO means that new actors will also be entering Arctic state EEZs and even territorial waters, increasing the risk of security and safety hazards close to shore.

The actors best positioned to be first movers in the CAO will be those that have already planned and developed the capacity to operate in the region. Not every state stands to gain equally from the opening of a commercially viable CAO. Russia would be seriously affected by the creation of a direct competitor to the Northern Sea Route. The risk of resource-driven geopolitical conflict in the CAO is limited, although accidental escalation is always possible. Sustained activity in the CAO will depend on a robust presence of search and rescue and disaster response provisions. Reliable access to the CAO does not mean safe navigation in the CAO.

Nuclear terrorists wear suits: How Iran could build a nuclear weapon without state approval

Matt Caplan, Vesal Razavimaleki

A nuclear terrorist does not match the profile of a suicide bomber or spree gunman. It’s not someone building a nuclear weapon in a cave from a box of scraps. A nuclear terrorist, rather, could be hiding in plain sight in a mid-tier government post. Such a person could be active in Iran, right now, motivated to build an improvised nuclear weapon after an opportunity to steal weapon-usable uranium—enriched at 60 per cent uranium 235 has just presented itself. This person could be emboldened by the absence of IAEA inspectors overseeing Iran’s known stockpile of fissile material.

Despite popular confusion about the nature of critical masses and what level of enrichment can be used for a weapon, a technical companion shows that as little as 40 kilograms of 60-percent-enriched uranium, representing only 10 percent of Iran’s stockpile, could be used to build a crude gun-type weapon like the “Little Boy” bomb that destroyed Hiroshima with an explosive yield of several kilotons. Such a weapon requires no further enrichment, greatly simplifying and fast-tracking construction.

The question, therefore, is not whether Iran can achieve its nuclear ambitions, but whether and how these can be realised by nuclear terrorists without state approval. If not by air, then by cargo. In their letter to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein suggested that a nuclear weapon may be too heavy to be delivered by air, but could be brought into a port in a cargo container and detonated. Such a scenario is feasible for aspiring nuclear terrorists in Iran.

While the technical hurdles of building a nuclear weapon have long been discussed, they may not be insurmountable to a well-resourced group of clandestine sub-state actors. As of July 2025, publicly available intelligence was inconclusive about what remains of Iran’s enrichment capabilities and other nuclear assets following the June attacks by Israel and the United States on its nuclear facilities. Some experts have suggested, reasonably so from a tactical perspective, that Iran may have removed part of its enriched uranium stockpile from the Fordow underground enrichment facility and scattered it into multiple secret caches.

Small Countries Are Seeking Asylum in Europe

Caroline de Gruyter

When the world was still a global village, a small European country could reasonably choose to be unaligned or neutral. It could steer its course as a sovereign nation and do some nice cherry-picking from international alliances on the side. If it was blessed with resources or a profitable niche business sector, then it could even delude itself with the belief that it hardly needed others at all.

Look at Switzerland, which calmy and neutrally sailed the waves of globalization for many years. Look at Iceland: in NATO but outside the European Union, and which never built a standing army because it never had the need. Or look at Norway, another NATO member outside the EU, proudly enjoying its wealth and independence while quietly copying most of the EU’s rulebook. Until a few years ago, all these small states thought they had the best of all worlds.

Targeting at Machine Speed: The Capabilities—and Limits—of Artificial Intelligence

The United States Army’s ability to deliver precision fires and effects is fundamentally tied to its doctrinal targeting methodology: decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A). Field Manual 3-60, Army Targeting prescribes the use of D3A as an integrative approach requiring cooperation across multiple warfighting functions. As the Army advances under the pressures of multidomain operations as its operational concept, optimizes its contributions to US strategic competition with near-peer adversaries, and pursues its recently announced transformation initiative, the necessity of integrating artificial intelligence into targeting workflows is paramount.

AI technologies have already proven their utility across a range of defense applications, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance processing, decision support, and autonomous systems operations. Over the past several years, a growing body of academic research has explored these capabilities, yielding insights with significant implications for military policy and doctrine. Key takeaways from this body of work include:AI in targeting presents a moral dilemma—it must be employed as a tool, not as a substitute for the warfighter’s judgment.

Time is the most compelling performance metric for evaluating AI effectiveness in the targeting process.AI offers undeniable scaling advantages, particularly in data processing and decision acceleration. Human commanders must remain the final arbiters of lethal force, preserving the principle of human-on-the-loop decision-making should augment—not replace—critical targeting functions, such as rules of engagement validation, proportionality assessments, and determinations of military necessity.

Even with these insights established by research, AI’s integration into the D3A targeting methodology remains underdeveloped in operational doctrine. There is therefore a central question the Army has yet to answer: Can AI enable the D3A cycle to achieve faster, more reliable, and more effective targeting—while preserving accountability through human oversight? Emerging programs such as the Israeli AI-enabled system known as “the Gospel,” the US Department of Defense’s Project Maven, and other kill chain automation initiatives reflect a growing desire to accelerate targeting cycles.

IRIS-T SLM Reports Successful Ballistic Missile Intercepts

According to Oleksii Makeiev, Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, the German IRIS-T SLM system has reportedly succeeded in intercepting ballistic missiles, as revealed in an interview with European Pravda on July 28. Citing Ukrainian military reports, Makeiev stated that IRIS-T SLM — though according to the manufacturer not originally designed for this purpose — had in some cases managed shot down ballistic missiles. He offered no details regarding the missile types or engagement conditions.

Diehl Defence has also declined to comment on specific incidents. A spokesperson only noted that “the customer has repeatedly expressed a satisfaction rate of 100 percent”, a figure likely reflecting the system’s performance against long-range drones and cruise missiles rather than ballistic threats.Thanks for reading Missile Matters — with Fabian Hoffmann! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

The ability of IRIS-T SLM to counter ballistic missile threats is not a total surprise but likely highly dependent on the type of incoming ballistic missile and the conditions of the engagement. The German Bundeswehr, for example, explicitly lists short-range ballistic missiles as part of the system’s engagement envelope. As stated on the official Bundeswehr website: “The IRIS-T SLM system from Diehl Defence is considered the most advanced, combat-proven, and modular air defense missile system for countering airborne attacks.

It provides 360-degree protection from close range up to medium distances (effective range 40 kilometres) and engages enemy aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and guided weapons, including short-range ballistic missiles”. Without additional information, it is impossible to determine which specific ballistic missiles were intercepted in the cases cited by the ambassador. According to well-informed sources, one key factor behind the air defense system’s high success rate is its use of Hensoldt’s TRML-4D high-precision radar.

Cooler Heads Prevail in the Gulf—for Now

Mina Al-Oraibi

For years, politicians, diplomats, analysts, and journalists working on the Middle East worried that a war between Iran and Israel could quickly spill over into the Arab world. If Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear program, many assumed, Iran would retaliate against U.S. interests in neighboring Arab states. Fears centered on Iraq and Syria rather than the Gulf. Given that Iran had stabilized relations with the Gulf over the past few years, the thinking went, it would avoid actions that could upset its new ties.

On June 23, these theories were put to the test. After the United States launched missile attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran retaliated by striking U.S. bases in Qatar. It was an unprecedented act. Iranian proxies had targeted the Gulf previously, most prominently with the Houthi attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in 2019 and on infrastructure in Abu Dhabi in 2022.

In these cases, Tehran was able to maintain plausible deniability. But the Qatar attack was different. Iran launched missiles directly at Qatar, striking the regional headquarters of U.S. Central Command and the Al Udeid Air Base. Tehran may have informed Doha of its plans ahead of time and developments were largely controlled. But the fact remains that strikes on the tranquil Qatari state crossed a line.

Tehran’s Wake‑Up Call for Beijing

Grant Rumley

Israel’s air campaign against Iran did more than degrade Tehran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities—it forced every regional actor to show its proverbial hand. Israel went all-in with an overwhelming airpower campaign, Gulf capitals folded into wary neutrality, and Washington showed that it still owns the table. Beijing, by contrast, merely dealt out press releases, its Middle East playbook reduced to rhetorical flourishes without ante.

With the dust now settled, the lesson most relevant to Beijing lies far from the Gulf. The short clash confirmed what Chinese strategists have long preached: In great-power contests, hard power decides outcomes. Grant Rumley is a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a former advisor for Middle East policy in the U.S. Defense Department, and the co-author, with Amir Tibon, of The Last Palestinian: The Rise and Reign of Mahmoud Abbas.

In a First, Portuguese Police Find Extremists’ Cache of 3D-Printed Firearms

In a June raid against right-wing extremist group Movimento Armilar Lusitano (MAL), Portuguese police discovered a cache of weapons, including several 3D-printed firearms (3DPFs). This marks the first time 3DPFs have been found in Portugal. 3DPFs have proven to be popular among extremists, particularly right-wing groups. The spread of 3DPFs in places like Europe, where gun ownership is uncommon and heavily restricted, is likely to present security forces with previously unseen challenges. MAL was formed in 2018 from a coalition of right-wing political groups. Similar to other such organizations, MAL successfully sought to recruit members of the local security forces to improve both their operational capacity and potentially infiltrate the state’s security apparatus.

In June, Portuguese Judicial Police working in collaboration with the National Counterterrorism Unit discovered several 3D-printed firearms (3DPFs) in a raid on a suspected cell of right-wing extremists, as part of “Operation Desarme 3D” (Operation Disarmament 3D) (Polícia Judiciária, June 17; Publico, June 17). The fact that the raid captured 3DPFs was significant, given that it was the first time such weapons were found in Portugal. This incident could portend the continuous spread of similar weapons in the country and throughout Europe, where prohibitions against the possession of firearms are generally understood to be fairly strict.

The guns belonged to a right-wing extremist group called Movimento Armilar Lusitano (MAL) (Portugal Resident, June 18). MAL was formed in 2018 from a coalition of right-wing political groups with the intention of establishing a unified political movement with an armed wing (SIC Notícias, June 17; Portugal Resident, June 18). Though the cell had no concrete plans for an attack, online communications revealed they eventually intended to target political institutions, such as São Bento Palace (where the Portuguese parliament is located) and Belém Palace (the residence of Portugal’s president), in addition to several politicians (SIC Notícias.

June 20). They also engaged in extensive preparations, which included manufacturing and acquiring explosives, bladed weapons, and firearms in addition to training with airsoft guns (SIC Notícias, June 17; Publico, June 17). Members of the group, including a growing number of youths, were active on Telegram and Signal (SIC Notícias, June 18; Expresso, June 20). Four 3D-printers were found in the raid alongside an FGC-9 rifle and a Harlot pistol. The firearms were reportedly fully functional and in good working condition (Publico, June 17).

Moscow’s Policies Increasingly Agitate Local Elites

The Kremlin has increased its suppression of regional self-government since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, fearing any manifestation of independence. In several regions, however, the local population has opposed such suppression, and the people’s mood aligns closer with the wishes of regional elites. In turn, the remaining regional elites are finding increasingly unconventional ways to defy the center and maintain a degree of autonomy. Russian political analyst Aleksandr Kynev noted that since the first half of 2024, the Kremlin has gradually sharpened its regional policies.

For the first year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the rotations of governors dropped, but it soon returned to a noteworthy 32 percent, and since July 2024, 13 governors have already been replaced. There is also a tendency for “participants of the [Special Military Operation (SVO)]”—career military personnel or managers who have worked in the “new territories”—to infiltrate the regional administrative elites (Re-Russia, July 9).

Kynev points out that the regional elite has already been replaced by an “administrative elite,” that is, officials lacking personal power and ties with their new region. In 2024, however, beyond just a change of governor, a wholesale shift of the entire nomenklatura has begun. In many regions, this involves the active participation of external personnel, and often follows the arrests of previous managers. The practice of coordinating appointments to executive positions in parliament with central authorities is also growing (Re-Russia, July 9).

In some regions, special deputy governors (government chairmen) have been named to look after the restoration of the “sponsored territories” in Eastern Ukraine. In others, regional and federal officials working in the administrations of the “new territories” are returning with promotions to governorships or vice-governorships. Among them are the governor of Chukotka, Vladislav Kuznetsov, formerly first deputy chairman of the “Donetsk People’s Republic’s” (DPR) government; the leader of the Omsk oblast, former chairman of the “DPR” government Vladislav Khotsenko.

Why the United States Should Not Fear a Space Pearl Harbor

Zachary Burdette

In the early 2000s, U.S. defense analysts sounded the alarm (PDF) about a potential “Space Pearl Harbor.” They warned that the U.S. military was becoming increasingly dependent on a small number of vulnerable satellites that would become tempting targets during a crisis or conflict. Those fears grew exponentially after China's landmark demonstration in 2007 of a direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missile that destroyed a Chinese weather satellite. Some analysts have argued in the years since that satellites are becoming a liability rather than an asset, potentially even “the American military's Achilles heel.

These fears have significant implications. If the United States depends heavily on satellites that it cannot defend effectively, that raises fundamental questions about its grand strategy and ability to defend allies and partners in the Pacific. If China believes that counterspace attacks could paralyze the U.S. military, that could fuel crisis instability by incentivizing China to strike first. Fortunately, the magnitude of the challenge remains more manageable than pessimists fear. While China's counterspace capabilities pose a serious challenge, worst-case scenarios of quick and easy counterspace campaigns that leave the U.S. military incapacitated are unrealistic.

Encouraging trends in the resilience of U.S. space architectures and terrestrial backups to space capabilities are mitigating the extent of the threat, though not eliminating it. Additionally, the Space Pearl Harbor framing overlooks that, rather than just playing defense, the United States also needs sustained investments to counter the dramatic growth of China's own space capabilities that could enable long-range strikes and put U.S. forces at increasing risk. If the United States depends heavily on satellites that it cannot defend effectively, that raises fundamental questions about its grand strategy and ability to defend allies and partners in the Pacific.

There are three main reasons that policymakers and analysts have expressed alarm about the U.S. ability to defend against Chinese counterspace attacks. First, the conventional wisdom is that the attacker has significant structural advantages over the defender in space. Analysts point to factors such as the predictability of orbits and the difficulty of hiding satellites as reasons that space is “an inherently vulnerable and offense-dominant domain.” Additionally, because DA-ASATs have historically been much cheaper than satellites.

Peace Negotiations in Ukraine Haven’t Failed. They Haven’t Really Started.

Samuel Charap

Donald Trump is disappointed with Vladimir Putin. “The talk doesn’t mean anything,” Mr. Trump has said of his phone calls with Russia’s president about ending the war on Ukraine. “We’ll have a great conversation,” he told the BBC. “I’ll say: ‘That’s good, I think we’re close to getting it done,’ and then he’ll knock down a building in Kyiv.” This frustration has translated into additional support for Ukraine and vows of more pressure on Russia. Mr. Trump announced last week that the United States would sell weapons to European nations, which would ship them to Ukraine, and threatened to impose “very severe” tariffs if Russia does not agree to a cease-fire within 50 days.

Mr. Trump seems to have come to the conclusion that Mr. Putin is the barrier to the peace in Ukraine that Mr. Trump has promised he will deliver. That despite visits to Moscow by Mr. Trump’s special envoy, exchanges of terse proposals and several phone calls between Mr. Trump and Mr. Putin, the Russian president has not merely continued his invasion, he has accelerated it. Mr. Trump may be right: Mr. Putin may indeed think that he does not need to compromise, that he can still have his way in Ukraine if he keeps fighting.

But if Mr. Trump believes that diplomacy has been tried and has failed, he is mistaken. A few phone calls and a couple of visits are not enough to end a war. And no one — maybe not even Mr. Putin himself — knows what he would accept if he were presented with a real negotiation process that required compromises from all sides. Until we test him with such a process, we cannot be sure that he is determined to fight on in any circumstances. Historically, negotiations to resolve major conflicts have been painstaking and protracted.

The Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which ended the bloodshed known as the Troubles in Northern Ireland, took almost two years of direct negotiations — and those negotiations took place only after years of groundwork and preparatory discussions. After the Arab-Israel war of 1973, Henry Kissinger spent months flying back and forth from Egypt to Israel, and Israel to Syria, in order to narrow the gaps between countries that had fought two wars in less than six years. The term “shuttle diplomacy” was coined to describe his dogged approach. The armistice to end the Korean War took 575 meetings over two years to finalize.

Cyberstorm on the horizon: David E. Sanger on what two recent breaches reveal about modern warfare

Sara Goudarzi

In 2023 and 2024, reporting showed the existence of two cyber espionage operations against the United States that were traced back to Chinese groups. One, referred to by Microsoft and other tech companies as “Volt Typhoon,” focused on shutting down critical American infrastructure—presumably in the wake of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The other, referred to by cyber analysts as “Salt Typhoon,” was an extremely sophisticated operation that used the country’s telecommunications networks to spy on Americans. While these incidents were by no means the first time foreign actors had gained access to US networks, the efforts were significant in their comprehensiveness and covertness.

At least one of them appeared to be part of a bigger military plan, raising crucial questions about the role of cyber operations in conflict. I spoke with David E. Sanger, White House and National Security Correspondent for The New York Times, who has reported extensively on the topic, to find out what to take away from these incidents, how cyber operations factor into the geopolitical landscape and future wars, and how the United States can best prepare for similar breaches on the horizon. Editor’s note: The resulting discussion has been edited and condensed for length and clarity.

Sara Goudarzi: You’ve reported on China’s recent hacking of both the United States’ utilities and communication systems. When did they occur, and what happened? David Sanger: I think one of the great under-recognized stories of what’s happened in the US-China relationship over the past two or three years is the extent and the sophistication of the cyber activity that has so shaken American policy makers.This came in two forms. The first is something known as Volt Typhoon, which was discovered by intelligence agencies during the Biden administration and really broke out into the public in 2023.

[1] This was an effort by the Chinese to get deep inside the American utility grid, pipelines, water, and gas—all the critical infrastructure. And it was discovered first in systems that were close to big American military bases: Guam, Hawaii, the West Coast of the United States. It’s not clear whether that was the original intention, but that’s where American officials were looking for it the hardest, because they understood right away what this was intended to do, which is to create a pathway into these systems so that if China needed to gum up the works, turn off the lights or the pipelines in a time of crisis—especially one over Taiwan—they could slow the American response to come to Taiwan’s aid.

America’s AI action plan aims to gut regulation and expand manufacturing

Frances Mack

Last Wednesday, the White House released “Winning the AI Race: America’s AI Action Plan,” a document introducing more than 90 federal policies related to artificial intelligence innovation, infrastructure, and diplomacy and security. The plan—which intends to “cement US dominance in artificial intelligence” and proposes gutting regulations, expanding AI use, and rapidly building data centers—is set to begin rolling out in the coming weeks and months In an hour-long speech later that day, President Trump, standing in front of tech leaders stated: “With your help, that golden age will be built by American workers.

It will be powered by American energy. It will be run on American technology, improved by American artificial intelligence.” Trump vowed to “turn America into an AI export powerhouse” and get “rid of woke.” The 28-page blueprint for winning the AI race contains three pillars outlining policies that promise to advance the United States’ productivity and technological industry but that come with sociopolitical and economic changes and environmental ramifications. In a split with the Biden administration’s policy on AI, the Trump administration’s plan aims to lift regulations and revise existing AI frameworks to eliminate content categorized as biased.

With these lightened restrictions, funding will be dedicated to widespread AI implementation across industries, impacting research and the labor market. The plan also prioritizes manufacturing semiconductors and chips, regardless of environmental impacts. Lastly, the blueprint delineates how the United States will develop and distribute AI to other countries to remain dominant in the global technology race, one that some experts view as futile. Accelerate AI innovation. The first, and heftiest, pillar involves stripping away the bureaucratic red tape and regulations that “smother” AI advancement.

The proposed policy actions indicate states will be able to pass AI laws if they don’t infringe on innovation. It also warns that federal funding will be diverted from states with burdensome AI regulations. However, compared to Europe’s stringent EU AI framework—and even some regulations in China, the country’s greatest AI adversary—the United States has little red tape to remove. The plan cites ideological bias as a roadblock and mentions that AI systems and large language models (LLMs) must protect free speech and American values. The Department of Commerce will be revising the AI Risk Management Framework “to eliminate references to misinformation, Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, and climate change.”

To keep the world’s data flowing, countries need to quickly fix broken undersea cables

Aaron Bateman

In the midst of US-Soviet tensions over Berlin in early 1959, five transatlantic submarine cables suddenly stopped working. Alarm bells rang in Washington since these undersea information networks carried NATO’s most sensitive intelligence and defence messages across the Atlantic. The United States and its allies initially suspected that the Kremlin might have purposefully cut the cables because a Soviet trawler was in the vicinity, but evidence was lacking. Nevertheless, because of this incident, NATO made cable resiliency a high priority.

Over the last couple of years, damage to submarine cables in the Baltic Sea, the Pacific Ocean, and the Red Sea has raised anxieties worldwide about the vulnerabilities of subsea information networks. These concerns are warranted; submarine cables are the physical infrastructure of global connectivity. More than 550 submarine cables, stretching in excess of 1 million kilometres along the seabed, serve as the information highways for both civilian and defence organisations.

The same cables that connect billions of users to the internet also transmit sensitive defence-related messages. The fact that cables are lengthy, immobile, and land at fixed points complicates efforts to secure them against both intentional acts of interference and accidents. The spate of cable breaks in the Baltic Sea in late 2024 immediately raised suspicions among European officials that sabotage was to blame. Since then, consensus has emerged that these incidents were likely accidental.

Also in 2024, multiple cables in the Red Sea broke, disrupting internet traffic between Asia and Europe. These cases underscore the fragile nature of the submarine cable networks that carry more than 95 percent of global telecommunications. During the Cold War—just like today—the United States and its allies had to contend both with accidental cable breaks on a regular basis and the threat of sabotage. Consequently, the United States invested in alternate means of communications, cooperated with allies to secure access to cable-repair vessels, and diversified cable routing.

Duma Defense Committee Head Calls for Processing Russian Men for Draft Year-Round

The head of the Duma’s defence committee has called for processing men to be drafted not two times a year as now but year-round, something he says would reduce tensions in the spring and fall campaigns by giving all involved time to operate more calmly. If adopted, his proposal could make it far easier for Moscow to move to a war footing by allowing the regime to boost the size of the military quickly, and thus making the situation less predictable for Russians and for other countries.

It could also give the Kremlin yet another tool to limit dissent by giving Moscow the ability to call almost any young men in for examinations and to conscript dissenters more readily. Andrey Kartapolov, chairman of the Russian State Duma’s defense committee, and his deputy, Andrey Krasov—both former senior officers in the Russian military and members of the ruling United Russia Party—have submitted a draft bill that would allow military commissariats to evaluate men year-round, not just during the two draft periods in the spring and fall, as it is now (Russian State Duma, July 22; Meduza, July 23; Cherta, July 28).

[1] The measure reflects what has already become a practice in Moscow and appears to enjoy the implicit support of Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose unpublished decree on these questions is cited by Kartapolov and Krasov (Meduza, July 22). The bill is therefore likely to pass quickly when the Duma returns from its summer recess and go into effect in January 2026. Kartapolov says that the measure is necessary both to reduce the pressures on the military commissariats and to allow men subject to the draft to know well in advance what their fate is likely to be. This would make the process more predictable for both.

The current rules require evaluating those who might be drafted only during the draft period, which leaves little time for planning and hinders careful consideration of medical and other data (RBC, July 22). The measure is already being challenged, however. Victor Sobolyev, a Duma deputy from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and who is also on the Defense Committee, says there is no evidence that the military commissariats are overburdened under the existing system and, consequently, there is no reason to make a change (Region Voice, July 26).

Serious Crime Hits 15-Year High in Russia After Return of Ex-Convicts From Ukraine

Returning veterans of the war against Ukraine pose an increasingly sinister threat to Russian society as violent crime in the country has skyrocketed, reaching a 15-year high. A return of “Afghan syndrome” and the inability to utilize specialized combat skills after military service have pushed many veterans to resort to rampant substance abuse and violence against family members, friends, and fellow citizens. The Kremlin’s dual failure of inadequately supporting veterans’ reintegration while applying leniency when prosecuting them for serious crimes has only exacerbated the situation.

The gun could soon be turned on the Kremlin, given the wisdom, or lack thereof, of militarizing convicts with promises of amnesty, arming them and sending them to the frontlines, and then expecting them to become model citizens upon their return without the proper support. Repeat offenses by former inmates conscripted into the Russian military to fight Ukraine now pose one of the biggest risks to public safety in the Russian Federation (see EDM, January 19, 2024, February 25, May 29).

According to state statistics, from January to June 2025, more than 333,000 “serious and particularly serious” crimes against articles of the country’s Criminal Code were recorded, as tens of thousands of military personnel, many of them ex-convicts, returned from the front. This figure represents a 15-year high for serious crime in Russia. From January to June 2024, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs registered just under 302,000 “serious and particularly serious” crimes, an increase of more than ten percent over 2023 levels (Radio Lenta, July 10).

Returning veterans of the war against Ukraine pose an increasingly sinister threat to Russian society, especially as loose guns and munitions proliferate across the country. The Kremlin has sought to co-opt these veterans as a “new Russian elite,” but uneven success in doing so could mean Moscow loses complete control of the situation in the coming months (see EDM, March 13, 2024, May 22, July 10). ussian officials have tried to downplay the rise in violent crime among veterans of the war. One year after Moscow launched its so-called “special military operation” (SVO), Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that criminal allegations against SVO veterans were “lousy behavior” and not a matter of concern for Moscow.

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