Steve Thomas
The purpose of this article is to reinforce some of the basic tenets of Pakistani foreign policy and to recommend to American policymakers a course of action that treats these tenets as unmalleable truths, as opposed to things America wishes weren't true. This article has no searing insights, but this doesn't make these observations any less worthy of action since the United States has neglected them since roughly 1979.
The first tenet is the control of the Pakistani civilian government by the Pakistan army. Even with the relatively recent addition of current Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Pakistani politics is a dynastic affair, and those dynasties owe their fealty to the military. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) was created by Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and President Zia ul Haq, as Anatol Lieven points out in his excellent book, Pakistan: A Hard Country. Zia Ul Haq previously served as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) before his coup d'état. In practical terms, this means foreign policy is conceived and executed by the military. The military will also grudgingly subsume other facets of government if it believes the civilians aren't pushing the country in the right direction. The transition of civilian power in Pakistan will (almost) always coincide with the change-over of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), who still maintains the role as king-maker and most powerful man in the country.
The current COAS-PM relationship is illustrative of this. As COAS Qamar Javed Bajwa nears the end of his term, for which he received a highly unusual extension, Mr. Khan should look over his shoulder and make sure the military’s support is still there. Mr. Khan owes his current post in large part to former ISI chief Faiz Hamid, as Hamid served as a power-broker in ISI’s internal security directorate during Mr. Khan’s ascension to power. And, of course, Mr. Hamid is almost certainly near the top of the list to ascend to the COAS position, having taken command of an army corps after leaving ISI. Corps command is typically seen as an informal pre-requisite to the COAS posting.
The second tenet is the one-dimensional nature of Pakistani foreign policy, and that dimension is India. Everything is viewed through the lens of India as an existential threat, including the partnership with China on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the sponsorship of the Taliban to prevent "strategic encirclement," should a government friendly to Delhi come to power in Kabul. This conflict provides the Pakistan military with the reasons it needs to take a huge slice of the Pakistani GDP and claim national security considerations as an excuse for everything from limiting the freedom of the press to replacing members of the judiciary. Any close observer of the Pakistani media is well aware of the almost farcical default response regarding any security issue in Pakistan. It was undoubtedly orchestrated by India's Research and Intelligence Wing (RAW), the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), or both.
A corollary to the second tenet is Kashmir. If no other issue can be raised to support the Pakistan military, Kashmir is the rallying cry. This is intractable, so American policymakers shouldn't pretend there is a solution. The UN Resolution in 1948 calls first for a complete cease-fire along the Line of Control (LoC), to be followed by the removal of Pakistani troops. Once this is complete, India will remove its forces. If the second tenet is true, there is no hope of Pakistan ever removing troops from the LoC. This would constitute a strategic and operational risk while also proving India is, perhaps, not an existential threat after all. This would, in turn, prove that perhaps military control over the government was not quite as necessary as was always believed.
The third and perhaps most crucial tenet is Pakistan's foreign policy is not oriented towards assisting America and never has been. The focus on India meant support for American counter-terrorism or regional policies would only be effected insofar as they did not abridge or threaten Pakistan's ability to counter the Indian menace. This includes America's efforts in Afghanistan and American efforts to stem extremism in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Pakistan's military and intelligence services were willing to help if, and only if, there was a long-term benefit oriented towards checking Delhi's ambitions in the region.
The question then becomes, what is a practical foreign policy position towards Pakistan if these things are true? This will be a difficult bit to swallow, but there are three prongs. First, deal almost exclusively with the military. This will, undoubtedly, alienate those in civilian government in Pakistan, but if the first facet of Pakistan foreign policy is true, strongly worded letters from Pakistani politicians and having our ambassadors called in should not be a deterrent.
Second, slash aid to the bare minimum required to assist in managing the inevitable refugee situation and provide development aid to assist with the endemic poverty in much of the country. This could, at least theoretically, address some root causes of extremism while making it more difficult (though of course not impossible) for the Pakistan army to get its hands on those funds.
Third, re-orient intelligence community, military, and diplomatic efforts to the former Soviet republics. This could help in the “over-the-horizon” capability the Biden administration is touting with respect to countering terrorism, and it could also assist in checking Chinese and Russian ambitions in the region.
While there may also be concern over a lack of human intelligence or other access if the United States removes itself from a serious relationship with Pakistan, it should be stated, clearly, the relationship between the two countries has always moved between lukewarm and frankly hostile. There has never been great access due to Pakistani cooperation, so it would appear there is less to lose than many would suppose. It would also be contrary to experience to assume this relationship would improve exponentially. It makes more sense to invest in new relationships than to throw good money after bad.
It is important to note there is no mention of India here. Despite its vast economic, political, and military potential, India is having its own watershed moment. It would be a mistake, at this point, to align wholly with a government in Delhi that slides daily closer to fascism.
As promised, there have been no original or conceptually strenuous new points in what is above. Rather, these are things most American foreign policymakers know to be almost self-evident. It is time to behave like these tenets of Pakistani foreign policy are what they appear to be. In this manner, America can only stop the endless cycle of conditional promises conditionally broken and move towards a policy in South Asia that benefits America's strategic goals in the region.
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