Ryan Bauer, Alexandra Gerber, Erik E. Mueller, Cortney Weinbaum, Paul Cormarie, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo, Weilong Kong, Auburn Brown, Melissa Shostak & Zara Fatima Abdurahaman
Russian Mercenary and Paramilitary Groups in Africa
Since 2018, Russian private military contractors have proliferated across Africa. In 2022, RAND assessed that from 2018 to 2021, such contractors were active in 33 African countries (Figure 1).1 The majority of activities occur under organizations controlled by the Wagner Group (Wagner) and, until his death in 2023, its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Moscow has sought to develop or revive its relationships with African partners to undermine western sanctions, access minerals and other raw materials, cultivate allies in international forums, advance its own political narratives, and increase military pressure on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) southern flank.2 One important means by which Russia has sought to accomplish these goals is by exporting mercenaries. Russian mercenaries serve as an important mechanism by which Moscow seeks to reduce its growing international economic and political isolation. Mercenaries help accomplish this by expanding Russia’s footprint and influence in Africa at a relatively low cost while providing an important source of revenue.3 Russian mercenaries have operated as a nimble expeditionary force, seemingly unencumbered by international rules of war, and have bolstered authoritarian regimes in Africa at the expense of the civilian populations’ and the countries’ overall security. Under Yevgeny Prigozhin’s leadership, Wagner operated on behalf of Moscow’s interests but with flexibility to pursue the group’s own goals and methods of operation. This indirect relationship with the Russian central government offered Russia the financial and diplomatic benefits from Wagner’s client relationships without Moscow incurring direct responsibility for casualties or human rights abuses.4
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