The rapid ascent of China and its increased presence in South and Central Asia, as well as in the Indian Ocean, have increased the risks of the Sino–Indian rivalry.
The security threats of the Sino-Indian rivalry are sharpened by each country’s strategic partnerships: India with the US; and China with Pakistan, which is also India’s traditional adversary. The authors note that Indian elites regard China as India’s principal rival, ranked above Pakistan, whereas Chinese elites regard India as a lesser rival than the US and Japan.
The authors argue that the Sino-Indian rivalry started almost immediately after the two countries’ emergence into the global arena in the 1940s. India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, tried to promote India as the natural leader of Asia,
a role that was contested by China. And the rivalry takes two forms: spatial rivalry, including disputes over borders and territory; and positional rivalry, related to each country’s position in the regional pecking order. The authors believe that positional rivalry may be more consequential in the Sino-Indian relationship.
China gradually chipped away at India’s ambitions. India inherited from Britian the notion that Tibet served as a good buffer for keeping hostile armies away from the northern Indian border. But when China occupied Tibet in the 1950s,
India was too weak to challenge it. India was further weakened by the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when its army was beaten by China. Despite the territorial aspect, the authors believe this war to have been an important mark of the positional rivalry.
India became a marginal strategic player in Asia for the rest of the twentieth century. And with China’s rapid economic development, the material power gap between China and India only became more substantial.
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