Yen-ting Lin
In May 2025, Ukraine signed a $60 billion critical minerals agreement with the United States—an investment framework celebrated as a landmark in bilateral cooperation. Yet, this deal was forged only after two years of war,
a 29% GDP contraction, and the loss of industrial territories holding over 30% of the world’s titanium and rare earths. Long recognized for their importance in aerospace, defense, and clean energy, these resources became bargaining assets only after immense national sacrifice and the failure of deterrence.
Taiwan, meanwhile, occupies a pivotal role in the global semiconductor supply chain, producing over 90% of the world’s advanced chips under 10 nanometers and contributing more than $70 billion annually through firms like TSMC, MediaTek, and UMC. These semiconductors power artificial intelligence, precision weapons,
and cutting-edge computing. Yet Taiwan faces mounting pressure from the People’s Republic of China, whose military doctrine increasingly signals 2027 as a potential flashpoint for unification by force.
Despite over $50 billion in Taiwanese-led investments in the United States, Japan, and Germany—spanning fabs from Arizona to Dresden—Taiwan remains outside formal military alliances like NATO and without a bilateral defense treaty. The Taiwan Relations Act provides strategic ambiguity but no explicit defense guarantee, leaving the island vulnerable to coercion.
This juxtaposition raises urgent questions: How can Taiwan ensure its semiconductor dominance translates into binding security guarantees? What lessons can it draw from Ukraine’s reactive resource diplomacy to avoid similar costs? And how can Taiwan’s strategic interdependence with the United States and its allies be leveraged to deter aggression without eroding its “silicon shield”?
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