Fabian Hinz
While the future of Syria remains unclear, the fall of the Assad regime is almost certain to alter missile-proliferation dynamics across the Levant. As yet unknown is whether Syria’s new government will continue the country’s decades-long investment in ballistic missiles.
The origins of Syria’s missile programme
Damascus’s interest in ballistic missiles began in the 1970s, driven by the poor performance of its air force during prior conflicts with Israel and a requirement for the capability to strike targets deep within Israel. Around 1975, the Soviet Union began supplying Syria with 300 kilometre-range R-300 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B) missiles and in the 1980s, it reinforced this capability with the more accurate, though shorter-range, OTR-21 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab).
Syria’s conversion of its Scud missile fleet into a strategic deterrent involved both the establishment of fortified underground bases, such as the 155th Brigade garrison in Qutayfah, and the modification of the missiles to serve as delivery systems for the country’s stockpile of chemical weapons. By 1985, United States intelligence concluded that Syria had successfully developed nerve-agent warheads for these missiles. This assessment was later confirmed when Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013, although its declaration was partial and widely perceived as deceptive. Among the stockpiles disclosed were the nerve agents Sarin and VX, more than 100 chemical warheads, and mobile mixing units designed to deploy with and fill the Scuds in times of conflict.
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