3 May 2025

Russia’s Demographic Problems Set Stage for Future Political Challenges

Paul Goble

Russia’s population has declined for the last seven years as the fertility rate, the number of women of reproductive age, and the immigration rate continue to decrease. According to Russian demographer Aleksey Raksha, Russian women gave birth to fewer than 294,000 babies during the first three months of 2025, the lowest quarterly figure for Russia in 225 years (The Moscow Times, April 11; Tochka, April 25). The current decrease in the fertility rate means that the average age of Russians will decline, resulting in higher mortality rates and an aging, generally smaller population in the coming decades (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, December 22, 2023; see EDM, August 18, 2022, February 6, 2024; URA.ru, April 24).

The seriousness of this combination is only now becoming clear. National fertility rates have fallen to 1.4 children per woman and, in some major cities, 1.0 children per woman. This is far below the estimated fertility rate needed (2.2) to counterbalance the population (see EDM, October 22, 2024; Window on Eurasia, February 2). Low birth rates now mean fewer women will be of childbearing age in the 2040s, and even fewer babies will be born in that decade. Demographers predict that there may be a slight uptick in babies born in the 2030s since there was a birth rate increase between 2007 and 2015 (URA.ru, April 24). Still, a potential increase in the 2030s is unlikely to make a substantive dent in the overall demographic crisis. The Kremlin may consider a limited birth rate increase in the 2030s as enough progress not to warrant substantial policy changes, which would worsen the demographic trend (URA.ru, April 24).

Russian demographic decline can be traced to World War II, which wiped out a generation and led to falling birth rates approximately every 25 years as each successive and smaller generation gave birth to fewer children. Small intermittent periods of growth since World War II have created a false sense of improvement and resulted in inadequate government response (see EDM, September 13, 2016; Window on Eurasia, April 21, 2024).

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