Kamran Bokhari
In its 2025 annual forecast, GPF wrote that the world no longer has an anchor around which to organize itself. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the downturn in U.S.-India relations. New Delhi assumed that its relationship with Washington was immune to the shifts in America’s global strategy, but that has not been the case. The Trump administration’s efforts to manage its two biggest adversaries, China and Russia, have revealed the limits of its decadeslong alignment with India. India still boasts the world’s fastest-growing economy, so it will remain a key U.S. partner, but it is unlikely to retain its special status as the U.S.-China competition heats up.
On Aug. 6, U.S. President Donald Trump slapped an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian goods in response to India’s continued purchase of Russian oil. The move brought overall tariffs on the world’s most populous nation (and close American ally) to 50 percent – among the steepest faced by any U.S. trading partner. Also on Aug. 6, Indian media reported that Prime Minister Narendra Modi will travel to China on Aug. 31 – his first trip to the country since the border clashes of June 2020 – to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Elsewhere, Indian national security adviser Ajit Doval is leaving for a trip to Moscow ahead of another visit to the Kremlin by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar.
These developments constitute a dramatic turn of events. Until recently, the United States saw India as a strategic ally, especially with regard to its foreign policy objective to contain China. This has been the case for every U.S. administration, including Trump’s first one, since the early 2000s. Central to that view is that over the past two decades, India’s has become the world’s fourth-largest economy, in terms of nominal gross domestic product, overtaking Russia’s, Italy’s, France’s, the United Kingdom’s and Japan’s. It also has the world’s fourth-largest military.
For these reasons, Washington has cultivated New Delhi as a critical partner on the military and economic fronts. In 2017, it revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and combined the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean basins into a single command known as INDOPACOM, making it easier to integrate India into its strategic plans for countering China. It also hoped India would be able to become an alternative industrial destination to help reduce global exposure to Chinese manufacturing.